By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The Caspian Sea is increasingly emerging as a focal point of geopolitical competition. The joint military exercises conducted by Russia and Iran in July, following similar drills by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the northern Caspian a month earlier, underscore the region’s rapid transformation into a nexus of strategic rivalries and evolving security alignments. Among the littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are assuming particularly prominent roles in shaping the strategic landscape. Their efforts are supported by Turkey, which is facilitating the naval expansion of these three Turkic nations. Russia’s ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine has significantly weakened Moscow’s capacity to assert dominance over the Caspian Sea and to effectively utilize it as part of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Russia to Iran and India.


                                                            Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The Caspian Sea was widely regarded as a “Russian lake” during the Soviet era, as Iran, possessing only a short Caspian coastline, showed little interest in utilizing it for power projection. For decades, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla maintained dominance over the waters of the inland sea. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Moscow sought to preserve the existing balance of power in the Caspian. In 2018, Russia secured an agreement among the five Caspian littoral states on territorial delimitation, excluding the military presence of non-littoral actors in the sea.

The region experienced a significant geopolitical shift in 2020 after Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey provided military assistance to Azerbaijan during the conflict. Following the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, the Caspian littoral states expanded their navies. Turkey continues to support Azerbaijan’s requirements for modern weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister, Zakir Hasanov, affirmed that Ankara was Baku’s principal partner in military cooperation.

Over the past five years, Turkey has facilitated the naval expansion of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. These countries, along with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are members of the Turkey-backed “Pan-Turkic Union.” Through this framework, Turkey has assumed a leading role in diminishing Russia’s influence over the military development of these states.

In 2023, Turkey’s Asfar and YDA Group, together with Kazakhstan’s Uralsk Plant “Zenit” JSC, concluded an agreement for the construction of offshore platforms in the Caspian Sea. The agreement included the production of various naval vessels, including main surface combat ships, to fulfill the operational requirements of the Kazakh Navy. Likewise, the deepening relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan signify a broader shift in energy geopolitics and highlight their shared strategic interests. The Bayraktar TB2, Turkey’s first domestically produced unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), is deployed within Turkmenistan’s armed forces. In February, the two countries signed a gas supply agreement that offers Turkmenistan a new export channel while consolidating Turkey’s position as a regional energy hub.

In 2024, the joint military exercises Birleistik (Unity) 2024 were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast, marking the first such drills held without Russian participation. The armed forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly participated in the exercise.

In April, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan announced plans to conduct the joint military exercises Caspian Breeze – 2025 in the northern part of the Caspian Sea near Russia’s coastline. The exercises commenced in June at Aktau, Kazakhstan, with the objective of strengthening the protection of maritime economic infrastructure, naval bases, and shipping routes. A month later, Russia and Iran initiated their own joint naval exercises, CASAREX 2025, under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” These drills were designed to enhance maritime security and promote deeper naval cooperation between the two states.

The two joint military exercises within the span of a single month demonstrate a changing regional balance of power. The Caspian littoral states have expanded their naval capabilities in recent years, thereby challenging Russia’s long-standing hegemony in the Caspian region.

IMPLICATIONS: The navies of the three Turkic littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, have experienced substantial growth and deepened cooperation in recent years. Through a series of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and supported by Turkey, these states have enhanced their strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. These developments have not only strengthened the collective influence and military capacity of the Turkic states but have also posed a significant challenge to Russia’s longstanding naval dominance in the Caspian.

Security cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states in the absence of Russian participation signifies a major geopolitical realignment in the Caspian region. For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have agreed to employ their joint naval forces to protect pipelines on the seabed and vessels operating on the surface. The regional geopolitical competition is likely to intensify following Iran’s decision to resume drilling operations in the Caspian after a 30-year hiatus. This development could generate tensions with the three Turkic littoral states, which are already deeply engaged in offshore oil and gas extraction within the Caspian Sea.

Turkey plays a pivotal role in the ongoing militarization of the Caspian Sea. It initially strengthened Azerbaijan’s defense capabilities, subsequently supported Turkmenistan, and is now actively engaged in enhancing Kazakhstan’s naval power. According to Yuri Lyamin, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), “Kazakhstan is following the ongoing, multi-year process of strengthening the navies of Caspian states. The reasons and necessity of this can be debated, but it is a long-standing trend driven by prestige and the desire to keep up with its neighbors. Over the past decade and a half, Turkmenistan has built a very strong navy in the Caspian, including with Turkey’s assistance. It was to a Turkish design that Turkmenistan’s largest ship, and one of the largest warships in the Caspian, the corvette Deniz Khan, was commissioned and constructed in 2021. A considerable number of missile, missile-artillery, and other boats for the Turkmen border guards were also built based on Turkish designs.” The growing number of actors in the region is complicating Moscow’s ability to utilize the area for strategic connectivity projects. One of these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a Russia-led project designed to connect Russian ports with Iran, the Gulf region, and the Indian Ocean. The INSTC agreement was initially signed in 2000 by Russia, Iran, and India, was later joined by Azerbaijan and several Central Asian states. Meanwhile, Iran is actively seeking alternative trade routes to the EU, including via Armenia.

