By Stephen Blank

In Washington on August 8, 2025, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed what amounts to a framework for a peace treaty. The agreement ratified both sides’ support for creating the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) in the area formally known as the Zangezur corridor, in Armenia’s Syunik province, and entrusts management of the corridor to a U.S. private company on a 99-year lease. It is also likely that U.S. security personnel will supervise the corridor’s planned intermodal rail and highway transportation. As a result, Azerbaijan will have direct overland contact with its Nakhchivan province while a direct land route will be established from the Caspian Sea straight through to Turkey, allowing a substantial growth of Central Asian trade with Europe. The agreement represents the first and considerable sign of a tangible U.S. presence in the Caucasus and comes at the expense of Russian and Iranian interests.

U.S. President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian President Nikolas Pashinyan sign the new Azerbaijan-Armenia peace accord in the White House (Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

BACKGROUND: After many years of unclear U.S. policies towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Trump Administration has made a major move to upgrade U.S. presence in the Caucasus and provide a decisive impetus towards the conclusion of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as a strong impetus for the so-called Middle Corridor between Asia and Europe. 

The Zangezur corridor has been a bone of contention in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks to terminate the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, since the corridor passes through Armenia. This “sliver” of territory has been at the heart of disputes dating back to the Soviet conquest of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1920-21, when the Soviet leadership deliberately separated Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan to prevent its proximity to Kemalist Türkiye. Armenia’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993-94 led to widespread ethnic cleansing and thousands of Azeri refugees as well as a strong Azeri irredentist movement that has now triumphed over Armenia and led Pashinyan’s government to sue for peace.

Domestic nationalist opposition in Armenia has vigorously protested Azerbaijan’s demand for the corridor, which would connect it to both Nakhichevan and Türkiye with potentially huge economics payoffs for both states. The issue has generated an impasse in the bilateral negotiations, often directly conducted by Presidents Pashinyan and Aliyev. The domestic pressure in Armenia and from the Armenian diaspora to refuse concessions to Azerbaijan has triggered a serious domestic crisis leading Pashinyan to arrest high-ranking members of the church on the grounds that they were plotting a coup. There is some evidence of Russian support for the coup plotters. Pashinyan’s reform agenda is anathema to Armenian reactionaries and nationalists are resisting what they call a surrender to Azerbaijan. Moscow evidently has its own interests in backing these disaffected elites to reverse Pashinyan’s reforms to prevent their emulation elsewhere. Moreover, strife between Yerevan and Baku benefits Moscow, allowing it to play the states off against each other and regain its influence in Armenia. Indeed, it has reinforced its military presence in Armenia despite the war in Ukraine.

IMPLICATIONS: In this context, Trump’s offer could present a way out of the current impasse. Washington will pay Armenia for a 99-year lease of the corridor, which would formally respect Armenia’s sovereignty but give the U.S. operating control over the area and allow it to place forces there to maintain the corridor and provide security. Armenia has previously hinted that it might be open to a proposal that preserves its sovereignty but allows for third party management of the corridor. The U.S. proposal allows Baku and Yerevan to sidestep the vexed question of sovereignty over the corridor until passions have subsided. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, gets de facto ability to link with Nakhchivan and to operationalize the routes traversing this territory. A working and well-maintained overland trade route to Türkiye, Europe, and the Levant constitutes a giant step towards consummating the Middle Corridor from China to Europe, allowing Azerbaijan to benefit as a key middleman on this route. At the same time, Armenia needs peace to deal with its domestic opposition, institute Pashinyan’s democratic agenda, and terminate the state of war so that Armenia can restore relations with Türkiye and profit from the expansion of international trade corridors into the Caucasus. The agreement also incentivizes both sides to move quickly towards a peace treaty where they and neighboring states, including in Central Asia, stand to gain economically and politically.

