By Stephen Blank

While Central Asian cohesion and regional cooperation grow; the South Caucasus is fragmenting. This process increasingly affects the nature and scope of regional interactions with key international actors. Russian influence has declined precipitously in Armenia, which is turning to the West, and Azerbaijan, which is expanding its circle of partners. However, in Georgia the state increasingly resembles Russia in its autocratic and legal structure and thus its state practices.

BACKGROUND:

Writing in 2024, the Azeri scholar Gulshan Pashayeva observed that a defining feature of the Caucasus was its fragmentation. This fragmentation is deepening and in effect, relationships between the South Caucasus and key external actors have quickly grown and assumed new shapes in 2025. Georgia’s dependence on Russia has grown, whereas Russian influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan has visibly declined as these states are turning to Washington and Europe. 

Georgia is paying the supreme price of colonial status as it over time loses territory to Russia as both South Ossetia and Abkhazia virtually included in the Russian Federation. The Russian-driven borderization whereby Russian or pro-Russian forces either overtly or surreptitiously move border posts demarcating Russian-controlled from Georgian territories to expand Russia’s holdings occurs with impunity.

The mounting discord between the Georgian government and the EU also exemplifies Georgia’s regression. Georgia’s government, possibly at Moscow’s behest, is trampling upon processes necessary for Georgian admission into the EU and frustrating both Brussels’ conditions and the continuing support for EU membership among a majority of the Georgian population. 

Armenia’s government is implementing a program of democratic reform and ultimate membership in the EU while striving to make a conclusive peace with Azerbaijan and normalize ties to Turkey despite staunch resistance by domestic, diasporic elements, the Church and Russian influencers. None of these groups supports peace and many of them, including Russia, fear democratization as signaling a decisive political defeat at home as well as a threat to Russia. It is no surprise that the Church with Russian backing emerged as the leader of an attempted coup in 2025 to replicate Russia’s success in Georgia and reverse Yerevan’s turn to the West.

Azerbaijan’s case is even more striking. Beyond its military-diplomatic success in forging an alliance with Turkey and partnership with Israel to strengthen its military capability, it neutralized Russian support for Armenia while improving ties with key European states and the U.S. The Trump Administration has now built a permanent monument to its military-economic presence in the Caucasus, namely the Trump International Road for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This project brings Washington into the Caucasus as a permanent player and checks Iranian threats to Azerbaijan and links to Armenia, while giving Yerevan a tangible reward for its pro-Western and anti-Russian policies. Meanwhile, Russia’s downing of an Azerbaijani airplane in 2024 and attacks on Azerbaijani residents in Russia have generated enormous resentment in Azerbaijan. 

IMPLICATIONS:

The Caucasus has become a battleground where the great powers and their favored local governments are not only on opposite sides, but where these powers’ rivalry also spills over into trade routes. The TRIPP has duly triggered Georgian apprehension since that project’s inauguration may well push aside Georgia as a preferred partner in the Middle Corridor project that ties together China, Central Asia, and ultimately Europe. But the significance of TRIPP far transcends its potential impact upon Georgia.

This project is only the latest manifestation of the declining Russian influence in the Caucasus and the parallel ensuing fragmentation of the region. While Moscow still holds many levers of influence and has no scruples about using them; they are fewer, less potent than before, and Russia faces a greater and more sustained foreign presence in the Caucasus than at any time since the disintegration of the USSR. Neither is this foreign influence strictly economic as in China’s case and as seen in its sponsorship of the Middle Corridor trade and transportation route through Azerbaijan that bypasses Russia. Türkiye’s alliance with Azerbaijan is of an explicitly military nature that provides an enduring supply of weapons, training, and presumably logistical and intelligence support for Azerbaijan. Türkiye also buttresses this support by providing the primary terminus for Azerbaijan’s increasing energy exports to Europe. Beyond these increasingly deep-rooted connections to Azerbaijan, through the Organization of Turkic States Türkiye now also has an institutional base for enduring outreach to Central Asia and the provision of all manner of military and economic ties to that region. 

