By Sergey Sukhankin

Uzbekistan, the most populous nation in Central Asia, has announced a strategic objective to significantly enhance the proportion of green energy within its energy portfolio and to utilize the surplus as a revenue source by exporting it to energy-demanding countries.This prioritization of green energy stems from ecological, economic, and geopolitical considerations. Given Uzbekistan's vast but largely untapped potential in this sector, Tashkent's initiative has been positively received internationally, with investors from China, the Gulf region, and the European Union expressing readiness to provide financial resources and technical expertise. However, despite growing international interest and the political elite's professed commitment, certain domestic challenges have led experts to question Uzbekistan's capacity to fully realize its considerable green energy potential.

Photo by Vladimir Jirnov

BACKGROUND: The end of 2024 witnessed a potentially transformative event for the development of green energy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. On November 13, during the World Leaders Climate Action Summit in Baku, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership agreement focused on the production and transmission of green energy. According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy, the country plans to commence exporting green electricity, primarily generated from solar and wind power, to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan by 2030.

This agreement reaffirms and solidifies the previously signed protocol in Astana, which outlined the establishment of the Central Asia-Azerbaijan-Europe Green Energy Corridor project. Beyond benefiting Uzbekistan, this initiative aims to strengthen ties between the two most influential Central Asian nations—despite their existing challenges—and enhance connectivity between Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby fostering improved inter-regional trade and cooperation. Uzbekistan is strategically positioned to develop its green energy potential, benefiting from a surplus of inexpensive labor and over 320 sunny days annually. Studies indicate that Uzbekistan possesses the most promising wind and solar energy potential in Central Asia.

By 2027, Uzbekistan plans to construct twelve state-of-the-art thermal power plants across the Bukhara, Tashkent, Khorezm, Kashkadarya, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, and Syrdarya regions. These projects are expected to generate an additional 49.7 billion kWh of electricity annually and, as asserted by Uzbekistan’s political leadership, will be realized through public-private partnerships financed primarily by foreign investments. Moreover, alongside its collaboration with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan’s green energy initiatives present opportunities to enhance economic and political cooperation with other Central Asian countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose competitive advantage in green energy lies in hydropower generation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Uzbekistan stands to benefit from developing its significant green energy potential in three primary ways. First, by mitigating environmental impacts and reducing natural gas consumption. Given the country’s rapidly growing population and its economic model, the political leadership has recognized the critical role of clean energy in supporting the local economy. By late 2024, Uzbek officials reported that solar and wind power plants had generated 4.5 billion kWh of electricity, conserving 1.36 billion cubic meters of natural gas and preventing 1.89 million tons of harmful emissions. Successes in green energy carry notable diplomatic and political implications. Uzbekistan’s leadership is actively positioning the country as a key regional player in green energy and sustainability, a stance explicitly articulated by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev during the 2024 annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Samarkand. This strategy not only enhances the country’s international image but is also expected to generate significant economic benefits.

Second, the development of green energy offers Uzbekistan an opportunity to strengthen economic ties with the European Union (EU). Historically, EU-Uzbekistan relations have been marked by challenges, primarily due to differences in values. However, the geopolitical shifts following Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 have underscored the mutual economic benefits of collaboration between the resource-rich Uzbekistan and the economically powerful EU.

In early 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized Uzbekistan’s export potential in green energy, stating that the country plans to produce 13 billion kilowatt-hours of green electricity, far exceeding domestic demand by a factor of 10 to 12, with the surplus available for export. According to Uzbek officials, the country is ready to supply between 2 and 5 gigawatts (GW) of green energy to Europe. In support of this initiative, the Italian company CESI is already conducting a feasibility study to facilitate the export of green energy to the EU.

Importantly, collaboration in green energy may serve as a stepping stone toward broader mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Uzbekistan, particularly in the economic sphere. The EU and individual member states, notably France, have shown significant interest in Uzbekistan's natural resources, especially critical metals, whose production Uzbekistan is determined to expand. In the context of China's assertive actions in the critical metals sector, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, holds the potential to significantly enhance its role as a key supplier of essential metals and resources to the EU, addressing the bloc's strategic needs.

Third, Uzbekistan seeks to strengthen ties with Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These resource-rich nations, equipped with advanced technologies, are particularly attractive to Uzbekistan due to their lack of a geopolitical agenda in Central Asia, unlike Russia or China, and their non-interventionist approach to local norms and values, which sometimes contrasts with the EU.