Trump’s proposal also works to stabilize the Caucasus by minimizing Russian opportunities for interference. For over a century, Russia has endeavored to manipulate the tensions between Armenians and Azeris to enhance its imperial reach and standing in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s victories of 2020 and 2023, plus the pressure of the war in Ukraine have forced Russia to retreat in the Caucasus and elsewhere. The agreement will likely strengthen Pashinyan’s government at home against his pro-Russian and Russian-backed enemies. Moreover, Trump’s proposal, by creating a basis for completing the Middle Corridor, undermines Russia’s increasing efforts to create an International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC) from India to Iran, Central Asia and Russia. Despite much recent Russian diplomatic effort, this proposed route is nowhere near as complete as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which relies on the Middle Corridor that bypasses Russia.

Türkiye stands to make major gains through this proposal and clearly supported it as part of its improving ties with Washington. While Russia sought to exploit Armeno-Azeri tensions; Türkiye’s massive aid to Azerbaijan’s military and alliance agreement with it gave it a lasting presence in the Caucasus. Washington seems to be at peace with this outcome, and the proposal could only have come about with Turkish support behind the scenes. This U.S.-proposed solution therefore enhances Türkiye’s reach and power projection through the Caucasus, which is increasingly important to Ankara given its rising multi-dimensional profile in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. 

Beyond the serious implications for local actors, the proposal entails equally meaningful consequences for actors beyond the Caucasus. Iran, for example, is a major loser and has already declared its opposition. After its defeat by Israel and the U.S. it has no choice but to make a rapprochement of some sort with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, Iran’s connection to Armenia will be seriously impaired and it will no longer be able to resupply Armenia with weapons or incite resistance against Baku over Zangezur. Furthermore, the real possibility of completing the Middle Corridor with U.S. help would imply a lasting U.S. presence on Iran’s northern border. This will seriously complicate Iran’s ability to rebuild either its network of terrorist proxies or its nuclear program.

Conversely, China gains from this proposal. If it materializes, it will give a major impetus to the realization of China’s BRI and the accompanying Middle Corridor. It also buttresses China’s growing economic position in the Caucasus most prominently embodied in its development of the Anaklia port in Georgia. China has invested considerable economic and political capital in the combination of major land and maritime trade and transport routes. If implemented, the proposal will represent another instance whereby China has gained influence and position in Eurasia at Russia’s expense.

The proposal also permits the EU an opportunity to expand its presence in Armenia and the Caucasus. A democratizing Armenia, freed of the Nagorno-Karabakh incubus, is already seeking EU membership. The EU also buys large amounts of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas and the prospect of real peace in the Caucasus can only redound to its benefit. The EU also stands to gain from the completion of the Middle Corridor, which provides it with a secure land route for trade to and from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China.

CONCLUSONS: Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposal constitutes the first major U.S. initiative in the Caucasus and Central Asia since the Clinton Administration helped develop the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to connect Transcaucasian oil to European markets. While consonant with the Administration’s overall perspective of using large-scale economic projects and/or trade opportunities as instruments to facilitate peaceful solutions to long-lasting wars, the proposal also marks the first sign that Washington realizes the importance and opportunity presented by the independence of South Caucasian states. If this project is implemented, awareness will likely grow that the Caucasus and Central Asia offer Washington many genuine and plentiful opportunities for increasing its economic and political influence.

This project may also reflect a growing U.S. awareness that the Caucasus and Central Asia are areas of strategic significance that both want a consistent engagement with Washington and offer new and exciting vistas regarding energy, rare earths, trade, investment, large-scale environmental cooperation, and security cooperation. That awareness has hitherto been missing in U.S. policy. Indeed, Trump’s policies regarding these regions has been quite inconsistent given Trump’s imposition of tariffs – exactly the wrong move – on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors. Policymakers need to understand the necessity and benefits of long-lasting partnerships for all parties since this project, if it comes to pass, creates opportunities for peace, cooperation among many international actors, enhanced trade, and greater independence for the South Caucasian states. These outcomes are not only in the interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia; they could also become the basis for very different development in the Caucasus than has been the case in the past.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

