By Robert M. Cutler
The year 2024 saw a shift away from external mediation in the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, to direct bilateral negotiations. Despite widespread expectations of a finalized peace treaty by the end of 2024, no agreement was signed. This reflects a strategic decision to avoid an interim settlement that could entrench unresolved provisions. Constitutional ambiguities in Armenia and bilateral territorial adjustments continue to shape the negotiation dynamics, raising questions about whether this diplomatic model will consolidate into a stable framework or remain in flux.
BACKGROUND: Since the 1994 Bishkek Protocol froze the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in a fragile ceasefire regime under Russian sponsorship, mediation models had consistently prioritized multilateral equilibrium over durable resolution. The OSCE Minsk Group—formalized in December 1994 with the three co-chairs France, Russia, and the U.S.—institutionalized this status quo. In this diplomatic environment, negotiations served as an instrument for conflict management rather than conflict termination. The April 2016 Four-Day War briefly upended that architecture, demonstrating the latent instability embedded of the frozen-conflict model. Four and a half years later, the 2020 Second Karabakh War fundamentally restructured the region’s power balance. It rendered obsolete the externally imposed frameworks that had governed negotiations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The outcome of the 2020 war was the restoration of Azerbaijan’s control over the previously Armenian-occupied regions around the territory of the former (Soviet-era) Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The Russian-brokered ceasefire of November 10, 2020, set the stage for a negotiation dynamic predicated on asymmetrical positioning. Armenia’s formal recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in October 2022 (a move reportedly taken despite Kremlin opposition) implicitly signalled a shift that was not widely acknowledged at the time. Specifically, multilateral mediation lost its functional rationale; a new phase of direct engagement emerged. The replacement of Minsk Group arbitration, beginning with face-to-face negotiations in Brussels (May 2022), Prague (October 2022), and Munich (February 2023), was the logical conclusion of this trajectory.
The October 2022 Prague meeting marked the first sustained round of direct talks without the Minsk Group’s mediation. It encapsulated the recalibration of the regional conflict-resolution paradigm. The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process has entered a structurally distinct phase, as direct bilateral diplomacy has replaced externally mediated negotiations. This is not merely a procedural transition. It is a fundamental shift in the conflict’s geopolitical management. For nearly three decades, external actors—principally Russia, the U.S., and the EU—had dictated the diplomatic framework while regional players remained constrained by inherited institutional architectures, notably the defunct OSCE Minsk Group.
IMPLICATIONS: The failure to finalize a peace treaty in 2024, despite reports that 90 percent of the agreement had been drafted, is not due to any diplomatic shortcoming. Rather, it represents a strategic recalibration. The logic behind avoiding an interim settlement is evident in historical analogues. For example, while the 1995 Dayton Accords successfully concluded the Bosnian War, institutionalized ethnic partitions persist as a structural impediment to governance nearly three decades later. To take another example, the 2015 Minsk II Agreement, designed to create a transitional settlement for the then-Donbas conflict, wound up embedding unresolved territorial issues in the political fabric. This subsequently facilitated Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The deliberate avoidance of a prematurely finalized Armenia–Azerbaijan treaty suggests an awareness of these precedents. By declining to entrench provisions that might later serve as triggers of an unresolved structural conflict, the diplomatic system moves toward a “stable equilibrium” to replace the “local equilibrium” of the temporary cessation of hostilities. The elimination of substantive third-party mediation reinforces this shift.
Since October 2022, all consequential negotiations have been conducted bilaterally. External actors now function as logistical facilitators rather than as substantive arbiters. This pattern is comparable with, for example, the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, which—despite U.S. facilitation at Camp David—was fundamentally structured around direct negotiation and which has shown durability for over four decades. It contrasts with the 1993 Oslo Accords, which relied upon external assurances and ambiguous transitional mechanisms, and which collapsed amid shifting geopolitical realities. The Armenia–Azerbaijan framework thus increasingly resembles the former model, with bilateralization reinforcing sustainability. However, asymmetries within the process remain pronounced.