Prominent Gulf-based corporations, such as ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia) and Masdar (UAE), are already actively engaged in developing Uzbekistan’s green energy potential and have announced ambitious future plans. For Uzbekistan, access to the Gulf's financial and technological resources addresses a critical need, enabling it to navigate the complex dynamics between Russia, China, and the EU—traditional power players in Central Asia. Moreover, if Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan cooperation in green energy proves successful, Uzbekistan could leverage these Gulf partnerships to diversify its foreign economic policy more effectively and enhance its regional and global strategic position.

However, these optimistic projections are tempered by concerns raised by experts regarding Uzbekistan's ability to translate its substantial potential into tangible outcomes. The primary issue lies in the country’s persistent challenges with deeply entrenched corruption and the ineffective management of resources, both of which hinder economic growth and deter foreign investment.

Unfortunately, the clean energy sector appears to be no exception. For instance, one investigative analysis uncovered structural corruption within the sector. Another recent investigation highlighted significant deficiencies in innovation within Uzbekistan's power grid and exposed multiple corruption schemes, while also drawing attention to Uzbekistan’s strengthening ties with Russia, which is reluctant to support Uzbekistan's modernization and transition to a green economy.

A second concern relates to the high cost of green energy production. Experts argue that even in economically and technologically advanced Western countries, green energy remains secondary to traditional energy sources. For Uzbekistan, unless production costs are significantly reduced—a process that could take considerable time—green energy may remain a luxury rather than a feasible primary energy source.

A third challenge, even if the first two are successfully addressed, is the region’s increasingly arid climate. Uzbekistan is already experiencing the adverse effects of sandstorms and similar natural phenomena, which disrupt the operations of solar panels and wind turbines. If these trends persist, they could undermine Uzbekistan's ability to achieve economies of scale, a key factor for reducing costs through the mass production of green energy. This climatic volatility poses a significant risk to the long-term viability of Uzbekistan's green energy ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan's potential success in transforming its significant green energy potential into practical achievements could yield substantial multidimensional benefits for both the country and the broader region. However, achieving this outcome requires effectively addressing two interdependent challenges.

The first is tackling endemic corruption and the ineffective management of resources—longstanding issues that have plagued Uzbekistan and its leadership since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although President Mirziyoyev has initiated reforms, progress in combating these systemic problems remains insufficient.

The second challenge is Uzbekistan's strengthening ties with Russia, which could hinder its ambitious initiatives. Russia has little interest in supporting Uzbekistan's economic growth or its transition to a cleaner energy mix. Moreover, Moscow is unlikely to favor efforts to enhance intra-regional economic and political cooperation, as these developments would bolster Central Asia's autonomy and reduce its dependence on Russia. Addressing these issues is critical for Uzbekistan to realize its green energy ambitions and contribute to regional development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Stephen Blank

As a second Trump Administration takes power it is worth inquiring of its future policies towards Central Asia and the Caucasus. While neither region is likely to be a priority of U.S. policy, both offer Washington numerous opportunities to advance its interests, vis-à-vis the regional states as well as the larger actors bordering them, most prominently Russia, China, and Iran. If the incoming administration adheres to the framework that Trump’s first team propounded of this being an era framed by great power competition, it may indeed come to see the value of upgrading U.S. policy towards these countries. Across Central Asia and in the Caucasus, particularly among the Georgian population now rising against its government, and in Armenia, a stronger U.S. profile would certainly be welcome.

BACKGROUND: For Washington to fully benefit from enhanced relations with the governments of Central Asia and the Caucasus, it must acknowledge and adapt to the current regional realities. These regions have transformed significantly over the past generation, necessitating a rethinking of U.S. engagement strategies. 

First, it is imperative to recognize that Central Asian states, as well as Russia and China, have come to terms with the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan and now consider Afghanistan an integral part of Central Asia. Despite Washington’s current reluctance to adopt a similar stance, advancing economic and political engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus creates a foundation for future dialogues involving Afghanistan. These engagements would prepare the groundwork for meaningful regional discussions and collaborations when conditions become favorable.