John DiPirro

July 25, 2025

Armenia stands at a critical crossroads as it seeks to break free from Russian influence and integrate with the West. Following recent peace talks with Azerbaijan in Abu Dhabi and the proposed U.S.-overseen Zangezur Corridor, Armenia has a unique opportunity to transform its geopolitical position. The nation must navigate four key strategic priorities: normalizing relations with Turkey despite historical tensions over the Armenian Genocide, accelerating EU and NATO integration while strengthening democratic institutions, developing strategic industries including defense manufacturing partnerships with Europe, and leveraging the Zangezur corridor to deepen ties with India as an emerging defense partner. With the pivotal 2026 parliamentary elections approaching and Russia intensifying hybrid attacks to destabilize the government, Armenia's choices will determine whether it consolidates as a democratic, pro-Western anchor or reverts to dependence and instability.

Read Armenia's Corridor Toward Regional Stability

By Emil Avdaliani 

Azerbaijan, akin to nations in Central Asia and the Gulf, endeavors to balance relations among major powers in order to avoid exclusive alignment with any singular geopolitical axis. Baku’s recent diplomatic initiatives reflect this strategy, which has contributed to enhancing the nation’s regional standing: relations with Iran have improved, engagement with China has intensified, and the European Union now seeks deeper political cooperation with Baku.

BACKGROUND: Ever since the return of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023 the country has pursued a much more diversified foreign policy by simultaneously building closer ties, beyond what it already had with Turkey and Russia, with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan, Israel and has moved to improve relations with the United States, which suffered during the Biden administration due to the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy building issues.

Since the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan in 2023, the country has adopted a markedly more diversified foreign policy, strengthening existing ties with Turkey and Russia while simultaneously deepening relations with China, Iran, the EU, the Persian Gulf states, Pakistan, and Israel, and taking steps to improve strained relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated under the Biden administration due to its prioritization of human rights and democratic governance.

This dynamic has become particularly pronounced in recent months. In April, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Baku to engage in discussions aimed at enhancing bilateral relations. Similarly, in April, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, visited Baku, where she met with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov; during the visit, both parties agreed to resume negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement.

A significant shift occurred in Baku–Beijing relations when, in April, the two countries elevated their ties to the level of a comprehensive partnership during the Azerbaijani president’s visit to China. While the development of the Middle Corridor remains a priority, the agreement with Azerbaijan places additional emphasis on enhancing bilateral cooperation in investment and business. As the largest economy in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan serves as a key entry point for China into the region.

Similarly, in April and May, Azerbaijan conducted meetings with Ukrainian officials—an uncommon move given Baku’s cautious stance on the war. However, in the context of increasingly strained relations with Russia, Baku’s outreach to Kyiv appears intended to signal displeasure to Moscow. Russia continues to deny any involvement in the downing of an Azerbaijani aircraft over its territory, a claim Baku maintains. Consequently, relations have deteriorated, with President Ilham Aliyev declining to attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in May.

In May, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan formalized their strategic partnership, enabling Tashkent to become a party to the Shusha Declaration, originally signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in 2021. Azerbaijan has maintained an active diplomatic presence in Central Asia, and although the Caspian Sea functions as a geographic divider, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are increasingly interconnected.

In late May, Azerbaijan hosted a trilateral summit with the leaders of Turkey and Pakistan, marking a new chapter in their cooperative relations. The geopolitical dimension of this partnership is becoming increasingly significant, particularly in light of Pakistan–India tensions and New Delhi’s growing ties with Armenia. The three Islamic nations also advanced collaboration in the political, economic, and military spheres.

Azerbaijan has also recently emerged as a venue for negotiations between opposing parties. For example, in April, Turkish and Israeli delegations convened in Baku to discuss the establishment of a potential “deconfliction mechanism” aimed at preventing direct clashes between the two states in Syria. In May, Baku also hosted Russian and German political representatives for talks on reviving the “Petersburg Dialogue,” which had been suspended since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This dimension of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy is particularly noteworthy, underscoring the country’s growing reputation as a credible and impartial facilitator of dialogue between the conflicting sides.