Conversely, Azerbaijan’s Port of Baku serves as a critical hub within the east–west Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, which links China to the EU via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby bypassing Russia. The Middle Corridor endows Baku’s with an important role for both Europe and Central Asia by providing a viable alternative to Russian transit routes, facilitating efficient east–west connectivity across the Caspian and through the South Caucasus.

Similarly, Turkey promotes the integration of Turkmenistan in the Middle Corridor, which would advance Turkey’s long-standing ambition to position itself as a strategic logistical bridge linking Asia and Europe.

The 2018 agreement grants the Caspian states the right to construct gas pipelines across the seabed. Ankara aims to channel Caspian gas to its territory via Azerbaijan, and onward to the EU, elevating Turkey’s role as a pivotal energy hub. However, this directly contradicts Russian interests and the potential exists for heightened tensions or even confrontation between the Turkey-backed Turkic states and the Russia-Iran alliance over control of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The geopolitical competition between the three Turkey-backed Turkic littoral states and the Russia–Iran alliance could intensify as both sides continue to expand their economic and military presence in the Caspian region. The increase in military exercises conducted over the past two years underscores the emergence of new security alignments within the Caspian basin.

Turkey has taken on a leading role in advancing the naval capabilities of the three Turkic littoral states, a position that was traditionally held by Russia. As Turkey’s involvement in the region deepens, Moscow’s ability to shape the military development of these countries will likely be further marginalized. Russia, meanwhile, continues to bear significant geopolitical costs for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the onset of the conflict, Moscow’s influence across Central Asia and other regions, including the Caspian, has steadily declined and other powers such as China and Turkey have begun to fill the resulting vacuum.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

By Sergey Sukhankin

Kazakhstan has finalized its decision regarding the bidder selected to construct its inaugural nuclear power plant (NPP). Contrary to earlier projections favoring a Chinese provider, the Russian state corporation Rosatom has assumed the leading role within the international consortium. However, this outcome is unlikely to marginalize Chinese interests: a Chinese firm is expected to lead the construction of a subsequent NPP, while Chinese companies are concurrently gaining prominence in other vital sectors of Kazakhstan’s (and Central Asia’s) economy, including renewable energy and water management. Western firms appear to be the principal losers, as their capacity to expand into the most lucrative and strategic segments of Kazakhstan’s economy is likely to diminish.

 The Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia. Image Courtesy of IAEA Imagebank  

BACKGROUND: In October 2024, following a national referendum in which over 71 percent of voters supported the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Kazakhstan, local authorities prouced a shortlist of prospective bidders. This included China’s CNNC, Russia’s Rosatom, South Korea’s KHNP, and France’s EDF. The selection process extended beyond economic rationale and was clearly shaped by geopolitical considerations: although Kazakhstani authorities initially intended to make a decision by the end of 2022, the deadline was repeatedly postponed. Despite widespread confidence among local experts that CNNC would prevail, and notable public support for the French and South Korean contenders, on June 14 it was officially announced that Russia’s Rosatom would lead the international consortium responsible for building the NPP.

However, appointing Rosatom to oversee Kazakhstan’s first NPP does not signify exclusive Russian dominance in the country’s emerging nuclear sector. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had previously stated that, to avert a foreseeable energy shortage, Kazakhstan would require not one but three NPPs. Furthermore, Minister of Energy Almasadam Sätqaliev publicly indicated that CNNC would likely head the consortium for the construction of another NPP. Tokayev later reaffirmed this during a meeting with Xi Jinping, assuring the Chinese leader that, given Kazakhstan’s need for 2–3 NPPs, CNNC is regarded as a reliable strategic partner with a secured role in the domestic market.

