John DiPirro

July 25, 2025

Armenia stands at a critical crossroads as it seeks to break free from Russian influence and integrate with the West. Following recent peace talks with Azerbaijan in Abu Dhabi and the proposed U.S.-overseen Zangezur Corridor, Armenia has a unique opportunity to transform its geopolitical position. The nation must navigate four key strategic priorities: normalizing relations with Turkey despite historical tensions over the Armenian Genocide, accelerating EU and NATO integration while strengthening democratic institutions, developing strategic industries including defense manufacturing partnerships with Europe, and leveraging the Zangezur corridor to deepen ties with India as an emerging defense partner. With the pivotal 2026 parliamentary elections approaching and Russia intensifying hybrid attacks to destabilize the government, Armenia's choices will determine whether it consolidates as a democratic, pro-Western anchor or reverts to dependence and instability.

Read Armenia's Corridor Toward Regional Stability

By Anna Vardanyan

The unprecedented anti-church campaign launched in Armenia at the end of May of this year, which is comparable only to the early Soviet years in terms of the severity of the measures, seems to cross all red lines. High-ranking clergy members are being arrested, the Prime Minister makes defamatory statements against the incumbent Catholicos and threatens to dethrone him, and law enforcement officers invade the country’s main church. What are the main drivers of these events, and what impact could they have on regional stability?

An Armenian Orthodox Church (Image Courtesy of GetArchive.net)

BACKGROUND: There are several reasons behind the current conflict between the Armenian government and the church. The current Armenian government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church have never been allies. Clashes with the church started from the very first days the revolutionary government came to power in 2018. The prime minister has regularly criticized the church hierarchy for its connections with the former authorities, which he calls a “criminal regime.” Looking back, it should be noted that, unlike with the current authorities, there were never issues with the Catholicos and the public during the three previous presidents’ rule. The incumbent Catholicos Karekin II was elected in 1999 during the administration of the first president, Levon Ter-Petrossyan, and has and still maintains very close relations with the latter. During the administrations of the second president, Robert Kocharyan, and the third president, Serzh Sargsyan, the Catholicos was treated respectfully, and there was  mutual understanding and support from the government to the church. There were even accusations that the Catholicos was obviously backing Kocharyan’s and, specifically, Sargsyan’s regimes and interfering in the political life of the state.

However, after the revolution in 2018, there were actions that appeared to be initiated by Pashinyan against the Catholicos, with a view to discrediting his reputation. In particular, from June to October 2018, protest rallies were held in which the participants demanded the resignation of Karekin II, whom they considered to be allied with the former authorities and accused of being involved in shady business deals.

Critics brought forward the narrative that Karekin II was “closed and shadowy,” he is believed to be too involved in business – a claim given greater weight by the discovery of a million-dollar Swiss bank account in his name. In 2015, an investigative report revealed that he had a million-dollar Swiss bank account, but the leaked files do not specify the exact role that Karekin II had in relation to the account, and the press spokesman of Catholicos said it was opened by his predecessor and used to help the Church.

The movement against the Catholicos, dubbed “New Armenia, New Patriarch,” has been holding rallies in downtown Yerevan, recording video appeals against Catholicos, and picketing his office in Echmiadzin, even pushing and grabbing him, as seen in an extraordinary video that shocked Armenians both for its aggression against the Catholicos and for the surprising vulnerability he displayed.

Nikol Pashinyan, during that period, stated that he was not going to intervene to reduce tensions against the Catholicos and emphasized the separation of church and state. However, as the movement failed to receive public support and was viewed rather poorly, Pashinyan’s targeting of the church ceased for a while.

After the defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, pressure on Pashinyan grew and Church leaders called for his resignation. The Catholicos urged Pashinyan to step down “to prevent further shocks, possible clashes, and tragic consequences to the public, to elect a new prime minister in consultation with political forces and to form an interim government of national accord.”

