By Fuad Shahbazov

January 26, 2022, the CACI Analyst

On October 6, 2021, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov met his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Moscow to discuss regional security and economic cooperation, and to address important concerns regarding the crisis in the South Caucasus. During the joint press conference, Lavrov repeatedly highlighted the idea of a “3+3 cooperation format” including the three South Caucasus states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – plus their three large neighbors, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, to focus on unlocking economic and transport communications in the region. The first meeting within the format took place in Moscow on December 2021; however, Georgia refused to take part. Moreover, recent tensions in the region between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijan and Iran suggest that the proposed format will not generate visible positive outcomes.

By Natalia Konarzewska

October 1, 2021, the CACI Analyst

Armenia’s incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party won by an overwhelming margin in snap elections on June 20. Pashinyan confirmed his strong mandate despite his government’s responsibility for the defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and its limited success in handling pressing issues such as the return of Armenian prisoners of war and the border conflict with Azerbaijan. Post-war Armenia faces a large number of serious challenges and to tackle them Pashinyan and his team will have to downplay its populist rhetoric in favor of improved governance.

By Emil A.Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev

June 10, 2021, the CACI Analyst

Starting in mid-May, a wave of confrontations between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have taken place in disputed border areas after large-scale fighting between the two states ended in November last year. While both sides trade accusations of violating each others’ international borders, there may be logical reasons for the recent spike in Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontations and their timing. Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections, unresolved issues of prisoners of war, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the question of the “Zangezur/Syunik corridor” have all possibly contributed to the recent events.

By Natalia Konarzewska

June 7, 2021, the CACI Analyst

Baku is preparing to open a transit corridor that will link Azerbaijani territory with its Nakhichevan exclave through southern Armenia. President Ilham Aliyev recently announced the construction of a railway that will link Azerbaijan proper with Nakhichevan and ramped up the rhetoric against Armenia, which remains reluctant towards the project. Most of the Armenian public and experts consider the transit corridor to be a geopolitical threat rather than a new opportunity for enhanced connectivity. This standoff recently turned into full-fledged security crisis as Azerbaijan’s army advanced into the territory of southern Armenia in mid-May.

By Robert M. Cutler

May 11, 2021, the CACI Analyst

The implementation of the trilateral agreement brokered by Russia on the night of November 9-10, 2020, between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues in fits and starts. Most near-term questions have been resolved. How intermediate-term issues turn out depend upon the results of the snap parliamentary elections called in June by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. As for the longer-term outcome, this is more difficult to estimate, and it is path-dependent upon those elections. In this regard, events on the ground—but not only the elections—are still in control, even if these are no longer military events.