Second, Azerbaijan is rapidly emerging as a key player in Central Asia. President Aliyev is frequently invited to and actively participates in regional presidential summits and Azerbaijan takes full part in significant regional economic, trade, and transportation initiatives. These projects, either in progress or under serious consideration, underscore Azerbaijan’s importance in shaping the region’s geopolitical and economic landscape. Consequently, any effective U.S. policy towards the Caucasus or Central Asia must account for these evolving regional dynamics. Recognizing and leveraging the interconnectedness between these regions will allow the U.S. to engage more effectively and with greater agility in advancing its strategic interests.

U.S. policymakers must also rethink both regions in a broader context. Central Asia and the Caucasus have established lasting inter-regional connections and ties to major global actors, including Turkey, Iran, India, South Korea, and Japan, alongside Russia and China. On economic grounds alone, Washington should increase its presence through trade, investment, environmental initiatives, and security cooperation, especially as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development forecasts robust growth for these states. Wider U.S. engagement is needed in contrast to its neglect for the region during the Afghanistan war—when U.S. policy was narrowly focused—and subsequent disengagement after Afghanistan fell to the Taliban. 

Continued U.S. and Western inattention gives Moscow and Beijing opportunities to solidify hegemonic influence, despite local governments’ explicit preference for multivector foreign policies. While the Biden Administration accepted Kazakhstan’s 5+1 presidential summit, this event has not become a recurring engagement, nor have there been significant high-level visits. Initiatives like the Economic Resilience in Central Asia (ERICEN) program are underfunded and lack alignment with an overarching strategy. This pattern of inadequate resources and strategic disconnect has long characterized U.S. initiatives in the region.

Similarly, strategy documents, such as the Trump Administration’s Central Asia Strategy to 2025, have achieved little, reflecting a lack of both intellectual and institutional commitment to the strategic importance of these regions. This is further evidenced by the absence of a strong U.S. response to Russian interference in Georgia, minimal involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, and the overall lack of a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia. Such bipartisan neglect highlights the critical need for a reformed and proactive approach to U.S. policy in the region.

IMPLICATIONS: To reverse this record of failure, the new administration must rethink its approach to these regions, recognizing their growing linkages and the potential of regional and international cooperation. Such collaboration will strengthen these states’ independence from Beijing and Moscow, aligning with vital U.S. interests. However, this objective requires large-scale institutional reform.

The State Department, Pentagon, and the National Security Council should establish a dedicated structure for Caucasus and Central Asian affairs. At the State Department, this would involve appointing an Assistant Secretary of State to oversee this portfolio, to whom the corresponding country desks report directly. In turn, he or she can report directly to the Under Secretary, Secretary of State, their opposite numbers at the Pentagon, and the White House at the National Security Council. Such a structure would elevate these regions’ importance in policymaking and provide the president with a more transparent and effective process for addressing issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

This reorganization would enable an integrated “whole-of-state” approach, ensuring that that U.S. policies align with its strategic interests and that regional voices are heard. It also allows the U.S. government to conduct policies towards these areas based on its interests rather than on the values of junior bureaucrats as in the State Department’s Bureau of Labor and Democracy. Its members previously boasted that they were going to impose democracy on Central Asian states and achieved merely an ignominious failure. They failed because they refused to take into account that every one of these governments has alternatives to Washington and factions within them who lean towards Moscow and Beijing. Therefore, in the absence of sustained U.S. engagement, all that these lectures achieved was increased anti-American resentment and a turn to other powers who took these states as they are. This outcome is visible in U.S. relations with Azerbaijan, which has many other patrons and several pro-Russian figures in its government. Baku spurned Congressional and Administration demands for democratization and subsequently moved closer to Russian policy. Undoubtedly, they saw these demands as moves initiated by this bureau and the Armenian lobby who influenced Congress in the absence of any coherent U.S. strategy.

Structural and intellectual reorganization will allow Washington to engage strategically and consistently with regional governments. By connecting democratization efforts with significant economic, political, and defense projects, these governments will find it harder to forgo the benefits of cooperation. Additionally, this structure minimizes the

influence of single-interest Congressional lobbies by emphasizing comprehensive and strategic policies. As Central Asia and the Caucasus gain prominence, increased administrative capability will enable better collaboration with Congress to shape balanced and forward-looking strategies. A proactive, strategic approach will not only enhance U.S. influence but also support the independence and development of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Addressing the importance of these regions in U.S. policymaking is critical to securing long-term stability and countering hegemonic ambitions by other powers.