After this, the relationship between the Catholicos and Pashinyan deteriorated irretrievably. On the one hand, the Armenian Church remains the only state institution that maintains independence from Pashinyan and his team. Moreover, the religious structure more than once spoke out from nationalistic positions, becoming a stronghold of protest sentiments. Last spring, it was the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church who spoke out against the delimitation of the border with Azerbaijan in the Tavush region. Local archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan then became the leader of the resistance movement. First, he led a march from the line of contact to Yerevan and then held several large rallies in the Armenian capital. The movement was also supported by the central leadership of the Church. The Investigative Committee of Armenia unfolded allegations that Galstanian had begun preparations for the violent overthrow of the government in November 2024 with the members of his opposition-backed movement.

In a statement, the Committee alleged that the group had planned to assassinate unnamed “civilians,” take other violent actions, and paralyze the country’s security apparatus for that purpose. According to official information, Galstanyan was planning to “form 200 groups of militants, each with 25 people, in order to occupy parliament.”  He allegedly discussed this with Levon Kocharyan, the son of Armenia’s second president and a member of parliament. As a result of this, Galstanyan and 14 supporters were arrested on June 26.  

However, this process of repression was not limited only to Galstanyan's arrest. Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahyan, the leader of the Shirak Diocese, has also been arrested, charged with “usurpation of power and overthrow of the constitutional order.” Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian billionaire with Russian citizenship, who recently expressed his willingness to support the Armenian Apostolic Church, was also arrested. He is also accused of inciting a coup d'état. The Investigative Committee claims that these three individuals played a role in a terrorist act being prepared against the state.

The government's campaign against the church and recent arrests have been criticized by Armenian civil society. More than two dozen non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders are raising the alarm that the authorities are interfering with the autonomy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, as well as the principle of the independence of the judicial system.

IMPLICATIONS: The government-church conflict in Armenia should not be viewed solely as an internal political process within the country. It eventually has a broader scope, and in some sense fits into the realm of global processes taking place in the world, given the trends of separation of church and state and the “secularization” of spirituality in the world. According to the Constitution of Armenia, the church is separated from the state ( Article 7.1. ), nevertheless, since its formation, it has enjoyed state support and actively participated in the country's political processes: there are also known periods in Armenian history when, in the absence of a state, the church assumed the role of the state itself.

As for the role of the church in Armenia today, it has broad public influence, but no legal powers or duties. When it comes to bringing a clergyman into the legal arena, it leads to a tension of sentiments, because neither in terms of public perception nor in terms of law are there regulations aimed at clarifying the powers of the church and the government. Meanwhile, the Armenian Church enjoys a strong reputation both inside the country and in the Armenian diaspora. According to the results of the 2011 census in Armenia, about 97 percent of the country's population are followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Further aggravation of church-state relations could lead to civil conflict within the country and pose a threat to the re-election of the current authorities in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026, which, in turn, could abort the efforts of the current authorities to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The ruling party is approaching the election campaign in a difficult position. This spring, representatives of the ruling “Civil Contract” party lost two key positions in the mayoral elections in Gyumri and Parakar. Surveys indicate that the same result could be seen at the national level. According to a survey conducted by MPG/Gallup International Association in January of this year, the support for the pro-government “Civil Contract” is only 11 percent.  At the same time, the church enjoys considerable trust among the population. According to the Caucasus Barometer, a national household survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), which sampled 1,561 people aged 18 and over in Armenia between July and October 2024, about 79 percent of Armenian residents expressed trust in the Armenian Apostolic Church, making it the highest figure among public institutions.

It is likely that the church will support the opponents of the ruling party, thereby increasing their chances of victory. Perhaps the campaign to discredit the clergy was launched by the authorities in order to prevent such a scenario. Moreover, the authorities may want to provoke some protests now so that by the election date, they will have already fizzled out. However, the crisis that has arisen threatens a split. If Pashinyan succeeds in changing the Catholicos, then opposition-minded citizens of Armenia and parishes in the Diaspora may not recognize the first hierarch appointed after political interference.