IMPLICATIONS: This diplomatic activism underscores Azerbaijan’s rising regional significance and its strategic efforts to position itself as a capable middle power—one that can exert influence within its immediate neighborhood while simultaneously acting as a crucial partner to rival great powers.

Evolving patterns of connectivity across Eurasia have been a key factor in enhancing Azerbaijan’s regional role. The Middle Corridor, which extends from the Black Sea to Central Asia and effectively links the EU with China, traverses Azerbaijan (alongside Georgia). This route enables both the EU and China to circumvent Russian territory, while Azerbaijan’s significance is further elevated by the EU’s demand for Caspian gas. Additionally, Brussels has intensified outreach to Central Asia, with which European leaders are increasingly engaging in trade and investment. The recent EU–Central Asia summit, where the Union pledged €12 billion in investments, exemplifies the rising importance of the Middle Corridor. A portion of this investment is earmarked for infrastructure upgrades along the route, particularly in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has also assumed a more critical role for China than in previous years. From Beijing’s perspective, Azerbaijan functions as a gateway to the Black Sea region. Moreover, China views Azerbaijan as a promising market for its rapidly expanding electric vehicle (EV) industry. Data from the past year indicate that Chinese brands are gaining increasing popularity in Azerbaijan, with discussions underway regarding potential joint production ventures. The country may also serve as a strategic hub for the distribution of Chinese EV models throughout the South Caucasus and beyond.

Azerbaijan’s increasing regional significance has prompted Iran to pursue full normalization of relations with its northern neighbor. During the Iranian president’s visit to Baku, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declared, “Our goal, our primary goal is to raise Azerbaijani–Iranian interstate relations to a higher level.” This aspiration was accompanied by tangible measures. On May 21, Iran announced the execution of the sole assailant responsible for the 2023 attack on the Azerbaijani embassy. Additionally, Iran and Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises—Araz-2025. Diplomatic relations have now been fully restored, and cooperation on the International North–South Transport Corridor has been expanded. Consequently, Tehran and Baku have reduced tensions to levels seen prior to 2020, before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Iran’s strategic calculations also reflect concerns about preventing Azerbaijan from decisively aligning with Israel or the U.S. Azerbaijan has recently been identified as a prospective candidate for inclusion in the Abraham Accords, a U.S.-led initiative aimed at improving Israel’s relations with the Islamic world. The U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, indicated that Azerbaijan could join the Accords in the near future. While he mentioned other potential members—including Armenia, Syria, and Lebanon—Azerbaijan stands out due to its geographic location north of Iran. Although Baku and Tel Aviv have historically maintained close ties, formal accession to the Accords would significantly elevate Azerbaijan’s stature in the Middle East and strengthen its relationship with the U.S. Given the persistent challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program, the Islamic Republic will remain a central focus of U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Azerbaijan’s position north of Iran will only enhance its strategic relevance for both the U.S. and Israel. This development will, in turn, improve Baku’s bargaining leverage, thereby motivating Iran to pursue increasingly cordial relations with its northern neighbor.

Another factor driving normalization is the Islamic Republic’s growing interest in maintaining peaceful relations with Azerbaijan, particularly as it faces mounting challenges. These include sustained Israeli strikes against its Axis of Resistance, the continued impact of the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, and tensions with Turkey arising from the evolving balance of power in Syria. In this context, Tehran appears increasingly inclined to avoid additional regional friction. Indeed, it may ultimately be compelled to tolerate Azerbaijan’s potential accession to the Abraham Accords, provided such a development does not constitute a direct security threat to the Islamic Republic.