CONCLUSIONS: The opportunities of the future and lessons from the past are unmistakable. Previous U.S. policies failed for reasons detailed in academic and professional literature. However, the Trump administration has a chance to respond to the region’s desire for enhanced U.S. economic, political, and military cooperation. Possibly excepting the pro-Moscow Georgian government, every state in the region seeks greater U.S. engagement, albeit on their terms.

This desire signifies a positive development that Washington should support by implementing the structural and policy changes outlined here. These adjustments would bolster the independence of Central Asia and the Caucasus and facilitate their cooperation with international institutions to spur regional development. This progress would empower these states to shape their futures independently, and not according to the wishes of Moscow or Beijing.

Failure to seize these opportunities and continuing inaction will leave these regions vulnerable to becoming backward, conflict-ridden dependents of Russia and China. The new generation, more aligned with Western values, may lose its chance for a brighter future. Rather than becoming stable regions fostering global cooperation, Central Asia and the Caucasus risk devolving into conflict zones where international rivalries escalate.

The U.S. must act decisively to prevent such an outcome. By prioritizing these regions and adopting a proactive strategy, Washington can mitigate great power competition and avert prolonged instability across Eurasia. The stakes are too high to ignore the transformative potential of effective engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

Svante E. Cornell and Brenda Shaffer

December 4, 2024

The United States, Europe, the United Nations and more are promoting a top-down energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, which shows no signs of emergence. Under this scenario, Europe and the global market are likely to maintain demand for the energy riches of Central Asia for many decades to come. The gas market of Central Asia itself requires additional gas volumes as well. In order to lower carbon emissions and air pollution and improve public health in Central Asia, the ideal policy in the region  is increased access to natural gas that can replace the widespread burning of biomass and lump coal. Current European policies promote expanding electrification and  is leading to a new look at nuclear energy. Accordingly, the uranium deposits of Central Asia have become of high commercial and geopolitical interest. 

Central Asia in the Energy Transition (PDF) Download

By Sergey Sukhankin

In Kazakhstan’s recent referendum, over 71 percent of voters endorsed building the country’s first nuclear power plant (NPP), marking a significant step toward advancing this major infrastructure project. Strongly supported by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and the national political elite, the NPP is expected to address Kazakhstan’s current and projected electricity needs. Additionally, as the world’s leading uranium producer, Kazakhstan stands to benefit from self-sufficiency in uranium enrichment, reducing its reliance on external suppliers. A key issue now centers on which entity will secure the NPP construction contract, with geopolitical considerations expected to weigh heavily alongside technological and economic factors.

BACKGROUND:  Discussions about constructing a new, modern NPP in Kazakhstan date back to the early 2000s. From 1973 to 1999, the country operated an NPP in Shevchenko (now Aktau), which was closed as part of Kazakhstan’s de-nuclearization policy. However, tangible steps toward this goal only began in 2021, following a severe electricity shortage linked to a spike in cryptocurrency mining and pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the European Union’s push for sustainable trade relations led Kazakhstani political leaders to prioritize renewable energy expansion in the national economy. In promoting a public vote for constructing an NPP, the government highlighted four main priorities: averting a potential energy crisis amid rising electricity demand; mitigating environmental risks linked to unsustainable energy sources; reducing Kazakhstan's reliance on electricity imports from Russia; and preserving the competitiveness of Kazakh exports to the EU. Despite compelling arguments supporting the nuclear power plant project, significant concerns have emerged from local experts, civil society, and the public. A primary worry centers on the risk of nuclear accidents, with Chernobyl and Fukushima serving as stark reminders of possible environmental catastrophes. Specific fears include potential harm to the fragile ecosystem of Lake Balkhash, which is already experiencing drying and may face further degradation from plant operations. Moreover, experts emphasize Kazakhstan's current lack of expertise and infrastructure for safely managing nuclear waste, leaving the issue of radioactive waste disposal unresolved. The economic viability of Kazakhstan's nuclear project is also a subject of concern. Critics point to the high construction costs and question the plant’s long-term financial sustainability, especially given the uncertain outlook for future electricity demand. Some experts suggest that the expected surge in demand may not occur as projected. They argue that even if demand does rise, Kazakhstan has alternative options, such as expanding renewable energy sources and improving the efficiency of the current electricity grid, which could address energy needs without relying on nuclear power. Geopolitical concerns further drive opposition to Kazakhstan’s nuclear project. Recent incidents at nuclear facilities, such as Zaporizhzhia and Kursk, illustrate the vulnerability of such infrastructure during conflicts, highlighting risks if similar instability arises in Central Asia. Additionally, Kazakhstan’s limited technical expertise and financial resources mean it would likely depend heavily on foreign partners to build and operate the plant. Critics argue that this reliance could compromise Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, with potential implications for the country’s long-term energy autonomy and geopolitical independence.