This conflict between the government and the church in Armenia could lead to a dangerous point, when external forces could take advantage of this situation and try to implement some of their plans through the Church or interfere in the internal affairs of the country. All this can fit into Russia's plans, for example, which wants to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, and considers the Armenian church as a factor of influence in the region. It is worth mentioning that the brother of Karekin II is the Primate of the Russian Armenian Diocese, and Samvel Karapetyan has great financial resources, has created tens of thousands of jobs in Armenia, and Pashinyan and his team are wary that he could fund large demonstrations and achieve a change of power in Armenia backed by Russia. The opposition and the Armenian Apostolic Church, Armenian businessmen in Russia, and the Armenian community in Russia may unite around Karapetyan, which could lead to Pashinyan's resignation. It is no coincidence that Russian public figures affiliated with the Kremlin have issued severe condemnations of the Armenian authorities’ attacks on the church, including a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who described the attacks on the Armenian Apostolic Church as “deeply worrisome and unjustified.” Lavrov's statement was immediately followed by a harsh response from Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, urging him “not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Armenia.”

The Kremlin is keen on the dominance or victory of Echmiadzin in this conflict, on the basis not of Christian solidarity but geopolitical interests. The Kremlin seeks to destabilize the situation in Armenia and create a chaotic and uncontrollable situation. Even if the current weakened government remains in Armenia, its dependence on the Kremlin will only increase under such unstable conditions.

Ultimately, this conflict may weaken the position of Christianity in the South Caucasus. It is no coincidence that the Chairman of the Caucasus Muslims’ Board (CMB), Sheikh-ul-Islam Pashazade, encourages this conflict and regularly criticizes the Armenian Church, considering it a “threat to neighbors.”

CONCLUSIONS:  It is obvious that the reasons for the conflict between the government and the church are political. The current authorities and the Church elite have many controversies, including on issues of fundamental importance for Armenia. The authorities see the Catholicos and the bishops as yet another political opponent, against whom they are applying all available tools. Nevertheless, what is most disturbing is that the ruling party and the Prime Minister himself are fueling this rift by employing aggressive methods that threaten both democratic norms and religious freedom. Instead of stabilizing the situation, they often exacerbate tensions by using divisive rhetoric and targeting individuals, setting a dangerous precedent for political debate. This behavior threatens to deepen existing divisions within society at a crucial stage for Armenia's democratic development. Such escalations threaten to further split Armenian society, influence the results of the upcoming elections next year and negatively affect the peace negotiations with Azerbaijan-- something that in turn will affect the entire region. Pashinyan's course aims to form a “homogeneous political space,” but risks defeat in parliamentary elections and a premature resignation from power and politics. In this case, there is a significant risk that Armenia will revert to a Russian orientation, despite Russia’s gradual decline in  influence in the South Caucasus today.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Anna Vardanyan is an independent journalist-researcher based in Yerevan. For ten years she has worked as a Communications expert and Media advisor to the Vice-President of the Parliament of Armenia. She has been working as an accredited journalist at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia.

By Suren Sargsyan

Donald Trump’s return to the White House marked significant shifts in U.S. foreign policy. His second presidential term not only departs from the foreign policy approach of the Biden administration but also diverges considerably from his own first term. The rapidly evolving trajectory of U.S. foreign policy has profound implications—not only for U.S. allies but also for countries and regions that are directly or indirectly affected by changes in Washington's global posture. The status of the South Caucasus, which has seen varying degrees of U.S. engagement and interest over the years, has become increasingly unclear in the Trump administration’s foreign policy, despite pivotal geopolitical developments that increase the region’s significance.

BACKGROUND: Scholarly literature reflects a range of views regarding Western, and particularly U.S. interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. One prevailing argument suggests that the West has historically exhibited limited engagement in these regions, largely because they have been traditionally considered part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Some analysts even contend that, with the exception of the Baltic states, most former Soviet republics have been implicitly regarded as falling within Russia’s zone of control by Western powers themselves.

