By Emil Avdaliani

Although the Middle Corridor, connecting the EU and China via the Black Sea and Central Asia, has witnessed notable development in recent years, its swift expansion is constrained by both geographical barriers and the political complexities prevalent along the route. The Northern Corridor through Russia would be further consolidated should Russia achieve a favorable resolution to its war in Ukraine. While the Middle Corridor serves as a dependable link between Central Asia and the EU, it is likely to remain a complementary route to the northern Eurasian commercial highway.

Photo source: Tanvir Anjum Adib

BACKGROUND: The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, extending from the Black Sea to Central Asia and western China, has gained prominence since 2022 following the onset of the war in Ukraine. Although the route had existed in practice since the 1990s and was formally inaugurated in the early 2000s, its scope remained limited due to inadequate infrastructure, geopolitical instability in the South Caucasus, and, more significantly, the appeal of the Russian route, which had facilitated trade between China and the EU. Compounding these challenges is the corridor’s multimodal nature—comprising both land and sea segments—which, despite making it the shortest geographical path between China and the EU, has ultimately rendered its operation economically unviable.

Indeed, data from the period prior to 2022 highlights this unfavorable reality: merely 2–3 percent of overland containerized freight traversed the Middle Corridor. This dynamic shifted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the route became increasingly associated with geopolitical volatility, the unpredictability of Moscow, and the risk of financial loss for both the EU and China. In addition, the European Union’s imposition of extensive sanctions on Russia has further incentivized the pursuit of alternative transport corridors.

Overall, cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor increased in 2024 for railway operators in Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. For example, Azerbaijani authorities reported transporting over 18.5 million tons of goods in 2024, representing a 5.7 percent increase compared to 2023. In the case of Kazakhstan’s railways, the volume of freight carried via the corridor grew by 63 percent, reaching 4.1 million tons in 2024. Turkish and Georgian railway companies likewise experienced a rise in cargo throughput during the same year.

In late 2024, Kazakhstan unveiled plans to finance the construction of a new terminal at Azerbaijan’s Alat port. Concurrently, Astana is undertaking development efforts at the Aktau port, with authorities aiming to triple container throughput by the end of the decade. Additional recent developments similarly suggest a significant reorientation of strategic focus toward the corridor. Notably, in March, Azerbaijan hosted 24 companies for the General Assembly of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route International Association (TITR IA) Legal Entities Union. The objective of the assembly was to raise cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor to 96,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). 

IMPLICATIONS: Thus far, the outlook for the Middle Corridor has appeared favorable. Major powers are increasingly expressing interest in the corridor’s development. In early April, the inaugural Central Asia–EU Summit was convened in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The event was viewed as an effort to enhance the European Union’s presence in the region amid intensifying great power rivalry over Eurasian connectivity. The EU pledged a €12 billion assistance package, of which €3 billion will be allocated to the transport sector. Central Asia holds strategic significance for the EU, particularly considering the Middle Corridor’s advancement within the scope of Brussels’ Global Gateway initiative—a rival to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With improved transport infrastructure, cargo delivery times between Europe and Central Asia are projected to be halved, reaching approximately 15 days.

China is another major stakeholder, whose growing interest in the Middle Corridor is evident through both political engagement and investment initiatives. A Chinese firm is currently constructing a deep-sea port in Anaklia on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, a development that may prove instrumental in achieving the goal of capturing a 20 percent share of EU–China maritime trade by 2035. Previous efforts to build the port were hindered by domestic political disputes, but the present geopolitical environment differs, with China now actively supporting the project. Beijing has also sought to strengthen its political relationship with Georgia, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement in 2023. A similar agreement was concluded with Azerbaijan in 2024, with an upgraded version on April 23, 2025, in which China committed to enhancing the country’s Caspian Sea ports and advancing the long-delayed China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. These developments collectively signal the emergence of a near-continuous corridor stretching from China’s western frontier to the Black Sea.