CONCLUSIONS: The recent flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding Azerbaijan underscores the country’s rising significance in regional affairs. Transit, trade, and investment constitute the central pillars of Baku’s engagement with regional and global powers. This approach aligns with what is commonly termed a multi-vector foreign policy—a strategic orientation wherein no single major power is prioritized. Instead, multi-alignment is pursued as a means to enhance a country’s international standing. In a global context marked by great power rivalry, the erosion of international norms, and the ascendance of middle powers, Azerbaijan—like many states in Central Asia and the Middle East—seeks to balance among dominant actors to avoid exclusive alignment with any one geopolitical center. Thus far, this strategy has served Baku well, and it is likely to persist amid the continuing emergence of an increasingly multipolar international system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is Professor of International Relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of the Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

Robert M. Cutler

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s April 2025 state visit to China, culminating in the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marks a significant elevation in bilateral relations. The agreement is more than a symbolic gesture: it reflects a strategic convergence across infrastructure, energy, and digital development. It also signals a re-balancing of power in the South Caucasus in response to Western inertia. As China consolidates its position, the question is no longer whether the West leads but whether it has already surrendered the initiative.

BACKGROUND: The Second Karabakh War of 2020 abruptly exposed the obsolescence of entrenched diplomatic frameworks in the South Caucasus, most notably the OSCE Minsk Group. The November 2020 Trilateral Statement that ended the fighting, brokered under Russia’s aegis, signified an incipient restructuring of regional dynamics. Russia positioned itself as the nominal guarantor of stability, installing a contingent of so-called peacekeepers on Azerbaijani territory. Yet this maneuver, driven by residual influence and opportunistic calculus, underscored Moscow’s determination to preserve a semblance of relevance amid shifting fault lines.

While Russia acted following long-established and well-defined interests, the U.S. and the EU hesitated. The initiatives introduced by Western actors, preoccupied with internal crises and other entanglements, lacked coherence, confidence, and strategic vision. The mediation efforts were fragmented and the summits were ad hoc. As a result, the promising diplomatic overtures failed to generate substantive traction. The reactive nature of Western engagement post-2020 contrasts starkly with the proactive moves of regional and other stakeholders having more immediate stakes in the evolving South Caucasus order.

Turkey’s deepening military partnership with Azerbaijan, formalized through the Shusha Declaration of 2021, epitomized pragmatic alignment. Kazakhstan, seizing the moment, accelerated its integration into the emergent Middle Corridor, bolstering East-West logistics networks through the Caspian basin. Concurrently, Gulf states capitalized on Azerbaijan’s post-war stabilization by channeling substantial investments into renewable energy infrastructure, particularly solar and wind projects in the liberated territories. These tangible gestures did not just reflect geoeconomic calculations but represented a recognition of the region’s latent economic potential.

In this context, China modified its traditionally cautious posture in the South Caucasus. Historically deferential to Russia’s informal sphere of influence, Beijing began to reassess the region’s strategic significance following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The resulting destabilization of Eurasian corridors, compounded by Western sanctions and the geopolitical weaponization of supply chains, propelled the South Caucasus from peripheral concern to a central axis in China’s connectivity strategy. This shift was not reflexive or opportunistic. Rather, it reflected China’s measured strategic assessment of the structural transformations in the architecture of Eurasian trade.

By 2022, the foundations for a deepening Sino-Azerbaijani partnership had been firmly established. The signing of a joint declaration on strategic partnership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in July 2024 signaled a decisive commitment to broaden bilateral economic ties. The two countries’ trade in 2024 was over 20 percent above its 2023 level, reaching nearly US$ 3.74 billion. Chinese enterprises expanded into sectors previously peripheral to their Eurasian ambitions: telecommunications, green energy, and transport logistics. President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Beijing in April 2025 did not initiate this trend but rather consolidated it. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) agreement was the logical culmination of sustained and deliberate moves that anchored Azerbaijan’s strategic realignment toward the East.

IMPLICATIONS: The realignment is not mere economic opportunism. Rather, it signals a deeper geopolitical evolution driven by the inadequacy of Western engagement and the region’s preparedness to respond to actors willing to match rhetoric with decisive action. The failure of Western policy is not just about inattentiveness, but also about an inability to grasp the interplay between regional agency, emerging connectivity frameworks, and the geopolitical vacuum created by Russia’s shifting posture. In this unfolding dynamic, Azerbaijan has moved beyond waiting for Western recognition or support. It has instead begun to assert its own role within a rapidly realigning Eurasian order.