Conversely, a competing viewpoint asserts that the U.S. has maintained clear, albeit non-vital, strategic interests in the region. While not central to U.S. foreign policy, these interests are nonetheless significant. Accordingly, Washington has sought to exert influence when opportunities have presented themselves most notably in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, following the September 11 terrorist attacks, and after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.

At various times and for varied reasons, U.S. policy toward the countries of Central Asia has gained increased attention, often surpassing the level of engagement shown toward the South Caucasus. This heightened focus has been driven by several key factors. Notably, following the events of September 11, 2001, Central Asia became strategically important for the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. In addition, the region has been viewed as a critical arena for geopolitical competition with Russia and China. The presence of significant energy resources has further elevated the strategic value of Central Asia in U.S. foreign policy calculations.

It is also important to recognize that the U.S. has rarely articulated official, standalone strategies for individual regions such as the South Caucasus. Exceptions exist—for instance, the Trump administration’s publication of a formal strategy for Afghanistan in 2017 or Central Asia Strategy of 2019 but they are rare. Often, regions like the South Caucasus are subsumed under broader strategic frameworks, such as the Caspian Basin, Eurasia, or the Greater Middle East. Within this context, U.S. policy toward Iran also influenced engagement with the South Caucasus. Even in the absence of a declared strategy, U.S. efforts to isolate Iran often relied on close cooperation with neighboring states, including Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, the U.S. viewed Georgia—and, to a lesser extent, Armenia—as potential counterweights to expanding Russian influence in the region. Moreover, Washington saw the normalization of Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the opening of their shared border as strategically important. Only under such circumstances could the closure or limiting the capabilities of the Armenia-Iran border be considered a feasible long-term policy goal. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. has sought to play an active role in addressing regional conflicts and unresolved issues, recognizing that the persistence of such disputes could create opportunities for the resurgence of Russian influence in the region. This understanding also underpinned Washington's active involvement in the OSCE Minsk Group and its support for the negotiation process regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

IMPLICATIONS: During Donald Trump’s first presidency, U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus was relatively passive. Throughout those four years, there were very few direct and active engagements with the leaders of South Caucasus countries, reflecting a lack of a robust or comprehensive bilateral agenda. While cooperation has taken place in specific areas, the U.S. did not maintain an active, coordinated, or consistent presence in the region. This changed significantly under President Joe Biden, particularly after the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and even more so following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning in 2022. Biden moved quickly to become involved in the South Caucasus, positioning the U.S. as a mediator in both Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish relations. Under leadership of President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken, Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish negotiations gained momentum. There was a concerted effort to reach a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan during Biden’s presidency, especially since the bulk of the negotiations had taken place under the mediation of his administration. However, the Democratic Party’s electoral defeat created a complicated situation. The new Trump administration appears to place little priority on the fact that the peace agreement is essentially ready, with only a few unresolved points remaining before it can be signed. As for the Armenian-Turkish negotiations, they too seem to have stalled under the current administration, suggesting a broader slowdown in U.S. engagement in the region's peace processes.

Moreover, several pressing questions remain unanswered. It is unclear how the U.S. envisions its mediating role within the framework of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agreement. Equally ambiguous is the meaning behind Trump advisor Steve Witkoff’s recent comment suggesting that Armenia and Azerbaijan could join the Abraham Accords. There is also uncertainty about the future of U.S. policy toward Georgia—once considered a strategic partner but now appearing to have lost that status—as well as toward Armenia, which was granted a similar strategic designation just days before President Biden's departure. More broadly, it remains unclear whether the U.S. views the South Caucasus as a cohesive regional unit or continues to approach it as a collection of separate, unrelated states.