Azerbaijan is also increasingly tied to the Middle East through its long-running defense and economic ties to Israel, their mutual collaboration against Iran and its membership in both the Abraham Accords and President Trump’s Board of Peace. Likewise, the EU and Azerbaijan have embarked upon a mutually rewarding series of ties independent of Russian influence and also primarily based on Azerbaijani energy exports in return for EU investment and political support.

Moreover, the advent of the TRIPP has launched what looks like a sustained U.S. presence in the Caucasus. This project is taking physical shape and Vice-President Vance’s visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan demonstrates that sustained interest. Under this project, “American companies could develop railways, roads, and pipelines linking Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave via a corridor through the south of Armenia’s Syunik Province.” Since Azerbaijan is now providing Armenia with energy, a formal peace treaty terminating the state of war over Nagorno-Karabakh under U.S. auspices seems likely. Beyond those signs of U.S. influence, President Trump has just stated that Vance’s tour will, “strengthen our strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, a beautiful Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with Armenia, Deals for our Great Semiconductor Makers, and the sale of Made in the U.S.A. Defense Equipment, such as body armor and boats, and more, to Azerbaijan.” If this lasting multi-domain U.S. presence materializes, it will represent a major blow to Russian ambitions but also codify the fragmentation of the Caucasus and exclude Georgia from the growing and long-term international competition in the region for a long time to come.

CONCLUSIONS:

Russia certainly still has cards to play. It has a long-term military base at Gyumri, Armenia, and well-established connections among the Armenian opposition that is both unreconciled to the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and to the Pashinyan government’s democratizing reforms and efforts to join the EU. Russia also has substantial economic connections to Georgia and what looks like a secure base of influence in Georgia’s government. 

Nevertheless, it is a declining power economically if not militarily and cannot stop the rising foreign presence in the Caucasus. Indeed, it depends on trade coming from Armenia and Central Assia to circumvent Western sanctions and access vital Western goods. Iran, whose back is to the wall due to combined U.S., Israeli, and European military-economic pressure, cannot bail it out. Nor will China, the primary sponsor of the Middle Corridor, rescue it in the Caucasus. Despite the Russo-Chinese “no-limits” partnership, Beijing has never lifted a finger to allow Russia to become a viable economic competitor across Eurasia or regarding inter-continental trade, transport, and connectivity issues.

Therefore, the fragmentation of the South Caucasus and the heightened presence of competing major international actors is likely to continue. Central Asian states, in contrast, forge ahead with mounting cohesion and collaboration. Indeed, those states, recognizing Azerbaijan’s critical geographic position and rising heft, have now included it in what used to be the 5+1 relationship with Washington, transforming it into a 6+1 formation. This development will also contribute to regional fragmentation. Azerbaijan is increasingly a power whose perspectives must embrace Washington, Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, not just the Caucasus.

The ethnopolitical rivalries that made the Caucasus a zone of conflict for a generation after 1991 may, however, be coming to an end as the new ties between Baku and Yerevan and greater foreign connections show. To the extent that Georgia can be helped to resolve its ethnic and other domestic cleavages that Russia continues to exploit, it may become possible for the South Caucasus to emulate the discernible regional cooperation now appearing in Central Asia.

That outcome would be to the benefit of the entire Caucasus as well as to its neighbors and interlocutors. While disappointing to Moscow, its regional clients and those “dead-enders” who wish to rekindle the fires of ethnic conflict, that way has been tried and founds wanting in the balance.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute (www.fpri.org.)

By Ambassador David Dondua

Georgia’s democratic backslide has shocked observers at home and abroad. Once a “beacon of democracy” and a frontrunner of European integration, the country has lost its standing within the European democratic family in a remarkably short time. While this shift may appear sudden, it reflects deeper vulnerabilities—lessons that matter not only for Georgia but also for other small states navigating similar geopolitical crossroads.

