By Irakli Laitadze

On June 7, Armenia held general elections with significant implications for both the country and the South Caucasus. Incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won 49.81 percent of the vote. Although falling short of a majority, the result still enables Pashinyan to form and lead the new government. The victory of Civil Contract is not merely an outcome of domestic politics. It signifies a rupture with Russia’s sphere of influence and the institutionalization of a pro-Western course. The collapse of the pro-Russian opposition, despite unprecedented pressure from Moscow, indicates that Armenian citizens made a strategic choice in favor of genuine sovereignty and European integration. This choice is likely to produce long-term changes not only in Armenia but also in the security architecture of the South Caucasus.

BACKGROUND:

Armenia approached the 7 June elections amid intense geopolitical turbulence. The country stood at a crossroads between two incompatible trajectories: deeper Euro-Atlantic integration or a return to Russia’s sphere of influence. Understanding this choice requires examining developments in the recent past.

Following its defeat in the 2020 Karabakh War, Armenia completely lost control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The country was confronted with a harsh reality: Russia, its ally and partner within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), failed to defend Armenia during the conflict. As a result, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s government intensified the already ongoing process of deepening ties with the EU and the U.S. In March 2026, the Armenian parliament adopted a bill initiating the process of accession to the EU. Consequently, the elections effectively became a referendum on Armenia’s foreign policy orientation and security strategy.

Russia responded with increased pressure. The election campaign was effectively transformed into an open confrontation between Moscow and Yerevan. Russian officials publicly warned that continued pursuit of a pro-Western course could expose Armenia to a scenario similar to that experienced by Ukraine.

The regional dimension is equally important. The South Caucasus is a region where the interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran, the U.S., the EU, and increasingly China intersect. Armenia has traditionally been a stronghold of Russian influence in the region: Russian forces are stationed at the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, an aviation component is based at Erebuni Air Base, and Armenia remains a member of the CSTO. Yerevan’s drift away from Moscow represents more than the loss of an ally; it is a strategic setback that could reshape the regional balance of power. This explains why the stakes were far higher than those of a regular parliamentary election.

IMPLICATIONS:

Russia’s attempt to influence the election outcome was not only unsuccessful but also counterproductive. In addition to extensive use of bots, disinformation, and fake news, reports suggest that Moscow was covertly preparing operations aimed at preventing Pashinyan’s re-election, allegedly including scenarios involving his physical elimination.

Russian economic pressure was systematic and sustained. Moscow banned imports of Armenian Jermuk mineral water, halted sales of Armenian brandy and wine, and reduced imports of meat and fish products. On the eve of the elections, Russia sent an official letter signaling its intention to suspend exports of gas, oil, and diamonds. Rosselkhoznadzor, Russia’s federal veterinary and phytosanitary agency, also banned imports of Armenian tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, and dried fruits. To influence the vote, plans were reportedly discussed to organize travel to Armenia for around 100,000 Russia-based Armenians.

The pro-Russian camp was represented by two key figures: Samvel Karapetyan and Ruben Vardanyan. Both embodied an alternative to Armenia’s Western-oriented course. Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire and leader of the Strong Armenia electoral bloc, lived in Moscow until last year and, in addition to Armenian citizenship, held Russian and Cypriot citizenship. He allegedly maintains links with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). Since June 2025, Karapetyan has been under house arrest on charges of encouraging the seizure of state institutions. Moscow openly demanded his release and participation in the parliamentary elections, turning the issue into a political instrument of pressure on Yerevan.

Another key figure was Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire who left Moscow to become State Minister of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Arrested by Azerbaijani authorities while leaving Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin Corridor, he is currently serving a prison sentence in Azerbaijan (Meduza). Vardanyan became both a symbol of the lost Armenian Karabakh and a reminder of the failure of the pro-Russian course, which ultimately provided Armenia with neither security nor genuine independence.

The election results reflected the Armenian public’s increasingly negative attitude toward Russia. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia alliance received 23.29 percent of the vote, while the Armenia bloc, led by former President Robert Kocharyan, a veteran of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War and a prominent advocate of close ties with Moscow, won 9.93 percent. Combined, the main pro-Russian forces secured only about two-thirds of the support received by Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.

Western countries, particularly the U.S., expressed unusually strong support for Nikol Pashinyan. On May 27, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly endorsed Pashinyan on Truth Social. The previous day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed several bilateral cooperation agreements, including a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Charter. On June 4, following a telephone conversation with Pashinyan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that Brussels was preparing additional support measures for Armenia, including €50 million in financial assistance.