For China, Azerbaijan serves as a gateway not only to Europe through the Middle Corridor but also toward the Middle East, reinforcing China’s broader trade architecture and strategic depth in the region. The CSP is not a symbolic gesture. Its scope is broad and consequential, encompassing coordinated industrial development, infrastructure harmonization, technology transfer, and streamlined customs protocols. These measures are underpinned by capital investments and long-term industrial partnerships. 

For Azerbaijan, the CSP consolidates a deliberate move to attenuate traditional dependencies on Western and Russian interlocutors. It embodies Azerbaijan’s long-articulated aspirations for economic diversification, substantiated now by tangible capital flows and operational partnerships. The CSP’s provisions span petrochemicals, metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and renewables. Agreements on aerospace and intellectual property signal a strategic depth, eschewing transactional engagement in favor of embedded, systemic collaboration. 

The transport dimension alone is reshaping regional dynamics. The Middle Corridor, stretching from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian basin, and into the South Caucasus and Europe, has demonstrated rapid growth. While still smaller in scale than northern routes traversing Russia, its year-on-year expansion has been notable. A trilateral joint venture among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia’s rail operators is actively synchronizing digital customs tracking and reducing delivery times to enhance competitiveness.

The Port of Alat, central to Azerbaijan’s maritime logistics, has already undergone substantial upgrades. Cross-border road transport agreements and operational protocols with China, concluded in 2024 and 2025, are streamlining east–west trade flows. China’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan as a "central transit node" underscores the strategic weight of this integration.

The significance of the CSP extends beyond ports and pipelines. Digital infrastructure has emerged as a foundational pillar. Huawei and ZTE, longstanding presences in the region, have solidified their positions through new agreements establishing joint research centers, expanding data infrastructure, and modernizing e-government frameworks. These initiatives are embedding Chinese technological standards into the South Caucasus and positioning Baku as a nascent digital hub.

Energy collaboration has similarly accelerated. China’s Universal Energy is backing the Gobustan solar project, with further discussions ongoing over potential wind energy developments along the Caspian coast. These initiatives are paralleled by an expansion of Chinese soft power, from Confucius Institutes to cultural exchanges and educational programs.

Azerbaijan has not “abandoned” the West. The reality is starker: the West has failed to keep pace with Azerbaijan’s evolving strategic calculus. President Aliyev’s visit to Beijing and the CSP with China are less an embrace of Beijing than a commentary on the chronic insufficiencies of Western engagement. For years, Baku signaled openness to deeper commercial ties, infrastructure investments, and a balanced diplomatic posture. What it often received were half-measures, symbolic gestures, and ideological critiques. 

The waning of Western diplomatic leverage in the South Caucasus is not a sudden anomaly. It is the cumulative outcome of incremental miscalculations, fragmentary approaches, and the persistent failure to integrate regional realities into a coherent strategic vision. The 2020 Second Karabakh War marked a decisive inflection point. Azerbaijan’s reintegration of its formerly occupied territories exposed the impotence of frameworks long regarded as the bedrock of resolution efforts. The abrupt reassertion of Azerbaijani territorial sovereignty in 2020, and its completion in 2023, underscored the extent to which Western actors had become disconnected from the region’s evolving dynamics.

Europe’s Global Gateway initiative, though nominally prioritizing the Middle Corridor, remains hesitant and underfunded. The U.S., preoccupied with broader geopolitical contests, has failed to sustain a coherent South Caucasus policy. When attention does surface, it is often filtered through domestic advocacy agendas misaligned with both regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. Thus, under the influence of domestic lobbies, two of the Biden administration’s last acts were to decline to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which bans direct assistance to the Azerbaijani government, and to sign a bilateral strategic partnership charter with the Armenian government.