IMPLICATIONS: In many respects, Kazakhstan’s decision to appoint Rosatom as the head of the international consortium is readily explicable and can be attributed to two principal factors. First is the logic of “do-not-poke-the-bear” thinking. A combination of adverse developments and humiliations—the stalled “three-day war” in Ukraine, increasing economic and political isolation, and a series of setbacks in the Middle East—has rendered the Russian political elite particularly sensitive to any potential rejection of its bid by Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has once again declined to join BRICS, a move that visibly displeased Moscow. At this juncture, it is worth recalling that on May 29, Vladimir Putin met with Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev—an event that, according to some experts, may be interpreted as part of Russia’s exertion of political pressure on Kazakhstan’s current leadership in relation to the NPP project.

Despite Russia’s ongoing decline, Kazakhstan’s accommodation of Russia’s NPP-related interests is not unexpected: when cornered, the Russian regime is capable of undertaking retaliatory measures—such as provocations, subversion, or other forms of pressure—against the significantly smaller Kazakhstan. Conversely, experts have acknowledged that the selection of Rosatom may also possess an element of rationality. Analysts based in Kazakhstan emphasize Russia’s notable competitive advantages, which include cultural and linguistic proximity as well as logistical and technological compatibility. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s decision to finalize an agreement for the construction of a small NPP—an agreement that has since been upgraded in scope—may have further influenced Kazakhstan’s preference for Rosatom. Importantly, Rosatom is not subject to international sanctions, and the likelihood of its inclusion on such lists does not appear imminent.

That said, uncertainty remains regarding how Kazakhstan would respond should the corporation become subject to Western sanctions or if Russia’s macroeconomic conditions deteriorate further. Although Russia reportedly offers Kazakhstan favorable credit terms—details of which remain undisclosed—Kazakhstan-based experts highlight that Russia has previously failed to fulfill its commitments to finance energy infrastructure projects in three Kazakhstani cities. Moreover, citing the Belarusian case, anonymous Russian sources caution that partnering with Rosatom may ultimately impose a financial burden on Kazakhstan, despite the apparent economic appeal of the offer, and could also give rise to significant safety concerns over time.

Russia, however, will not be the sole dominant actor in Kazakhstan’s emerging nuclear energy sector. As previously noted, the local ruling elite regards China as a crucial component of the equation and, seemingly, as a counterbalancing force to Russia. For its part, Beijing will capitalize on several competitive advantages as it seeks to expand its influence within the country and its nuclear industry.

First, China is intensifying its cooperation with Kazakhstan in the field of water management, a domain of critical importance given the deteriorating conditions in the Caspian Sea. For example, during a recent meeting between Chinese and Kazakh water management experts, it was agreed that China Energy International Group would provide comprehensive training and expertise to its Kazakh counterparts. Additionally, it was disclosed at the meeting that the company is actively exploring the construction of a hydroelectric power facility in Kazakhstan and has expressed interest in participating in projects focused on the digitalization and automation of the country’s water management sector. Beyond current challenges with water supply, Kazakhstan’s ambitious plans to develop green hydrogen—which demands significant water resources—underscore water management as a strategic priority, and China is poised to expand its involvement in this area.

Second, China is rapidly enhancing its role in one of Kazakhstan’s most promising economic sectors—its uranium industry. Kazakhstan ranks first globally in uranium production and holds the second-largest uranium reserves after Australia, where production may decline due to growing public opposition. In light of ongoing geopolitical instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kazakhstan and Canada are likely to remain the two leading uranium producers, maintaining dominance in the global market. In this context, China could support Kazakhstan in addressing two major constraints limiting the full exploitation of its uranium resources: the absence of domestic enrichment capabilities and the continued reliance on Russia for uranium export logistics.

It is thus worth noting that Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group recently concluded an agreement with the Chinese firm SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, a subsidiary of the State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Under this arrangement, the Russian party transferred its shares in uranium production sites located in Northern Kazakhstan (Northern Khorasan) to its Chinese counterpart. Although experts remain divided on China’s rationale for acquiring stakes in what is viewed as a relatively depleted and marginal uranium site, many interpret this as a strategic move to further expand China’s presence in Kazakhstan. In any case, an increasing foothold in the country’s uranium sector could serve as a compelling argument in China’s favor in its pursuit of the NPP project.

Finally, Kazakhstan must recognize the potential consequences it may face in the near future if it fails to deepen its cooperation with China in nuclear and other forms of clean energy. Many experts contend that China’s rapid shift toward renewable energy signals a troubling trend for its hydrocarbon suppliers, including Kazakhstan. At present, renewable sources account for 80 percent of China’s energy and electricity demand, while fossil fuels still constitute approximately 62 percent of its overall energy consumption. However, the proportion of non-renewable energy in China’s energy mix is expected to decline further. This trajectory suggests that Kazakhstan should proactively explore alternative areas of economic cooperation—such as critical metals, renewable energy, and nuclear power—with its principal economic partner, especially in light of Beijing’s strategic direction and the intensifying competition from regional actors like Uzbekistan, where China is also expanding its presence.