IMPLICATIONS:  Four main contenders have emerged to construct Kazakhstan’s NPP: Russia’s Rosatom, China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KEPCO), and France's Électricité de France (EDF). While Kazakhstan has pledged to base its choice on factors such as economic feasibility, technological reliability, and environmental safety, Russia and China realistically lead the race. Although France and South Korea bring significant expertise, high construction costs (potentially exceeding US$ 12 billion) and geopolitical dynamics may limit their competitiveness. Thus, Kazakhstan appears to face three pragmatic options moving forward. One option is for China to assume the role of sole contractor for the project, a scenario with several competitive advantages. China offers relatively lower construction costs compared to French and South Korean alternatives and maintains a robust trade and investment relationship with Kazakhstan, enhancing its influence as an economic partner. However, the feasibility of China proceeding alone is uncertain. Moscow might perceive China’s unilateral role as a diplomatic slight, as Russia has become a key strategic partner and potential Arctic access point for China. Moreover, it remains unclear if China is willing or prepared to undertake this project independently, given its geopolitical sensitivities. A second option is to appoint Russia as the sole contractor, a role Moscow has long pursued. Between 2010 and 2019, President Vladimir Putin personally lobbied Kazakhstan to select Rosatom as its nuclear plant builder. Given Russia’s current geopolitical isolation and diminishing network of allies, Moscow might view any exclusion of Rosatom as a serious diplomatic offense. The recent “grain war” between Russia and Kazakhstan—allegedly sparked by Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS—demonstrates how swiftly Moscow might respond with retaliatory measures if it perceives a breach in loyalty or alignment. An analysis of Russian sources indicates several strategies Russia might use to “encourage” Kazakhstan to prioritize Rosatom’s bid. A primary leverage point is Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russian territory for transporting export-bound oil. Approximately 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russia, and oil revenue constitutes about two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s national budget. Any disruption in this transit route could precipitate a fiscal crisis for Kazakhstan, with severe implications for the stability of its national budget. A second leverage point is Russia’s role in alleviating Kazakhstan’s energy deficit through electricity exports. Russian experts warn that any abrupt cessation of this supply could lead to severe energy shortages in Kazakhstan, potentially triggering economic and political instability. These pressure points are further highlighted by recent incidents, such as the explosion at Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev discussed with EU officials increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supplies. These events suggest that- Should Kazakhstan consider alternatives to Russia for its NPP construction, it might face similar pressures or retaliatory actions from Moscow. Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russia for both oil export infrastructure and electricity supply exposes the country to significant vulnerabilities. Nearly 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, and oil revenues account for approximately two-thirds of the national budget. Any disruption to this transport network could result in severe economic consequences, potentially destabilizing Kazakhstan’s fiscal position. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s electricity deficit is largely covered by imports from Russia. Russian experts caution that if Russia were to cut off this supply, Kazakhstan would face a precarious situation, where both political stability and economic restructuring could become unfeasible. These dependencies highlight Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to Russian influence, as demonstrated by the 2022 explosion at the Tengiz oil field, the country’s largest, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev’s discussions with EU officials about increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supply due to the invasion of Ukraine. This incident underscores Russia’s capacity—and potential willingness—to retaliate against Kazakhstan should the country act in ways that conflict with Russian interests. A third option is to form an international consortium to oversee the construction of the NPP. This approach could provide a balanced compromise, allowing Russia to participate without being the sole contractor, thus reducing the risk of secondary economic sanctions. Such an arrangement might appeal to Moscow, as it would obscure Rosatom’s central role while still involving Russian expertise. Notably, President Tokayev has rhetorically supported the idea of an “international consortium,” suggesting that this could be the most feasible solution. However, several uncertainties surround the international consortium option. A significant challenge is that the construction of the nuclear reactor, the core component of the NPP, cannot be easily divided among multiple parties. This raises the critical issue of who would be responsible for sourcing and manufacturing the reactor, as the origin of this essential component remains unclear. Furthermore, the distribution of responsibilities within the consortium could lead to complications. Some members would likely take leadership roles, while others would play secondary, supportive functions. The precise allocation of these roles, and how they align with the interests of the participating companies, remains uncertain, potentially creating tensions within the consortium and complicating cooperation and decision-making.

