Published in Analytical Articles

By Umair Jamal

On July 3, 2025, Russia became the first major state to formally recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. This decision, framed as a strategic partnership aimed at countering the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), seeks to employ Taliban authority to stabilize Afghanistan and curb regional terrorism. Yet, the move entails legitimizing a regime with longstanding and ongoing associations with jihadist networks, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and other extremist actors. These linkages, encompassing ideological affinities, logistical cooperation, and territorial safe havens, generate concern regarding the exacerbation of extremism, the destabilization of neighboring states such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, and the complication of global counterterrorism strategies.

                                                                 City of Kabul (Image Courtesy of Pexel)

BACKGROUND: Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government on 3 July 2025 represents a significant reorientation in its Afghan policy. This decision is underpinned by Moscow’s security imperatives and broader geopolitical calculations.

After the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Taliban rapidly reasserted control over Afghanistan, creating a power vacuum that has permitted diverse extremist organizations to expand within ungoverned spaces. Russia’s engagement is shaped by the Taliban’s asserted opposition to the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K), a shared adversary responsible for the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, which claimed more than 140 lives. This incident highlighted ISIS-K’s transnational capabilities, leading Russia to regard the Taliban as a prospective partner in constraining its influence.

In April 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court annulled the Taliban’s terrorist designation, maintained since 2003, thereby facilitating formal recognition and reflecting a pragmatic effort to stabilize Afghanistan and safeguard Russian interests in Central Asia. The Taliban’s governance, however, remains highly contested owing to their strict enforcement of Islamic law and enduring connections with extremist organizations. The movement appears to have openly violated the 2020 Doha Agreement commitment undertaken with the international community to prevent Afghan territory from serving as a base for terrorism.

During their 1996–2001 rule, the Taliban provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda, a relationship that endures through both operational and ideological linkages, as documented in recent UN assessments. The Haqqani Network, a semi-autonomous Taliban faction under Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, remains pivotal in orchestrating attacks and sheltering terrorists. In addition to al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban sustain ties with organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which targets China’s Xinjiang region. Since 2021, at least 21 extremist groups have exploited Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training, recruitment, and logistical operations, according to the UN’s 15th Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report.

ISIS-K, which emerged in 2015 with an estimated 4,000–6,000 combatants, persists in conducting attacks across Iran, Pakistan, and Europe, reinforcing Russia’s calculated yet precarious reliance on the Taliban to confront this threat while potentially disregarding their wider patronage of jihadist networks.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban carries substantial implications for regional stability and global counterterrorism. On the one hand, it may enhance collaboration against militant organizations such as ISIS-K, which pose threats to both Russia and Central Asian states. The Taliban have undertaken operations that reduce ISIS-K’s local activity, though the group’s international reach endures, as demonstrated by the 2024 Moscow attack. On the other hand, such engagement entails risks, as legitimizing the Taliban may strengthen a regime that continues to shelter, protect, and support multiple extremist factions.

A recent United Nations assessment warns that al-Qaeda and its affiliated jihadist groups now control facilities in 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and are increasingly assisting anti-Pakistani militants, such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in conducting cross-border attacks. Another UN report indicates that the TTP has established new training camps in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika (Barmal) Provinces and is expanding recruitment within its ranks, including from the Afghan Taliban. The UN further notes that the Taliban continues to provide the TTP with logistical, operational, and financial support, with leader Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly receiving a “monthly payment” of approximately 43,000 USD. Evidence also suggests that TTP cadres sustain tactical-level ties with ISIL-K in Afghanistan while offering training and assistance to militant networks in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. Moreover, the de facto authorities in Kabul have deployed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) combatants within law enforcement and military units to provide domestic security, particularly in northern Afghanistan.