However, given the evolving geopolitical dynamics surrounding Ukraine—particularly the ongoing negotiations between Russia and the U.S.—the Middle Corridor may face adverse consequences. Should Russia secure substantial gains in Ukraine, its strategic influence in the South Caucasus is likely to be enhanced. This could result in the consolidation of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan within Moscow’s sphere of influence, thereby empowering Russia to obstruct the functioning of a transit route that circumvents its territory from the south and facilitates access for rival powers into Central Asia. Potential measures at Russia’s disposal span from overt military actions to more subtle strategies, including embedding itself economically through infrastructure investments in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Moreover, despite the war in Ukraine entering its fourth consecutive year, this has not signaled the complete demise of the Russian route. Indeed, between 2022 and 2024, the northern corridor has continued to function as a major conduit between China and the EU. While the volume of freight transported along this route has fluctuated, it has nonetheless persisted as a vital commercial artery. Consequently, the Middle Corridor has continued to serve in a primarily complementary capacity.

This underscores the enduring viability of the northern route and should Russia–U.S. relations experience a substantial improvement; major enterprises may increasingly favor the well-established northern corridor. In contrast, the Middle Corridor continues to face constraints arising from both geographic challenges and the involvement of multiple stakeholders along its path. Infrastructure remains underdeveloped, and while intergovernmental cooperation is progressing, it still falls short of what is necessary. The true potential of the Middle Corridor is projected to reach up to 20 percent of overland containerized trade between China and the EU. However, this estimate is conditional upon several factors, including the successful completion of the Anaklia port and the expansion of the railway network across the South Caucasus.

CONCLUSION: Although the Middle Corridor has experienced considerable growth in recent years, its overall potential remains constrained. Geographic limitations, combined with persistent political complexities along the route, continue to impede rapid development. However, broader shifts in Eurasian geopolitics pose even greater challenges—should Russia succeed in concluding the war in Ukraine favorably and reconciling with the U.S., the corridor traversing Russian territory would be further solidified. This scenario does not imply that the Middle Corridor will cease to evolve. Rather, it is expected to continue expanding while remaining complementary to the northern Eurasian trade axis and functioning as a reliable conduit between Central Asia and the EU.

AUTHOR BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

The first EU–Central Asia Summit took place amid intensifying global competition, emphasizing the EU’s efforts to strengthen ties through connectivity, economic diversification and access to critical raw materials. Key regional concerns—including migration, sanctions circumvention, and infrastructure gaps—were also addressed. There is growing anticipation that the EU will adopt a more holistic and regionally attuned strategy, moving beyond great power rivalry to foster inclusive, long-term partnerships. Such an approach would bolster the EU’s credibility as a constructive and complementary actor in Central Asia’s evolving geopolitical landscape. Instead of competing against Russia and China, the EU can play more effective role as a reliable partner.

Photo source: Framalicious

BACKGROUND: The first EU–Central Asia Summit was held in Uzbekistan on April 4, 2025, in Uzbekistan. The EU was represented by President of the European Council António Costa and Head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. During the summit, multilateral relations were addressed in a comprehensive and multidimensional manner. The parties discussed various areas of cooperation, including security challenges, economic collaboration, connectivity under the Global Gateway framework and people-to-people ties.

The EU holds a distinct position in the region, being Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner and its largest investor, accounting for 22.6 percent of the region’s foreign trade and 40 percent of foreign investments. In particular, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have expressed their intention to further develop trade relations with Europe under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which facilitates more favorable access to the EU market.

This summit is also significant given its timing—coinciding with a period in which the U.S., alongside Russia and China, has emerged as a competitor to the EU in the region. In this new geopolitical landscape, strengthening relations with alternative markets has become a strategic objective for all major actors. However, the EU is expected to adopt a clearer stance on key issues in its evolving engagement with Central Asia. There are growing expectations that the EU will address the unintended negative impacts of its sanctions on Russia, which have also affected the region. Additionally, greater emphasis is expected on areas that align more closely with the region’s pressing needs—such as agricultural development and connectivity infrastructure—rather than focusing narrowly on selected industries or geopolitical competition. 

IMPLICATIONS: The EU’s timely convening of the Central Asia Summit coincided with a period in which global developments are compelling all countries to make new strategic choices. Actors affected by the protectionist U.S. economic policies, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and China’s rapid and seemingly unstoppable economic expansion are increasingly seeking new avenues for cooperation. While the EU already maintains a satisfactory level of economic engagement with the region, this new initiative signals an ambition to address more niche and forward-looking areas. These include specific areas such as geographical and digital connectivity, the green economy, critical raw materials and water management.

