By Mamuka Tsereteli

March 10th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

On March 4, 2016, Georgia and Azerbaijan reached a deal that allows Georgia to receive close to 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of additional gas annually from Azerbaijan. Georgia’s Minister of Energy Kakha Kaladze announced after the signing that Georgia will no longer need to buy additional volumes of gas from Gazprom. This ends several months of speculation about Georgia’s concessions to Gazprom, fueled by a number of controversial statements by government officials. This agreement strengthens the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and keeps Georgia from becoming further affected by Gazprom’s coercive power. 

By Emil Souleimanov

March 9th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

Chechnya’s strongman Ramzan Kadyrov has recently come under increasing fire for publicly humiliating his critics and – particularly when unable to reach out to his detractors in person – for retaliating against their families. In late 2015 and early 2016, members of the Europe-based Chechen diaspora communities organized a series of demonstrations attended by hundreds of Chechens protested in Vienna, Stockholm and Berlin against the indiscriminate practices carried out by the Kadyrov regime in their home country. These protests and Kadyrov’s consequent promise to hold protestors’ relatives living in Chechnya accountable for the supposedly anti-Chechen defamation campaign have drawn attention to the practice of collective punishment that has shaped Chechnya’s social and political landscape since the early 2000s. 

By Boris Ajeganov

March 7th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

Uncertainty on the future of Georgia’s energy security has been growing since late 2015, when Georgia’s minister of energy and deputy PM Kakha Kaladze met with Alexey Miller, CEO of Russia’s Gazprom twice in the span of a month. Discussions on Gazprom’s potential return to the Georgian market quickly raised eyebrows in Baku and caused popular protests in Tbilisi. In a March 4 turnaround, Kaladze announced a deal to receive additional gas from Azerbaijan, thus removing the need to import Russian gas. Party politics aside, Tbilisi appears to have skillfully used its strategic position in the South Caucasus to secure a favorable energy deal without sacrificing its sovereignty.