Azerbaijan has consistently employed a “position-setting” strategy, articulating clear demands and advancing specific legal-political objectives. This was evident in President Ilham Aliyev’s remarks at the February 2024 Munich Security Conference, where he characterized the negotiation process as a “one-sided dialogue” in which Azerbaijan proposes terms while Armenia refrains from active counter-positioning. This dynamic was illustrated also by the February 2024 withdrawal of Armenian forces from four Azerbaijani villages (Baghanis-Ayrum, Ashaghi Askipara, Kheyrimli, and Gizilhajili). This withdrawal was executed without a formalized reciprocal agreement, creating the perception that Azerbaijani proposals, rather than structured bilateral compromise, are the driving force in the conflict-resolution process.
The trial of Ruben Vardanyan, a key former figure in the Karabakh administration, further underscores Azerbaijan’s strategy of consolidating its post-2020 advantage through legal and political mechanisms. Vardanyan, arrested in September 2023 following Azerbaijan’s military operation in Karabakh, has been charged with financing terrorism and illegally crossing Azerbaijan’s border. His prosecution reflects a broader pattern of post-conflict legal adjudication, where Azerbaijan is systematically dismantling the institutional remnants of the former Karabakh authority while reinforcing its sovereignty claims over the region.
This judicial dimension introduces new considerations for the negotiation process. While Armenia has distanced itself from former Karabakh leadership figures, the trial raises concerns over how legal precedents set by Azerbaijan’s courts could influence broader diplomatic calculations. Precedents from post-war trials in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate that such cases can serve as mechanisms of conflict closure or as sources of prolonged diplomatic friction, depending on how they are leveraged within ongoing negotiations. Whether the trial is seen as a necessary legal process or as a strategic assertion of power will shape both Armenian domestic discourse and international perceptions of Azerbaijan’s post-war governance model.
An unresolved question about Armenia’s constitution remains a central point of contention. The constitution’s preamble makes reference to the 1990 Armenian Declaration of Independence, which in turn invokes the 1989 Soviet-era decision on the then–Nagorno-Karabakh, implicitly sustaining a legal framework that conflicts with Armenia’s 2022 diplomatic commitments. While Armenia contends that a treaty provision will supersede domestic law, Azerbaijan cites historical precedents in which Armenian legal rulings activated dormant constitutional clauses to justify policy reversals.
For example, the 2003 Armenian Supreme Court decision permitting Robert Kocharyan’s candidacy for president, despite constitutional residency requirements, exemplifies this phenomenon. Kocharyan, who had never officially resided in the Republic of Armenia prior to independence, was deemed eligible based on his prior residence in Nagorno-Karabakh during the Soviet and early post-Soviet period. This precedent reinforces Azerbaijan’s concerns regarding the durability of Armenian legal commitments, particularly given the requirement for a national referendum to amend the constitutional preamble—an event that will not take place before late 2026.
Historically, such delays have introduced windows of instability, where unforeseen political shifts disrupt anticipated diplomatic trajectories. The postponement of Palestinian legislative elections following the Oslo Accords, for example, contributed to the erosion of transitional governance structures, leading to subsequent escalations. The Armenia–Azerbaijan process now faces a comparable timeline-dependent risk, where protracted legal ambiguity could generate new friction points before formalized resolution mechanisms are enacted.
CONCLUSIONS: The bilateralization of diplomacy in the South Caucasus challenges the post-Soviet convention of externally managed equilibrium but has not yet cohered into a stable system. Whether the region consolidates into a sustainable post-conflict order or re-enters a phase of mediated arbitration depends not only on the resolution of uncertainties over the Armenian constitution, but also on unresolved territorial demarcations and the strategic recalibrations of external actors. The next 24 months will likely determine the trajectory of this diplomatic framework. Events between now and the end of 2026 will establish whether bilateral statecraft becomes institutionalized or whether it remains only an intermediary phase before external actors (not just Russia but also the EU and Iran) again seek to reassert dominant influence.
AUTHOR BIO: Robert M. Cutler was for many years a senior research fellow at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, and is a past fellow of the Canadian International Council.
By Stephen Blank
On November 28, 2024, the Georgian Dream (GD) government announced the termination of Georgian efforts to join the EU. This decision, coming on top of a stolen election and mounting popular disaffection, triggered continuing large-scale demonstrations against the regime despite severe governmental repression. The unfolding Georgian scenario involves continuous information warfare, ongoing efforts at state capture, stolen elections, and creeping annexation through the process of “borderization.” This is a familiar pattern of the process of Russian state capture across Eastern Europe in the Balkans and Ukraine. Georgia is in a major political crisis with considerable international repercussions, which should motivate increased attention and engagement from the EU as well as the U.S.