Within the Global Gateway initiative, the EU has sought to engage with the region primarily through infrastructure projects, allocating a budget of €300 million for this purpose. Although the EU’s initial intention was, to some extent, to compete with China, it has opted for a more nuanced and tempered approach in recent years. As Dr. Stefan Meister from the German Council on Foreign Relations explains, “EU is not about seriously challenging China and Russia, but rather about offering some alternatives in some sectors, competing in some sectors—especially on raw materials and on connectivity.” This perspective reflects the EU’s new approach of pragmatic engagement rather than direct confrontation, seeking to expand its influence through sector-specific cooperation and strategic investments.

Given China’s geographical proximity and economic leverage, it has become clear that directly confronting Beijing’s dominant position in Central Asia would yield little benefit for any actor involved. Instead, the EU has pursued a strategy of complementarity rather than rivalry. Central Asian countries, positioned to benefit from this geopolitical pragmatism, stand to gain significantly—particularly through the further development of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, which promises to enhance regional connectivity, linking the EU and Central Asia within 15 days and expanding their access to diversified markets.

In addition, the issue of critical minerals is also of great importance in the new period. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed in March 2023, aims to ensure a secure, sustainable and diversified supply of critical raw materials essential for strategic sectors. As demand for materials like rare earths and especially lithium is projected to increase up to twelvefold by 2030, the EU seeks to reduce its overreliance on single third-country suppliers. The Act sets specific targets: at least 10 percent of the EU’s annual consumption should be extracted within Europe, 40 percent processed, and 25 percent recycled, with no more than 65 percent of any strategic raw material imported from a single external source. These measures are central to the EU’s efforts to diverse partnerships with Central Asia.

Kazakhstan’s substantial uranium reserves and its role as a producer of 19 critical raw materials essential to the EU make it a strategically important partner. Additionally, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan possess reserves of 43, 17, and 71 critical minerals respectively, further enhancing the region’s value from the EU’s perspective. However, despite this resource richness, the region’s transport connectivity remains heavily influenced by Russia and China—posing a significant challenge for the EU as it seeks to establish independent and secure supply routes.

Migration constitutes a growing challenge in EU–Central Asia relations in addition to the risk of sanctions circumvention and agriculture development limitations. The EU has expressed increasing concern over migration flows originating from or transiting through the region—particularly given instability in Afghanistan and broader socioeconomic pressures within Central Asia. Despite this pragmatic exchange, questions remain about the long-term sustainability and oversight of such processes.

On the other hand, an increasing number of Russian companies are reportedly using Central Asia to circumvent Western sanctions, raising concern within the EU. Russian-affiliated businessmen have begun relocating portions of their assets to countries in the region to shield them from asset freezes, a development the EU views unfavorably. In 2024, several companies were added to the U.S. sanctions list. Additionally, remittances from Russia remain a vital source of income for countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, since the imposition of sanctions, this financial flow has become unstable, posing significant challenges to the economic stability of these remittance-dependent economies. The EU needs to address this issue in the future since there is no specifically designed policy to resolve it.

Lastly, the EU has been slow to support the broader economic development of Central Asia. According to World Bank data, the agriculture sector remains a weak component of total GDP in the region: 4 percent in Kazakhstan, 9 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 11 percent in Turkmenistan, 20 percent in Uzbekistan and 22 percent in Tajikistan. The service sector dominates these economies, accounting for 56 percent in Kazakhstan, 52 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 45 percent in Turkmenistan, 43 percent in Uzbekistan, and 35 percent in Tajikistan. Under these conditions, the EU needs to play an effective role in strengthening the region’s capacity for industrial production and economic diversification. A narrowly focused strategy centered solely on gas, oil, and critical raw materials risks undermining the long-term goals of sustainable and inclusive cooperation.

CONCLUSION: Although EU policy frameworks are often presented with ambitious and appealing labels, critical areas remain that require greater attention in Central Asia. Rather than pursuing selective economic cooperation, the EU should prioritize agricultural development, the diversification of industrial sectors and the provision of sufficient infrastructure support. Moreover, a clear and coherent stance on the indirect impact of sanctions against Russia in the region is urgently needed. These ongoing uncertainties and regional expectations will play a defining role in shaping the future trajectory of EU–Central Asia relations.