The 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC) was held in Yerevan on 4 May 2026, with the participation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The event served as a clear signal of Armenia’s emerging European orientation and identity. Almost simultaneously, Turkey partially lifted the trade restrictions on Armenia that had been in place since 1993. The easing of this economic embargo marks a significant step toward the normalization of Armenian–Turkish relations and has the potential to reshape the region’s economic architecture.

A stable, pro-Western Armenia would be better positioned to finalize a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and secure the full lifting of Turkey’s long-standing economic blockade. Under such circumstances, Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO could become a realistic prospect in the near future. This step would deprive Russia of the principal legal framework underpinning its military presence in Armenia, further accelerating the country’s geopolitical reorientation.

Armenia is expected to continue developing its relations with the EU while maintaining membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, as confirmed by Prime Minister Pashinyan. This reflects tactical pragmatism rather than an ideological compromise: Armenia remains dependent on Russian gas imports and on the large Armenian diaspora residing in Russia. Nevertheless, the country’s strategic orientation toward Europe appears to have been firmly established.

CONCLUSIONS:

The elections of 7 June may prove to be a point of no return in the history of post-Soviet Armenia. Despite political pressure, economic coercion, and extensive Russian involvement, Armenian voters endorsed a genuinely sovereign choice and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to a pro-Western path of development.

Russia suffered a strategic defeat, as neither Karapetyan nor Kocharyan succeeded in challenging the pro-Western majority of Armenian voters. The Kremlin’s unprecedented pressure, including threats of a “Ukrainian scenario” and the use of economic coercion, failed to weaken Nikol Pashinyan and his supporters. Instead, these measures contributed to their further mobilization and strengthened Pashinyan’s image as a defender of Armenian sovereignty and statehood.

The electoral victory of Civil Contract and its parliamentary majority provide Armenia’s pro-European course with a clear democratic mandate to advance further along the path of European integration.

Armenia is entering a phase of profound transformation in its security architecture, moving from dependence on Russia toward a more diversified and multilateral security framework. This realignment is likely to reshape not only Armenian domestic and foreign policy but also the broader balance of power in the South Caucasus. For the first time in the post-Soviet era, Armenia, and, to a lesser extent, the wider region, is beginning to move beyond the logic of Russian dominance. The date of June 7, 2026, may be remembered as the day Armenia chose its own future.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Irakli Laitadze is an Adjunct Professor at Ilia State University (Tbilisi, Georgia) and Senior Fellow of the think-tank EU Awareness Centre (Brussels). He was previously a career diplomat, serving as a senior Counsellor in the Mission of Georgia to the EU and Director of the EU Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. After his diplomatic service, he was the CFO in GMT Hospitality and CEO of Publishing House Artanuji. He holds degrees from Tbilisi State University, the Diplomatic School of Madrid (Diploma), and Cambridge University (MBA), and a Ph.D. (Magna cum laude) from Tbilisi Free University. 

By Farkhod Tolipov

On May 29, 2026, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council convened in Astana, Kazakhstan, bringing together representatives of the five Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states and one observer state. Armenia was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister rather than the Prime Minister, while observer Uzbekistan was represented at the highest level by its President. Although the summit followed a largely routine agenda, discussions were overshadowed by speculation regarding Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the Union. In contrast, Uzbekistan maintained its traditionally supportive stance toward Eurasian integration. These developments suggest that the EAEU may have reached the limits of its current institutional composition and geopolitical configuration.

BACKGROUND:

The EAEU, established in 2015, succeeded the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), which existed from 2001 to 2014. Both organizations were founded with the objective of creating an economic foundation for deeper integration among the former Soviet republics. They emerged within the broader framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While the USSR consisted of 15 union republics, the CIS began with 12 member states and has since contracted to eight. The EAEC comprised six member states, whereas the EAEU currently includes five.

When the CIS was established, many experts and politicians described it as a framework for the “peaceful divorce” of the former Soviet republics. In retrospect, this assessment appears largely correct. Rather than promoting deeper integration, the CIS, the EAEC, and the EAEU have experienced gradual contraction and persistent disagreements. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Moscow has sought to preserve the remaining cohesion of this declining integration project. As part of these efforts, it introduced so-called informal meetings of EAEU heads of state. This is the backdrop for the May 2026 EAEU summit in Astana.

The EAEU summit in Astana coincided with Vladimir Putin’s second state visit to Kazakhstan. Observers focused less on the outcomes of the visit than on President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s remarks during the official welcoming ceremony. Tokayev described Russians and Kazakhs as brotherly nations sharing a common history, cultural traditions, and mentality. Such a warm reception for a leader conducting a war against Ukraine and widely criticized by the international community may negatively affect Kazakhstan’s international reputation.