BACKGROUND:

The rapid erosion of Georgia’s democratic and pro-Western trajectory cannot be explained by a single decision, policy, or political figure. Rather, it is the result of a complex combination of factors. At the most general level, it reflects the success of a long-term Russian hybrid and cognitive operation against Georgian society, an operation that ultimately proved much more effective than the 2008 military invasion.

As a result of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russia occupied only 20 per cent of Georgia’s territory. In the decade that followed, however, Moscow achieved something far more consequential. Through sustained political influence, economic leverage, disinformation, and elite capture, it gradually penetrated Georgia’s state institutions. Government, parliament, the presidential administration, courts, security services, police, armed forces, and the foreign service all became vulnerable to influence. Most importantly, Russia succeeded in distracting the country from its European integration trajectory and sowing mistrust toward democratic reforms and Western aspirations. Strategically, this amounted to the cognitive occupation of the entire state.

Blaming this reversal solely on Russian hybrid attacks, the pro-Russian stance of the ruling Georgian Dream government, or the role of the de facto ruler, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, would be too simple. The reality is more complex. Among the many political, social, and institutional factors that shaped Georgia’s vulnerability, one has remained largely unrecognized, rarely discussed, and almost entirely absent from public debate.

In the late 1980s, as the collapse of the Soviet Union became inevitable, Georgian society engaged in intense debates about the future of the independent state. Constitutional arrangements, models of governance, economic systems, currency, and even sporting affiliations were openly discussed. One issue, however, was never truly debated: the foreign policy orientation of independent Georgia.

On this question, there appeared to be complete consensus. Becoming part of the West was treated as self-evident—almost sacred. It was widely perceived as the fulfilment of centuries-long aspirations to align Georgia with Europe. No alternatives were discussed, not because they were examined and rejected, but because few dared to articulate them. In a diverse, multi-ethnic society that had lived under Russian rule for more than two centuries, it is unlikely that such alternatives were entirely absent. Yet for the next three decades, this unchallenged consensus shaped both Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy.

IMPLICATIONS: 

From today’s perspective, this unquestioned consensus appears to have been a missed opportunity for deeper and informed societal consolidation. This observation should not be misunderstood as questioning Georgia’s European choice. The author firmly believes that the European path was and remains the right choice for Georgia. Yet accepting this choice without deep public reasoning, open discussion, or even heated debate left society ill-prepared to fully understand and defend it.

Georgian society is often characterized by emotional radicalism, reinforced by a lack of democratic traditions. This leaves limited space for critical reflection. As a result, key aspects of EU and NATO integration were rarely discussed in a fact-based and accessible way. Public support, therefore, remained largely emotional rather than knowledge-based.

This gap became visible whenever misinformation spread. Claims that EU regulations would ban or severely restrict traditional agricultural products, force the uprooting of vineyards—widely perceived as an attack on Georgia’s cultural heritage—or exclude most of local goods from European markets due to strict quality standards repeatedly triggered public outrage. Such narratives exposed how shallow public understanding often was, despite consistently high levels of declared support for European integration.

Insufficient effort was made to explain to citizens that compromise is inherent in joining any international organisation. Government officials and even NGOs promoting the EU and NATO integration often avoided discussing trade-offs and long-term costs. Citizens were rarely told that today’s difficulties are frequently the price of tomorrow’s benefits—choices that can only be made consciously by an informed society.

Following the adoption of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), the state should have launched a large-scale educational effort to demonstrate how this instrument could be applied in practice, particularly for small entrepreneurs and rural communities. While some initiatives were undertaken, largely with donor support, they were insufficient. For many citizens, European integration remained an abstract promise rather than a lived experience.