CONCLUSIONS: Kazakhstan’s decision to appoint Rosatom de facto as the lead entity in constructing its first nuclear power plant (NPP) reflects a blend of economic, geopolitical, and symbolic considerations. The second NPP will most likely be built by China, which is simultaneously consolidating its position in Kazakhstan’s water management and renewable energy sectors—domains poised to drive economic growth across Central Asia for decades to come. For Russia, weakened and humiliated in Ukraine and the Middle East, the opportunity to construct Kazakhstan’s inaugural NPP represents a highly symbolic gesture, acknowledging its ongoing role in bilateral relations. Kazakhstan’s choice to prioritize a Sino-Russian consortium—though the long-term stability of this partnership remains uncertain—for shaping the country’s nuclear future effectively establishes a duopoly in this sector of the national economy. This development may be unwelcome news for Western actors, whose companies are unlikely to secure significant contracts in Kazakhstan’s most strategic economic sectors.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Sergey Sukhankin

In early January 2025, operations at the uranium-producing Kazakhstan-based Joint Venture Inkai LLP (JV Inkai) were temporarily halted – the venture, established in the early 1990s, has been jointly managed by Kazatomprom (which holds a 60 percent stake) and the Canadian company Cameco (with 40 percent) – resulting in a brief decline in the share prices of both firms in New York and evident concern among Canadian investors. After a short interruption, activities at Inkai resumed without disruption. This event – though seemingly a minor occurrence that largely escaped the attention of many analysts – reflects broader and more concerning trends (particularly for the West) emerging within the global uranium market, in which Kazakhstan plays a pivotal role.

Photo source: NAC Kazatomprom JSC

BACKGROUND: The strategic significance of uranium extends well beyond its military applications. The rapidly increasing global interest in nuclear energy—among both economically advanced and developing countries—is contributing to uranium’s emergence as a commodity of critical strategic value. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency (IEA), in addition to the existing 420 nuclear reactors worldwide, 63 new reactors are currently under construction, and the operational lifespan of a further 60 reactors is being extended. As a result, uranium's importance is projected to grow steadily in the years ahead. The present and future stability of the global nuclear energy sector is therefore highly contingent upon reliable access to substantial, readily extractable uranium reserves located in politically stable and predictable nations. It is precisely in this context, however, that significant challenges begin to surface.

Following the onset of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Western access to two critical sources of both enriched and unenriched uranium has been partially obstructed. U.S. sanctions targeting Russian uranium have jeopardized U.S. access to this supply, while geopolitical instability—marked by a pronounced anti-Western orientation—in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, has effectively severed France’s access to locally sourced unenriched uranium. Exacerbating this situation, other major African uranium producers, including Namibia and Tanzania, are increasingly inclined to cooperate with Russia and China in uranium extraction activities. This emerging alignment places them in growing opposition to Western companies and their strategic interests.

At present, the already limited list of geopolitically stable, world-class uranium-producing nations has effectively narrowed to just three: Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia. Among them, Kazakhstan stands as the global leader in the production of unenriched uranium, accounting for over 40 percent of total global output, and ranks as the second-largest country in terms of uranium reserves.

The primary concern lies in the fact that, despite its considerable wealth in natural resources, Kazakhstan is unable to fully leverage its vast resource potential. The country remains heavily dependent on two dominant geopolitical actors—Russia and China—both of which exert significant influence over the direction and development of Kazakhstan’s uranium-producing sector. Most critically, these two states maintain increasingly strained relations with the West.

Consequently, certain Kazakhstan-based analysts have voiced suspicions that the underlying cause of the operational halt at Inkai was pressure exerted by Russia, allegedly in response to Kazakhstan’s post-2022 efforts to alter the logistics of its uranium exports by decreasing reliance on Russian transit routes and instead utilizing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (commonly referred to as the Middle Corridor) as an alternative to exporting uranium through Russian territory.

IMPLICATIONS: The global uranium industry is currently characterized by rapidly increasing demand alongside growing uncertainty regarding the reliability of supply, driven largely by global and regional geopolitical disruptions. Within this context, Kazakhstan’s role as a resource-rich and historically stable supplier of uranium has acquired a qualitatively new significance. Notably, Kazakh authorities have publicly committed to boosting uranium production in 2025 and to diversifying both their export destinations and logistical routes, aiming to reduce the country's reliance on Russia. Nevertheless, the “Inkai incident”—which allegedly represents only the visible portion of deeper structural dynamics affecting Kazakhstan’s uranium sector—raises three key concerns.