On the other hand, framing cooperation with Central Asia solely as a tool for competing with Russia and China is unlikely to yield meaningful benefits for either the EU or the region. A more constructive approach would involve the EU positioning itself as a complementary partner, offering alternatives rather than rivalry. This strategy not only fosters regional stability but also helps mitigate the negative effects of U.S. protectionist tendencies, thereby strengthening the EU’s credibility as a balanced and reliable actor in Central Asia.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as an academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs.

By Stephen Blank

On November 28, 2024, the Georgian Dream (GD) government announced the termination of Georgian efforts to join the EU. This decision, coming on top of a stolen election and mounting popular disaffection, triggered continuing large-scale demonstrations against the regime despite severe governmental repression. The unfolding Georgian scenario involves continuous information warfare, ongoing efforts at state capture, stolen elections, and creeping annexation through the process of “borderization.” This is a familiar pattern of the process of Russian state capture across Eastern Europe in the Balkans and Ukraine. Georgia is in a major political crisis with considerable international repercussions, which should motivate increased attention and engagement from the EU as well as the U.S.

BACKGROUND: The current Georgian crisis represents a conscious emulation of the 2013-14 Maidan in Ukraine where the population revolted against the Moscow-backed Yanukovych government’s rejection of trade association with the EU, massive corruption, attempts to subordinate Ukraine to Russia, and anti-democratic tendencies. Also mirroring Ukraine, Georgia’s government has employed massive repression, but to no avail. While the Georgian protests evoke the Ukrainian demonstrations of 2013-14, the conditions that gave rise to them embody the Russian pattern of state capture. This pattern of attempted elite and state capture comprises constant information warfare, the use of Russian energy as a political weapon of subversion, threatened or real territorial annexations, and stolen elections. What has occurred in Georgia to lead up to this explosion of popular discontent repeats developments in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and to some degree Serbia. 

The program of the GD party, e.g. the attempt to impose, as in Russia, a “Foreign Agents Law” intended to suffocate both domestic opposition and its foreign supporters, consciously emulates the pattern of Russian imperialism. Since Georgia’s defeat in its war against Russia in 2008, Moscow has worked assiduously to discredit pro-Western forces and gradually subvert Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Having utilized the same strategy as in Ukraine, Moscow has helped engulf Georgia in a perpetual crisis where its pro-Western forces depend on Western support while GD clearly enjoys Russian support and patronage while utilizing Moscow’s tactics.

Since its independence in 1991, Georgia’s own unresolved political and ethnic cleavages have clearly given Moscow numerous opportunities for suborning and subverting Georgian efforts at democracy and integration with the West, even though most Georgians prefer those pro-Western outcomes. As in other targets of Russian policy, corruption is endemic, exemplified by the head of GD, Bidzina Invanishvili, who is under U.S. sanctions. Transparency International Georgia has identified 95 companies controlled by Ivanishvili that are registered in the notorious tax havens British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. This examination of Georgian politics also highlighted pervasive violence, bombings, attempted assassinations, and now massive police repression against demonstrators. 

This violence reflects the long-running polarization of Georgian politics that has made governing this unruly state difficult and thus enfeebled its efforts to defend itself against Russian subversion and intervention.

Another major problem has been Georgia’s inability to deal with demands by its South Ossetian and Abkhaz populations for more autonomy if not independence. The failure to reach a settlement, admittedly due to considerable Russian meddling, provided a pretext for the war of 2008 that Georgia lost and for the subsequent creation of Russian army, navy, and air force bases in these territories. 

Worse yet, governed by Russian satraps, mainly from the Silovye Struktury (Power or Force Structures) and occupied by Russian troops, these territories have become staging grounds for Moscow’s “borderization” policy that consists of regular encroachments into Georgian territory that is then annexed to these regions. Their ultimate destiny as seen from Moscow is clearly incorporation into the Russian Federation.