While Armenia was represented by its Vice Prime Minister, the summit was attended by the presidents of the four other EAEU member states as well as Uzbekistan. The agenda was largely routine, focusing on logistics, digitalization, free trade, and artificial intelligence. Beyond these issues, the leaders of the four member states adopted a special statement concerning Armenia, expressing concern over its possible withdrawal from the EAEU and its aspirations for EU membership. The statement was delivered to the Armenian Vice Prime Minister, who reaffirmed his country’s intention to remain in the EAEU while safeguarding its national interests and respecting those of the other member states.

President Putin emphasized the incompatibility of simultaneous membership in the EAEU and the EU and warned Armenia of the economic consequences of leaving the EAEU. His remarks, resembling an ultimatum, amounted to a clear signal that Russia would reconsider existing trade and economic arrangements with Armenia should it withdraw from the Union. This position once again highlighted the predominantly Russia-centered nature of the EAEU, rather than a genuinely multilateral integration framework among equal members. In contrast, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reaffirmed that closer cooperation with the EAEU remains a key foreign policy priority for Uzbekistan.

IMPLICATIONS:

The EAEU summit in Astana took place in a complex geopolitical setting. Earlier, on May 15, Kazakhstan hosted an informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in Turkistan. Among other issues, OTS leaders discussed cooperation in artificial intelligence and digitalization, the same topics featured on the EAEU agenda. This overlap raises questions about the compatibility of integration initiatives pursued by the two organizations. It remains unclear how AI and digitalization strategies developed within the potentially competing frameworks of the OTS and the EAEU can coexist.

The summit was preceded by Donald Trump’s visit to China and Putin’s subsequent visit, both demonstrating renewed geopolitical activism. For Central Asian states, these events underscored the significance of the US–Russia–China geopolitical triangle, whose rivalry they observe with growing concern. Against this backdrop, the EAEU summit of “five minus one” member states appeared overshadowed by broader great-power competition.

The EAEU summit in Astana was also preceded by a series of high-profile diplomatic initiatives by Uzbekistan. In April, Saida Mirziyoyeva, Head of the Presidential Administration, visited Washington, D.C., for the launch of the American–Uzbek Business and Investment Council. On May18, she traveled to London, where she met British officials, international investors, and representatives of the London Stock Exchange following the IPO of the Uzbekistan National Investment Fund (UzNIF). On May 24, she visited New Delhi and held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on trade and investment cooperation. These developments reflected Uzbekistan’s active engagement with Western partners in the weeks preceding the EAEU summit.

On April 15, President Mirziyoyev received a Russian delegation led by Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration and former head of Rosatom. According to official reports, the talks focused on implementing previously reached agreements and deepening the Uzbek–Russian strategic partnership and alliance. Against the backdrop of Uzbekistan’s intensive diplomatic engagement with Western partners, the EAEU summit in Astana appeared relatively modest and somewhat ad hoc. This reflected Russia’s preference for advancing its interests through bilateral relations rather than through the Union’s multilateral framework.

Rather than presenting itself as a dynamic and cohesive economic bloc, the EAEU revealed its geopolitical dimension. During the summit, Putin suggested that developments in Armenia could follow a trajectory similar to that of Ukraine. While such a scenario appears unlikely, this rhetoric may prove counterproductive. Russian pressure on Armenia is likely to deepen anti-Russian sentiment among Armenians and further strengthen the country’s orientation toward Europe.

For Central Asia, regional integration is challenged by Russia’s continuing geopolitical ambitions. While the EAEU has experienced contraction, regional cooperation in Central Asia is expanding, exemplified by Azerbaijan’s accession to the Community of Central Asia last year. Thus, while Armenia and Georgia seek closer integration with the EU, Azerbaijan strengthens its role within the Central Asian regional framework. In this evolving geopolitical environment, the OTS gains a new opportunity to emerge as a viable alternative to the EAEU.

CONCLUSIONS:

Zbigniew Brzezinski once predicted that the EAEU would struggle to survive beyond 10–20 years, arguing that its ideological foundation, Eurasianism, was both outdated and geopolitically unsustainable. This ideology has found limited resonance in Central Asia and other former Soviet republics. From this perspective, the EAEU masks a tacit divergence between its member states and an increasingly assertive Russia. 