First, can Kazakhstan successfully restructure its existing logistical routes and thereby reduce its strategic dependence on Russia? On the surface, such a shift appears feasible. According to statistics provided by Kazakh authorities, the country has made tangible progress in increasing uranium shipments through the Middle Corridor. Available data indicate that approximately 64 percent of West-bound uranium exports are now transported via this route. Moreover, Kazakhstan has also expanded its uranium exports to Western markets, with shipments destined for the United States gaining particular prominence.

The reality, however, appears significantly more complex. Despite recent efforts to diversify transit routes, a substantial portion of Kazakhstan’s uranium exports continues to be transported through Russian territory. Furthermore, Russia’s state-owned corporation Rosatom maintains (in)direct control over at least five of Kazakhstan’s fourteen major uranium production sites, reinforcing Russia’s strategic influence over the sector. In addition, the Middle Corridor presents notable challenges. Geopolitically, Georgia—an essential transit country along the route—occupies a critical position, and its political leadership has demonstrated increasing alignment with Moscow, potentially complicating matters should Russo-Western relations further deteriorate. From a logistical standpoint, representatives of the Canadian firm Cameco have expressed concerns, stating that the Middle Corridor “has proven to be neither reliable nor predictable,” due to the complex network of countries traversed and the numerous permits required for transit.

Compounding these challenges is the apparent ambivalence within Kazakhstan regarding the exclusion of Russia from its current uranium transportation framework. Specifically, Kazakh officials have indicated that the country does not intend to significantly expand the use of the Middle Corridor for uranium exports. Additionally, many Kazakhstan-based experts express skepticism about any prospective reduction in cooperation with Rosatom (i.e., Russia). On the contrary, a prevailing view among these analysts is that bilateral collaboration in the uranium sector is likely to deepen in the future.

Second, what is the actual role of China in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry and how will this role evolve? At present, China is the world’s second-largest consumer of uranium, following the United States, and its demand is expected to continue rising. Kazakhstan serves as China’s primary source of uranium: according to several studies, over half of Kazakhstan’s uranium output is currently exported to China, with some estimates suggesting this figure may be as high as 60 percent. This situation, as noted by representatives of major Western uranium-related enterprises, “raises concerns about reduced availability for Western markets, potentially exacerbating global supply constraints,” a challenge that is already beginning to manifest within the industry.

Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group recently concluded an agreement with the Chinese firm SNURDC Astana Mining Company Limited, a subsidiary of the State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Co., Ltd. Under this arrangement, the Russian side transferred its shares in uranium-producing sites located in Northern Kazakhstan (Northern Khorasan) to its Chinese counterparts. At present, there is no consensus among experts regarding China’s rationale for acquiring stakes in what is considered a relatively depleted and comparatively minor uranium production site.
While some analysts contend that the acquisition primarily serves China’s geoeconomic objectives—particularly in light of projections indicating a substantial increase in the country’s uranium consumption over the coming years—others emphasize a more overtly geopolitical dimension to China’s actions. Notably, Stanislav Pritchin of the Central Asia Department at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences has drawn attention to China’s established practice of acquiring “unpromising” oil and natural gas deposits. In his view, such acquisitions function as instruments for expanding China’s strategic presence within the host country.

Third, what is the future role of Western companies in Kazakhstan’s uranium industry? Given that neither China nor Russia appears willing to reduce their involvement in the sector—thereby sustaining Kazakhstan’s strategic dependency on both actors—serious concerns have emerged regarding the potential marginalization or even eventual withdrawal of Western firms from the country’s uranium landscape. Indeed, some Kazakhstan-based experts have implicitly acknowledged a widely discussed notion circulating in Western policy and business circles: the ongoing bifurcation of the global uranium industry. This refers to the emergence of a distinct segmentation of uranium supply chains along geopolitical lines, with one stream aligned with the West and the other with the China-led bloc. Within this context, it is feared that Kazakhstan may ultimately be compelled to align more closely with the latter and reduce its cooperation with Western partners accordingly.

Undoubtedly, such a scenario would only be likely to materialize in the event of a further deterioration in political and economic relations between China (and, under certain conditions, Russia) and their Western counterparts. While this scenario remains hypothetical at present, it is by no means implausible.