IMPLICATIONS:  Hitherto the West has been overly passive regarding Georgia even though it is ultimately Georgians themselves who must overcome the causes of their long-running crisis. Given Moscow’s loss of influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan it is likely to redouble its efforts through GD to convert Georgia into a pliable, quiescent satellite that emulates Russian political processes and laws. 

From the standpoint of its values, the EU should intensify its activity with stiffer sanctions against the leaders of GD, issue stronger and more persistent denunciations of what is happening in Georgia and keep the issues of repression and Georgian aspirations before Western publics. By doing so the West and pro-democracy organizations can then increase pressure on both GD and its patrons in Moscow. Moreover, it is also necessary for U.S. diplomacy to weigh in on the side of Georgian democracy in unison with the EU and other organizations so that Georgia can begin to resolve its pressing political and economic issues.

Admittedly the Trump Administration is unlikely to be swayed by invocations of democratic values and solidarity although earlier U.S. administrations have previously promised this to Georgia. However, multiple important strategic considerations growing out of Georgia’s strategic location in the Caucasus and on the eastern shores of the Black Sea could influence Washington to become involved. Since the framework for the Trump Administration’s foreign policy will likely be great power competition and within it the U.S. search for new or improved foreign trade markets, Georgia’s strategic importance can manifest itself to Washington.

If the West continues to adopt the passive position of the last 15 years, Georgia will be lost to Russia, and its economy will be turned to a Russo-Chinese orientation rather than a Western one. That orientation has already had profound consequences for U.S. firms. In particular, U.S. firms who bid on the giant construction project for a projected Georgian port at Anaklia on the Black Sea lost out to a Chinese-led consortium, not least due to the political hegemony of GD. 

However, the stakes involved in the port at Anaklia and other comparable projects transcend Georgia. This port, along with other investments in infrastructure are vital for bringing Azerbaijani and ultimately Central Asian energy to Europe and expanding European trade to both the Caucasus and Central Asia. Central Asia also has considerable potential for exporting green energy and, even more importantly, has large quantities of rare earth minerals. To the degree that Georgia is an independent actor whose infrastructure is integrated with that of the other Black Sea littoral states, Central Asian states will then enjoy much greater opportunities for trade, investment, connectivity, and linkages with the global economy. 

If Georgia falls prey to Moscow’s agenda, then its economy and politics will be reoriented to Russia and China, denying Central Asian states much of the opportunities they seek to integrate with the global economy. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to state that Georgia’s freedom is the key to and precondition for both the Caucasus’ and Central Asia’s full emancipation from the remaining imperial ambitions of both Russia and China.

CONCLUSIONS:  Georgia is clearly in a major political crisis not unlike that of Ukraine in early 2014. As in Ukraine, Moscow seeks to impose a Russian-type regime upon a recalcitrant population and once again triggered a political explosion with considerable international repercussions. Foreign support is desperately needed in this case as well, although finally Georgians must resolve their political problems themselves. This Western support obviously is bound up with Western values to which most Georgians subscribe.

This is not solely an issue pertaining to the fight for democratic governance in Georgia. Russia has long looked askance at Armenia’s effort to democratize and now that it is breaking free of Russia, to the degree that Russia can suborn Georgian democracy it will certainly seek to undermine Armenia’s own experiment in democratization. It will also continue to seek inroads into Azerbaijani politics even though that country’s government is not democratic. As the war in Ukraine and thirty years of previous Russian policy shows, empire is in Moscow’s genetic code, and nothing is more antithetical to empire than democracy. 

Major strategic issues, i.e. the future destiny of both the Caucasus and Central Asia and of peace in Eurasia are at stake. Russia’s efforts to restore its empire are utterly incompatible with peace and any concept of international order not only in Ukraine and Europe but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The argument therefore needs to be made both to Washington and European capitals that dedicated support for Georgia’s sovereignty and democracy are necessary not only to uphold common Western values but also the peace and security of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as countries beyond the Black Sea.

AUTHOR BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

By Alexander Scrivener

Georgia’s political crisis rumbles on as the government of the increasingly anti-Western Georgian Dream party faces widespread protests from the country’s overwhelmingly pro-EU populace. But as the number of demonstrators dwindle due to a combination of oppression, fatigue, and demoralisation, the question of how Georgian Dream will manage the situation going forward becomes crucial.