BACKGROUND: The current Georgian crisis represents a conscious emulation of the 2013-14 Maidan in Ukraine where the population revolted against the Moscow-backed Yanukovych government’s rejection of trade association with the EU, massive corruption, attempts to subordinate Ukraine to Russia, and anti-democratic tendencies. Also mirroring Ukraine, Georgia’s government has employed massive repression, but to no avail. While the Georgian protests evoke the Ukrainian demonstrations of 2013-14, the conditions that gave rise to them embody the Russian pattern of state capture. This pattern of attempted elite and state capture comprises constant information warfare, the use of Russian energy as a political weapon of subversion, threatened or real territorial annexations, and stolen elections. What has occurred in Georgia to lead up to this explosion of popular discontent repeats developments in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and to some degree Serbia.
The program of the GD party, e.g. the attempt to impose, as in Russia, a “Foreign Agents Law” intended to suffocate both domestic opposition and its foreign supporters, consciously emulates the pattern of Russian imperialism. Since Georgia’s defeat in its war against Russia in 2008, Moscow has worked assiduously to discredit pro-Western forces and gradually subvert Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Having utilized the same strategy as in Ukraine, Moscow has helped engulf Georgia in a perpetual crisis where its pro-Western forces depend on Western support while GD clearly enjoys Russian support and patronage while utilizing Moscow’s tactics.
Since its independence in 1991, Georgia’s own unresolved political and ethnic cleavages have clearly given Moscow numerous opportunities for suborning and subverting Georgian efforts at democracy and integration with the West, even though most Georgians prefer those pro-Western outcomes. As in other targets of Russian policy, corruption is endemic, exemplified by the head of GD, Bidzina Invanishvili, who is under U.S. sanctions. Transparency International Georgia has identified 95 companies controlled by Ivanishvili that are registered in the notorious tax havens British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. This examination of Georgian politics also highlighted pervasive violence, bombings, attempted assassinations, and now massive police repression against demonstrators.
This violence reflects the long-running polarization of Georgian politics that has made governing this unruly state difficult and thus enfeebled its efforts to defend itself against Russian subversion and intervention.
Another major problem has been Georgia’s inability to deal with demands by its South Ossetian and Abkhaz populations for more autonomy if not independence. The failure to reach a settlement, admittedly due to considerable Russian meddling, provided a pretext for the war of 2008 that Georgia lost and for the subsequent creation of Russian army, navy, and air force bases in these territories.
Worse yet, governed by Russian satraps, mainly from the Silovye Struktury (Power or Force Structures) and occupied by Russian troops, these territories have become staging grounds for Moscow’s “borderization” policy that consists of regular encroachments into Georgian territory that is then annexed to these regions. Their ultimate destiny as seen from Moscow is clearly incorporation into the Russian Federation.
IMPLICATIONS: Hitherto the West has been overly passive regarding Georgia even though it is ultimately Georgians themselves who must overcome the causes of their long-running crisis. Given Moscow’s loss of influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan it is likely to redouble its efforts through GD to convert Georgia into a pliable, quiescent satellite that emulates Russian political processes and laws.
From the standpoint of its values, the EU should intensify its activity with stiffer sanctions against the leaders of GD, issue stronger and more persistent denunciations of what is happening in Georgia and keep the issues of repression and Georgian aspirations before Western publics. By doing so the West and pro-democracy organizations can then increase pressure on both GD and its patrons in Moscow. Moreover, it is also necessary for U.S. diplomacy to weigh in on the side of Georgian democracy in unison with the EU and other organizations so that Georgia can begin to resolve its pressing political and economic issues.
Admittedly the Trump Administration is unlikely to be swayed by invocations of democratic values and solidarity although earlier U.S. administrations have previously promised this to Georgia. However, multiple important strategic considerations growing out of Georgia’s strategic location in the Caucasus and on the eastern shores of the Black Sea could influence Washington to become involved. Since the framework for the Trump Administration’s foreign policy will likely be great power competition and within it the U.S. search for new or improved foreign trade markets, Georgia’s strategic importance can manifest itself to Washington.