CONCLUSION: Although Kazakhstan and its political leadership have expressed strong interest in expanding foreign—particularly Western—participation in the country’s uranium industry, the influence of external geopolitical dynamics cannot be overlooked. As uranium increasingly assumes a role in the global energy mix comparable to that historically occupied by fossil fuels, the issue of access to and supply of this resource has transcended purely economic considerations and has firmly entered the realm of geopolitics.

In light of the intensifying geopolitical competition between East and West over access to emerging markets and spheres of influence, it is conceivable that China and its strategic partners may seek to curtail Western access to Kazakhstan-based uranium—mirroring developments in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Western firms are increasingly being displaced from uranium-related ventures. To avert a potential supply shock—akin to that experienced in the oil and natural gas sector following Russia’s attempt, in the aftermath of February 2022, to weaponize hydrocarbon exports as a means of exerting geopolitical pressure on the West—it is imperative that Western companies (and, arguably, governments) begin to explore alternative uranium sources to sustain their nuclear energy agendas. Given the small number of globally significant suppliers, increased attention should be directed toward Canada and Australia, which possess substantial uranium reserves and are regarded as geopolitically stable and reliable partners.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).     

By Anna Harvey

In a January 2025 interview with Ana Tili newspaper, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined his vision of Kazakhstan as a middle power balancing relations between global powers while pursuing domestic reforms. The analysis examines how Tokayev has moved to separate himself from his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, implementing constitutional changes, economic reforms, and foreign policy shifts following the January 2022 events, while facing the complex challenge of maintaining independence from both Russian and Chinese influence. Tokayev’s leadership marks a new stage of Kazakhstan’s development, positioning the country as an independent player on the global stage.

Photo by Vladimir Tretyakov

BACKGROUND: On January 3, 2025, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev gave a written interview with Ana Tili newspaper reflecting on 2024 and discussing Kazakhstan’s future. In the interview, Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's role as a "middle power" globally; its ties with the U.S., Russia, and China; Nazarbayev's legacy; economic development; and Kazakhstan's future goals. He also addressed the "January events," the January 2022 mass protests against gas prices that turned into an intra-elite fight and escalated into riots and violence.

In international politics, Tokayev expressed pride in Kazakhstan's "middle power" status, stating the country should "work collaboratively to build new, resilient bridges between conflicting geopolitical poles. Kazakhstan maintains support for the UN and other international organizations. Tokayev expressed optimism about relations with both the U.S. and China, noting Kazakhstan's willingness to support Washington regarding Ukraine and plans for extensive high-level dialogue with Beijing in 2025.

Regarding the former president, Tokayev characterized Nazarbayev's legacy as overwhelmingly positive and noted their strong relationship, including monthly phone calls. Despite his own efforts to reduce Russian influence in Kazakhstan, Tokayev expressed no concern about Nazarbayev's December meeting with Putin, describing such meetings as exchanges between "long-time friends and colleagues with much to reminisce about."

On the economic front, Tokayev praised Kazakhstan's progress while noting that "economic growth of 4 percent is insufficient." Rather than artificially holding exchange rates or micromanaging sectors, he stated his belief that the government should "ensure the stability and efficiency of the economy, the dynamic development of the real sector, growth in labor productivity, and the creation of high-quality jobs." He also supports recovering illegally obtained assets for reinvestment in education, infrastructure, and social needs.

Domestically, Tokayev highlighted extensive modernization projects in housing, roadways, railways, industry, and education. He also discussed the expansion of Kazakhstan’s social state: in 2024, the government began the National Fund for Children, where 50% of investment income from the National Fund of Kazakhstan will go to children's savings accounts for housing or education after age 18. Additionally, pensions, academic scholarships, and civil servant salaries were increased.  Tokayev also emphasized his government's rapid response to spring 2024 flooding and efforts to build a "Clean Kazakhstan" through environmental initiatives.

In response to a question about the January events, Tokayev affirmed that, had decisive actions “not been taken against the instigators of the riots and organizers of the coup, Kazakhstan today would be a very different country, with diminished independence and restricted sovereignty.” The January events in question began on January 1, 2022, and began as protests against hikes in energy prices in western Kazakhstan. These protests appeared to be co-opted into an intra-elite struggle pitting parts of Nazarbayev’s entourage, specifically in the security structures, against Tokayev’s government, and spiraled into violent riots. Tokayev responded by requesting peacekeeping forces from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) be deployed to suppress the rioters. In total, around 238 people were killed. Since the riots, Tokayev has used the memory of the events to support a number of governmental reforms, including strengthening the powers of parliament over the presidency. In his interview, the President encouraged citizens not to fall victim to disinformation related to the riots, and he later stated evidence of involvement from criminal groups in the January events was a driving force behind his efforts to strengthen law and order in Kazakhstan, a project labeled “Just Kazakhstan.”