Will Georgian Dream choose to “muddle through” and ignore the dissenters, or will it seek to cement a more fully-fledged authoritarian regime through brute force? It is too early to make definitive predictions, but the current status quo may evolve into a longer-term state of permanent low-level political crisis in which neither government nor opposition possesses the resources to gain a decisive victory over the other.

BACKGROUND: Georgia’s street protest movement has now entered its third month. The protests began on November 28 in response to the announcement by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze that the country would be suspending its bid to join the EU until 2028.

The announcement came soon after a disputed parliamentary election on October 26, in which the ruling Georgian Dream party claimed victory with almost 54 percent of the vote. None of the four opposition forces recognised the result, which they allege was falsified. This position was also supported by President Salome Zourabichvili who claims to remain in office despite her term ending on 29 December. International and domestic observer missions gave at best mixed verdicts about the conduct of the election, casting further doubt on the result’s legitimacy. For example, the OSCE mission found that in 24 percent of observations, voter secrecy was “potentially compromised.”

But the election itself only prompted small-scale, relatively subdued protests. It was not until PM Kobakhidze’s suspension of membership talks with the EU that hundreds of thousands of Georgians came out onto the streets spontaneously. Polls have indicated that at least 80 percent of Georgians support EU membership, and the abrupt announcement caused a significant eruption of public anger.

Unlike previous protests, which had been mostly centred on the capital Tbilisi, the protests this time included sizable demonstrations in the regions, including the cities of Kutaisi, Batumi, Ozurgeti, and even the normally politically quiescent small town of Khashuri.

The protests were at first accompanied by a steady stream of resignations, including Georgia’s ambassadors to the US, France, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. Footage of widespread police brutality against protesters in the initial weeks fuelled further anger. This violence was also perpetrated by unofficial regime enforcers, the so-called titushky, who targeted opposition leaders and activists for unprovoked beatings, in some cases with police looking on and refusing to intervene.

Meanwhile Georgian Dream-aligned media attempted to paint the protesters as violent, pointing at demonstrators’ use of fireworks against police.

As domestic and foreign pressure on Georgian Dream increased, the government changed tack. The use of indiscriminate violence fell, replaced instead by more targeted actions. Fines for breaking the rules around protest rose tenfold, and the blocking of “strategic” roads of international importance was made a criminal offense.

The combination of fatigue, holidays, and government crackdowns have meant that numbers at the street protests are not currently as high as at their peak in early December. But a determined core of activists continue to protest and shut roads.

Georgia is now at a crossroads. It is unclear whether the protests will slowly peter out, or whether they will gain new strength as spring approaches. It also remains to be seen whether Georgian Dream continues to follow a policy of balancing crackdowns with a policy of ignoring the demonstrators.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s domestic politics is at an impasse, with supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party and opposition-minded Georgians increasingly inhabiting parallel realities.

The reality Georgian Dream is attempting to project is one of business-as-usual. It is assisted in this by the fact that, since the end of President Zourabichvili’s term on December 29, Georgian Dream now has monopoly control of all major state institutions. Georgian Dream MPs sit alone in Parliament, and officials shuttle between Tbilisi and its remaining foreign partners such as Hungary and the UAE.

The other reality is one in which none of these institutions are now recognised as legitimate by the opposition. Many Western countries maintain strategic ambiguity, neither recognising the government’s legitimacy, nor formally cutting ties. Despite Georgian Dream’s hopes that the Trump Administration would agree to a reset in frayed U.S.-Georgia relations, it was pro-opposition Salome Zourabichvili, and not her Georgian Dream-appointed successor as president, Mikheil Qavelashvili, who was invited to attend President Trump’s inauguration.

What happens next is difficult to predict.

Perhaps the most likely scenario is one in which both domestic society and foreign partners remain split between those who recognise the Georgian government as legitimate and those who do not. This stalemate between a government that maintains sufficient resources to cling to power, and a pro-EU protest movement that is both too weak to topple Georgian Dream but too strong to be comprehensively defeated could endure for an extended period.