If the West continues to adopt the passive position of the last 15 years, Georgia will be lost to Russia, and its economy will be turned to a Russo-Chinese orientation rather than a Western one. That orientation has already had profound consequences for U.S. firms. In particular, U.S. firms who bid on the giant construction project for a projected Georgian port at Anaklia on the Black Sea lost out to a Chinese-led consortium, not least due to the political hegemony of GD.
However, the stakes involved in the port at Anaklia and other comparable projects transcend Georgia. This port, along with other investments in infrastructure are vital for bringing Azerbaijani and ultimately Central Asian energy to Europe and expanding European trade to both the Caucasus and Central Asia. Central Asia also has considerable potential for exporting green energy and, even more importantly, has large quantities of rare earth minerals. To the degree that Georgia is an independent actor whose infrastructure is integrated with that of the other Black Sea littoral states, Central Asian states will then enjoy much greater opportunities for trade, investment, connectivity, and linkages with the global economy.
If Georgia falls prey to Moscow’s agenda, then its economy and politics will be reoriented to Russia and China, denying Central Asian states much of the opportunities they seek to integrate with the global economy. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to state that Georgia’s freedom is the key to and precondition for both the Caucasus’ and Central Asia’s full emancipation from the remaining imperial ambitions of both Russia and China.
CONCLUSIONS: Georgia is clearly in a major political crisis not unlike that of Ukraine in early 2014. As in Ukraine, Moscow seeks to impose a Russian-type regime upon a recalcitrant population and once again triggered a political explosion with considerable international repercussions. Foreign support is desperately needed in this case as well, although finally Georgians must resolve their political problems themselves. This Western support obviously is bound up with Western values to which most Georgians subscribe.
This is not solely an issue pertaining to the fight for democratic governance in Georgia. Russia has long looked askance at Armenia’s effort to democratize and now that it is breaking free of Russia, to the degree that Russia can suborn Georgian democracy it will certainly seek to undermine Armenia’s own experiment in democratization. It will also continue to seek inroads into Azerbaijani politics even though that country’s government is not democratic. As the war in Ukraine and thirty years of previous Russian policy shows, empire is in Moscow’s genetic code, and nothing is more antithetical to empire than democracy.
Major strategic issues, i.e. the future destiny of both the Caucasus and Central Asia and of peace in Eurasia are at stake. Russia’s efforts to restore its empire are utterly incompatible with peace and any concept of international order not only in Ukraine and Europe but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The argument therefore needs to be made both to Washington and European capitals that dedicated support for Georgia’s sovereignty and democracy are necessary not only to uphold common Western values but also the peace and security of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as countries beyond the Black Sea.
AUTHOR BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.
By Alexander Scrivener
Georgia’s political crisis rumbles on as the government of the increasingly anti-Western Georgian Dream party faces widespread protests from the country’s overwhelmingly pro-EU populace. But as the number of demonstrators dwindle due to a combination of oppression, fatigue, and demoralisation, the question of how Georgian Dream will manage the situation going forward becomes crucial.
Will Georgian Dream choose to “muddle through” and ignore the dissenters, or will it seek to cement a more fully-fledged authoritarian regime through brute force? It is too early to make definitive predictions, but the current status quo may evolve into a longer-term state of permanent low-level political crisis in which neither government nor opposition possesses the resources to gain a decisive victory over the other.
BACKGROUND: Georgia’s street protest movement has now entered its third month. The protests began on November 28 in response to the announcement by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze that the country would be suspending its bid to join the EU until 2028.
The announcement came soon after a disputed parliamentary election on October 26, in which the ruling Georgian Dream party claimed victory with almost 54 percent of the vote. None of the four opposition forces recognised the result, which they allege was falsified. This position was also supported by President Salome Zourabichvili who claims to remain in office despite her term ending on 29 December. International and domestic observer missions gave at best mixed verdicts about the conduct of the election, casting further doubt on the result’s legitimacy. For example, the OSCE mission found that in 24 percent of observations, voter secrecy was “potentially compromised.”