CONCLUSIONS: Maintaining a presence in the South Caucasus requires effective engagement with each state individually. However, a regional approach remains essential. Within Trump’s team, there appears to be a growing understanding of the significance of the South Caucasus for Russia, Iran, and Turkey not only geopolitically but in broader historical context. As a result, extending U.S. influence in the region would require both a clearly defined regional strategy and tailored bilateral tools, including the application of soft power. Yet the Trump administration’s limited interest in soft power (cutting all foreign assistance programs), its lack of enthusiasm for deepening bilateral partnerships, and its relatively passive role in regional conflict resolution, all point towards the absence of a strategic approach toward the South Caucasus. The Trump administration still lacks a concrete policy toward the South Caucasus as a region, as well as clear strategies for conflict resolution in the region and distinct approaches to Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan individually.

This will complicate the efforts of future U.S. administrations to establish meaningful involvement in the region and could create an environment conducive to the emergence of regional formats like the 3+3 platform (involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Turkey, and Iran). The establishment of such a framework would effectively push not only the U.S. but also the EU out of the region—at a time when the EU is struggling to maintain relevance in global geopolitics, especially as long as Washington acts unilaterally. A withdrawal of U.S. influence from the South Caucasus would make reengagement either impossible or extremely difficult. Therefore, if the U.S. aims to maintain influence in a region bordered by its historical rival Iran, strategic competitor Russia, and a problematic ally in Turkey, Washington must, at the very least, preserve its current level of influence. This includes deepening strategic relationships, applying soft powr, and fostering new economic and business ties. Within this context, it would be logical for the administration to intensify its efforts to support the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as enhance its engagement with Georgia. Unresolved issues in the region will prevent the U.S. from achieving a robust strategic presence—not only across the South Caucasus as a region but also within the individual countries that comprise it.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate in U.S. foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

By Davit Petrosyan

On 13 March 2025, Yerevan and Baku announced consensus on the peace agreement text, raising hopes of ending the decades-long conflict. The U.S. described it as a “historic peace treaty,” while the European Council encouraged both parties to proceed with signing. However, closer analysis suggests the document is more about formally closing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict than achieving sustainable peace. The failure to resolve key disputes—such as unblocking regional transit routes and border delimitation—combined with growing military imbalance in Baku’s favor and Armenia’s concession of important deterrent tools, suggests that Azerbaijan may launch new escalations when the broader geopolitical climate becomes more permissive. 

Photo source: ffikretow

BACKGROUND: The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to the late 1980s, when a war (1988-1994) broke out between ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region—an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Armenians—and Azerbaijani forces. With backing from the Republic of Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians gained control not only over Nagorno-Karabakh but also seven adjacent districts. A ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia on 5 May 1994 effectively froze the conflict. Although Nagorno-Karabakh achieved de facto independence, it remained unrecognized by any country, including Armenia. The OSCE Minsk Group—co-chaired by Russia, the U.S., and France—was established to facilitate a peaceful resolution.

After sixteen years of stalled negotiations, the conflict reignited on 27 September 2020, when Azerbaijan—backed by Turkey—launched a large-scale offensive, reclaiming the seven surrounding districts and about a third of Nagorno-Karabakh. Following several failed mediation attempts by Russia, France, and the U.S., Russia brokered a ceasefire on 9 November 2020. The agreement commissioned the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the region; the establishment of a joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center; and the transferred control of the Lachin corridor, previously under Armenian control and connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, to Russian peacekeeping forces. 

In the following period, Yerevan and Baku engaged in several rounds of peace talks, initially mediated by Moscow. Over time, however, the EU and the U.S. assumed more active roles. Early negotiations focused on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and later evolved into discussions about the rights and security of Armenians living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Negotiations also centered on border delimitation, humanitarian issues including the return of prisoners of war and detainees, the handover of landmine maps, and the search for missing persons. A particularly contentious issue was the unblocking of regional transit routes (connectivity), including the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which would connect Azerbaijan to its western exclave, Nakhichevan. 

Despite ongoing talks, Azerbaijan launched military incursions into Armenia’s internationally recognized territory between 2021 and 2022, occupying approximately 215 square kilometers. In response, Armenia invited the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor its border with Azerbaijan. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blockaded the Lachin corridor—with the tacit approval of Russian peacekeepers—and, following a ten-month blockade, launched an offensive that resulted in the forced displacement of 120,000 ethnic Armenians from the region. 