In recent months, foreign terrorist combatants of Central Asian origin with affiliations to al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have relocated from the Syrian Arab Republic to northern Afghanistan. These fighters have been characterized as “scouts,” serving as a vanguard to establish conditions for the subsequent arrival of their families and additional militants into Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Uyghur militant organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), continues to operate within Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, ETIM enjoys “unprecedented levels of freedom” under Taliban governance. In some instances, the Taliban have relocated ETIM militants from Badakhshan, near China’s border, to other regions under pressure from Beijing. This relocation appears to constitute partial restraint rather than elimination, enabling the group and its ideology to persist in Afghanistan. The Taliban have further refused to extradite senior figures such as TIP leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, who remains in Kabul directing the group’s global activities, including those of its Syrian contingents. Turkistani reportedly mediates internal Taliban disputes and represents al-Qaeda in the Taliban’s Shura Majlis, particularly on military affairs. This situation directly contradicts Taliban denials of hosting foreign fighters and demonstrates high-level endorsement and protection.

Another pressing concern is that the Taliban are deploying and mobilizing foreign militant organizations such as Jamaat Ansarullah, which undermines Tajikistan’s stability, and the IMU, to combat ISIS-K in Afghanistan. This operational integration is troubling, as it demonstrates the incorporation of such groups into military roles. A recent UN assessment highlights “closer ETIM/TIP collaboration with the Taliban in Afghanistan,” encompassing alliances with TIP’s Syrian affiliate, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The report further noted that “Regional Member States reported that, in December 2024, a three-person delegation, including one representative from ETIM/TIP, traveled from Damascus to Kabul and engaged the de facto authorities on the eastward movement of foreign terrorist fighters.” Such partnerships and dialogues indicate that the Taliban regard groups like ETIM and IMU as allies rather than adversaries, despite their destabilizing implications for Central Asia and Russian interests.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government constitutes a high-risk gamble that may ultimately backfire by strengthening a regime deeply enmeshed with jihadist networks. United Nations reports substantiate the Taliban’s continued support for organizations such as al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, TTP, and ETIM, which exploit Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces for training and cross-border operations, thereby undermining stability across Central and South Asia.

By legitimizing the Taliban, Russia may unintentionally reinforce a wider terrorist ecosystem, thereby weakening international counterterrorism norms and complicating collaboration with Western and regional partners. The Taliban’s accommodation of at least 21 extremist organizations, documented since 2021, heightens the risk of Afghanistan reemerging as a central hub of global terrorism.

To balance its security interests while mitigating associated risks, Russia should pursue a cautious and multifaceted strategy. First, it should employ platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to coordinate with China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on intelligence exchange and border security to limit extremist spillover. Second, Moscow should make its support for the Taliban conditional upon verifiable commitments to sever links with groups such as TTP and ETIM, reinforced through targeted sanctions to ensure compliance. Third, Russia ought to engage both Pakistan and India in addressing cross-border threats posed by TTP and Kashmir-oriented organizations like LeT and JeM, fostering regional dialogue to avert escalation. Finally, it should strengthen its domestic counterterrorism capacity by investing in real-time surveillance of Afghan-based groups and reducing reliance on Taliban assurances.

By combining pragmatic engagement with rigorous oversight, Russia can advance its objective of constraining ISIS-K while avoiding the amplification of a broader jihadist threat and ensuring that Afghanistan does not further destabilize the region.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

Wednesday, 20 August 2025

Trump Makes a Move in the Caucasus

Published in Analytical Articles

By Stephen Blank

In Washington on August 8, 2025, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed what amounts to a framework for a peace treaty. The agreement ratified both sides’ support for creating the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) in the area formally known as the Zangezur corridor, in Armenia’s Syunik province, and entrusts management of the corridor to a U.S. private company on a 99-year lease. It is also likely that U.S. security personnel will supervise the corridor’s planned intermodal rail and highway transportation. As a result, Azerbaijan will have direct overland contact with its Nakhchivan province while a direct land route will be established from the Caspian Sea straight through to Turkey, allowing a substantial growth of Central Asian trade with Europe. The agreement represents the first and considerable sign of a tangible U.S. presence in the Caucasus and comes at the expense of Russian and Iranian interests.

