By Sergey Sukhankin

Uzbekistan, the most populous nation in Central Asia, has announced a strategic objective to significantly enhance the proportion of green energy within its energy portfolio and to utilize the surplus as a revenue source by exporting it to energy-demanding countries.This prioritization of green energy stems from ecological, economic, and geopolitical considerations. Given Uzbekistan's vast but largely untapped potential in this sector, Tashkent's initiative has been positively received internationally, with investors from China, the Gulf region, and the European Union expressing readiness to provide financial resources and technical expertise. However, despite growing international interest and the political elite's professed commitment, certain domestic challenges have led experts to question Uzbekistan's capacity to fully realize its considerable green energy potential.

Photo by Vladimir Jirnov

BACKGROUND: The end of 2024 witnessed a potentially transformative event for the development of green energy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. On November 13, during the World Leaders Climate Action Summit in Baku, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership agreement focused on the production and transmission of green energy. According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy, the country plans to commence exporting green electricity, primarily generated from solar and wind power, to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan by 2030.

This agreement reaffirms and solidifies the previously signed protocol in Astana, which outlined the establishment of the Central Asia-Azerbaijan-Europe Green Energy Corridor project. Beyond benefiting Uzbekistan, this initiative aims to strengthen ties between the two most influential Central Asian nations—despite their existing challenges—and enhance connectivity between Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby fostering improved inter-regional trade and cooperation. Uzbekistan is strategically positioned to develop its green energy potential, benefiting from a surplus of inexpensive labor and over 320 sunny days annually. Studies indicate that Uzbekistan possesses the most promising wind and solar energy potential in Central Asia.

By 2027, Uzbekistan plans to construct twelve state-of-the-art thermal power plants across the Bukhara, Tashkent, Khorezm, Kashkadarya, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, and Syrdarya regions. These projects are expected to generate an additional 49.7 billion kWh of electricity annually and, as asserted by Uzbekistan’s political leadership, will be realized through public-private partnerships financed primarily by foreign investments. Moreover, alongside its collaboration with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan’s green energy initiatives present opportunities to enhance economic and political cooperation with other Central Asian countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose competitive advantage in green energy lies in hydropower generation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Uzbekistan stands to benefit from developing its significant green energy potential in three primary ways. First, by mitigating environmental impacts and reducing natural gas consumption. Given the country’s rapidly growing population and its economic model, the political leadership has recognized the critical role of clean energy in supporting the local economy. By late 2024, Uzbek officials reported that solar and wind power plants had generated 4.5 billion kWh of electricity, conserving 1.36 billion cubic meters of natural gas and preventing 1.89 million tons of harmful emissions. Successes in green energy carry notable diplomatic and political implications. Uzbekistan’s leadership is actively positioning the country as a key regional player in green energy and sustainability, a stance explicitly articulated by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev during the 2024 annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Samarkand. This strategy not only enhances the country’s international image but is also expected to generate significant economic benefits.

Second, the development of green energy offers Uzbekistan an opportunity to strengthen economic ties with the European Union (EU). Historically, EU-Uzbekistan relations have been marked by challenges, primarily due to differences in values. However, the geopolitical shifts following Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 have underscored the mutual economic benefits of collaboration between the resource-rich Uzbekistan and the economically powerful EU.

In early 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized Uzbekistan’s export potential in green energy, stating that the country plans to produce 13 billion kilowatt-hours of green electricity, far exceeding domestic demand by a factor of 10 to 12, with the surplus available for export. According to Uzbek officials, the country is ready to supply between 2 and 5 gigawatts (GW) of green energy to Europe. In support of this initiative, the Italian company CESI is already conducting a feasibility study to facilitate the export of green energy to the EU.

Importantly, collaboration in green energy may serve as a stepping stone toward broader mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Uzbekistan, particularly in the economic sphere. The EU and individual member states, notably France, have shown significant interest in Uzbekistan's natural resources, especially critical metals, whose production Uzbekistan is determined to expand. In the context of China's assertive actions in the critical metals sector, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, holds the potential to significantly enhance its role as a key supplier of essential metals and resources to the EU, addressing the bloc's strategic needs.

Third, Uzbekistan seeks to strengthen ties with Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These resource-rich nations, equipped with advanced technologies, are particularly attractive to Uzbekistan due to their lack of a geopolitical agenda in Central Asia, unlike Russia or China, and their non-interventionist approach to local norms and values, which sometimes contrasts with the EU.

Prominent Gulf-based corporations, such as ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia) and Masdar (UAE), are already actively engaged in developing Uzbekistan’s green energy potential and have announced ambitious future plans. For Uzbekistan, access to the Gulf's financial and technological resources addresses a critical need, enabling it to navigate the complex dynamics between Russia, China, and the EU—traditional power players in Central Asia. Moreover, if Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan cooperation in green energy proves successful, Uzbekistan could leverage these Gulf partnerships to diversify its foreign economic policy more effectively and enhance its regional and global strategic position.

However, these optimistic projections are tempered by concerns raised by experts regarding Uzbekistan's ability to translate its substantial potential into tangible outcomes. The primary issue lies in the country’s persistent challenges with deeply entrenched corruption and the ineffective management of resources, both of which hinder economic growth and deter foreign investment.

Unfortunately, the clean energy sector appears to be no exception. For instance, one investigative analysis uncovered structural corruption within the sector. Another recent investigation highlighted significant deficiencies in innovation within Uzbekistan's power grid and exposed multiple corruption schemes, while also drawing attention to Uzbekistan’s strengthening ties with Russia, which is reluctant to support Uzbekistan's modernization and transition to a green economy.

A second concern relates to the high cost of green energy production. Experts argue that even in economically and technologically advanced Western countries, green energy remains secondary to traditional energy sources. For Uzbekistan, unless production costs are significantly reduced—a process that could take considerable time—green energy may remain a luxury rather than a feasible primary energy source.

A third challenge, even if the first two are successfully addressed, is the region’s increasingly arid climate. Uzbekistan is already experiencing the adverse effects of sandstorms and similar natural phenomena, which disrupt the operations of solar panels and wind turbines. If these trends persist, they could undermine Uzbekistan's ability to achieve economies of scale, a key factor for reducing costs through the mass production of green energy. This climatic volatility poses a significant risk to the long-term viability of Uzbekistan's green energy ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan's potential success in transforming its significant green energy potential into practical achievements could yield substantial multidimensional benefits for both the country and the broader region. However, achieving this outcome requires effectively addressing two interdependent challenges.

The first is tackling endemic corruption and the ineffective management of resources—longstanding issues that have plagued Uzbekistan and its leadership since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although President Mirziyoyev has initiated reforms, progress in combating these systemic problems remains insufficient.

The second challenge is Uzbekistan's strengthening ties with Russia, which could hinder its ambitious initiatives. Russia has little interest in supporting Uzbekistan's economic growth or its transition to a cleaner energy mix. Moreover, Moscow is unlikely to favor efforts to enhance intra-regional economic and political cooperation, as these developments would bolster Central Asia's autonomy and reduce its dependence on Russia. Addressing these issues is critical for Uzbekistan to realize its green energy ambitions and contribute to regional development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).