Since then, peace talks have continued, with Armenia seeking to avoid further escalation and Azerbaijan advancing new demands. On 13 March 2025, both parties announced a consensus on the text of the peace agreement. However, Azerbaijan added two conditions: the “amendment” of Armenia’s Constitution and the dissolution the OSCE Minsk Group. 

IMPLICATIONS: The agreement fails to resolve all disputes, leaving flashpoints that could trigger new escalations. One major issue is connectivity—the modalities for restoring road links, which is absent from the finalized text. Azerbaijan continues demanding unhindered access to its western exclave Nakhichevan, and has repeatedly threatened to open the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” by force. Conversely, Armenia views any extraterritorial corridor as a red line, signaling its resolve to respond proportionally. This marks a shift from earlier Azerbaijani incursions, when Armenian forces adopted a defensive posture, with Prime Minister Pashinyan declaring that Armenia would not retake occupied territories militarily. 

The diverging stances of regional powers on connectivity could either deter or ignite a future conflict. On February 14, 2025, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova blamed Armenia for “freezing” trilateral efforts to reopen routes. On March 26, 2025, Turkish President Erdoğan declared plans to build regional trade corridors centered on Zangezur. Conversely, on September 7, 2024, a senior Iranian official reaffirmed that the “Zangezur Corridor” was a red line for Iran. Joint Armenia-Iran military exercises in April 2025, amid increased Azerbaijani activity along the border, aimed to demonstrate Iran’s readiness to deter Azerbaijani attempts to take the route by force.

The agreement also leaves border delimitation unresolved, which has already led to military clashes, with Azerbaijan occupying 215 km² of Armenian territory. To date, only one portion of the border has been delimited. Key areas where Azerbaijani forces have advanced remain undelimited. Azerbaijan has shown no intention of withdrawing, raising doubts about the agreement’s ability to resolve tensions and establish lasting peace. Importantly, Russia can leverage disputes on this issue and connectivity to maintain its influence in the region. 

The EUMA’s removal from the Armenian–Azerbaijani border would significantly weaken Armenia’s security. Since EUMA’s deployment in mid-February 2023, not a single square meter of Armenian territory has been occupied. The mission has served as an effective external balancing tool, deterring Azerbaijani advances. Given that large portions of the border remain undelimited, EUMA’s withdrawal would eliminate a key stabilizing presence and increase the risk of new Azerbaijani aggression. 

Under the peace deal, Armenia agreed to withdraw international lawsuits against Azerbaijan, forfeiting another deterrent. Four applications to the European Court of Human Rights documented widespread Azerbaijani human rights violations during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, while Armenia's complaint to the International Court of Justice accused Azerbaijan of systematic racial discrimination. Dropping these cases not only erases the record of violations but also removes a major constraint on Azerbaijan’s future actions, freeing its hands for provocations. 

The peace agreement lacks enforcement mechanisms. No third party is designated to oversee compliance, further increasing the risk of escalation. It also fails to address the fate of at least 106 Armenian prisoners of war (POWs) and detainees, making the document resemble a “punitive” conclusion to the war rather than a genuine peace agreement. 

One of the primary motivations behind Azerbaijan’s additional conditions, “amending” Armenia’s Constitution and dissolving the Minsk Group, is to bury the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Constitution’s preamble cites the 1990 Declaration of Independence and references the joint statement of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan portrays this as evidence of Armenian territorial claims. The dissolution of the Minsk Group is intended to symbolize the closure of the conflict it was created to resolve.

Finally, the military balance continues to shift in Azerbaijan’s favor. While both countries allocate 4–5 percent of their GDP to defense, Azerbaijan’s spending was 3.5 times higher in 2020, 4.4 times higher in 2021, 3.8 times higher in 2022, and 2.7 times higher in 2023. Projections show that Azerbaijan’s defense budget was 2.7 times higher in 2024 and is expected to be 2.9 times higher in 2025. As the imbalance grows, Azerbaijan’s confidence in resorting to force to compel Armenia into new concessions is likely to increase.