U.S. President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian President Nikolas Pashinyan sign the new Azerbaijan-Armenia peace accord in the White House (Image Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

BACKGROUND: After many years of unclear U.S. policies towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Trump Administration has made a major move to upgrade U.S. presence in the Caucasus and provide a decisive impetus towards the conclusion of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as a strong impetus for the so-called Middle Corridor between Asia and Europe. 

The Zangezur corridor has been a bone of contention in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks to terminate the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, since the corridor passes through Armenia. This “sliver” of territory has been at the heart of disputes dating back to the Soviet conquest of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1920-21, when the Soviet leadership deliberately separated Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan to prevent its proximity to Kemalist Türkiye. Armenia’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993-94 led to widespread ethnic cleansing and thousands of Azeri refugees as well as a strong Azeri irredentist movement that has now triumphed over Armenia and led Pashinyan’s government to sue for peace.

Domestic nationalist opposition in Armenia has vigorously protested Azerbaijan’s demand for the corridor, which would connect it to both Nakhichevan and Türkiye with potentially huge economics payoffs for both states. The issue has generated an impasse in the bilateral negotiations, often directly conducted by Presidents Pashinyan and Aliyev. The domestic pressure in Armenia and from the Armenian diaspora to refuse concessions to Azerbaijan has triggered a serious domestic crisis leading Pashinyan to arrest high-ranking members of the church on the grounds that they were plotting a coup. There is some evidence of Russian support for the coup plotters. Pashinyan’s reform agenda is anathema to Armenian reactionaries and nationalists are resisting what they call a surrender to Azerbaijan. Moscow evidently has its own interests in backing these disaffected elites to reverse Pashinyan’s reforms to prevent their emulation elsewhere. Moreover, strife between Yerevan and Baku benefits Moscow, allowing it to play the states off against each other and regain its influence in Armenia. Indeed, it has reinforced its military presence in Armenia despite the war in Ukraine.

IMPLICATIONS: In this context, Trump’s offer could present a way out of the current impasse. Washington will pay Armenia for a 99-year lease of the corridor, which would formally respect Armenia’s sovereignty but give the U.S. operating control over the area and allow it to place forces there to maintain the corridor and provide security. Armenia has previously hinted that it might be open to a proposal that preserves its sovereignty but allows for third party management of the corridor. The U.S. proposal allows Baku and Yerevan to sidestep the vexed question of sovereignty over the corridor until passions have subsided. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, gets de facto ability to link with Nakhchivan and to operationalize the routes traversing this territory. A working and well-maintained overland trade route to Türkiye, Europe, and the Levant constitutes a giant step towards consummating the Middle Corridor from China to Europe, allowing Azerbaijan to benefit as a key middleman on this route. At the same time, Armenia needs peace to deal with its domestic opposition, institute Pashinyan’s democratic agenda, and terminate the state of war so that Armenia can restore relations with Türkiye and profit from the expansion of international trade corridors into the Caucasus. The agreement also incentivizes both sides to move quickly towards a peace treaty where they and neighboring states, including in Central Asia, stand to gain economically and politically.

Trump’s proposal also works to stabilize the Caucasus by minimizing Russian opportunities for interference. For over a century, Russia has endeavored to manipulate the tensions between Armenians and Azeris to enhance its imperial reach and standing in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s victories of 2020 and 2023, plus the pressure of the war in Ukraine have forced Russia to retreat in the Caucasus and elsewhere. The agreement will likely strengthen Pashinyan’s government at home against his pro-Russian and Russian-backed enemies. Moreover, Trump’s proposal, by creating a basis for completing the Middle Corridor, undermines Russia’s increasing efforts to create an International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC) from India to Iran, Central Asia and Russia. Despite much recent Russian diplomatic effort, this proposed route is nowhere near as complete as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which relies on the Middle Corridor that bypasses Russia.