A fundamental contradiction of Georgia’s post-independence politics is that all Georgian governments over the past three and a half decades have claimed to be pro-Western and have promised the population a European democratic future, including NATO membership. Even the current ruling party, Georgian Dream, publicly declared the same until recently. Yet in practice, the actions of all those governments, without exception, have often fallen short of democratic standards, at times even sharply contradicting them. 

Against this backdrop, today, the ruling party has deliberately cast Europe as a convenient scapegoat for almost all of the country’s past and current difficulties, whether stemming from poor governance, institutional weaknesses, corruption, reform costs, or external developments beyond Georgia’s control. Georgian Dream has transformed ordinary challenges into a political weapon to erode public trust in democratic reforms and derail the country’s European path.

As noted above, in every election, including the watershed 2012 vote, virtually all political actors pledged a European future to voters; even marginal candidates openly backed or courted by the Kremlin used pro-Western rhetoric. Unlike in Ukraine, Moldova, or Armenia, where societies were exposed to competing geopolitical visions and, over time, could observe different policy orientations, compare outcomes, and distinguish between credible and non-credible strategic paths, Georgian voters were never offered a genuine choice. They were offered reassurance that the European path was uncontested and secure. This monopoly of a single geopolitical orientation meant that alternatives were neither seriously articulated nor openly debated. Paradoxically, the absence of pluralism later became a vulnerability: because the European choice was never collectively debated and consciously affirmed, it failed to generate a strong sense of public ownership.

Today, pro-Russian actors exploit this gap by asking: “Who decided that Georgia must choose Europe?” The ruling Georgian Dream has increasingly reinforced this narrative by claiming that the European course was imposed on Georgia by some phantom foreign forces. 

At the same time, fully replacing Europe with Russia remains politically tricky in the short term, given prevailing public attitudes. Instead, the government has sought to cultivate the idea of “state neutrality” as an ostensibly safer alternative to Western integration, one that promises stability while allowing Georgians to preserve their traditions, identity, and way of life without external pressure. Packaged in this way, neutrality appears as a return to normalcy and sovereignty. Such a narrative can gain traction precisely because the European path was never thoroughly debated, internalised, and embraced on the basis of knowledge.

In reality, however, neutrality functions as a transitional narrative rather than a genuine option. Given Georgia’s geography, security environment and economic dependencies, let alone historical experience, neutrality is simply not workable. In practice, abandoning Western integration is the fastest route to renewed subordination to Russia and the gradual erosion of Georgian statehood.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s democratic and geopolitical setback is not the result of abandoning Europe overnight. It is the consequence of failing to cultivate deep understanding, ownership, and resilience around the European choice over three decades. Strategic orientations cannot survive on consensus alone; they require constant explanation, public debate, and civic education.

For years, Georgia proudly cited overwhelming public support for European integration. Yet emotional endorsement without understanding is fragile. A society that genuinely comprehends how Western institutions function and what integration realistically entails is far more resilient to manipulation. In retrospect, 50 or even 40 per cent of firm, knowledge-based support would have been more durable than 80 per cent of symbolic approval. This underscores that the key to Georgia’s recovery lies not in numbers alone but in cultivating genuine understanding and ownership among citizens.

This moment, however, is not irreversible. What was insufficiently addressed in the past can still be corrected. Periods of crisis often force societies to replace inherited assumptions with conscious choices. Continued engagement by Georgia’s Western partners is therefore essential—not less, but more focused on education, communication, and societal resilience.