The EAEU seems to have reached its peak in composition and geopolitical design. It becomes quite obvious that its makeup can be only five members or even less, and that the EAEU is losing its attractiveness. It looks like another “C5” (to use the Central Asian “C5+1” formula), however, it would become a “C5-1” if Armenia should withdraw, possibly returning to “C5” if Uzbekistan would join. This again underscores the geopolitical nature of the EAEU and the limited attractiveness of Eurasianism. Central Asia should take note of Russia’s ultimatum to Armenia and its increasingly belligerent posture toward former Soviet republics.

In November 2025, the 7th Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State was held in Tashkent, where participants agreed to transform the Consultative Meetings into the Community of Central Asia (CCA). Azerbaijan became a full member of the new organization. The 8th summit, expected to take place in Turkmenistan this year, will be the first meeting of the newly established Community. However, the membership of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the EAEU, and Uzbekistan’s observer status, risk reducing the CCA to a largely symbolic project. As a result, the concept of the CCA remains vague, its institutional model underdeveloped, and its future trajectory uncertain.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

By Suren Sargsyan

On May 4-5, Yerevan hosted two significant events: the 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC) and the first Armenia–EU Summit. The gatherings brought together leaders from EU member states as well as representatives from Canada, the UK, and NATO. The Armenia–EU Summit concluded with a joint declaration and several cooperation agreements, prompting renewed debate over whether Armenia intends to pursue eventual membership in the EU. The question is particularly relevant given Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s ambiguous statements regarding Armenia’s strategic orientation. While the government has expanded cooperation with the EU across numerous sectors, it has simultaneously emphasized that Armenia does not intend to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Consequently, it remains unclear whether Yerevan seeks eventual EU membership or merely aims to deepen relations with the EU while avoiding a confrontation with Russia.

BACKGROUND:

Since Armenia’s 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” political observers, media outlets, and analysts have frequently argued that the country is gradually reorienting itself toward Europe. Many interpreted the rise of a reform-oriented government as a signal that Armenia would seek deeper integration with the EU and possibly pursue membership in the future. Such assessments often portrayed Armenia as distancing itself from Russia and adopting a more Western-oriented foreign policy.

In practice, however, Armenia has not taken concrete steps toward EU accession during the years following the revolution. Instead, the government has continued a long-standing policy of strengthening ties with the EU while maintaining relations with Russia. This approach is consistent with the policies pursued by previous Armenian administrations, which also sought to diversify the country’s external partnerships.

Armenia’s engagement with the EU predates the current government. Key milestones include the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1996, participation in the European Neighborhood Policy from 2004, involvement in the Eastern Partnership launched in 2009, and the signing of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. These initiatives demonstrate that successive Armenian governments have viewed closer cooperation with Europe as beneficial for political, economic, and institutional development.

At the same time, none of Armenia’s previous administrations formally declared EU membership as a strategic objective. The current government has likewise avoided making such a commitment. Instead, Armenian officials typically provide cautious and often ambiguous responses when asked about accession prospects. This ambiguity allows multiple interpretations and sustains public debate without requiring a definitive policy choice. Public opinion nevertheless remains broadly supportive of the prospect of EU membership in general, and visa liberalization in particular. According to surveys conducted by the International Republican Institute, 51 percent of Armenians would support EU membership if a referendum were held, while 32 percent would vote against. Such attitudes make the topic politically attractive, particularly during election periods. By avoiding a clear rejection of membership aspirations, the government can appeal simultaneously to pro-European constituencies and to voters who favor maintaining strong relations with Russia.

IMPLICATIONS:

The EPC Summit in Yerevan was significant not only because of its scale and high-level participation but also because it was held in a non-EU member state. If Armenia genuinely intended to pursue EU accession, this gathering would have provided an ideal opportunity to announce such ambitions and seek political support from European leaders. Virtually all relevant decision-makers were present, creating a favorable diplomatic environment for such a declaration. No such announcement was made, suggesting that EU membership is not currently a priority within Armenia’s foreign policy agenda. The absence of such a step indicates that Yerevan remains focused on deepening cooperation with the EU rather than initiating a formal accession process. This situation reveals a degree of tension between public sentiment and official policy. While support for European integration appears relatively strong among the Armenian population, the government has avoided translating these preferences into a concrete strategic objective. The primary reason appears to be geopolitical rather than domestic. The decision to pursue EU membership depends not only on Armenia’s political will but also on the willingness of the EU to accept new members. Enlargement remains a complex issue involving economic, political, institutional, and security considerations. Brussels evaluates candidate countries according to extensive criteria, including governance standards, economic performance, social development, and regional stability. Consequently, accession is a lengthy and demanding process even under favorable circumstances.