Türkiye stands to make major gains through this proposal and clearly supported it as part of its improving ties with Washington. While Russia sought to exploit Armeno-Azeri tensions; Türkiye’s massive aid to Azerbaijan’s military and alliance agreement with it gave it a lasting presence in the Caucasus. Washington seems to be at peace with this outcome, and the proposal could only have come about with Turkish support behind the scenes. This U.S.-proposed solution therefore enhances Türkiye’s reach and power projection through the Caucasus, which is increasingly important to Ankara given its rising multi-dimensional profile in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. 

Beyond the serious implications for local actors, the proposal entails equally meaningful consequences for actors beyond the Caucasus. Iran, for example, is a major loser and has already declared its opposition. After its defeat by Israel and the U.S. it has no choice but to make a rapprochement of some sort with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, Iran’s connection to Armenia will be seriously impaired and it will no longer be able to resupply Armenia with weapons or incite resistance against Baku over Zangezur. Furthermore, the real possibility of completing the Middle Corridor with U.S. help would imply a lasting U.S. presence on Iran’s northern border. This will seriously complicate Iran’s ability to rebuild either its network of terrorist proxies or its nuclear program.

Conversely, China gains from this proposal. If it materializes, it will give a major impetus to the realization of China’s BRI and the accompanying Middle Corridor. It also buttresses China’s growing economic position in the Caucasus most prominently embodied in its development of the Anaklia port in Georgia. China has invested considerable economic and political capital in the combination of major land and maritime trade and transport routes. If implemented, the proposal will represent another instance whereby China has gained influence and position in Eurasia at Russia’s expense.

The proposal also permits the EU an opportunity to expand its presence in Armenia and the Caucasus. A democratizing Armenia, freed of the Nagorno-Karabakh incubus, is already seeking EU membership. The EU also buys large amounts of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas and the prospect of real peace in the Caucasus can only redound to its benefit. The EU also stands to gain from the completion of the Middle Corridor, which provides it with a secure land route for trade to and from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China.

CONCLUSONS: Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposal constitutes the first major U.S. initiative in the Caucasus and Central Asia since the Clinton Administration helped develop the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to connect Transcaucasian oil to European markets. While consonant with the Administration’s overall perspective of using large-scale economic projects and/or trade opportunities as instruments to facilitate peaceful solutions to long-lasting wars, the proposal also marks the first sign that Washington realizes the importance and opportunity presented by the independence of South Caucasian states. If this project is implemented, awareness will likely grow that the Caucasus and Central Asia offer Washington many genuine and plentiful opportunities for increasing its economic and political influence.

This project may also reflect a growing U.S. awareness that the Caucasus and Central Asia are areas of strategic significance that both want a consistent engagement with Washington and offer new and exciting vistas regarding energy, rare earths, trade, investment, large-scale environmental cooperation, and security cooperation. That awareness has hitherto been missing in U.S. policy. Indeed, Trump’s policies regarding these regions has been quite inconsistent given Trump’s imposition of tariffs – exactly the wrong move – on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors. Policymakers need to understand the necessity and benefits of long-lasting partnerships for all parties since this project, if it comes to pass, creates opportunities for peace, cooperation among many international actors, enhanced trade, and greater independence for the South Caucasian states. These outcomes are not only in the interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia; they could also become the basis for very different development in the Caucasus than has been the case in the past.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

 

 

Published in Analytical Articles

By Charlotte Krausz

President Trump's recent imposition of 25 percent tariffs on India for importing Russian oil signals a potential expansion of secondary sanctions to other Russian energy customers. The policy shift threatens to extend punitive measures to post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus that remain heavily dependent on Russian energy infrastructure. While aimed at curtailing Russia's war revenues, such measures could paradoxically drive these strategically important regions closer to Moscow's orbit, undermining years of U.S. and EU engagement in the region.