CONCLUSION: The current peace agreement fails to resolve crucial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, depriving Armenia of important balancing and deterrent mechanisms. The two additional conditions put forward by Azerbaijan suggest that at this stage, Baku's aim is not to achieve a comprehensive peace, but to decisively close the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The failure to address the issue of Armenian POWs and detainees held in Baku, as well as the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, demonstrates that this agreement is not aimed at bringing sustainable peace to the South Caucasus but rather at formally confirming Azerbaijan's achievements so far. 

The weak peace agreement and the continually shifting military balance in Azerbaijan's favor enables Baku to retain the necessary levers to escalate the situation when the geopolitical environment appears more favorable. It reserves options to compel Armenia into new concessions, such as securing the route to Nakhichevan on its own terms and constraining Armenia's post-conflict recovery efforts. Finally, diverging positions over the reopening of regional transit routes and conflicting interests among regional powers could serve as additional triggers for renewed escalation, providing Russia with opportunities to maintain its influence in the region. 

AUTHOR BIO: Davit Petrosyan is a Fulbright Scholar pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Previously, he served as an Assistant to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia and as Chief Program Officer of Restart Civic-Youth Foundation.

By Emil Avdaliani

Since Donald Trump’s return to office, Washington has initiated high-level negotiations with Moscow aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine. Although the outcome of these discussions remains uncertain, it is increasingly apparent that the U.S. and Russia are moving toward finding common ground on their most contentious disputes. However, U.S. attempts to establish a lasting rapprochement with Russia will likely produce negative implications for Ukraine, undermining its sovereignty, and potentially impacting other borderland areas, notably the South Caucasus, where Russia challenges Western influence.

Photo source: NASA.

BACKGROUND: Each of the three South Caucasus countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—has articulated distinct expectations regarding Trump's presidency. The Biden administration lacked a clear strategic vision for the South Caucasus, with Washington frequently oscillating between emphasizing human rights and democracy promotion (as exemplified by Georgia), and pursuing strategic calculations, such as swiftly signing a strategic partnership with Armenia to deepen the divide between Yerevan and Moscow. Washington's approach towards Azerbaijan similarly blended democratizing objectives with strategic considerations.

Under Biden’s administration, Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s relations with the U.S. deteriorated, whereas Armenia, aiming to reduce its excessive reliance on Russia, benefited from Washington's policies between 2021 and 2024, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement in January. Consequently, all three states anticipate enhanced engagement from the Trump administration, with Azerbaijan and Georgia particularly expecting a significant shift toward greater transactionalism and realism in bilateral foreign relations.

Both Tbilisi and Baku have anticipated that under Trump their relations with the U.S. would improve. For example, Tbilisi supported the U.S.-backed UN resolution on Ukraine that diluted Russia’s responsibility for initiating the conflict. Similarly, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev indicated in a statement that “…when President Trump led the U.S., our relationship developed very successfully—unlike the past four years, during which it significantly deteriorated owing to the Biden administration’s unfair and unjust stance toward Azerbaijan.”

IMPLICATIONS: A potential major agreement between the U.S. and Russia regarding Ukraine would likely affect the South Caucasus countries differently; however, the overall outcome may well be characterized by an expansion of Russian influence across the region.

Throughout Russia’s war in Ukraine, Moscow has faced significant challenges in maintaining its influence over the South Caucasus. Other powers, including China, Iran, Turkey, the Arab Gulf states, and even India, have expanded their presence in the region through substantial investments, trade agreements, and enhanced cooperation in security and energy sectors. This development has resulted in a period of regional multipolarity, where no single actor has been able to establish exclusive dominance. Consequently, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have increasingly diversified their foreign policies, embracing a multi-vector approach beyond traditional partnerships.