CONCLUSIONS: The South Caucasus has shifted from constituting a peripheral zone to a strategic nexus. Capital and influence from East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are converging upon the region. Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the Gulf states have become active participants in this evolving matrix. Azerbaijan, far from merely serving as a bridge, has assumed the role of architect and builder of new routes. Aliyev’s visit to Beijing is emblematic of this shift. Baku no longer waits for external recognition; it engineers its own relevance. 

The West must recognize this not as a defection, but as an adaptation to opportunity over nostalgia. The coming months will be decisive. If the West wishes to remain a meaningful player, it must replace rhetorical overtures with substantive commitments: joint infrastructure ventures, credible support for energy transition, and diplomatic engagement rooted in regional realities rather than encumbered by historical preoccupations.

Azerbaijan’s choice is not between China and the West, but between agency and irrelevance. It has already chosen. The question now is whether the West retains both the capacity—and the will—to respond.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

Azerbaijan's acquisition of at least 50 JF-17 Block III fighter jets from Pakistan, to be equipped with Turkish-manufactured missiles, aims to enhance the aerial combat capabilities of the Azerbaijani Air Force. Jointly developed by China and Pakistan, the JF-17 Block III fighters will gain increased lethality through the integration of avionics from Türkiye’s advanced defense industry. This agreement has further consolidated the multi-dimensional defense collaboration between Pakistan, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, commonly referred to as "three brothers." Pakistan and Azerbaijan are also actively participating in Türkiye’s Kaan fifth-generation fighter aircraft program. The procurement of Türkiye’s fifth-generation jets, among the most advanced globally, is expected to be transformative for both Baku and Islamabad.

BACKGROUND:  Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan are collectively referred to as the "three brothers" since Türkiye was the first state, and Pakistan the second, to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. Both Türkiye and Pakistan provided military support to Baku during the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020. The states convened in Islamabad in January 2021 for a trilateral meeting, during which they agreed to expand cooperation in political, strategic, trade, economic, peace, and security, while reaffirming mutual support on issues of shared concern.

Initiated and launched by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 2010, the Kaan fifth-generation fighter program represents Türkiye’s indigenous jet fighter initiative. Following Türkiye’s exclusion from the U.S. F-35 fifth-generation fighter program in 2019, the Kaan remains Türkiye’s sole alternative and is intended to replace the country's aging fleet of F-16 fighter jets. The first prototype was tested in 2023; however, the development process is expected to span at least a decade. 

While Azerbaijan is providing financial assistance to Türkiye’s Kaan program, hundreds of Pakistani officials and engineers are actively engaged in the project. In 2023, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed an agreement during the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2023) in Istanbul to advance the development of the Kaan fighter program. As part of its contribution, Azerbaijan is expected to offer financial investment and industrial collaboration in support of the initiative.

In 2024, Azerbaijan’s Defence Minister Zakir Hasanov stated that his country was leveraging the defense capabilities of Türkiye, its primary partner in military cooperation. In January 2025, Türkiye and Pakistan finalized plans to establish and operate a joint facility for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jet, agreeing to collaborate on the development and manufacturing of the aircraft.

In February 2025, defense industry authorities from Azerbaijan and Türkiye, during a meeting held at the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX-2025) in Abu Dhabi, discussed the successful military-technical cooperation between the two nations and pledged to further strengthen defense industry ties by exploring prospects for joint projects.

The JF-17 Thunder Block III, a fourth-generation fighter jet, has been developed through a joint venture between Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation. Compared to earlier versions of JF-17, the Block III features superior maneuverability, enhanced combat capabilities, and improved stealth characteristics. In February 2024, Azerbaijan signed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement with Pakistan for the procurement of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal also included pilot training and armaments for the fighter jets. On 25 September 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced, “The JF-17 jets have already been integrated into the arsenal of Azerbaijan’s air force.”