But the election itself only prompted small-scale, relatively subdued protests. It was not until PM Kobakhidze’s suspension of membership talks with the EU that hundreds of thousands of Georgians came out onto the streets spontaneously. Polls have indicated that at least 80 percent of Georgians support EU membership, and the abrupt announcement caused a significant eruption of public anger.
Unlike previous protests, which had been mostly centred on the capital Tbilisi, the protests this time included sizable demonstrations in the regions, including the cities of Kutaisi, Batumi, Ozurgeti, and even the normally politically quiescent small town of Khashuri.
The protests were at first accompanied by a steady stream of resignations, including Georgia’s ambassadors to the US, France, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. Footage of widespread police brutality against protesters in the initial weeks fuelled further anger. This violence was also perpetrated by unofficial regime enforcers, the so-called titushky, who targeted opposition leaders and activists for unprovoked beatings, in some cases with police looking on and refusing to intervene.
Meanwhile Georgian Dream-aligned media attempted to paint the protesters as violent, pointing at demonstrators’ use of fireworks against police.
As domestic and foreign pressure on Georgian Dream increased, the government changed tack. The use of indiscriminate violence fell, replaced instead by more targeted actions. Fines for breaking the rules around protest rose tenfold, and the blocking of “strategic” roads of international importance was made a criminal offense.
The combination of fatigue, holidays, and government crackdowns have meant that numbers at the street protests are not currently as high as at their peak in early December. But a determined core of activists continue to protest and shut roads.
Georgia is now at a crossroads. It is unclear whether the protests will slowly peter out, or whether they will gain new strength as spring approaches. It also remains to be seen whether Georgian Dream continues to follow a policy of balancing crackdowns with a policy of ignoring the demonstrators.
IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s domestic politics is at an impasse, with supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party and opposition-minded Georgians increasingly inhabiting parallel realities.
The reality Georgian Dream is attempting to project is one of business-as-usual. It is assisted in this by the fact that, since the end of President Zourabichvili’s term on December 29, Georgian Dream now has monopoly control of all major state institutions. Georgian Dream MPs sit alone in Parliament, and officials shuttle between Tbilisi and its remaining foreign partners such as Hungary and the UAE.
The other reality is one in which none of these institutions are now recognised as legitimate by the opposition. Many Western countries maintain strategic ambiguity, neither recognising the government’s legitimacy, nor formally cutting ties. Despite Georgian Dream’s hopes that the Trump Administration would agree to a reset in frayed U.S.-Georgia relations, it was pro-opposition Salome Zourabichvili, and not her Georgian Dream-appointed successor as president, Mikheil Qavelashvili, who was invited to attend President Trump’s inauguration.
What happens next is difficult to predict.
Perhaps the most likely scenario is one in which both domestic society and foreign partners remain split between those who recognise the Georgian government as legitimate and those who do not. This stalemate between a government that maintains sufficient resources to cling to power, and a pro-EU protest movement that is both too weak to topple Georgian Dream but too strong to be comprehensively defeated could endure for an extended period.
In this scenario, Georgian Dream may continue to oscillate between broad crackdowns on protesters and more passive and targeted methods of dealing with dissent, including merely ignoring demonstrations until they peter out by themselves. It is possible that, especially in a world in which Georgia is far from the top of international agendas, Georgian Dream manages to “muddle through” and serve out its term until the 2028 parliamentary election, despite large sections of the population refusing to recognise its legitimacy. A similar situation ensued between 2008 and 2012 when large parts of the then opposition to the United National Movement government of President Mikheil Saakashvili boycotted Parliament.
However, a more troubling scenario is also possible. Georgian Dream’s recent rhetoric has often suggested a lurch towards fully fledged authoritarianism. Senior officials including PM Irakli Kobakhidze have vowed that “co-habitation” with the opposition would soon come to an end and that many parties would be banned. Threats against the country’s largest liberal-leaning university, Ilia State University, machinations around the ownership of the main pro-opposition TV channel Mtavari, and systematic beatings and arrests of opposition leaders all point to a rapid deterioration in democratic freedoms.
At worst, Georgia could end up more closely resembling Azerbaijan or Belarus than it ever has before. Authoritarian consolidation in Georgia is unlikely to look exactly like it does in those countries – but the emergence of a syncretic “Khachapuri Putinism” that borrows from both the Hungarian and Russian models of governance cannot be ruled out.