Tbilisi and Yerevan have been notably successful in pursuing this strategy. For example, the Georgian government, while publicly maintaining its aspiration to join the EU, has concurrently signed a strategic partnership with China, enhanced cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and developed stable relations with Russia, despite the latter’s ongoing occupation of two Georgian regions. Armenia, aiming to reduce its reliance on Moscow, has sought increased military cooperation with India, explored the possible normalization of relations with Turkey, and, most significantly, announced its intention to seek EU membership.

Nevertheless, with a potential agreement on Ukraine, Russia would once again have the capacity to redirect resources into the South Caucasus to restore its weakened position. The Trump administration is unlikely to prioritize the smaller South Caucasus states, instead viewing the region primarily as within Russia’s sphere of influence. This approach aligns with Washington’s broader foreign policy objective of shifting its strategic focus toward the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the U.S. lacks significant investments in the South Caucasus and shows limited interest in developing the Middle Corridor connecting Azerbaijan and Georgia to Central Asia.

More significantly, the South Caucasus states themselves increasingly perceive momentum shifting in the Kremlin’s favor and appear unlikely to oppose this declining trend. A potential agreement on Ukraine, which would solidify Russian gains, is expected to accelerate this shift toward Moscow. Indeed, Georgia and Azerbaijan have already anticipated such developments; what initially emerged as a policy of appeasement following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has since evolved into a understanding that the balance of power in the region favors Russia. This shift partially reflects necessity, as Western powers were—and remain—unlikely to provide meaningful military assistance, while Russia continues to pose a credible threat despite its engagement in Ukraine.

Moreover, Georgia's approach reflects a deliberate foreign policy strategy implemented by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, in power since 2012, aimed at developing a multi-vector diplomatic stance. Integral to this approach is the recognition of Russia's regional influence and a corresponding effort to maintain stable relations with Moscow. Although Georgia and Russia lack formal diplomatic relations, their bilateral economic ties have expanded considerably. Additionally, Tbilisi has subtly indicated declining enthusiasm for NATO and EU membership, both particularly contentious issues from Moscow's perspective.

In contrast, Baku possesses a considerably broader set of tools to counterbalance Russian influence, occasionally resulting in bilateral tensions, as exemplified by the recent incident involving a downed Azerbaijani aircraft. Nevertheless, geographical proximity, significant economic linkages, and Russia's formidable military presence will ultimately compel Azerbaijan toward reconciliation with Moscow. Indeed, signs of rapprochement are already evident through subtle gestures, such as the unveiling of a statue in Moscow honoring Heydar Aliyev, the father of current Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Baku's hosting of the 22nd session of the bilateral inter-parliamentary commission.

Even in the case of Armenia, which signed a strategic partnership agreement with the U.S. shortly before Biden left office, it remains uncertain whether Washington will seriously commit to its implementation. Previous experiences are particularly instructive: between 2008 and 2024, Georgia maintained a strategic partnership agreement with the U.S., covering issues such as preparation for a free trade agreement, visa liberalization, and enhanced military and security collaboration. However, few tangible outcomes materialized, suggesting a similar pattern could emerge for Armenia. Early indicators are indeed discouraging, as evidenced by the reported postponement of a planned U.S. delegation visit to Yerevan. Additionally, Armenia's prospects for EU membership remain remote, given Georgia's ongoing difficulties with Brussels and internal disagreements within the EU regarding enlargement. Consequently, these factors will likely prompt Armenia to moderate its stance toward Russia, returning to full-scale cooperation even while maintaining certain aspects of its multi-vector foreign policy.

CONCLUSION: In the context of a potential rapprochement between Russia and the U.S. over Ukraine, the South Caucasus emerges as particularly vulnerable. Moscow would gain an opportunity to reassert its regional influence by filling the strategic vacuum left by an increasingly disengaged Washington. Additionally, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are likely to recalibrate their foreign policies to align more closely with Russia. Although this trend has manifested in various forms over recent years, it is expected to accelerate significantly should Moscow successfully conclude its engagement in Ukraine.

AUTHOR BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.