IMPLICATIONS: Arming the JF-17 “Thunder” Block III fighter jets acquired by Baku with Türkiye’s Gökdoğan Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) and Bozdoğan Within-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missile (WVRAAM) will significantly enhance the aerial firepower of Azerbaijan's Air Force. It also underscores the progress of Türkiye’s defense industry. Türkiye is emerging as a major global arms exporter, after the leading five exporters—the U.S., France, Russia, China, and Germany.

With its advanced combat capabilities, the JF-17 aircraft surpasses the region’s Russian-made jets, including the MiG-29 and SU-25. Russia has been Azerbaijan’s primary arms supplier for decades, however, the JF-17 will replace Azerbaijan’s existing and aging fleet of Russian-manufactured MiG-29 fighters. The JF-17 are expected to enhance Azerbaijan’s airpower amid escalating regional security challenges. Equipped with improved avionics and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the Block III variant is adaptable to diverse combat scenarios. 

According to the Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSB), Türkiye’s defense and aerospace exports in 2024 totaled US$ 7.2 billion. Three Turkish defense firms are included in the ‘Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies’ list, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Jointly developed by Pakistan and China, the JF-17 fighter jet deal with Azerbaijan also creates opportunities for China to secure additional defense agreements with Azerbaijan and other countries in the region. Between 2019 and 2023, China accounted for 5.8 percent of global arms exports. During this period, China supplied arms to nearly 40 countries across Asia and Africa, ranking as the fourth largest exporter of conventional weapons after the U.S., France, and Russia.

By selling the JF-17 Thunder to Azerbaijan, Pakistan has effectively supported China in boosting demand and expanding its market for arms and military equipment in a region traditionally dominated by Russia. The JF-17 agreement with Azerbaijan is likely to facilitate the entry of Chinese weaponry and enhance China’s influence in the region.

Islamabad, Ankara, and Baku have integrated their tactical and strategic practice with the use of Turkish drone systems. In the Kaan project, Türkiye is experimenting with a ‘loyal wingman’ drone, to gather data in a range of different terrains and against a range of technologies.

The development of the Kaan fighter will significantly reduce Türkiye’s reliance on foreign aircraft. As a fifth-generation fighter program, Kaan demands extensive expertise, substantial financial resources, and international collaboration. Azerbaijan’s financial investment and Pakistan’s manufacturing expertise will not only support Türkiye’s Kaan project but also further reinforce the trilateral defense cooperation for long-term initiatives.

The joint factory established by Islamabad and Ankara for the production of Türkiye’s Kaan fighter jets will further consolidate the defense partnership between Pakistan and Türkiye. Pakistan’s role is expected to enable Türkiye to produce the Kaan jet at a reduced cost. Cost-effective joint production of the Kaan is expected to expand Türkiye’s defense exports, while also bolstering Pakistan’s aerial defense capabilities.

Yet the involvement of Pakistan—China’s longstanding strategic ally and “all-weather” friend—in the Kaan project may pose challenges in sourcing components from Western suppliers due to security concerns. China’s suspected indirect involvement in the Kaan program via Pakistan is viewed as a potential risk to the project. Although China has no official role in Türkiye’s Kaan initiative, critics suspect an indirect influence through Pakistan’s participation. A primary factor behind the rising demand for Chinese defense equipment is its competitive pricing, attributed to low-cost production. The anticipated cost-effective production of the Kaan fighters has further fueled suspicions regarding China’s indirect involvement in the project.

Pakistan’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan carries significant geopolitical implications. In the aftermath of the six-week Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2020, Armenia—Azerbaijan’s primary adversary—has become the largest importer of weapons from India, Pakistan’s principal regional rival.

CONCLUSION: The JF-17 and Kaan fighter jet agreements is a clear statement that Pakistan and Türkiye will continue to bolster Azerbaijan’s military capabilities, with trilateral defense cooperation expected to deepen further. If successful, the Kaan project will lay the groundwork for expanded trilateral collaboration among Türkiye, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan in launching additional large-scale defense initiatives. It will also create opportunities for future bilateral or trilateral joint ventures in the defense industry among the three nations.