Gazprom headquarters in St. Petersburg, Russia (Image Courtesy of Flickr)

BACKGROUND: In his statements, Trump has criticized countries that import oil and accused them of funding the “Russian war machine.” By stopping Russia’s revenues from its largely petrostate-based war economy, the U.S. seeks to thwart Russian advances in Ukraine and punish Putin. Yet imposing high tariffs on countries dependent on Russia for their energy supply, especially on post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, could have far worse ramifications for U.S. and EU aspirations in the region and drive former Soviet republics closer to Russia once more

A key example of this policy shift occurred in the first days of August 2025, when President Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff (later raised to 50 percent) on India for being a major buyer of Russian oil. Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of India, said that “the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable.” Given that India buys one-third of its crude oil from Russia, India is unlikely to change course, and the tariffs have badly damaged relations with India. The move is especially surprising given Trump’s past cordial relationship with Modi and the Biden administration's geopolitical courting of India. Biden even hosted Modi for a state dinner in June 2023.

In a recent opinion piece in The Washington Post, Andriy Yermak, Ukraine’s chief of the presidential office, praised the high tariffs on India. Yermak declared that it was a “great first step” but called for more pressure and for a “full economic blockade” of Russia. While Ukraine understandably wants everything possible to be done to end the war and bring peace, not all avenues will lead to the desired outcome. The decision for Europe to get off Russian oil following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was apparent and necessary. And though it led to an increase in energy costs and inflation, alternative energy sources were found, and Russia lost a vital stream of revenue. The expansion of these sanctions, this reasoning goes, will help the war effort and thwart Russia’s imperial ambitions.

But this strategy could be disastrous if poorly applied, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where countries are still dependent on Russia for energy needs. The energy landscape in Central Asia reflects decades of Soviet-era infrastructure and integration. Central Asian countries, except oil-rich Turkmenistan, remain highly reliant on Russian energy infrastructure and benefit from shared Soviet-era energy grids and the Eurasian Economic Union.

The South Caucasus presents a similar case. Georgia and Armenia, even more so, are largely dependent on Russian oil and have limited energy supply options. Georgia lacks domestic oil refineries and imports primarily from Russia and Azerbaijan, with Russian imports recently surpassing Azerbaijani supplies for the first time in eighteen years despite troubled bilateral relations. Armenia faces even greater constraints, with Gazprom maintaining a monopoly over natural gas imports and distribution. Natural gas made up 80 percent of Armenia’s energy imports in 2020. The rest comes from Iran in an electricity-for-natural trade deal. Armenia’s natural gas imports are delivered through the North-South Gas Pipeline via Georgia. Other regional pipelines bypass Armenia due to geopolitical conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

IMPLICATIONS: Following the closure of European markets to Russian oil after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian energy companies redirected their focus towards Central Asia, leading to an increase in Russian energy imports into the region. Russia and Central Asian countries rely on the same Soviet-era-built energy grid and EAEU membership. Russian investment in Central Asia’s energy infrastructure has expanded since 2022, including nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and hydroelectric facilities elsewhere. Even Kyrgyzstan, despite being a renewable energy leader, plans to double its Russian oil imports by 2040.

Despite their energy dependence on Russia, both Armenia and Georgia have sought EU membership in the past. Both countries have undergone democratic revolutions, although their current political situations are tenuous. After Russia failed to defend Armenia from Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive, public opinion of Russia dramatically decreased, with two-thirds expressing a negative view and 40 percent viewing Russia as a threat. When the Georgian government withdrew from EU accession in November 2024, protests lasted for months demanding a reversal. Armenia and Georgia also share ties to Europe and the U.S. in terms of tourism, culture, and ethnic diasporas.

The U.S. imposing sanctions or high tariffs on countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus has the potential to undo decades of U.S. outreach to these regions. These could not separate their energy supplies from Russia without great harm to their own economies, nor would such a tradeoff be worth it to them. Antagonist trade policies would increase anti-American sentiment, inhibit future American investment, and thrust these post-Soviet states back into Moscow’s orbit.

Secondary sanctions on Russian oil importers are not assured to change the situation on the ground in Ukraine, which has been at a territorial standstill for months. Russia has proved more than capable of keeping its war machine growing and expanding under international sanctions. These approaches are less effective than simply supplying Ukraine directly with the weapons it needs to liberate territory and defend its skies.

Should the U.S. see strategic importance in weaning post-Soviet republics off Russian oil, it could encourage alternative energy routes and the use of renewable energy. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are already at the forefront in renewables like wind and hydroelectric power. A key alternative route could source energy from Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan has the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world. As Michael Doran from the Hudson Institute explains, “We just need a few kilometers of pipeline to be built in order to connect up Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan, which can then flow comfortably to Europe across Georgia … Turkmen Gas could end the dependence of Europe on Russian gas.” In addition, the U.S.-brokered peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan presents new energy options for Armenia. If Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey were to be opened, it could diversify its energy imports rather than remaining reliant on Russia.

CONCLUSIONS: Post-Soviet states in Central Asia and the Caucasus are caught between a revanchist Russia and growing ties with the West. Central Asia and the South Caucasus have much to offer the West, from energy deposits to critical minerals, emerging democracies, and tourism. A “full economic blockade” would not only be impossible to enforce but also detrimental to long-term U.S. interests.

The countries of the Central Asia and Caucasus regions are aware of the great power rivalries surrounding them. They understand their precarious situations and the importance of not antagonizing Russia. If the U.S. wants to have a presence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in the decades to come, it must respect the inherent multilateralism of these regions. As the war in Ukraine drags on, Washington must decide to what extent it sees importance in stopping the flow of Russian oil. It must weigh the value of cutting Russian oil revenues against future relations with post-Soviet countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Charlotte Krausz is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council, a Washington-based think tank. She is an undergraduate at the University of St. Andrews studying International Relations and Persian.

Published in Analytical Articles

By Anna Vardanyan

The unprecedented anti-church campaign launched in Armenia at the end of May of this year, which is comparable only to the early Soviet years in terms of the severity of the measures, seems to cross all red lines. High-ranking clergy members are being arrested, the Prime Minister makes defamatory statements against the incumbent Catholicos and threatens to dethrone him, and law enforcement officers invade the country’s main church. What are the main drivers of these events, and what impact could they have on regional stability?

An Armenian Orthodox Church (Image Courtesy of GetArchive.net)

BACKGROUND: There are several reasons behind the current conflict between the Armenian government and the church. The current Armenian government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church have never been allies. Clashes with the church started from the very first days the revolutionary government came to power in 2018. The prime minister has regularly criticized the church hierarchy for its connections with the former authorities, which he calls a “criminal regime.” Looking back, it should be noted that, unlike with the current authorities, there were never issues with the Catholicos and the public during the three previous presidents’ rule. The incumbent Catholicos Karekin II was elected in 1999 during the administration of the first president, Levon Ter-Petrossyan, and has and still maintains very close relations with the latter. During the administrations of the second president, Robert Kocharyan, and the third president, Serzh Sargsyan, the Catholicos was treated respectfully, and there was  mutual understanding and support from the government to the church. There were even accusations that the Catholicos was obviously backing Kocharyan’s and, specifically, Sargsyan’s regimes and interfering in the political life of the state.

However, after the revolution in 2018, there were actions that appeared to be initiated by Pashinyan against the Catholicos, with a view to discrediting his reputation. In particular, from June to October 2018, protest rallies were held in which the participants demanded the resignation of Karekin II, whom they considered to be allied with the former authorities and accused of being involved in shady business deals.

Critics brought forward the narrative that Karekin II was “closed and shadowy,” he is believed to be too involved in business – a claim given greater weight by the discovery of a million-dollar Swiss bank account in his name. In 2015, an investigative report revealed that he had a million-dollar Swiss bank account, but the leaked files do not specify the exact role that Karekin II had in relation to the account, and the press spokesman of Catholicos said it was opened by his predecessor and used to help the Church.

The movement against the Catholicos, dubbed “New Armenia, New Patriarch,” has been holding rallies in downtown Yerevan, recording video appeals against Catholicos, and picketing his office in Echmiadzin, even pushing and grabbing him, as seen in an extraordinary video that shocked Armenians both for its aggression against the Catholicos and for the surprising vulnerability he displayed.

Nikol Pashinyan, during that period, stated that he was not going to intervene to reduce tensions against the Catholicos and emphasized the separation of church and state. However, as the movement failed to receive public support and was viewed rather poorly, Pashinyan’s targeting of the church ceased for a while.

After the defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, pressure on Pashinyan grew and Church leaders called for his resignation. The Catholicos urged Pashinyan to step down “to prevent further shocks, possible clashes, and tragic consequences to the public, to elect a new prime minister in consultation with political forces and to form an interim government of national accord.”

After this, the relationship between the Catholicos and Pashinyan deteriorated irretrievably. On the one hand, the Armenian Church remains the only state institution that maintains independence from Pashinyan and his team. Moreover, the religious structure more than once spoke out from nationalistic positions, becoming a stronghold of protest sentiments. Last spring, it was the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church who spoke out against the delimitation of the border with Azerbaijan in the Tavush region. Local archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan then became the leader of the resistance movement. First, he led a march from the line of contact to Yerevan and then held several large rallies in the Armenian capital. The movement was also supported by the central leadership of the Church. The Investigative Committee of Armenia unfolded allegations that Galstanian had begun preparations for the violent overthrow of the government in November 2024 with the members of his opposition-backed movement.

In a statement, the Committee alleged that the group had planned to assassinate unnamed “civilians,” take other violent actions, and paralyze the country’s security apparatus for that purpose. According to official information, Galstanyan was planning to “form 200 groups of militants, each with 25 people, in order to occupy parliament.”  He allegedly discussed this with Levon Kocharyan, the son of Armenia’s second president and a member of parliament. As a result of this, Galstanyan and 14 supporters were arrested on June 26.  

However, this process of repression was not limited only to Galstanyan's arrest. Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahyan, the leader of the Shirak Diocese, has also been arrested, charged with “usurpation of power and overthrow of the constitutional order.” Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian billionaire with Russian citizenship, who recently expressed his willingness to support the Armenian Apostolic Church, was also arrested. He is also accused of inciting a coup d'état. The Investigative Committee claims that these three individuals played a role in a terrorist act being prepared against the state.

The government's campaign against the church and recent arrests have been criticized by Armenian civil society. More than two dozen non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders are raising the alarm that the authorities are interfering with the autonomy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, as well as the principle of the independence of the judicial system.

IMPLICATIONS: The government-church conflict in Armenia should not be viewed solely as an internal political process within the country. It eventually has a broader scope, and in some sense fits into the realm of global processes taking place in the world, given the trends of separation of church and state and the “secularization” of spirituality in the world. According to the Constitution of Armenia, the church is separated from the state ( Article 7.1. ), nevertheless, since its formation, it has enjoyed state support and actively participated in the country's political processes: there are also known periods in Armenian history when, in the absence of a state, the church assumed the role of the state itself.

As for the role of the church in Armenia today, it has broad public influence, but no legal powers or duties. When it comes to bringing a clergyman into the legal arena, it leads to a tension of sentiments, because neither in terms of public perception nor in terms of law are there regulations aimed at clarifying the powers of the church and the government. Meanwhile, the Armenian Church enjoys a strong reputation both inside the country and in the Armenian diaspora. According to the results of the 2011 census in Armenia, about 97 percent of the country's population are followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Further aggravation of church-state relations could lead to civil conflict within the country and pose a threat to the re-election of the current authorities in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026, which, in turn, could abort the efforts of the current authorities to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The ruling party is approaching the election campaign in a difficult position. This spring, representatives of the ruling “Civil Contract” party lost two key positions in the mayoral elections in Gyumri and Parakar. Surveys indicate that the same result could be seen at the national level. According to a survey conducted by MPG/Gallup International Association in January of this year, the support for the pro-government “Civil Contract” is only 11 percent.  At the same time, the church enjoys considerable trust among the population. According to the Caucasus Barometer, a national household survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), which sampled 1,561 people aged 18 and over in Armenia between July and October 2024, about 79 percent of Armenian residents expressed trust in the Armenian Apostolic Church, making it the highest figure among public institutions.

It is likely that the church will support the opponents of the ruling party, thereby increasing their chances of victory. Perhaps the campaign to discredit the clergy was launched by the authorities in order to prevent such a scenario. Moreover, the authorities may want to provoke some protests now so that by the election date, they will have already fizzled out. However, the crisis that has arisen threatens a split. If Pashinyan succeeds in changing the Catholicos, then opposition-minded citizens of Armenia and parishes in the Diaspora may not recognize the first hierarch appointed after political interference.

This conflict between the government and the church in Armenia could lead to a dangerous point, when external forces could take advantage of this situation and try to implement some of their plans through the Church or interfere in the internal affairs of the country. All this can fit into Russia's plans, for example, which wants to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, and considers the Armenian church as a factor of influence in the region. It is worth mentioning that the brother of Karekin II is the Primate of the Russian Armenian Diocese, and Samvel Karapetyan has great financial resources, has created tens of thousands of jobs in Armenia, and Pashinyan and his team are wary that he could fund large demonstrations and achieve a change of power in Armenia backed by Russia. The opposition and the Armenian Apostolic Church, Armenian businessmen in Russia, and the Armenian community in Russia may unite around Karapetyan, which could lead to Pashinyan's resignation. It is no coincidence that Russian public figures affiliated with the Kremlin have issued severe condemnations of the Armenian authorities’ attacks on the church, including a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who described the attacks on the Armenian Apostolic Church as “deeply worrisome and unjustified.” Lavrov's statement was immediately followed by a harsh response from Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, urging him “not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Armenia.”

The Kremlin is keen on the dominance or victory of Echmiadzin in this conflict, on the basis not of Christian solidarity but geopolitical interests. The Kremlin seeks to destabilize the situation in Armenia and create a chaotic and uncontrollable situation. Even if the current weakened government remains in Armenia, its dependence on the Kremlin will only increase under such unstable conditions.

Ultimately, this conflict may weaken the position of Christianity in the South Caucasus. It is no coincidence that the Chairman of the Caucasus Muslims’ Board (CMB), Sheikh-ul-Islam Pashazade, encourages this conflict and regularly criticizes the Armenian Church, considering it a “threat to neighbors.”

CONCLUSIONS:  It is obvious that the reasons for the conflict between the government and the church are political. The current authorities and the Church elite have many controversies, including on issues of fundamental importance for Armenia. The authorities see the Catholicos and the bishops as yet another political opponent, against whom they are applying all available tools. Nevertheless, what is most disturbing is that the ruling party and the Prime Minister himself are fueling this rift by employing aggressive methods that threaten both democratic norms and religious freedom. Instead of stabilizing the situation, they often exacerbate tensions by using divisive rhetoric and targeting individuals, setting a dangerous precedent for political debate. This behavior threatens to deepen existing divisions within society at a crucial stage for Armenia's democratic development. Such escalations threaten to further split Armenian society, influence the results of the upcoming elections next year and negatively affect the peace negotiations with Azerbaijan-- something that in turn will affect the entire region. Pashinyan's course aims to form a “homogeneous political space,” but risks defeat in parliamentary elections and a premature resignation from power and politics. In this case, there is a significant risk that Armenia will revert to a Russian orientation, despite Russia’s gradual decline in  influence in the South Caucasus today.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Anna Vardanyan is an independent journalist-researcher based in Yerevan. For ten years she has worked as a Communications expert and Media advisor to the Vice-President of the Parliament of Armenia. She has been working as an accredited journalist at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia.

 

 

Visit also

silkroad

AFPC

isdp

turkeyanalyst

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

Newsletter

Sign up for upcoming events, latest news, and articles from the CACI Analyst.

Newsletter