Europe has not disappeared from Georgia’s collective identity. If reinforced through knowledge rather than slogans, it can still serve as the foundation for democratic recovery and a sustainable return to the European path.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ambassador David Dondua is a diplomat and political analyst. He serves as Chairman of the EU Awareness Centre, a Brussels-based think tank focused on European integration, democratic resilience, and countering hybrid threats in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

By Stephen Blank

It would currently be very much in the U.S. interest to reinvigorate relations with Georgia. Despite Georgia’s growing submission to Russian policy, its mounting anti-democratic repression, and pervasive corruption, opportunities exist that can justify a U.S. policy initiative towards the country. Specifically, Trump can emulate his achievement of inserting U.S. influence over trade routes like the Zangezur corridor to resuscitate the U.S. effort to develop Georgia’s Anaklia port complex on the Black Sea. Success would establish a lasting U.S. presence and provide a counterbalance to Sino-Russian influence. An enduring U.S. trade presence and even management of the primary land and sea corridors linking the Caucasus to both Central Asia and Europe could facilitate a far-reaching strategic transformation throughout these regions.

Image Credit: PICRYL

BACKGROUND: The U.S. is moving quickly to build on President Trump’s intervention in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its resolution. A U.S. delegation recently travelled to Armenia to begin the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which Washington, Baku, and Yerevan agreed to in August. The delegation has just announced an initial investment of US$145 million to begin building this road, thus confirming Washington’s presence in the Caucasus. Beyond this intervention, the administration is strengthening ties with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and may even be planning a trip there. 

In Georgia, an enduring U.S. presence at Anaklia would have repercussions beyond its possible impact on Georgia’s domestic politics. Due to Ukraine’s success in driving the Black Sea Fleet out of the battle theater, Russia is building a strategic naval hub at Ochamchire in Abkhazia, which will clearly be an enduring threat to Georgia. Likewise, China’s large investments throughout the Black Sea region aim to obtain lasting economic-political influence over the entire littoral. Both these processes will clearly aim to exclude Western influence from Georgia and beyond. A U.S. presence in Anaklia would provide a check on both powers’ ambitions and preserve an option for all the states of the Caucasus and the Black Sea littoral in general. Even if the Trump Administration has no interest in or incentive to influence Georgian democratization, it does seek to expand U.S. economic presence in both the Caucasus and Central Asia to check China and Russia. Since Central Asia’s economic-political growth depends on its ability to trade in an unhampered way with the West through secure economic corridors leading to Europe, a U.S. presence in Anaklia, together with TRIPP and an enhanced U.S. position in Central Asia, likewise augments the economic-political independence of Central Asian states.

Several years ago, Georgia rejected plans that were already in place for a Western firm to build the port at Anaklia and awarded the contract to the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). Yet despite that decision and the fact that the China Railway Tunnel Group is building a highway that would connect Western Georgia to Russia, and Chinese workers are constructing an East-West highway across Georgia, no port has been built. A report by Civic Idea, an independent Georgian think tank, points out that China’s interest in this deep-water port coincides with its presence at the port of Poti, which is part of the larger Free Industrial Zone. In both these cases, the report cited strong evidence of Georgian corruption at China’s expense, leading to delays in construction at Anaklia, even as the Western presence has been excluded.

IMPLICATIONS: Therefore, an opportunity exists for a U.S. initiative to recapture the contract for building a port at Anaklia. While this would require a strong negotiating team, it is nevertheless conceivable and desirable not only for the West but for other Central Asian and South Caucasus states. At present, the idea of the Middle Corridor seems to be the most likely vehicle for connecting China, Central Asia, and the Caucasus with Europe. TRIPP provides a major impetus to land-based trade for this intercontinental project. However, a passage through Anaklia not only benefits Georgia by connecting it to the Middle Corridor; it also offers a maritime route for shippers in both Europe and Asia that would increase trade and connectivity. The opportunity of sending bulk cargoes through the Black Sea would permit traders to reach more markets than those accessible exclusively by land-based trade and transport flows. Cargoes requiring maritime transport could originate in China or Central Asia, or in Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Russia (once peace is achieved in the current Russian war against Ukraine), and be shipped at reduced cost to any other member of the corridor. This would stimulate economic exchanges and reduce shipping costs, facilitating mutual cooperation on safeguarding either or both extensions of this corridor, thereby improving regional cooperation and security among the members.