Finally, many Georgians hope that somehow the government can be forced to leave office or make major concessions. Some hope that the Trump Administration will continue to pile pressure on Georgian Dream through sanctions. Others talk of the falling value of the Georgian lari as evidence that prolonged political crisis could impact investor confidence, forcing Georgian Dream to the negotiating table in order to save the economy.
These hopes may be exaggerated. Trump’s initial actions in office have only emboldened Georgian Dream as its civil society critics are stripped of USAID funding and support. And while a major economic shock cannot be ruled out, the double-digit growth Georgia has enjoyed as a result of the influx of Russian money has so far more than cancelled out the impact of any jitters amongst the relatively small number of Western investors in the country. A recently announced US$ 6 billion in investment from the UAE demonstrates that investors that do not prioritise democratic values are more than happy to fill economic gaps vacated by more scrupulous investors.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if the pro-EU protest movement in Georgia is to have any chance of success, it must cease waiting for external deliverance and focus on mobilising its supporters more strategically.
CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s pro-EU protest movement is far from dead. But the prospect of it succeeding in replacing the ruling Georgian Dream party look slimmer by the day. A combination of fatigue, weak leadership, and foreign allies distracted by the upheaval being wrought by the Trump Administration, do not amount to favourable conditions for Georgia’s opposition.
Georgian Dream, on the other hand, are not in an ideal position either. Increasingly isolated on the international stage, they alternate between going through the motions of day-to-day ordinary governance and lurches into outright authoritarianism that leave the impression of a government under siege.
It is difficult to predict how this stalemate ends. But a broad range of outcomes between full authoritarian consolidation and a fracturing of the regime is possible. However, despite the opposition’s apparent fixation on securing foreign support to bolster its position, it seems increasingly likely that the fate of Georgia will be largely decided by the balance of domestic forces, rather than in some grand bargain between global powers whose main priorities lie elsewhere.
AUTHOR BIO: Alexander Scrivener works at the Democratic Security Institute (DSI) in Tbilisi, where he leads policy research on advancing democratic security across Eurasia. His work spans policy advocacy and media analysis, with past roles at the BBC, International Criminal Court, and Transnational Institute.
By Anna Harvey
In a January 2025 interview with Ana Tili newspaper, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined his vision of Kazakhstan as a middle power balancing relations between global powers while pursuing domestic reforms. The analysis examines how Tokayev has moved to separate himself from his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, implementing constitutional changes, economic reforms, and foreign policy shifts following the January 2022 events, while facing the complex challenge of maintaining independence from both Russian and Chinese influence. Tokayev’s leadership marks a new stage of Kazakhstan’s development, positioning the country as an independent player on the global stage.
Photo by Vladimir Tretyakov
BACKGROUND: On January 3, 2025, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev gave a written interview with Ana Tili newspaper reflecting on 2024 and discussing Kazakhstan’s future. In the interview, Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's role as a "middle power" globally; its ties with the U.S., Russia, and China; Nazarbayev's legacy; economic development; and Kazakhstan's future goals. He also addressed the "January events," the January 2022 mass protests against gas prices that turned into an intra-elite fight and escalated into riots and violence.
In international politics, Tokayev expressed pride in Kazakhstan's "middle power" status, stating the country should "work collaboratively to build new, resilient bridges between conflicting geopolitical poles. Kazakhstan maintains support for the UN and other international organizations. Tokayev expressed optimism about relations with both the U.S. and China, noting Kazakhstan's willingness to support Washington regarding Ukraine and plans for extensive high-level dialogue with Beijing in 2025.
Regarding the former president, Tokayev characterized Nazarbayev's legacy as overwhelmingly positive and noted their strong relationship, including monthly phone calls. Despite his own efforts to reduce Russian influence in Kazakhstan, Tokayev expressed no concern about Nazarbayev's December meeting with Putin, describing such meetings as exchanges between "long-time friends and colleagues with much to reminisce about."
On the economic front, Tokayev praised Kazakhstan's progress while noting that "economic growth of 4 percent is insufficient." Rather than artificially holding exchange rates or micromanaging sectors, he stated his belief that the government should "ensure the stability and efficiency of the economy, the dynamic development of the real sector, growth in labor productivity, and the creation of high-quality jobs." He also supports recovering illegally obtained assets for reinvestment in education, infrastructure, and social needs.