CONCLUSIONS:  The construction of Kazakhstan’s NPP will provide crucial insight into Russia’s influence in Central Asia, a region where assertions of Russia’s diminishing role may underestimate its true significance. The outcome of this project could offer a clearer picture of Russia’s geopolitical and economic standing in the region. If Kazakhstan ultimately selects Rosatom as the sole bidder—an outcome that seems less probable—or if Russia’s state corporation participates within an international consortium, it will symbolize Russia’s continued strategic presence in Central Asia. Such a scenario would highlight Russia’s ability to retain substantial leverage in the region, despite competing global interests. Whether as the lead contractor or a key consortium member, Rosatom’s involvement would likely reinforce its central role in the region’s energy infrastructure and broader geopolitical affairs.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Vali Kaleji

Over the past decade, “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has emerged as a significant instrument for China to advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The inability of certain nations, such as Sri Lanka and various African countries, to repay their loans has resulted in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure, including ports and mines. However, the repercussions of China’s debt-trap diplomacy vary across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable within the region. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, leveraging gas exports to China, do not encounter substantial difficulties. Conversely, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most susceptible Central Asian nations to China’s “Debt-trap Diplomacy.”

BACKGROUND: The concept of “Debt-trap Diplomacy” was first introduced by Indian academic Brahma Chellaney in 2017. This term describes a relatively new policy tool employed by China in connection with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The strategy involves China extending excessive loans to low-income, heavily indebted countries that are unable to repay them. Consequently, these borrowing nations are compelled to cede strategic assets to China in a debt-for-equity swap to alleviate their debt burden. Recent studies indicate that Beijing has also become a significant emergency rescue lender to these same countries, many of which are struggling to manage their debts. Between 2008 and 2021, China allocated US$ 240 billion to bail out 22 countries, predominantly those involved in Xi Jinping’s BRI. Countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Mongolia, Zambia, Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia have been notably impacted by China’s debt-trap policy in recent years. A prominent example of this policy is the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. The Chinese government provided a loan for the port’s development, which was carried out by Chinese contractors. When Sri Lanka failed to meet its loan repayments, China leased the port for 99 years as a form of debt repayment. This 99-year lease is strategically significant for Beijing, particularly in the context of its competition with India in the Indian Ocean. In Central Asia, statistical data indicate that with the expansion of China’s economic and commercial influence, the debt owed by countries in this region to Beijing has increased significantly. By the first half of 2023, Central Asia’s collective debt to China had reached US$ 15.7 billion, representing 7.6 percent of the region’s external debt. Kazakhstan, in particular, has accumulated a substantial amount of hidden debt. According to central bank data, as of January 1, 2024, Astana owed US$ 9.2 billion, primarily to the China Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank). However, this debt constitutes only about 3.5 percent of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (GDP), a figure that has remained relatively stable over the past three years. Tajikistan, on the other hand, owes an estimated US$ 3.3 billion to foreign investors, with half of this amount owed to China, equating 27 percent of its total GDP. Consequently, China is Tajikistan’s primary creditor. According to the Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan, as of early 2024, the country’s debt to China stood at US$ 900 million, which accounts for 27.8 percent of its total external debt. By the end of 2023, Uzbekistan’s debt to China amounted to US$ 3.775 billion, representing just under 13 percent of its total external debt. Notably, by 2022, the China Development Bank (CDB) held US$ 2.2 billion of this debt, making it Uzbekistan’s third-largest creditor. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, has approximately US$ 4 billion in outstanding loans to China, which constitutes around 40 percent of its total GDP. This equates to roughly US$ 700 owed to China per Kyrgyz citizen. The country’s bilateral concessional loans exceed US$ 2 billion, or 44 percent of its total debt. Of this, 36.7 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt is owed to the Export-Import Bank of China, amounting to US$ 1.7 billion in 2023. Akylbek Japarov, the chairman of the Kyrgyz Cabinet of Ministers, has stated that the country has reached the peak of its external debt payments. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov has expressed optimism that, if the current situation remains stable, the country’s foreign debt could be paid off by 2035. Regarding Turkmenistan, the information available is limited and unclear. The only notable instance is a statement by then-President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov on June 12, 2021, asserting that Turkmenistan had fully repaid loans provided by China for the pipeline and the first stage of the Galkynysh gas field development on time and in full.