IMPLICATIONS: Tokayev's interview reveals his continued efforts to establish an independent identity from his predecessor. Initially, Tokayev was depicted as largely a figurehead acting on behalf of Nazarbayev, in spite of clear indications that he was assertively pushing a reformist agenda against the resistance of elements of the “old guard.” Following the January 2022 events, he has made significant breaks from Nazarbayev's legacy through constitutional reforms, including stripping Nazarbayev's title of “Elbasy” (or national patriarch) and removing immunity protections for his family.

Further changes include increasing Kazakhstan’s presence on the world stage and decreasing reliance on Russia. Kazakhstan's “positive balance” policy (initially promoted by Tokayev in 1997, when he was Foreign Minister) has gained new significance, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Tokayev’s condemnation of the invasion, acceptance of Russian draft evaders, and pursuit of alternative pipelines have established Kazakhstan as a middle power outside Russia's sphere of influence. Regionally, Kazakhstan has increased its influence through initiatives like the Turkic World Vision-2040 program.

Kazakhstan is Central Asia's largest economy ($261.4M GDP in 2023). Under Tokayev, the country is actively diversifying away from Russian and Chinese influence, especially as a result of Russia’s damaged reputation following the invasion of Ukraine and public skepticism toward Chinese business practices. Seeking alternatives, Kazakhstan has successfully attracted Western investment, particularly from the United States ($65B invested), which sees Kazakhstan as a potential alternate rare-earth supplier and strategic partner in the region.

CONCLUSIONS: President Tokayev has evolved beyond his initial role as Nazarbayev's chosen successor, building a distinct legacy as revealed in his Ana Tili interview. His vision for Kazakhstan's future emphasizes its role as a middle power, balancing engagement with the United States, European Union, Russia, and China to maintain political and economic sovereignty. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan has strengthened its position by expanding regional ties and diversifying its interests beyond Russia and China.

However, significant challenges remain. Kazakhstan must navigate complex domestic power dynamics, including potential resistance from remaining elements of the old guard and public discontent, especially regarding economic opportunities. Meanwhile, Russia continues to pressure Kazakhstan to limit its independent foreign policy, while public skepticism of Chinese influence constrains economic partnerships. The success of economic diversification and domestic reforms will depend on Tokayev's ability to manage these internal and external pressures while maintaining Kazakhstan's sovereignty.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Anna Harvey is a Researcher at the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute and the American Foreign Policy Council. She received a Master of Arts in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University. She has written for Newsweek, the U.S. Army War College War Room journal, and Postimees newspaper.

By Rafis Abazov

Kazakhstan has long sought to establish itself as a "middle power" in Eurasia, though its geographic and political significance has often been overshadowed by rivalries among major powers like Russia, China, and the West. Recent developments—such as the rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), expanded Eurasian transport links, and deeper global economic integration—offer new opportunities to realize this ambition. These themes were explored at the Kazakhstan Economic Freedom Conference held in Astana in September 2024, where experts debated whether Kazakhstan can effectively capitalize on these trends to enhance its global standing.

BACKGROUND:  In international relations, a "middle power" refers to a state that, while not a superpower, exerts significant regional influence and acts as a bridge between larger global powers. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy with a GDP of US$ 261 billion (2023), has pursued this status through a strategy of balancing relations with major neighbors like Russia and China while fostering strong ties with the West. Astana emphasizes principles of non-alignment and multivector diplomacy, enabling the country to mediate regional conflicts, support global non-proliferation, and contribute actively to international organizations.  Kazakhstan’s vision as a middle power is rooted in its economic potential, particularly its vast reserves of oil, gas, and minerals, which have attracted substantial foreign investment over the past three decades. This influx of investment has supported infrastructure development and economic diversification, bolstering its regional standing. By leveraging its natural resources, strategic geographic position, and diplomatic engagement, Kazakhstan aspires to shape regional and global dynamics. Nevertheless, as global economic systems and technological innovations transform the international landscape, Kazakhstan’s ability to adapt and capitalize on these changes will be crucial in achieving its middle-power ambitions.