In Armenia’s case, additional geopolitical factors further complicate the issue. EU member states would inevitably consider Russia’s position when evaluating any Armenian application. Armenia remains a member of the EAEU and maintains extensive security ties with Russia. It also hosts Russia’s only military base in the South Caucasus. Given these realities, many European governments would be reluctant to support a process that could significantly increase tensions with Moscow.

Moreover, EU enlargement requires unanimous approval by all member states. Even countries with stronger institutional links to Europe have faced lengthy and uncertain accession processes. As a result, Armenian membership, even if formally pursued, would likely require many years or even decades to achieve. It would also necessitate extensive economic, political, and legal reforms that could generate significant domestic costs.

Comparisons with Georgia and Ukraine are often made in discussions of Armenia’s European aspirations. These cases provide useful reference points because both countries have actively pursued closer integration with the EU while facing strong Russian opposition. However, Armenia’s geopolitical circumstances differ in important ways.

Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, Armenia does not share a border with Russia. This reduces certain direct security risks associated with Russian pressure. At the same time, Armenia lacks a direct land or maritime connection to any EU member state. This geographical reality limits economic integration and creates logistical challenges.

Furthermore, the EU itself remains divided on the question of further enlargement. While some member states support enlargement, others remain cautious due to concerns about institutional capacity, financial costs, migration, and security implications. The prolonged and uncertain experiences of countries such as Ukraine and Georgia illustrate that membership aspirations do not necessarily translate into rapid progress.

Economic considerations also constrain Armenia’s options. Despite efforts to diversify its international partnerships, Russia remains Armenia’s principal economic partner. Russia accounts for a substantial share of Armenian exports, imports, investment flows, and labor migration. Any move toward EU accession would therefore have significant economic implications and could provoke responses from Moscow that Armenia would need to manage carefully.

Regional dynamics further complicate the issue. Armenia must also consider the interests of neighboring Iran. Although EU membership does not automatically imply NATO membership, Tehran could interpret such a move as part of a broader Western geopolitical alignment. Given the importance of Armenian-Iranian relations, Yerevan is unlikely to disregard Iranian concerns.

The position of the U.S. adds another layer of complexity. Although Washington generally supports European stability and cooperation, U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus has focused primarily on regional stability, economic connectivity, and broader geopolitical initiatives while Armenia’s potential EU accession hardly factor into U.S. strategic priorities. 

Among these constraints, Russia’s influence remains the most significant. Armenia’s security dependence, economic integration, and geographic realities create structural limitations that make a rapid strategic shift toward EU membership highly unlikely.

These factors also raise a broader question: if neither Armenia nor the EU is seriously pursuing accession, what was the primary purpose of the summit? Plausibly, the event was intended primarily as a demonstration of political support for Prime Minister Pashinyan and his government ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections. Hosting such a high-profile international gathering enhanced Armenia’s diplomatic visibility while reinforcing the government’s image as a credible partner for Europe.

CONCLUSIONS:

There is currently little to suggest that Armenia regards full EU membership as an immediate or realistic foreign policy objective. Although the government continues to expand cooperation with European institutions, it has avoided taking the political steps necessary to initiate a formal accession process. The absence of any membership declaration during the Armenia–EU Summit reinforces this assessment. At the same time, none of the principal external actors have strong incentives to support or concede to Armenian accession. Russia remains firmly opposed to such a development, while the EU lacks a clear consensus on further enlargement. Iran would likely view the prospect with concern, and the U.S. interest in the issue is limited. 

Discussions about EU membership in Armenia often serve domestic political purposes rather than reflecting an actionable policy agenda. The issue remains attractive to many voters and therefore continues to feature prominently in political discourse. Nevertheless, Armenia’s current strategy appears to focus on maximizing cooperation with the EU while preserving functional relations with Russia and other regional actors.

Accordingly, Armenia’s objective is best understood not as the pursuit of full EU membership but as the maintenance of deep political, economic, and institutional ties with the EU without fundamentally challenging the existing regional balance of power.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

By Vali Kaleji 

While the Armenian government appears to seek a short-term balance between the U.S. and Russia in the railway sector, its long-term objective is to end Russia’s monopoly and extensive influence over this critical infrastructure in Armenia. The realization of this objective, as well as reforms in the electricity and gas sectors, largely depends on the outcome of the decisive parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026. These elections will determine whether Armenia returns to its pre-2018 foreign policy orientation or continues its recent trajectory toward closer alignment with the West.

