By Eduard Abrahamyan

December 3rd, 2015, The CACI Analyst

The Turkish Air force’s downing of a Russian Su-24 warplane on November 24, has deteriorated relations between the two states, already tense after Russia’s increasing military engagement in the Syrian conflict. The incident represented the first direct clash between Moscow’s and Ankara’s interests in the Middle East and could potentially extend the geography of the enduring standoff between Russia and the West. Yet it has been met in the West with some understanding of Russia’s concerns. Turkey’s response to Russia’s consistent violations of its airspace coincided with an anticipated accord between Armenia and Russia on the establishment of a joint missile air defense system that will be deployed during a visit of Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu to Yerevan.

By Erik Davtyan

November 12th, the CACI Analyst

On October 6 and 7, Turkish military helicopters entered Armenia’s airspace near the village of Baghramyan in the Armavir region and remained for 2-4 minutes. The Head of Armenia’s General Department of Civil Aviation, Artyom Movsesyan, confirmed the violation in an interview to the Hraparak daily and said that Ankara’s explanation was that the helicopters had crossed into Armenian air space due to bad weather conditions. The Armenian-Turkish border has been closed for over 20 years (since 1993) and though the situation along the border is usually secure and calm, rare incidents on or near the border raise deep concerns in Armenia.

By Armen Grigoryan (05/27/2015 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The outcome of Turkey’s recent parliamentary elections may partly reduce tensions in relations with Armenia, stopping the mounting hostile rhetoric of recent months. A normalization of bilateral relations should not be expected at this stage, but the trend of increasing cooperation in the humanitarian area, and in culture, tourism, and the media in recent years will likely continue. At the same time, some policies may need to be reassessed in consideration of regional security risks, including the growing level of militarization in the South Caucasus, increased tensions on the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh in the absence of progress in the negotiation process, as well as Russia’s capacity for manipulating the regional conflicts.