Central Asian states, which are all seeking to utilize the Caspian Sea for expanded international trade to Europe, would profit greatly from a reliable, secure maritime passage westward. Uzbekistan, which is doubly landlocked, has called for a global pact guaranteeing transit and the creation of an international logistics forum for landlocked states. It is negotiating with its neighbors to buy ships and operate ferries on the Caspian Sea to buy and sell goods and overcome existing bottlenecks. To the extent that it can move cargoes to and from its neighbors on the Caspian Sea, the opening of a secure and reliable route from the Caspian ports of Azerbaijan to the Black Sea and thence to Europe or to reverse that process would constitute an enormous stimulus to its economy and those of its neighbors. Similarly, a reliably functioning port in Anaklia that is not beholden to Russo-Chinese or Georgian corruption would enhance Georgia’s economy, along with those of Armenia and Azerbaijan. TRIPP will undoubtedly stimulate Central Asian economic integration with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and a reliable maritime trade route through Anaklia will also similarly redound to Georgia’s benefit.

A secure U.S. position in Anaklia and its accompanying infrastructure also has potentially profound strategic implications. It would prevent both China and Russia from monopolizing Black Sea trade and geopolitics. Even if this port ultimately services large-scale Chinese trade going to Europe or from there to China, a U.S. presence would limit the amount of influence that China can wield in Georgia and beyond its borders. It would contribute to ensuring a stable series of long-term protocols that will benefit Georgia, along with other South Caucasus states and Central Asian traders. The economic benefits of a well-managed port complex would provide positive political incentives for Georgia, while the established presence of U.S. interests would act to deter Russia’s threat of military action and make it harder for Russia to operate militarily in the Black Sea. 

Persuading the Trump Administration to make an offer to Georgia that it cannot refuse regarding Anaklia is admittedly a hard sell, especially when the Black Sea is a war zone and Georgian Dream is seeking to neutralize the domestic opposition with Moscow’s support. Nevertheless, inaction increases the costs to Washington and its allies, especially after putting down a marker in the Caucasus by investing in TRIPP. If Anaklia and the maritime arm of intercontinental trade and connectivity through the Caucasus are dominated by U.S. adversaries, they will use that opportunity to undermine TRIPP and negate its benefits. That outcome will surely undermine the Administration’s continuing investment in regional peace and could catalyze a return to warfare. Moreover, inaction also permits China and Russia to throttle the Administration’s now rising interest in Central Asia, as expressed in rumors of a presidential visit. It would also dash the hopes of Central Asian states for a more vigorous relationship of mutual benefit with Washington and Europe. 

CONCLUSIONS: The Chinese and Russian rivalries with the U.S. are global. They are not confined to Taiwan, Ukraine, or even Europe. Moscow and Beijing are contesting U.S. power, influence, and values globally, not least in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Therefore, it is arguably in the interest of Washington and those states that wish to partner with it to enhance their partnerships when opportunities present themselves, even if economic and political risk is involved. A Western initiative linking Washington with interested European and Eurasian states regarding Anaklia is therefore probably less risky than has been imagined. The benefits of offering to develop Anaklia as a major port center managed according to international standards outweigh these risks in the new regional environment, thus meriting serious consideration. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

By Gabriel Chubinidze and Stephen F. Jones

Read Bidzina Ivanishvili: Governing from the Shadows 

By David Bujiashvili and Tomáš Baranec

In a resolution on July 9, 2025, the European Parliament called for a review of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement (AA) and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), citing Georgia’s continued violations of the Agreement’s core principles. The resolution warned that persistent backsliding on democratic values could lead to the suspension of Georgia’s economic and trade benefits. Accordingly, the Parliament urged the European Commission and the Council to assess Georgia’s compliance with these standards and consider suspending the visa-free regime in case democratic norms are not respected.