 Photo by Denis Belitsky, 2023

BACKGROUND:

On 13 February 2008, Armenia signed an agreement transferring full control of the state-owned Armenian Railways to South Caucasus Railway (Yuzhno-Kavkazskaya zheleznaya doroga, YuKZhD), a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways (RZhD). Subject to mutual agreement, the contract may be extended until 2048. The agreement followed a concession model, transferring operational, managerial, and investment responsibilities to the Russian side. Although ownership of the railway infrastructure formally remained with the Armenian government, operational control, investment decisions, tariff policy, and network development were effectively placed under Russian authority, constituting influence without formal ownership.

The 2008 railway agreement was effectively a continuation, and one of the consequences, of the 2002–2003 “debt-for-assets” agreement between Armenia and Russia, which settled Armenia’s US$ 96 million debt to Russia. The 30-year concession agreement is widely regarded as a major turning point in the development of Russia’s structural influence over Armenia’s economy and infrastructure in the post-Soviet period. Under the debt-for-assets arrangement, ownership or management of six major industrial and economic assets in Armenia, including electricity, gas, electronics, and defense-related sectors, was transferred to Russia, facilitating Russian dominance and influence in other sectors, including railways and telecommunications.

To reduce this monopoly and dependency, the Armenian government signed an agreement with Iran in 2009, one year after the 30-year concession agreement, to construct the “Marand–Norooz–Meghri–Yerevan” railway. Russia opposedthe project, and despite considerable efforts by Armenia, the railway was never realized, leaving Russia’s monopoly over Armenia’s railway network intact.

Plans to revive Soviet-era railway routes in the southern South Caucasus failed to materialize in the transformed regional environment following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. However, the peace agreement signed by Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan at the White House on August 8, 2025, marked a new phase in the construction and integration of road and railway routes in southern Armenia. Nevertheless, despite the completion of approximately 80 percent of the 110-kilometer Horadiz–Aghband railway line in southwestern Azerbaijan (around 140 kilometers including auxiliary routes), and Turkey’s initiation of a new 224-kilometer railway line from Kars to the Nakhichevan border, scheduled for completion before 2030, the rehabilitation and construction of the railway line in southern Armenia has yet to begin.

In these circumstances, during a press briefing on February 13, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that a country maintaining “friendly relations” with both Russia and Armenia could “purchase the concession management rights” of Armenia’s railways, which are currently under Russian management. He presented this as a potential solution to Armenia’s loss of “competitive advantage” by having international routes pass through the country. When asked which states could assume such a role, Pashinyan mentioned Kazakhstan, the UAE, and Qatar, while noting that the list was not exhaustive.

IMPLICATIONS:

Pashinyan’s recent statements may represent the latest step by the Armenian government to reduce the country’s dependence on Russia in the infrastructure sector. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian control and influence over Armenia’s railway network and railway management became particularly significant due to Armenia’s status as a landlocked country. After the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia’s railway routes with Azerbaijan (the eastern route) and Turkey (the western route) were closed. The disruption of railway connections between Armenia and Azerbaijan also severed Armenia’s rail link with Iran via the Julfa–Nakhichevan route. Consequently, over the past three decades, Armenia’s only active railway connection has been the northern route, a Soviet-era railway line running through Georgia to Russia and the Black Sea. Notably, despite the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia following the August 2008 war, this railway corridor, like the road route, has remained open and operational.

The absence of Armenia’s railway connectivity in three directions, eastward towards Azerbaijan, southward towards Iran, and westward towards Nakhichevan and Turkey, and the country’s dependence on the northern route through Georgia to Russia significantly strengthened the monopoly position and influence of the Russian-controlled South Caucasus Railway company. The Armenian government’s new approach therefore represents a step toward reducing Russia’s monopoly and influence over Armenia’s railway infrastructure, while also diversifying the country’s rail connections.

However, the most noteworthy aspect is Russia’s continued presence in these developments. Although Russia was excluded from the agreements reached during the Washington summit, it nevertheless expressed readiness to discuss possible participation in the Trump Route with Armenia. Mikhail Kalugin, Director of the Fourth CIS Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, argued that “there are ample grounds” for such involvement. Among other points, Kalugin referred to South Caucasus Railway, which “holds a concession to manage Armenia’s railway network.”

On the other hand, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan revealed that he had asked Russia to “urgently address” the full restoration of railway sections adjacent to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan and the Turkish border. The issue concerns three key railway sections: Yeraskh–Nakhichevan, Gyumri–Kars, and Ijevan–Gazakh. Pashinyan stated that he had raised the matter with Russia more than a month earlier.