IMPLICATIONS:  Three key developments hold the potential to bolster Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power, with one of the most transformative being the rise of CBDCs. As digital equivalents of national currencies issued by central banks, CBDCs promise to revolutionize global financial systems by improving transactional efficiency, strengthening monetary policy, and significantly reducing the costs of cross-border payments. Kazakhstan is actively examining the potential of CBDCs, drawing lessons from countries like China, which has advanced in developing the digital yuan.  For Kazakhstan, adopting a CBDC could modernize its financial infrastructure, enhancing its integration into global and regional financial networks. A national CBDC would not only streamline domestic payment systems but also facilitate faster, cheaper, and more secure international transactions. This shift could play a pivotal role as Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economy beyond oil and gas, attracting foreign direct investment in emerging sectors such as advanced technology, green energy, and financial services.  Additionally, a CBDC would enable Kazakhstan to exercise greater control over its monetary system, reducing reliance on foreign currencies in trade and cross-border finance. Amid increasing geopolitical tensions and the impact of sanctions on global trade flows, such autonomy within a digital financial ecosystem could significantly enhance Kazakhstan’s economic resilience and reinforce its strategic positioning as a middle power. The second key development bolstering Kazakhstan's middle-power aspirations is its role in bridging East and West. Strategically located at the center of Eurasia, Kazakhstan has long been pivotal in regional transportation and logistics. This role is being strengthened by the expansion of Eurasian transportation corridors, particularly the 4,200-km Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). Positioned at the intersection of major trade routes connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Kazakhstan's importance has grown amid disruptions in global supply chains caused by geopolitical tensions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and shifting trade partnerships. Initiatives such as China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project further underscore Kazakhstan’s centrality in facilitating overland trade between China and Europe. Investments in infrastructure—including railways, highways, and ports—enhance Kazakhstan’s potential to capture a larger share of international trade flows, boosting its economy and geopolitical relevance. Discussions at the Astana conference highlighted how these transportation corridors present a critical opportunity for Kazakhstan to redefine its middle-power role. By strengthening economic ties with major global actors such as China, the European Union, and Turkey, Kazakhstan not only solidifies its position as a regional logistics hub but also enhances its capacity as a mediator. This dual role, connecting East and West through both trade and diplomacy, reinforces Kazakhstan’s strategic standing in an increasingly interconnected world. The third development shaping Kazakhstan’s aspirations as a middle power is its integration into the global economy amidst ongoing global shocks. Like many nations, Kazakhstan has faced significant economic disruptions in recent years due to the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical conflicts, and environmental crises. Mark Uzan, director of the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee and co-organizer of the Astana conference, noted that these shocks have disrupted global supply chains, heightened financial market volatility, and altered trade patterns. They have also exposed vulnerabilities in Kazakhstan’s economic model, particularly its reliance on natural resource exports. Kazakhstan’s response to these challenges has been twofold. Domestically, the government has emphasized economic diversification, with investments in renewable energy, agriculture, and digital technologies. Internationally, Kazakhstan has pursued deeper integration into global and regional economic systems, including active participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Astana conference underscored the urgency for Kazakhstan to accelerate its diversification efforts and strengthen resilience to external shocks. Policies promoting advanced technology transfer, improved governance, and enhanced participation in global value chains were identified as critical steps. Successfully navigating these challenges could not only stabilize Kazakhstan’s economy but also enhance its credibility and influence as a middle power on the global stage.

CONCLUSIONS:  At the international conference in Astana, experts emphasized the transformative potential of CBDCs in positioning Kazakhstan as a financial hub in the region and a key player in the emerging digital economy. By adopting CBDCs and advancing digital finance, Kazakhstan could assert itself as a middle power by actively shaping global financial norms and practices. Moreover, integrating regional transportation corridors with technologies like blockchain and digital logistics platforms could improve efficiency and transparency in trade, giving Kazakhstan a competitive edge. With strategic control over vital transportation routes and a commitment to digital innovation, Kazakhstan is well-positioned to influence the reconfiguration of global trade networks in the 21st century. Kazakhstan’s rise as a middle power should therefore be reinterpreted beyond its diplomatic and geopolitical role, focusing on its capacity to navigate and shape the regional economic order. The interplay of CBDC adoption, transportation network expansion, and integration into regional and global economic systems creates new pathways for Kazakhstan to enhance its influence on the international stage. However, Kazakhstan’s ability to secure middle-power status will depend on well-calibrated economic policies that address internal challenges while responding to global economic, technological, and geopolitical shifts. The conference underscored the importance of embracing digital finance, expanding its transportation hub role, and building economic resilience. By doing so, Kazakhstan can solidify its position as a pivotal actor in the future of the Eurasian region and the global economy.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is the author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007) and The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013). He was executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan between 2014 and 2019 and organized the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan in 2014 and 2015. He served as a UNDP project manager (joint project UNDP, FAO, and UNICEF) between 2019 and 2022.