IMPLICATIONS: Over the past two decades, China has supplanted Russia as the primary economic and trading partner of Central Asian countries. Debt-trap diplomacy plays a crucial role in solidifying this shift. The inability of Central Asian nations, particularly those with weaker economies like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their loans could result in China acquiring ownership of key infrastructure within these countries. For instance, China might gain control over the Kyrgyz thermal power plant in Bishkek, the Datka-Kemin power transmission line, and the road connecting the northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, China could potentially own and manage Tajikistan’s gold and silver mines. Consequently, the capacity of Central Asian countries, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, to repay their debts to China holds significant and long-term strategic implications. Debt repayment can sustain China as a crucial economic and trade partner for Central Asian countries, which is vital for maintaining a balance against Russia. However, the inability to repay these loans will lead to a strong dependence on China, creating conditions similar to Russia’s relationships with Belarus and Armenia. In 2002, under the “Property for Debt” agreement between then-President of Armenia Robert Kocharian and the Russian Federation, Armenia’s inability to repay its loans resulted in the Russian government taking ownership of significant economic infrastructure, including electricity, gas, telecommunications, and railways. This process has significantly contributed to Armenia’s strong dependence on Russia. Even after two decades, despite considerable dissatisfaction with Russia, Nikol Pashinyan’s government has struggled to establish a more independent and diverse foreign policy. Similarly, debt-trap diplomacy and China’s potential ownership of infrastructure could lead to comparable outcomes for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, akin to the situation in Armenia or the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. This scenario poses a serious challenge for these small Central Asian countries in terms of “diversifying” and “balancing” their foreign policies. This challenging process has led to a rise in anti-Chinese sentiments and Sinophobia in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in recent years. Notably, in 2011, Tajikistan resolved a border dispute by ceding land, a move believed to be part of a debt relief agreement with China. Furthermore, in 2018, over 30,000 Chinese migrants, many of whom were construction workers on BRI-funded projects, arrived in Kyrgyzstan. Given this context, there are serious concerns about the negative and potentially dangerous consequences of China’s debt-trap diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tajik political scientist Parviz Mullojanov has warned that accumulating Chinese debt is “playing with fire,” as it could serve as a pretext for political and geopolitical expansion at any moment. However, leaders and experts close to Central Asian governments dismiss these concerns as Western propaganda against China. They argue that borrowing and repayment are part of economic interdependence in today’s world, which can foster economic growth. This perspective is reflected in signs around Tajikistan’s capital that read: “Assistance from China for a common future.” On the other hand, the lack of transparency in Chinese loan agreements, coupled with infrastructure investments, has exacerbated issues of corruption and oligarchy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appear to face fewer challenges and threats from China’s debt-trap diplomacy, largely due to their stable and growing economies. Additionally, Turkmenistan stands out as the only Central Asian country with a positive trade balance with China, primarily due to its gas exports. Consequently, the loans and debt to China, whose full extent remains unclear, do not pose a significant threat to Turkmenistan’s economy.

CONCLUSIONS: Over the past 22 years, China has invested US$ 105 billion in Central Asia through development finance, with the China Development Bank (CDB) playing a pivotal role in this process. “Debt-trap Diplomacy” has become a crucial tool for advancing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it enters its second decade. During a virtual summit in January 2022, marking 30 years of diplomatic ties with Central Asian countries, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would provide US$ 500 million in aid to Central Asia over the next three years to support socially significant projects. Furthermore, in October 2023, at the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, China and Central Asian states adopted a joint action plan for developing green technology in the region. Given these developments, it is expected that China’s loan policies and debt-trap diplomacy will continue in Central Asia. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine presents an opportunity for China to further expand its economic and financial influence in the region, similar to the Ruble Crisis of 1998. However, the impact of China’s debt-trap diplomacy varies across Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan’s debt to China is considered the most manageable by regional standards. Uzbekistan, benefiting from economic growth, and Turkmenistan, with its positive trade balance due to gas exports to China, do not face significant challenges. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most vulnerable to China’s debt-trap diplomacy. If these countries are unable to repay their substantial debts to China, which constitute a significant portion of their GDP, they may face situations similar to those experienced by Sri Lanka and Armenia. This could pose serious challenges to their efforts to diversify and balance their foreign policies.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .