Japan Enters Central Asia's Congested Geoeconomic Market
By Emil Avdaliani
On December 19–20, 2025, the heads of state of the five Central Asian countries met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takachi in the C5+1 format. This marked the fifth such summit involving Central Asian leaders in 2025. Japan’s growing engagement with the region is driven primarily by interest in mineral extraction and processing, sectors that have attracted increasing competition from major Asian and Western powers. Tokyo’s evolving approach reflects broader global dynamics and heightened tensions over supply chains. Rather than seeking to exclude other external actors or assume a leading security role in Central Asia, Japan is pursuing a pragmatic strategy centered on economic cooperation. Through economically attractive initiatives, it aims gradually to strengthen its geopolitical position in the region.
BACKGROUND:
In December 2025, Tokyo hosted its first Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue, representing an upgraded version of a cooperation framework originally established in 2004. The region has thus evolved from a relatively peripheral area into a significant area in Japan’s foreign policy.
A series of agreements was concluded during the summit. Uzbekistan and Japan elevated their relationship to an expanded strategic partnership, prioritizing cooperation in green energy, the IT sector, deep industrial decarbonization, and the development of critical minerals, including uranium supplies. The two sides plan to implement projects worth over US$12 billion through a joint investment platform and the establishment of an economic zone in the Samarkand region.
Japan will also extend yen-denominated loans to Uzbekistan for the procurement of medical equipment and to improve small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to financial resources. In addition, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirzioev proposed holding biennial summits at the head-of-state level and initiating the development of a Cooperation Strategy between Central Asia and Japan.
For Japan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stand out because of their geographic position, economic potential, and human resources. However, Tokyo is also deepening engagement with other regional actors. Turkmenistan, for example, concluded eight investment agreements with Japanese firms. In Tajikistan, Japan has expressed interest in developing logistics and transport infrastructure, as well as in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements.
Japan and the Central Asian states also established cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence and medicine. The parties proposed the creation of a Central Asia–Japan digital hub to promote collaboration in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, the Internet of Things, and digital technologies.
Following the summit, a multilateral business forum was convened at which several joint projects were announced. These included the construction of solar power plants in Uzbekistan by Sumitomo, Chubu Electric Power, and Shikoku Electric Power, supported by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI); the establishment of a medical center by Sojitz; and critical minerals mining projects involving the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC).
IMPLICATIONS:
For the Central Asian states, closer ties with Japan form part of a broader strategy to pursue a more multi-aligned foreign policy, extending beyond reliance not only on Russia and China but also on the EU and the U.S. Japan is regarded as a reliable and responsible source of investment, particularly in sectors such as green energy and infrastructure. With its considerable technological expertise and development experience, Tokyo is in a strong position in the competition for influence in Central Asia.
Japan nevertheless faces structural constraints as an investor that limit its geopolitical weight in Central Asia. Geography constitutes the primary obstacle: there are no direct overland or maritime routes linking Japan to the region. Central Asia’s landlocked position, combined with its considerable distance from Japan, will continue to impose significant constraints on bilateral relations. Consequently, Japan is unlikely to emerge as a major geopolitical actor in the heart of Eurasia. It will remain structurally disadvantaged especially vis-à-vis Russia and China, but also in comparison to the EU and the U.S.
Second, Japan interest in security and military cooperation in the region is limited. Instead, it has primarily relied on soft power as its principal instrument of influence in Central Asia. For example, Tokyo has long supported Kazakhstan in assisting victims of Soviet-era nuclear testing by providing medical and technical aid, particularly to residents of the Abay region, where the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site is located. Other Central Asian states likewise receive substantial financial assistance from Japan. Notably, Tokyo offers various forms of partnership that are not formally conditioned on requirements related to democracy or human rights reforms.
Tokyo has demonstrated particular openness to cooperation in the extraction and processing of minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). This focus reflects the heightened global attention Central Asia has received in recent years due to its resource base, which is critical for global supply chains. Japan seeks to diversify its mineral and REE imports away from China. This is not the first indication of Japanese interest in the region’s rare earth sector. In the 2010s, Tokyo participated, albeit briefly, in the Stepnogorsk project in Kazakhstan before withdrawing from the initiative. The December summit, however, signaled a renewed commitment to the mineral sector, underscored by a pledge to invest approximately US$ 19 billion over the next five years in developing supply chains in the region.
In this context, Kazakhstan introduced the Next-Generation SmartMining Plus initiative, aimed at digitalizing the mining industry. Discussions also addressed the first-ever shipment of gallium, a rare metal used in electronics and semiconductors, from Kazakhstan, a development of particular significance given China’s dominant position in global gallium production.
The intensifying competition for Central Asia’s REEs and other critical minerals forms part of a broader contest over the region’s resource base. The EU, Russia, China, the U.S., and other actors all perceive substantial untapped potential in Central Asia.
Although Japan is a relatively late entrant into this competition, its pledge to invest US$ 19 billion is notable, as no other external power has committed a comparable sum. The closest parallel is the EU’s plan to mobilize €12 billion under its Global Gateway initiative, which aims to enhance connectivity across Eurasia and strengthen the Union’s competitiveness vis-à-vis China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Tokyo is capitalizing on Central Asia’s preference for engaging a wide range of external partners. It has also identified sectors in which the region remains particularly vulnerable and receptive to external support. One such domain is the rapidly evolving landscape of Eurasian connectivity.
In the context of the war in Ukraine and the increasing efforts by the EU, India, China, and other actors to develop alternative overland trade routes, the so-called Middle Corridor, linking the Black Sea to China’s western region of Xinjiang, has gained strategic prominence. Japan’s support for strengthening east–west connectivity in Central Asia reflects an effort to reduce Russia’s historically entrenched influence over the region’s infrastructure and economic networks. This strategic logic underpins Tokyo’s commitment to further development of the Middle Corridor.
CONCLUSIONS:
Japan’s expanding engagement with Central Asia reflects both its own foreign policy recalibrations and the intensifying competition among Asian and Western powers for access to the region’s strategic resources. Rivalry among Asian actors in particular has grown more pronounced, with China, South Korea, India, and several ASEAN member states all seeking to deepen their ties with Central Asia.
Compared to Russia and China, however, Japan’s ambitions remain more cautious. Rather than pursuing dominance, Tokyo aims to position itself as a facilitator of existing regional dynamics. Support for the expansion of the Middle Corridor and for the extraction and processing of REEs and other critical minerals aligns with Japan’s objective of mitigating Moscow’s and Beijing’s potential monopolistic influence in these sectors.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
From Declarations To Corridors: Rethinking Economic Integration In Central Asia
By Rafis Abazov
For more than three decades, economic integration in Central Asia has been shaped by ambitious declarations, multilateral communiqués, and periodic summit diplomacy. Yet tangible outcomes have often lagged behind political rhetoric. The emerging shift from abstract integration models toward corridor-based, infrastructure-driven cooperation marks a potentially decisive turning point. Recent developments between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—notably the revival of the Almaty–Bishkek Economic Corridor with support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the creation of industrial and logistics hubs along their shared border—suggest that Central Asia may finally be moving from declarative regionalism to functional economic integration.
BACKGROUND:
Since independence, Central Asian states have repeatedly endorsed the idea of regional economic integration. Initiatives ranging from customs cooperation to Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU) were designed to lower barriers, stimulate trade, and create a single economic space. In practice, however, these frameworks often lacked operational depth. Divergent regulatory regimes, weak cross-border infrastructure, and limited coordination between national development strategies constrained their impact. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan provide a revealing case. Despite geographical proximity and strong historical ties, economic cooperation long remained below potential. According to official data, bilateral trade turnover remained under US$ 2.0 billion in 2025, yet this figure still represented only a fraction of what integrated logistics, industrial cooperation, and value-chain development could deliver. Another indicator underscores this gap: more than 70 percent of bilateral trade consisted of raw materials and low value-added goods, highlighting the structural limitations of existing trade patterns. Against this backdrop, corridor-based integration has emerged as a pragmatic alternative. Rather than attempting to harmonize entire economies at once, economic corridors focus on specific geographic axes where infrastructure, trade facilitation, industrial policy, and investment can be aligned. This logic underpins the renewed focus on the Almaty–Bishkek Economic Corridor, one of the most densely populated (with population about 4.4 million people) and economically dynamic cross-border zones in Central Asia. The Almaty–Bishkek Economic Corridor (ABEC) was initially conceptualized in the mid-2010s as a pilot for cross-border integration. Supported by the ADB, the corridor connects two major urban agglomerations—Almaty and Bishkek—located less than 250 kilometers apart. Together, they account for a significant share of both countries’ GDP, population, and industrial capacity.
IMPLICATIONS:
The renewed political momentum behind ABEC is notable. In 2025, the official visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Kyrgyzstan elevated economic corridor development to the level of strategic priority. The visit reaffirmed both governments’ commitment to moving beyond symbolic cooperation toward concrete joint projects, particularly in logistics, agri-processing, and light manufacturing. Perhaps the most innovative element of the new integration model is the creation of joint industrial trade and logistics complexes (ITLCs) along the Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan border. Unlike traditional free trade zones, these hubs are designed as shared economic spaces, with coordinated infrastructure, customs regimes, and investment incentives. The first pilot hub in the Kordai area represents a qualitative shift. It is not merely a transit point but a platform for joint production, storage, processing, and distribution. By co-locating enterprises from both countries, the hub aims to shorten supply chains, reduce logistics costs, and encourage value-added manufacturing. Early estimates suggest that efficient corridor operations could reduce cross-border transport costs by 15–20 percent, significantly improving competitiveness for small and medium-sized enterprises on both sides, create thousands of jobs, and increase bilateral trade turnover to US$ 3.0 billion by 2030. Importantly, these hubs are embedded in a broader political framework. Their creation followed mutual state visits, meetings of the Kazakh–Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Council, and sustained high-level engagement. This alignment between political leadership and technical implementation has been largely absent in earlier regional initiatives.
The shift from declarations to corridors carries broader implications for Central Asia’s integration trajectory. First, it reframes free trade agreements as enabling instruments rather than endpoints. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) alone do not generate trade; infrastructure, logistics, and industrial cooperation do. The Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan experience suggests that FTAs are most effective when embedded in spatially defined economic corridors with clear investment pipelines. Second, corridor-based integration offers scalability. Success along the Almaty–Bishkek axis could be replicated along other strategic routes, linking Central Asia more effectively to South Asia, China, and the Caucasus. In this sense, corridors function as building blocks for a wider regional economic space. Third, the model strengthens resilience. By promoting regional value chains and reducing dependence on distant markets, corridor integration can buffer Central Asian economies against external shocks. For landlocked countries, improved cross-border connectivity is not a luxury but a strategic necessity. Finally, the political economy dimension is crucial. Sustained leadership engagement—illustrated by the 2025 presidential visit and repeated intergovernmental consultations—signals a recognition that economic integration requires long-term commitment, institutional coordination, and trust-building. This is a departure from the episodic diplomacy that characterized earlier phases of regional cooperation.
CONCLUSIONS:
ADB-supported assessments emphasized several corridor advantages: proximity to markets, complementary labor and production structures, and existing transport links that could be upgraded at relatively low cost. Recent investments have focused on modernizing border crossing points, improving road and logistics infrastructure, and harmonizing customs and sanitary standards. These “soft infrastructure” reforms are as critical as physical upgrades, reducing transaction costs and uncertainty for businesses.
This ADB’s evaluation illustrates the choices for Central Asian republics. The region can continue to produce integration declarations with limited practical impact, or it can invest in functional mechanisms that deliver measurable economic outcomes. The evolving partnership between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan suggests that the latter path is increasingly viable. By anchoring integration in corridors, logistics hubs, and targeted industrial cooperation, the two countries are experimenting with a new model of regionalism—one that is pragmatic, incremental, and results-oriented. Supported by institutions such as ADB and reinforced by high-level political will, this approach moves integration from aspiration to implementation. If sustained and expanded, corridor-based integration could redefine economic cooperation across Central Asia. It offers a way to translate geography into advantage, proximity into productivity, and political goodwill into shared growth. In doing so, it may finally allow the region to move from declarations to durable economic corridors—and, ultimately, toward a genuinely integrated economic space.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007), An Effective Project Manager (2025) and some others. He has been an executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan since 2014 and facilitated the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries.
Russia’s Offer to Build an SMR in Kyrgyzstan and its Implications
By Sergey Sukhankin
In late 2025, during his visit to Kyrgyzstan, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin declared Russia’s readiness to build a small modular nuclear power reactor (SMR) in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signaling Moscow’s intention to move beyond traditional trade relations toward projects in long-term strategic infrastructure. Russia’s proposal may be justified by the need to address Kyrgyzstan’s persistent problem of frequent energy shortages, caused by rising consumption, aging energy infrastructure, and overreliance on hydropower as the primary source of electricity generation. At a deeper level, however, the initiative reflects Moscow’s post-2022 strategy, premised on exporting high-technology solutions to politically friendly states and anchoring influence through capital-intensive projects with multi-decade life cycles, such as SMRs. Undoubtedly, if successfully constructed, an SMR could strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s energy security. Yet, it would also exacerbate the country’s strategic dependence on Russia by locking it into long-term technological, financial, and regulatory reliance, rendering the project arguably more geopolitical in nature than economic.
BACKGROUND:
Kyrgyzstan’s energy system has long suffered from structural fragility stemming from the country’s overarching dependence on hydropower: more than 90 percent of electricity generation derives from this source, largely produced by the Toktogul cascade. Exposed to multiple risks and weaknesses, such as droughts, aging Soviet-era infrastructure, and rapidly growing domestic demand, the system has shifted from experiencing occasional electricity deficits to facing a structural crisis. In 2023, the government introduced a state of emergency in the energy sector, explicitly acknowledging the inability of existing generation capacity and demand-management tools to ensure uninterrupted supply. Experts note that persistent electricity shortages could further undermine Kyrgyzstan’s socio-economic stability and, in the longer term, generate political repercussions posing serious challenges to the country’s leadership. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan appears unable to address this challenge independently. Beyond economic constraints, particularly the high fixed costs associated with hydropower generation, recent water shortages have further exacerbated the problem. In this context, Kyrgyz authorities have expressed interest in developing nuclear energy projects, with external financial support, as a potential solution to the country’s long-term electricity supply challenges.
This interest emerged in parallel with Russia’s broader strategic effort to diversify its export portfolio beyond raw materials. In this context, Moscow has actively promoted the deployment of an SMR in Kyrgyzstan as part of a wider push to export high-value energy technologies. The origins of this initiative can be traced to early 2022, when Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, and the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy signed a non-binding memorandum on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Beyond signaling technical cooperation, the memorandum laid the groundwork for potential SMR construction and the gradual development of a national regulatory framework, indicating a long-term and structurally embedded approach rather than a short-term energy solution. Following the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 and Russia’s exposure to an expanding array of international (Western) sanctions, the idea gained renewed momentum.
Given Kyrgyzstan’s highly specific socio-political environment, distinct from that of other Central Asian states, public opinion on nuclear energy is an issue the ruling elite cannot afford to ignore. Available evidence suggests that societal attitudes toward nuclear power remain ambivalent. According to public opinion surveys conducted in 2024, 58 percent of respondents expressed support for the development of nuclear energy, while 38 percent voiced categorical opposition. Support is largely driven by expectations that nuclear power could help meet the country’s growing electricity demand and create new employment opportunities. At the same time, significant concerns persist regarding nuclear safety, environmental risks, seismic vulnerability, and the state’s institutional capacity to regulate complex and high-risk technologies. As a result, nuclear energy remains a politically sensitive and potentially contentious issue within Kyrgyzstan’s domestic political landscape.
IMPLICATIONS:
Should the Kyrgyz political leadership respond positively to Russia’s proposal, the country would face a combination of potential benefits and risks, which can be broadly categorized as follows.
First, meeting energy needs and ensuring system stability. From an energy-security perspective, the emergence of an SMR could positively affect Kyrgyzstan’s electricity balance. Unlike hydropower, nuclear generation provides continuous baseload output independent of seasonal water availability. Russian officials have indicated that Kyrgyzstan could be offered a plant based on the RITM-200N reactor design, with total capacity ranging from approximately 110 to 440 MW, depending on configuration. This output could supply electricity to between 66,000 and 352,000 households simultaneously. Even at the lower end of this range, such capacity could reduce imports and ease pressure on hydropower assets during dry periods. That said, to fully realize these benefits, Kyrgyzstan would need to meet several conditions: the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory framework, an independent nuclear safety authority, trained operators, emergency-response systems, and long-term arrangements for fuel supply and waste management. For Kyrgyzstan, this would entail either creating much of this infrastructure from scratch or delegating these functions to Russia, a choice that would inevitably deepen institutional dependence on Russia.
Second, the issue of economic costs and long-term dependence. Although SMRs are often presented as cheaper and more flexible than conventional large nuclear plants, they remain capital-intensive projects with long payback periods. In practice, this would require Kyrgyzstan to assume long-term financial obligations while ceding significant control over critical components of its energy system to a foreign state with a documented record of using energy as a geopolitical instrument of pressure. Moreover, dependence would extend well beyond construction, encompassing fuel supply, maintenance, software, spare parts, and periodic upgrades. For Kyrgyzstan, this would narrow future strategic options and increase the cost of diversifying away from Russian technology for decades to come.
Third, implications for domestic politics. Nuclear projects frequently face public resistance even in countries with strong institutions. In Kyrgyzstan, where trust in state decision-making is limited and political competition is intense, an SMR could become a focal point for opposition mobilization, particularly in the event of an incident or if Russia were perceived as leveraging Kyrgyzstan’s dependence. Without transparent consultations, credible safety assurances, and clearly articulated local benefits, the project risks appearing as an externally imposed geopolitical arrangement rather than a sovereign national development choice.
Fourth, intra-regional geopolitical effects. The Central Asian “water–energy–food” nexus is inherently conflict-prone due to divergent seasonal priorities: upstream states, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, seek to maximize winter electricity generation, while downstream countries depend on summer water flows for irrigation. From a policy perspective, the deployment of an SMR could offer a structural advantage by providing reliable winter baseload generation, thereby reducing reliance on hydropower and creating space for more predictable and cooperative water–energy arrangements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, this opportunity entails significant trade-offs. An SMR would deepen long-term technological and financial commitments to an external partner and could become entangled in regional and extra-regional geopolitical bargaining. If politicized, the project risks undermining trust, constraining policy flexibility, and further securitizing energy governance in Central Asia rather than contributing to its stabilization.
CONCLUSIONS:
Russia’s proposal to build an SMR in Kyrgyzstan represents a pivotal choice that extends well beyond energy policy. While the project could substantially enhance electricity security and reduce vulnerability to hydrological shocks, it would also bind Kyrgyzstan to long-term technological, financial, and regulatory dependence on Russia. In a politically pluralistic and socially sensitive environment, such dependence entails significant domestic and regional risks. Ultimately, the project’s impact will depend on whether Kyrgyz authorities can balance short-term energy gains against strategic autonomy, address public concerns transparently, and prevent the SMR from becoming an instrument of geopolitical leverage rather than a catalyst for sustainable development.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).
The Organization of Turkic States' Push into Green Finance and Digital Innovation
By Lindsey Cliff
The Organization of Turkic States has expanded beyond its cultural foundations to address regional challenges through green finance, digital innovation, and artificial intelligence initiatives. Led by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the OTS established the Turkic Green Finance Council and proposed collaborative AI networks, responding to economic pressures from sanctions and oil price fluctuations. Key initiatives include the Turkic Green Vision promoting renewable energy development and the Green Middle Corridor for sustainable transport, alongside digitalization programs for customs procedures and cybersecurity cooperation. The establishment of institutional mechanisms—councils with rotating leadership, working groups of technical experts, and concrete investment vehicles—suggests organizational maturation. Whether these programs deliver tangible results will determine if the OTS evolves from primarily aspirational declarations into substantive economic and technological cooperation.
BACKGROUND:
The Organization of Turkic States has recognized the interconnected nature of climate, technology, and economy-related challenges. As such, the OTS has recently pushed, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan leading the charge, for greater collaboration and integration in response to these threats. The fields of green energy, digital transformation, and smart innovation have become areas of pragmatic cooperation.
At the 2025 Gabala Summit, OTS leaders stressed "the importance of cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence and promote the integration of AI, green and digital technologies, and smart manufacturing systems into industrial strategies of the Member States, with a view to enhancing productivity, sustainability, and regional competitiveness through coordinated innovation and capacity-building efforts." This declaration marks a significant evolution for an organization that began with primarily cultural ambitions.
These initiatives respond to practical challenges facing landlocked Central Asian states. The growing global confrontation between the West and a loose anti-Western axis has added economic challenges for countries in the region. Mutual sanctions imposed by Russia and the West from 2014 onward hit the region hard, in combination with dramatic fluctuations in oil prices. Large-scale devaluations took place in the years following 2014, lowering purchasing power. While some entrepreneurs benefited from helping Russia circumvent sanctions, this hardly benefited the economy as a whole or reduced unemployment.
IMPLICATIONS:
In the domain of green finance and sustainability, the OTS has taken several concrete action steps. In Bishkek in November 2024, the Turkic Green Finance Council was established, with the Kazakh Astana International Finance Centre taking the lead. The Council will "provide OTS member states with an additional boost for developing green finance and attracting sustainable investments into regional projects."
The Council's inaugural meeting in September 2025 was attended by "heads and representatives of financial regulators, ministries of economy and finance, as well as stock exchanges from OTS Member States and Observers," supporting the possibility of tangible integration among all levels of the region's public and private sectors. Unlike summit-level photo opportunities, this meeting brought together the officials responsible for day-to-day implementation and strategy. The meeting resulted in the adoption of a joint communique expressing commitment to progress in sustainable development and environmental protection, "guided by the principles of Turkic Green Vision, as well as the Turkic World Vision 2040, and the OTS Strategy for 2022-2026."
The practical objectives of the Council, along with attendance by multiple levels of government and business leaders, suggest the OTS is moving from broad declarations toward institutional mechanisms for sustainable finance. The Turkic Green Vision proposes creation of several working groups: the Turkic Renewable Energy Alliance would promote renewable energy development; the Green Middle Corridor would create a sustainable transport route; the Turkic Biodiversity and Ecosystem initiative would promote collaboration in environmental protection and restoration; the Climate Change and Educational Awareness Program would promote study of climate issues and community disaster resilience.
Artificial intelligence and digitalization have also become main focuses of OTS integration. At the 2024 Bishkek Summit, Secretary General Kubanychbek Omuraliev highlighted collaborative projects across "e-commerce, technoparks, digital infrastructure development and cybersecurity" and suggested creation of a Turkic AI network and further investment in AI innovation and education. The organization also aims to streamline trade through digitized customs procedures, enabling more efficient transportation of goods.
Uzbekistan has been at the center of much of the AI and digitization agenda. Domestic investment in the digital sector has led to rapid modernization, increasing domestic internet access and speed, expanding IT service exports from $170 million to $1 billion, and attracting foreign investment. In AI, Uzbekistan has been investing within the framework of its "Strategy for the Development of AI Technologies through 2030." The goal is to "create a national AI model and train 1 million specialists." Already, the country has spent $50 million toward this goal, with 86 projects started and free online training programs launched. Through OTS AI Forums, the organization hopes to follow Uzbekistan's lead toward a more digital future with international investment in local IT and AI.
Kazakhstan is also attempting to lead in areas of AI and digital innovation, suggesting an intra-OTS Digital Monitoring Center. Kazakhstan's President Tokayev recently proposed dedicating an upcoming informal OTS summit to the theme of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development, and he made digitalization and AI the centerpiece of Kazakhstan's national strategy in a September 2025 public address. The aim is to set up Kazakhstan as a "fully digital country" within three years, establishing a dedicated ministry for digitalization and AI, developing legal codes for AI governance, and developing digital currencies.
In these areas, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are taking leading roles. Kazakhstan not only hosted the inaugural Green Finance Council but also suggested its creation. Of course, Uzbekistan now leads the region in AI readiness and is making significant domestic progress on its digitization and AI agendas. Future OTS summits will likely maintain continued focus on AI, digital innovation, and sustainable development.
CONCLUSIONS:
The Kazakh-proposed Digital Monitoring Center represents potential cybersecurity and defensive integration—a real avenue for pragmatic cooperation. The transnational nature of climate threats and the internet necessitate a collective regional response. While the Turkic Green Vision adds language about supporting "cultural and natural values of the region," and third-party observers recognize IT as a way to "preserve cultural heritage," the primary drivers are practical: economic development, energy security, and regional competitiveness.
These initiatives respond to genuine needs. The rapid development of initiatives in finance, digitalization, and green energy demonstrates that the OTS is expanding beyond its cultural foundations. However, questions remain about implementation. As with many OTS initiatives, movement from declarations to concrete results will determine whether these programs represent genuine integration or remain primarily aspirational.
The establishment of institutional mechanisms—councils with rotating leadership, working groups of technical experts, and concrete investment vehicles like the Turkic Investment Fund—suggests a maturing organization. If these initiatives deliver tangible results in coming years, they will mark the OTS's evolution from a primarily cultural organization into a platform for substantive economic and technological cooperation.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Lindsey Cliff is a junior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, who is also pursuing a Master’s degree at Georgetown University in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies.
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