BACKGROUND: The signing of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement in 2014, establishing a comprehensive framework for deeper political association and economic integration was a culmination of a systematic rapprochement between Tbilisi and Brussels. The AA encompasses cooperation in democratic governance, justice, human rights, energy, environmental policy and other sectoral areas. A key component of the agreement is the DCFTA granting Georgian goods duty-free access to the EU’s Single Market.

Building on the comprehensive framework of the AA/DCFTA, Georgian citizens also gained one of the most tangible benefits of EU integration: visa-free access to the Schengen Area in March 2017. This milestone held both symbolic and practical significance, allowing Georgian nationals to travel for up to 90 days without a visa. It was widely seen as a reward for the country’s reform efforts and remains one of the most tangible benefits delivered to the Georgian public as part of the European integration process.

The geopolitical landscape shifted again in 2022 with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompting the EU to reassess its enlargement policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. In this context, Georgia was granted EU candidate status in 2023 recognizing Georgia’s European aspirations and progress in the AA implementation.

However, shortly after gaining EU candidate status, internal challenges in Georgia, including political polarization and pressure on the judiciary, raised concerns about the country’s adherence to EU norms. This led to a major turning point on 28 November 2024, when Georgia’s ruling party declared that it would not place the issue of opening EU accession talks on the national agenda until the end of 2028.

In reaction to these developments, the EU has taken concrete steps, including suspending high-level political dialogue with Georgia. The European Council suspended visa facilitation privileges for holders of Georgian diplomatic and service passports as an initial step toward broader restrictions. Following the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on July 15, 2025, Georgia was given a deadline to implement 8 key recommendations by August 31. Failure to comply could lead to the suspension of the visa-free regime for all Georgian citizens and potentially a review or suspension of specific AA/DCFTA provisions. 

Meanwhile, several EU member states are keen to impose personal sanctions asset freezes and travel bans on Georgian officials but are constrained by the lack of unanimity among EU members. Past instances, such as Hungary and Slovakia blocking personal sanctions against Georgia illustrate the complexity of achieving full consent.

Alongside political developments, Georgia’s economic integration with the EU has delivered measurable results. Since the 2014 signing of the EU–Georgia AA/DCFTA, exports to the EU have grown about 17 percent, expanding beyond wine, mineral water, and hazelnuts to include kiwifruit, blueberries, berries, organic honey, essential oils, dried and processed fruits, and, since 2022, snails. Export activity is strongest in Kakheti (wine and agriculture), Imereti (food processing), and Adjara, which benefits from its Black Sea access facilitating trade. Shida Kartli, bordering Russia, remains less export-oriented due to geopolitical challenges and limited market access. 

Complementing trade growth, visa-free travel has expanded opportunities for tourism, business, education, and family ties, while significantly increasing remittances from EU countries. Since its introduction in 2017, over 500,000 Georgian citizens have benefited, making more than 1 million visits to Schengen Area countries. Starting at around US$ 414 million in 2017, EU-origin remittances more than tripled to approximately US$ 1.4 billion by 2024, reflecting a 238 percent increase. On the contrary, remittances from Russia started at approximately US$ 380 million in 2017 but grew only modestly to around US$ 420 million by 2024. Consequently, the EU now accounts for roughly 44 percent of Georgia’s total remittances, overshadowing Russia’s declining share.

IMPLICATIONS: The DCFTA plays a critical role in Georgia’s economic interests. Its suspension would have serious consequences, threatening jobs, competitiveness, and rural development. For years, it has provided Georgian producers, farmers, and entrepreneurs with tariff-free access to the EU market. Its suspension would damage the economy, erode public trust, and increase social vulnerability. 

In contrast to the gradual economic impact of the DCFTA, the suspension of visa-free travel would hit ordinary Georgians immediately, undermining free mobility. Thousands rely on it for tourism, personal matters, and medical access to EU clinics. Students, entrepreneurs, and families would face new bureaucratic obstacles. Restrictions would hinder Georgian entrepreneurs from attending EU exhibitions and forums, limiting partnerships and market growth, while reduced EU access could deepen reliance on Russia and China, both visa-free partners. 