Domestically, Tokayev highlighted extensive modernization projects in housing, roadways, railways, industry, and education. He also discussed the expansion of Kazakhstan’s social state: in 2024, the government began the National Fund for Children, where 50% of investment income from the National Fund of Kazakhstan will go to children's savings accounts for housing or education after age 18. Additionally, pensions, academic scholarships, and civil servant salaries were increased. Tokayev also emphasized his government's rapid response to spring 2024 flooding and efforts to build a "Clean Kazakhstan" through environmental initiatives.
In response to a question about the January events, Tokayev affirmed that, had decisive actions “not been taken against the instigators of the riots and organizers of the coup, Kazakhstan today would be a very different country, with diminished independence and restricted sovereignty.” The January events in question began on January 1, 2022, and began as protests against hikes in energy prices in western Kazakhstan. These protests appeared to be co-opted into an intra-elite struggle pitting parts of Nazarbayev’s entourage, specifically in the security structures, against Tokayev’s government, and spiraled into violent riots. Tokayev responded by requesting peacekeeping forces from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) be deployed to suppress the rioters. In total, around 238 people were killed. Since the riots, Tokayev has used the memory of the events to support a number of governmental reforms, including strengthening the powers of parliament over the presidency. In his interview, the President encouraged citizens not to fall victim to disinformation related to the riots, and he later stated evidence of involvement from criminal groups in the January events was a driving force behind his efforts to strengthen law and order in Kazakhstan, a project labeled “Just Kazakhstan.”
IMPLICATIONS: Tokayev's interview reveals his continued efforts to establish an independent identity from his predecessor. Initially, Tokayev was depicted as largely a figurehead acting on behalf of Nazarbayev, in spite of clear indications that he was assertively pushing a reformist agenda against the resistance of elements of the “old guard.” Following the January 2022 events, he has made significant breaks from Nazarbayev's legacy through constitutional reforms, including stripping Nazarbayev's title of “Elbasy” (or national patriarch) and removing immunity protections for his family.
Further changes include increasing Kazakhstan’s presence on the world stage and decreasing reliance on Russia. Kazakhstan's “positive balance” policy (initially promoted by Tokayev in 1997, when he was Foreign Minister) has gained new significance, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Tokayev’s condemnation of the invasion, acceptance of Russian draft evaders, and pursuit of alternative pipelines have established Kazakhstan as a middle power outside Russia's sphere of influence. Regionally, Kazakhstan has increased its influence through initiatives like the Turkic World Vision-2040 program.
Kazakhstan is Central Asia's largest economy ($261.4M GDP in 2023). Under Tokayev, the country is actively diversifying away from Russian and Chinese influence, especially as a result of Russia’s damaged reputation following the invasion of Ukraine and public skepticism toward Chinese business practices. Seeking alternatives, Kazakhstan has successfully attracted Western investment, particularly from the United States ($65B invested), which sees Kazakhstan as a potential alternate rare-earth supplier and strategic partner in the region.
CONCLUSIONS: President Tokayev has evolved beyond his initial role as Nazarbayev's chosen successor, building a distinct legacy as revealed in his Ana Tili interview. His vision for Kazakhstan's future emphasizes its role as a middle power, balancing engagement with the United States, European Union, Russia, and China to maintain political and economic sovereignty. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan has strengthened its position by expanding regional ties and diversifying its interests beyond Russia and China.
However, significant challenges remain. Kazakhstan must navigate complex domestic power dynamics, including potential resistance from remaining elements of the old guard and public discontent, especially regarding economic opportunities. Meanwhile, Russia continues to pressure Kazakhstan to limit its independent foreign policy, while public skepticism of Chinese influence constrains economic partnerships. The success of economic diversification and domestic reforms will depend on Tokayev's ability to manage these internal and external pressures while maintaining Kazakhstan's sovereignty.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Anna Harvey is a Researcher at the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute and the American Foreign Policy Council. She received a Master of Arts in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University. She has written for Newsweek, the U.S. Army War College War Room journal, and Postimees newspaper.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
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