However, the Armenian government appears to support Russian participation and investment only in railway sections located outside the so-called “Trump Route.” Addressing possible Russian involvement in the project, Nikol Pashinyan stated that the route is a bilateral initiative with the U.S., adding that “any third-party involvement can be discussed only bilaterally.” Pashinyan also responded to the South Caucasus Railway’s expressed readiness to transfer only the Meghri railway section, through which the Trump Route is expected to pass, from its administration to Armenia, arguing that the statement reflected a “misunderstanding.” “The [Meghri railway] section is not under Russian management for it to be handed over to Armenia. It is Armenia’s sovereign territory, and we have not delegated the management of that sovereign territory to anyone. There is no railway there to be managed by anyone,” Pashinyan stated.

In fact, as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk stated, the Russian Federation has decided to begin substantive negotiations on the restoration of two sections of Armenia’s railway network that would reconnect Armenian railways with the railway network of the Republic of Azerbaijan near the town of Yeraskh and with the railway network of the Republic of Turkey near the settlement of Akhuryan. The total length of the sections to be restored has been announced as 1.6 kilometers and 12.4 kilometers, respectively. All of these sections exclude southern Armenia, through which the Trump Route is expected to pass. Nevertheless, the reopening of these railway sections forms part of the Pashinyan government’s Crossroads of Peace project.

CONCLUSIONS:

Armenia’s exit from political and military dependence on Russia is unlikely without ending Russia’s monopoly over the country’s economic infrastructure. The Armenian government took an initial step in this direction by nationalizing the country’s electricity grid, and on July 9, 2025, Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed a law permitting the nationalization of the national electricity distribution company. However, this decision became politically contentious following the arrest of opposition leader Samvel Karapetyan, who had acquired full ownership of the Armenian Power Grid Company and the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant in 2017.

Armenia’s dependence on Russian-controlled economic infrastructure extends beyond railways and electricity. The exclusive supplier of natural gas in Armenia’s domestic market is Gazprom Armenia, a Russian-Armenian company established in December 1997, whose shares are wholly owned by Russia’s Gazprom. Consequently, Armenia’s efforts to end Russia’s monopoly and influence over its economic infrastructure face significant obstacles. The realization of this objective will largely depend on the outcome of the crucial parliamentary elections on June 7, 2026, which will determine whether Armenia returns to its pre-2018 foreign policy orientation or continues its recent trajectory toward closer alignment with the West.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Alpaslan Özerdem and Olesya Vartanyan

After more than three decades of closure, the Türkiye-Armenia border may soon reopen. A string of recent developments, including the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to Yerevan, agreements to simplify visa procedures, and moves toward direct land trade, suggest that normalization is shifting from cautious diplomacy toward practical implementation. If it does, it would mark one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. Yet reopening the border will require careful political management. Without it, renewed contact could generate friction rather than stability.

BACKGROUND:

The land border between Türkiye and Armenia has been closed since 1993. Ankara shut the crossing in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the first war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, the border has symbolized one of the most enduring geopolitical divides in the region. For communities on both sides, the closure produced long-term economic and social consequences. Armenia’s access to regional markets has remained constrained, while eastern Turkish border regions have also faced limited cross-border economic opportunities.

Regional dynamics began shifting after the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which altered the political balance in the South Caucasus and created new incentives for diplomatic engagement. In the aftermath of the war, Ankara and Yerevan appointed special envoys in 2021 to explore the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations and reopening the border.

Since then, negotiations have progressed slowly but steadily. Several confidence-building measures have been agreed and some already implemented. These include agreements allowing third-country citizens to cross the border, the resumption of direct flights between Istanbul and Yerevan, and discussions on facilitating trade and travel. In early 2026, the pace of normalization accelerated visibly. In March, Turkish Airlines launched regular scheduled flights on the Istanbul-Yerevan route. The two governments agreed to simplify visa procedures, and reports emerged that direct land trade between Türkiye and Armenia would begin as part of a broader US-led Caucasus peace push. Last December Bloomberg reported that Ankara was weighing a full reopening of the border within six months, while senior Turkish officials publicly expressed optimism, stating that they hoped “everything develops quickly.”

Physical preparations also indicate growing readiness. Armenia has renovated the Margara checkpoint on its side of the border, declaring the facility technically ready for operation. Türkiye has likewise upgraded infrastructure at the Alican crossing. These preparations suggest that the technical conditions for reopening could be met relatively quickly if political decisions align.