This impact would be compounded by low-cost airlines, particularly WizzAir, which could reduce routes or raise fares. WizzAir, operating in both Georgia and Armenia, may even close its Georgian operations entirely and shift all flights to Armenia if the EU suspends visa-free travel for Georgians, especially given the prospect that Armenia could gain visa-free access in the coming years. Such a shift would make flights from and to Georgia more expensive and less accessible, further reducing European tourist arrivals. Meanwhile, flights from Russia have risen sharply in recent years, increasing the risk of greater reliance on Russian tourists if European arrivals decline due to fewer low-cost flights. 

The economic consequences would not be limited to tourism. Suspension of visa-free travel would also negatively affect household incomes derived from remittances, underscoring the EU’s crucial role in supporting Georgia’s economic development through these flows. Many Georgians working in the EU without proper permits—often in informal sectors such as caregiving or domestic work—would no longer be able to sustain these livelihoods. Currently, they avoid breaching the 90-day visa-free limit by rotating their stays among friends and relatives, a practice that complies with entry rules while significantly contributing to remittance inflows. This informal mobility has provided a vital boost to Georgia’s economy.

Beyond economic costs, the suspension would deal a profound emotional blow to pro-European Georgians, deepening frustration and a sense of isolation. It would be perceived not merely as a bureaucratic measure but as a symbolic break - a clear signal that the country’s European path is no longer guaranteed.

Domestically, the suspension would likely be attributed to the government’s democratic backsliding rather than external pressures. Attempts by authorities to deflect responsibility onto the opposition, civil society, or the EU are unlikely to convince the pro-European majority. This could heighten polarization and, with local elections on 4 October 2025, trigger protests and increase pressure on the ruling party.

From a legal and procedural perspective, suspending parts of the AA/DCFTA is highly complex, requiring unanimity among all 27 member states. Therefore, suspension of the AA/DCFTA is unlikely, while in contrast, suspending the visa-free regime requires only a qualified majority of 15 member states, making it a more feasible short-term option if Georgia fails to meet EU benchmarks.

Despite these considerations, the EU remains cautious about measures that could directly harm ordinary Georgian citizens, especially given the 86 percent public support for EU membership. However, internal divisions over targeted personal sanctions have increased the likelihood of collective measures, including suspending visa-free travel. While affecting ordinary Georgians, this step may be the EU’s only remaining leverage if the government continues undermining democratic norms and fails to implement the recommended reforms by the end of August.

CONCLUSION: In the absence of a unified position towards the Georgian government, the EU currently has only a limited set of sanctions, which primarily target the local population rather than key representatives of the ruling party and business circles close to it. The ability of these tools to change the Georgian government’s position is likely limited. Moreover, both the suspension of visa liberalization and the less likely suspension of parts of the AA/DCFTA may be double-edged in the medium term, as they could increase the dependence of the Georgian economy and business on Russia and China.  

Even if the current status quo with Georgia remains, while Ukraine and Moldova continue advancing towards EU membership, freezing Georgia’s accession process would create a damaging gap in EU enlargement policy. This could result in a ‘Turkey-style’ scenario, where candidate status is maintained in name but the accession perspective is practically frozen.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: David Bujiashvili is a Georgian diplomat and expert in European integration with over 26 years of experience in EU Affairs. He has held senior government positions, coordinated the implementation of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, visa liberalization, and EU assistance to Georgia, and served as Chief Coordinator of Georgia’s EU Accession Questionnaire (2021–2022), directly contributing to Georgia’s EU candidate status. He is also an Associate Professor at ALTE University of Georgia and author of the book Steps for Comprehending the European Union and 12 academic publications on EU Affairs.

Tomáš Baranec is the Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Black Sea Studies as well as a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He currently works as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague.