By Laura Linderman

On November 28, 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party explicitly announced a change in Georgia's foreign policy trajectory, despite overwhelming public opposition to turning away from European integration. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze declared the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, rejecting talks until 2028 and refusing EU budget support. Kobakhidze asserted that Georgia would enter the EU in 2030, "with dignity" - a claim rejected by the vast majority of Georgians who view this as a betrayal of the country's pro-European aspirations.

This decision sparked nationwide protests that reflect the broad public consensus in support of European integration. Demonstrators have gathered in Tbilisi, Batumi, and cities across Georgia, condemning GD's decision and the subsequent police brutality against mostly peaceful protesters. Demonstrations have continued since the announcement, with protesters blocking streets, clashing with riot police, and facing dispersal attempts using water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray. President Salome Zourabichvili has pledged to stay on as Georgian President, emphasizing that the illegitimate Parliament cannot elect a legitimate President.

BACKGROUND:  Prior to the October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections, Georgia's economy was experiencing double-digit economic growth, despite the fact that most ordinary Georgians live near poverty. This growth was fueled, in part, by financial flows from Russia, including tourism, trade, and potentially sanctions-evading investment. Russia is a significant market for Georgian products like wine, and the influx of Russian money had created a wealthy elite dependent on these financial flows. The economic growth figures helped the Georgian Dream (GD) secure support and acquiescence from some segments of the population.

This dependence on Russian money creates a conflict between Georgia's political aspirations of joining Europe and its economic realities. Despite preferential access to the EU market, Georgia did not produce much that Europe wanted to buy, while Russia was a major consumer of Georgian products. This economic reality, coupled with GD's close ties to Russia, likely contributed to the party's decision to halt EU accession negotiations, further consolidating its grip on power and jeopardizing Georgia's European future.

The protests that followed Georgian Dream's decision to suspend EU accession negotiations were fueled by a strong desire for EU integration among a distinct majority of the Georgian population. While the GD government maintained its rhetoric about commitment to eventual EU membership, its decision to postpone accession talks until 2028 provoked immediate public anger and confirmed long-standing suspicions that the government lacked genuine commitment to EU integration. The government's ratification of a Russian-style "foreign agents" law over the summer, coupled with its strategic courting of older, rural conservative constituencies more vulnerable to fears of cultural upheaval and potential conflict with Russia, further reinforced the perception that GD was prioritizing appeasement and political expediency over meaningful European alignment.

The timing of the announcement coincided with a European Parliament resolution documenting electoral irregularities. This resolution echoed widespread criticism of the elections, which were marred by concerns about the secrecy of the vote, vote-rigging, voter intimidation, and a lack of transparency, as reported by international observers. GD's decision, perceived by many as a rejection of the popular will in favor of closer ties with Russia, led to a significant portion of the population demanding immediate progress toward EU membership.

IMPLICATIONS:  Since the November 28^th announcement, numerous civil servants have resigned in protest, including Georgia's ambassadors to the United States, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Italy, Czechia, and the Netherlands. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia imposed sanctions on GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and several high-ranking Interior Ministry officials, barring them from entering their countries. The Baltic states also condemned the suppression of protests and reaffirmed their support for the Georgian people's European aspirations. In addition to these resignations and sanctions, various sectors of Georgian society mobilized in opposition to the GD's decision. Students from universities organized marches and protests, demanding a reversal of the decision and calling on their universities to suspend classes so students could participate in demonstrations. The Georgian Trade Unions Confederation criticized GD's lack of transparency and condemned police violence against protesters. The International Chamber of Commerce in Georgia warned that halting the EU accession process would negatively impact the country's economy and investor confidence. Both major banks, Bank of Georgia and TBC Bank, and leading internet providers Magti and Silknet condemned the government's actions and reaffirmed their commitment to European integration.

The implications of GD’s decision and the subsequent protests are multifaceted and far-reaching:

• Erosion of Democracy: GD’s actions, including the alleged election rigging and violent suppression of protests, have significantly damaged Georgia’s democratic credentials. International observers have expressed concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the shrinking space for civil society in Georgia, especially the ratification of the Russian-style foreign agents law. The use of excessive force against protesters, including journalists, further highlighted the government's disregard for fundamental freedoms.

• Strained EU Relations: The decision to halt EU accession has severely strained Georgia’s relationship with the EU. European officials have condemned GD's move as a betrayal of the Georgian people’s aspirations and a rejection of the country's European future. The suspension of EU budget support and the potential for sanctions against GD leaders further isolate Georgia from its European partners.

• Strained US Relations: The US decision to suspend its Strategic Partnership with Georgia, in response to GD's halt of EU accession negotiations, signals a deterioration in US-Georgia relations and underscores US concerns about GD government's commitment to democratic values and the rule of law. By suspending the partnership, the US aims to pressure the Georgian government to reconsider its actions and to demonstrate its commitment to democratic principles. The suspension also raises questions about the future of US assistance to Georgia, which has been instrumental in supporting the country's democratic and economic development. This move could weaken Georgia's security and stability, particularly in the context of ongoing tensions with Russia. Additionally, it may embolden anti-Western forces within Georgia and undermine the pro-European aspirations of the Georgian people

• Geopolitical Realignment and Russian Influence: The timing of Russian President Vladimir Putin's praise for GD's decision, just minutes after the announcement, has raised suspicions about potential Russian influence behind the move. The sources also highlight GD's adoption of policies, such as the "foreign agent" law, that mirror Russian legislation and have been criticized by the EU and the US.

• Implications for Regional Stability: The potential geopolitical realignment of Georgia has significant implications for the balance of power in the South Caucasus. A shift towards Russia could embolden the Kremlin to exert more influence in the region and potentially threaten the sovereignty of other neighboring countries, particularly Armenia.

• Economic Fallout: The halting of EU accession has created significant economic uncertainty for Georgia. The potential for reduced foreign investment and trade disruptions could severely impact the country's economic growth. While Georgia's recent economic growth has been partly fueled by Russian money, this raises concerns about economic sustainability and potential dependence on Russia. The Georgian Dream (GD) party's rejection of EU budget support will limit financial assistance and hinder development. GD's actions have damaged Georgia's international reputation and risk international isolation. Widespread protests, including strikes by schools and universities, are disrupting economic activity and further undermining investor confidence. The ongoing political instability threatens to derail Georgia's economic progress and international standing.

CONCLUSION:  GD's decision to halt EU accession has triggered a nationwide crisis, revealing a stark disconnect between the ruling party and the overwhelming pro-European sentiments of Georgian citizens. While GD claims to be pursuing a "European path with dignity," its actions suggest a shift towards Russia's sphere of influence, raising concerns about the country's sovereignty and democratic future. This shift is motivated, in part, by a strategic calculation that aligns with the interests of certain political and economic elites within Georgia, who have benefitted from closer ties with Russia and favor an appeasement strategy with the North. GD has employed a range of tactics to consolidate its power, including manipulating elections, intimidating voters, and suppressing dissent, drawing parallels to the authoritarian playbook seen in countries like Hungary. The opposition's struggle to counter GD's narrative and mobilize sustained public resistance highlights the challenges facing pro-democracy forces in Georgia.

AUTHOR BIO: Laura Linderman is a Senior Fellow and Director of Programs at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council.

By Rafis Abazov

Kazakhstan has long sought to establish itself as a "middle power" in Eurasia, though its geographic and political significance has often been overshadowed by rivalries among major powers like Russia, China, and the West. Recent developments—such as the rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), expanded Eurasian transport links, and deeper global economic integration—offer new opportunities to realize this ambition. These themes were explored at the Kazakhstan Economic Freedom Conference held in Astana in September 2024, where experts debated whether Kazakhstan can effectively capitalize on these trends to enhance its global standing.

BACKGROUND:  In international relations, a "middle power" refers to a state that, while not a superpower, exerts significant regional influence and acts as a bridge between larger global powers. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy with a GDP of US$ 261 billion (2023), has pursued this status through a strategy of balancing relations with major neighbors like Russia and China while fostering strong ties with the West. Astana emphasizes principles of non-alignment and multivector diplomacy, enabling the country to mediate regional conflicts, support global non-proliferation, and contribute actively to international organizations.  Kazakhstan’s vision as a middle power is rooted in its economic potential, particularly its vast reserves of oil, gas, and minerals, which have attracted substantial foreign investment over the past three decades. This influx of investment has supported infrastructure development and economic diversification, bolstering its regional standing. By leveraging its natural resources, strategic geographic position, and diplomatic engagement, Kazakhstan aspires to shape regional and global dynamics. Nevertheless, as global economic systems and technological innovations transform the international landscape, Kazakhstan’s ability to adapt and capitalize on these changes will be crucial in achieving its middle-power ambitions.

IMPLICATIONS:  Three key developments hold the potential to bolster Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power, with one of the most transformative being the rise of CBDCs. As digital equivalents of national currencies issued by central banks, CBDCs promise to revolutionize global financial systems by improving transactional efficiency, strengthening monetary policy, and significantly reducing the costs of cross-border payments. Kazakhstan is actively examining the potential of CBDCs, drawing lessons from countries like China, which has advanced in developing the digital yuan.  For Kazakhstan, adopting a CBDC could modernize its financial infrastructure, enhancing its integration into global and regional financial networks. A national CBDC would not only streamline domestic payment systems but also facilitate faster, cheaper, and more secure international transactions. This shift could play a pivotal role as Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economy beyond oil and gas, attracting foreign direct investment in emerging sectors such as advanced technology, green energy, and financial services.  Additionally, a CBDC would enable Kazakhstan to exercise greater control over its monetary system, reducing reliance on foreign currencies in trade and cross-border finance. Amid increasing geopolitical tensions and the impact of sanctions on global trade flows, such autonomy within a digital financial ecosystem could significantly enhance Kazakhstan’s economic resilience and reinforce its strategic positioning as a middle power. The second key development bolstering Kazakhstan's middle-power aspirations is its role in bridging East and West. Strategically located at the center of Eurasia, Kazakhstan has long been pivotal in regional transportation and logistics. This role is being strengthened by the expansion of Eurasian transportation corridors, particularly the 4,200-km Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). Positioned at the intersection of major trade routes connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Kazakhstan's importance has grown amid disruptions in global supply chains caused by geopolitical tensions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and shifting trade partnerships. Initiatives such as China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project further underscore Kazakhstan’s centrality in facilitating overland trade between China and Europe. Investments in infrastructure—including railways, highways, and ports—enhance Kazakhstan’s potential to capture a larger share of international trade flows, boosting its economy and geopolitical relevance. Discussions at the Astana conference highlighted how these transportation corridors present a critical opportunity for Kazakhstan to redefine its middle-power role. By strengthening economic ties with major global actors such as China, the European Union, and Turkey, Kazakhstan not only solidifies its position as a regional logistics hub but also enhances its capacity as a mediator. This dual role, connecting East and West through both trade and diplomacy, reinforces Kazakhstan’s strategic standing in an increasingly interconnected world. The third development shaping Kazakhstan’s aspirations as a middle power is its integration into the global economy amidst ongoing global shocks. Like many nations, Kazakhstan has faced significant economic disruptions in recent years due to the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical conflicts, and environmental crises. Mark Uzan, director of the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee and co-organizer of the Astana conference, noted that these shocks have disrupted global supply chains, heightened financial market volatility, and altered trade patterns. They have also exposed vulnerabilities in Kazakhstan’s economic model, particularly its reliance on natural resource exports. Kazakhstan’s response to these challenges has been twofold. Domestically, the government has emphasized economic diversification, with investments in renewable energy, agriculture, and digital technologies. Internationally, Kazakhstan has pursued deeper integration into global and regional economic systems, including active participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Astana conference underscored the urgency for Kazakhstan to accelerate its diversification efforts and strengthen resilience to external shocks. Policies promoting advanced technology transfer, improved governance, and enhanced participation in global value chains were identified as critical steps. Successfully navigating these challenges could not only stabilize Kazakhstan’s economy but also enhance its credibility and influence as a middle power on the global stage.

CONCLUSIONS:  At the international conference in Astana, experts emphasized the transformative potential of CBDCs in positioning Kazakhstan as a financial hub in the region and a key player in the emerging digital economy. By adopting CBDCs and advancing digital finance, Kazakhstan could assert itself as a middle power by actively shaping global financial norms and practices. Moreover, integrating regional transportation corridors with technologies like blockchain and digital logistics platforms could improve efficiency and transparency in trade, giving Kazakhstan a competitive edge. With strategic control over vital transportation routes and a commitment to digital innovation, Kazakhstan is well-positioned to influence the reconfiguration of global trade networks in the 21st century. Kazakhstan’s rise as a middle power should therefore be reinterpreted beyond its diplomatic and geopolitical role, focusing on its capacity to navigate and shape the regional economic order. The interplay of CBDC adoption, transportation network expansion, and integration into regional and global economic systems creates new pathways for Kazakhstan to enhance its influence on the international stage. However, Kazakhstan’s ability to secure middle-power status will depend on well-calibrated economic policies that address internal challenges while responding to global economic, technological, and geopolitical shifts. The conference underscored the importance of embracing digital finance, expanding its transportation hub role, and building economic resilience. By doing so, Kazakhstan can solidify its position as a pivotal actor in the future of the Eurasian region and the global economy.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a director of the Institute for Green and Sustainable Development at Kazakh National Agrarian Research University. He is the author of The Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics (2007) and The Stories of the Great Steppe (2013). He was executive manager for the Global Hub of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI) on Sustainability in Kazakhstan between 2014 and 2019 and organized the International Model UN New Silk Way conference in Afghanistan in 2014 and 2015. He served as a UNDP project manager (joint project UNDP, FAO, and UNICEF) between 2019 and 2022.

By Ghulam Ali

Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Jiang Zaidong recently criticized the repeated attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, calling them “unacceptable” and citing security as the biggest challenge to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). His comments followed two fatal incidents within six months, which claimed seven Chinese lives. Pakistan’s Foreign Office, instead of addressing the concerns, dismissed the remarks as “perplexing,” revealing underlying tensions in the bilateral relationship. Despite China’s role as Pakistan’s key economic partner, security lapses and strained diplomacy are testing the limits of their traditionally strong ties, highlighting deeper challenges to the CPEC and broader cooperation. These tensions point to a more complex dynamic in bilateral relations, revealing that mutual dependency alone may not be sufficient to sustain smooth cooperation amidst mounting challenges.

BACKGROUND:  The diplomatic row between China and Pakistan intensified during a seminar in Islamabad on October 30, when Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong openly rebutted remarks by Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. Dar claimed that China prioritized security in its overseas investments but made Pakistan an exception due to its friendship. The ambassador firmly countered, stating that President Xi Jinping consistently emphasizes the importance of ensuring the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions, and projects in Pakistan, reiterating that security remains China’s top concern and a major constraint to the CPEC.  This marked the first public expression of such sentiments by China and an equally unprecedented response from Pakistan's Foreign Office, which described the remarks as “perplexing” and “surprising.” Pakistan's English-language media reflected the gravity of the situation, with Dawn describing the exchange as rare and The Nation advising restraint from the Foreign Office. Further complicating matters, Pakistan canceled President Asif Ali Zardari’s planned visit to China on November 2, citing a dubious pretext of a foot injury, signaling deeper strains in the relationship amid growing concerns over security and diplomatic discord. This is not the first time China has urged Pakistan to ensure the security of its nationals. In several meetings with Pakistani leaders, China has consistently emphasized the importance of safeguarding Chinese citizens and interests in Pakistan. During his meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in June 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated the need for Pakistan to create a safe and stable environment, stressing the protection of Chinese nationals, projects, and institutions. In line with this, Beijing also sent Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, to Islamabad, where he echoed similar concerns regarding security during discussions with Pakistan’s political leaders. China has faced numerous attacks on its citizens in Pakistan, with over 21 Chinese nationals killed since 2017. The Balochistan Liberation Army, a separatist group seeking independence for the underdeveloped Balochistan province, which hosts the strategic Gwadar Port, is behind many of these attacks. The Balochi population has long expressed grievances over marginalization and resource extraction without benefiting from the region’s wealth, fueling insurgent movements. Currently, Balochistan is experiencing its fifth wave of insurgency. Another key source of attacks on Chinese nationals is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group primarily based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While the TTP has denied responsibility, Pakistani authorities have attributed the March 2024 suicide bombing that killed five Chinese engineers to the group. Allegations suggest that the TTP may be collaborating with Uyghur separatists, given their shared religious ideology, further complicating the security landscape for Chinese nationals in Pakistan.