In this scenario, Georgian Dream may continue to oscillate between broad crackdowns on protesters and more passive and targeted methods of dealing with dissent, including merely ignoring demonstrations until they peter out by themselves. It is possible that, especially in a world in which Georgia is far from the top of international agendas, Georgian Dream manages to “muddle through” and serve out its term until the 2028 parliamentary election, despite large sections of the population refusing to recognise its legitimacy. A similar situation ensued between 2008 and 2012 when large parts of the then opposition to the United National Movement government of President Mikheil Saakashvili boycotted Parliament.

However, a more troubling scenario is also possible. Georgian Dream’s recent rhetoric has often suggested a lurch towards fully fledged authoritarianism. Senior officials including PM Irakli Kobakhidze have vowed that “co-habitation” with the opposition would soon come to an end and that many parties would be banned. Threats against the country’s largest liberal-leaning university, Ilia State University, machinations around the ownership of the main pro-opposition TV channel Mtavari, and systematic beatings and arrests of opposition leaders all point to a rapid deterioration in democratic freedoms.

At worst, Georgia could end up more closely resembling Azerbaijan or Belarus than it ever has before. Authoritarian consolidation in Georgia is unlikely to look exactly like it does in those countries – but the emergence of a syncretic “Khachapuri Putinism” that borrows from both the Hungarian and Russian models of governance cannot be ruled out.

Finally, many Georgians hope that somehow the government can be forced to leave office or make major concessions. Some hope that the Trump Administration will continue to pile pressure on Georgian Dream through sanctions. Others talk of the falling value of the Georgian lari as evidence that prolonged political crisis could impact investor confidence, forcing Georgian Dream to the negotiating table in order to save the economy.

These hopes may be exaggerated. Trump’s initial actions in office have only emboldened Georgian Dream as its civil society critics are stripped of USAID funding and support. And while a major economic shock cannot be ruled out, the double-digit growth Georgia has enjoyed as a result of the influx of Russian money has so far more than cancelled out the impact of any jitters amongst the relatively small number of Western investors in the country. A recently announced US$ 6 billion in investment from the UAE demonstrates that investors that do not prioritise democratic values are more than happy to fill economic gaps vacated by more scrupulous investors.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if the pro-EU protest movement in Georgia is to have any chance of success, it must cease waiting for external deliverance and focus on mobilising its supporters more strategically.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s pro-EU protest movement is far from dead. But the prospect of it succeeding in replacing the ruling Georgian Dream party look slimmer by the day. A combination of fatigue, weak leadership, and foreign allies distracted by the upheaval being wrought by the Trump Administration, do not amount to favourable conditions for Georgia’s opposition.

Georgian Dream, on the other hand, are not in an ideal position either. Increasingly isolated on the international stage, they alternate between going through the motions of day-to-day ordinary governance and lurches into outright authoritarianism that leave the impression of a government under siege.

It is difficult to predict how this stalemate ends. But a broad range of outcomes between full authoritarian consolidation and a fracturing of the regime is possible. However, despite the opposition’s apparent fixation on securing foreign support to bolster its position, it seems increasingly likely that the fate of Georgia will be largely decided by the balance of domestic forces, rather than in some grand bargain between global powers whose main priorities lie elsewhere.

AUTHOR BIO: Alexander Scrivener works at the Democratic Security Institute (DSI) in Tbilisi, where he leads policy research on advancing democratic security across Eurasia. His work spans policy advocacy and media analysis, with past roles at the BBC, International Criminal Court, and Transnational Institute.

Johan Engvall

January 22, 2025

In a time of geopolitical uncertainty, the South Caucasus and Central Asia have become more interconnected, forming a new Trans-Caspian area. As trade along the Middle Corridor is gaining in importance, the Caspian Sea is becoming a unifier rather than divider of the regions. All countries on the eastern and western side of the Caspian pursue multi-vector foreign policies to avoid overreliance on any single external actor. As the EU is seeking to assert itself geopolitically, it is in its strategic interest to support the evolving Trans-Caspian cooperation. To elevate its engagement with the countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the EU should replace the outdated Eastern Partnership with a new Trans-Caspian Partnership. Such partnership would enhance regional connectivity and cooperation and give regional states greater collective weight in their dealings with different powers.

Read The Convergence of the South Caucasus and Central Asia (PDF)