Still, reopening the border remains politically sensitive. For Türkiye, the process remains closely linked to the broader relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly negotiations over a comprehensive peace agreement following the collapse of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh authorities in 2023. Since last August, when the two countries signed several accords at the White House, Baku and Yerevan have taken a number of steps forward, including facilitating transit trade to Armenia through Azerbaijan and Armenia’s recent agreement with the United States on the TRIPP transit route, which will facilitate the operation of a transit route between Azerbaijan and its enclave of Nakhchivan in southern Armenia. These are promising steps, but a final peace agreement is still pending, which Türkiye must take into consideration.

Ankara has long coordinated its approach toward Armenia with Baku. Turkish policymakers have repeatedly emphasized that normalization should not undermine Azerbaijan’s strategic interests, and progress in Türkiye-Armenia relations has often moved in parallel with developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations. How close are the parties to a final agreement on the border? The string of practical steps in early 2026 suggests the process has crossed a threshold from symbolic confidence-building to operational preparation. Yet the absence of a finalized Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal means that Ankara retains a political brake on the timeline. A stall or deterioration in those talks could slow or freeze the border track; conversely, a breakthrough could accelerate it rapidly.

Domestic political considerations also matter. In Armenia, normalization with Türkiye remains controversial for segments of society deeply affected by historical grievances, and the issue will feature in the country’s upcoming June parliamentary elections. In Türkiye, policymakers must balance diplomatic engagement with Armenia against their longstanding strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

IMPLICATIONS:

If and when the border reopens, the effects will extend well beyond bilateral relations. Armenia has long depended on limited transit routes through Georgia and Iran to access external markets. Opening the Turkish border would provide an alternative corridor, linking Armenia more directly to European and Middle Eastern trade networks. It would also reinforce Türkiye’s role as a regional connector between the South Caucasus and broader Eurasian markets. In this context, reopening the border aligns with wider connectivity initiatives such as the Middle Corridor, which aims to strengthen east-west trade routes across the region.

Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has weakened since the start of the war in Ukraine and the collapse of its peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. As Moscow’s role recedes, regional actors are increasingly seeking alternative economic and diplomatic partnerships. In parallel, instability in the Middle East, including conflict involving Iran, has heightened uncertainty along key transit routes. For Armenia, which has relied on access through Iranian territory, reopening the Turkish border would reduce dependence on a single corridor and provide greater strategic flexibility.

On the other hand, the expansion of trade and transit routes associated with reopening the Türkiye-Armenia border could deepen regional interdependence and, in turn, support longer-term peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Durable reconciliation rarely rests on diplomatic agreements alone; it often emerges when economic cooperation and shared interests make renewed conflict increasingly costly. Expanded trade, transportation links, and cross-border mobility can help create these incentives by encouraging regional actors to view cooperation not as a concession but as mutual gain.

At the local level, decades of closure have left many towns near the frontier economically stagnant. Renewed cross-border access could stimulate transportation links, tourism, and commercial exchange. Armenian producers would gain easier access to Turkish markets, while Turkish businesses could expand trade with Armenia and potentially beyond. However, regions that have been economically isolated for decades may struggle to adjust quickly to new competitive pressures, and if cross-border trade develops unevenly, local communities could perceive the reopening as disruptive rather than beneficial.

The practical challenges of reopening should not be underestimated. Local authorities, customs agencies, border police, and regulatory bodies on both sides have never previously operated together. Communities along the frontier have lived in close geographical proximity but political separation for decades. In the Armenian village of Margara, residents have long lived within sight of the Turkish side of the river without direct contact. Renewed engagement may generate economic and cultural exchange, but it could also expose differences in administrative practices, expectations, and social attitudes that will require careful management on both sides.

CONCLUSIONS:

The reopening of the Türkiye-Armenia border represents more than a bilateral diplomatic milestone. It reflects a broader transformation in the political landscape of the South Caucasus. The rapid accumulation of practical steps in early 2026, from flights to visa agreements to land trade, indicates that the process has moved beyond the realm of aspirational diplomacy. Yet the outcome is not guaranteed. The process remains closely linked to developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, domestic political considerations in both countries, and evolving regional geopolitics. Whether Ankara ultimately opens the border before or after a finalized Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal will be a critical signal of how much Türkiye is willing to decouple the two tracks. Whether the border ultimately becomes a bridge between the two societies or simply another contested frontier will depend on how effectively these challenges are addressed not only in the coming months, but in the longer term.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Alpaslan Özerdem is Dean of the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. Olesya Vartanyan is a conflict analyst specializing in South Caucasus security and peace processes and a PhD student at George Mason University.