IMPLICATIONS:  The Chinese ambassador’s public expression of frustration and his direct reprimand of Pakistani officials highlighted China’s increasing impatience with Pakistan’s handling of security for Chinese nationals. By emphasizing the gravity of the situation and warning against future incidents, the ambassador signaled that China would no longer shy away from bluntly addressing its concerns. This shift in tone underscores the growing tension in the bilateral relationship, with the potential for global attention if the situation deteriorates further. The security situation in Pakistan will be pivotal in determining China’s future investment decisions. If the security environment remains unstable, China may choose to complete ongoing projects but refrain from launching new ones. This was evident during Chinese Premier Li Qiang's mid-October visit to Pakistan for the SCO conference, where he did not explicitly endorse the second phase of the CPEC or any new initiatives. This lack of commitment signals that security concerns could heavily influence China’s willingness to deepen its involvement in Pakistan moving forward. China and Pakistan had already planned to review their counterterrorism cooperation, and recent developments are likely to expedite this process through three key trends. First, China may increase its security support by providing bomb-proof vehicles for the safe transport of Chinese engineers, offering specialized security training to Pakistani personnel, and expanding intelligence sharing and consultation between the two countries. Second, the idea of involving Chinese private security companies (PSCs) or establishing joint security arrangements with Pakistani counterparts could gain traction. China has expressed interest in deploying PSCs, especially in conflict zones worldwide, to safeguard its growing investments. However, the deployment of PSCs to Pakistan faces both legal and practical obstacles. Pakistani law prohibits foreign security companies from operating within its borders. Even if this hurdle is overcome, the concept is likely to face challenges due to the country’s security realities. The Pakistani military and intelligence agencies, despite having the necessary resources and capabilities, have struggled to protect Chinese nationals. Given this, private companies, with far fewer resources, may not be effective in improving security. Additionally, bringing in foreign security personnel, whether from China’s armed forces or private firms, could expose them to the same risks from terrorist groups that have targeted Chinese nationals in the past. Third, the worsening security situation in Pakistan could provide the military with a pretext for launching another large-scale military operation, something it has long advocated. In June 2024, the Pakistani government approved the counter-terrorism operation Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), but its implementation was delayed due to opposition from political parties and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), which advocates for the rights of Pashtuns. However, conducting a military operation during a period of economic difficulties, political polarization, and significant opposition would reduce its likelihood of success. Additionally, such an operation would come with substantial economic costs and the risk of collateral damage, particularly in already unstable regions, further complicating its execution and effectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS:  Although a seemingly minor incident, Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong's remarks have exposed long-standing issues between China and Pakistan, revealing underlying challenges in their relationship. These comments have sparked debate, both within Pakistan and internationally, regarding the durability of their "all-weather" friendship. If one factor has most damaged the Sino-Pakistani partnership, it is terrorism. Likewise, if there is one issue that will significantly determine the future of this relationship, it is the ongoing challenge of terrorism and its impact on security for both nations.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Dr. Ghulam Ali is the Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies (www.rcas.top). He received his PhD from Monash University in Australia and completed a postdoc at Peking University in Beijing. He has authored or edited four books and published articles in academic journals and media outlets.