By Suren Sargsyan

One year has passed since Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington agreement under the direct mediation of President Trump. Nevertheless, the TRIPP project, an approximately 40-kilometer route that would constitute the shortest segment of the Middle Corridor, has yet to be implemented, leaving the broader project incomplete. Notably, the principal obstacles to its implementation originate neither in Armenia nor Azerbaijan but are predominantly external factors that continue to impede the project’s realization.

Image Source: Alam and Blancas (2026), Map O.1, "Main trade corridors connecting Asia and Europe." World Bank. CC BY 3.0 IGO. 

BACKGROUND: 

In August 2025, the Trump administration initiated a process aimed at normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in which an enhanced U.S. strategic presence in the South Caucasus, particularly in Armenia, was expected to play a significant role. A central element was the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) on Armenian territory, which would provide Azerbaijan with a direct connection to its Nakhchivan exclave without transiting Iran. The TRIPP would also offer Armenia and Azerbaijan an opportunity to strengthen their integration into the Middle Corridor, connecting Central Asia with Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.

In other words, the TRIPP would facilitate the development of the Middle Corridor through Armenia and Azerbaijan, which, according to the Trump administration, would contribute significantly to the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. From a strategic perspective, the route also offers the prospect of transporting Central Asian energy resources to Europe while bypassing Russia and Iran. At the same time, it would provide Central Asian states with greater opportunities to diversify their export routes and reduce their dependence on China. Kazakhstan has shown particular interest in the project, as reflected in its deepening relations with Armenia, alongside its traditionally close ties with Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, the project has experienced significant delays despite sustained efforts by Washington to advance its implementation. The U.S. has allocated financial resources for infrastructure development, established a dedicated fund to support the project, and appointed a manager with extensive knowledge of Armenia and its business environment, as well as direct ties to the Trump administration. Despite these measures, construction has yet to begin, and little information has been made available regarding the implementation process. The clearest indication of a potential timeline came from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who recently stated that construction on Armenian territory may begin in early 2027.

IMPLICATIONS:

Developments over recent months provide a broader picture of the factors that have delayed the implementation of the TRIPP project on Armenian territory and, consequently, the project as a whole. The first concerns Iran. The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has fundamentally altered the regional security environment, with Tehran targeting U.S. military bases and other facilities in neighboring states within range of its missile capabilities. Against this backdrop, TRIPP represents a U.S.-backed strategic transport route running directly along Iran’s northern border, in some places only a few hundred meters away. Its location and strategic significance have generated considerable concern in Tehran, which has publicly expressed its opposition to the project.

It therefore cannot be ruled out that the delays are partly linked to the negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and uncertainty over their outcome. In the event of renewed hostilities, the route could potentially become a target for Iran despite being located on the territory of a third country. Moreover, prior to the proposed implementation of TRIPP, Iran provided Azerbaijan with its shortest transit route to the Nakhchivan exclave, creating a degree of Azerbaijani dependence on Tehran that TRIPP would substantially reduce. Iran therefore also has an economic and geopolitical interest in the project’s development. Yet another significant obstacle concerns the railway component of TRIPP. A functioning rail connection is central to the project’s ambition to facilitate trade between Central Asia and Europe and is therefore of critical logistical importance to the viability of the corridor as a whole.

However, Armenia’s railway network remains under concession to the state-owned Russian Railways, with the agreement set to remain in force for a considerable period. Russia has shown little willingness to relinquish control, although recent developments suggest that the issue may be subject to negotiation. When the possibility of returning the railway network to Armenian control was raised, the head of Russian Railways emphasized that Russia had invested approximately US$ 400 million in Armenia’s railway infrastructure. This statement can be interpreted in two ways. Moscow may be signaling that it expects compensation for its investments as a condition for terminating the concession. Alternatively, it may indicate an interest in participating in the TRIPP project itself, with its existing investment potentially forming the basis for such involvement. In either case, control over Armenia’s railway infrastructure introduces a significant Russian dimension into the implementation of TRIPP.

This considerably complicates the situation, as both Moscow and Tehran are capable of exerting pressure on Armenia, albeit in different ways and in pursuit of their respective strategic interests. Any potential Russian participation in TRIPP would not, however, be a matter for Yerevan and Baku alone, as Washington and Moscow could potentially reach a separate agreement on Russia’s role in the project. At present, however, Iranian security concerns and Russia’s control over Armenia’s railway infrastructure remain among the principal external factors hindering the implementation of TRIPP.

CONCLUSIONS:

At present, Armenia and Azerbaijan have limited scope to advance the implementation of TRIPP independently. The outcome of potential negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, and ultimately the termination of hostilities, may prove critical to the project’s future. Should the parties pursue a diplomatic settlement, TRIPP may need to form part of a broader package of agreements between Washington and Tehran. The Russian dimension is equally complex. Moscow may seek compensation for its investments in Armenia’s railway infrastructure, a substantial burden for Armenia, or demand some form of participation in the project. The latter would present Washington with a strategic dilemma: whether to accommodate Russian involvement in a transport corridor whose broader geopolitical rationale includes reducing regional dependence on Russia.

In either case, the Trump administration would need to engage in substantive negotiations with Moscow, whether to agree on compensation or determine the terms of potential Russian participation in the project. The implementation of TRIPP therefore depends on a broader set of political and strategic agreements extending well beyond Armenia and Azerbaijan. Without such arrangements, the corridor will continue to entail significant geopolitical and security risks, potentially undermining its attractiveness to businesses seeking reliable routes for transporting goods between Central Asia and Europe.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

By Nicola Ilario

South Ossetia's recent presidential transition, in which Alan Gagloev resigned in favor of Russian administrator Marat Kambolov, marks the latest step in a long-running process of Russo-Ossetian integration. The May 2026 "Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction," marks a significant step in South Ossetia's integration, signifying Moscow's broader strategy toward Georgia and the South Caucasus as well as its limitations.

BACKGROUND:

On June 23, Alan Gagloev resigned from his post as President of the small breakaway republic of South Ossetia, taking a new position as an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The move happened suddenly. Gagloev, in a televised address to the Ossetian people, claimed that after meeting Putin on June 22, he agreed to become an advisor to the Office of the Russian President. The next day he resigned. In his place, Prime Minister Marat Kambolov assumed the responsibilities of the presidency.

Kambolov is, notably, not a native to South Ossetia. A Russian national, Kambolov was sworn in as South Ossetia’s Prime Minister on June 17, 2026, but had until 2025 not been involved in the domestic affairs of the breakaway republic. Born in North Ossetia in 1965, he graduated from Moscow State Social University and the Russian Academy of Public Administration, going on to work in the Russian government. In May, he was tapped to be Gagloev’s advisor, and soon became Gagloev’s nominee for the premiership. Kambolov is expected to deepen Russo-Ossetian ties, implementing provisions of a bilateral treaty signed between Russia and Ossetia on May 9, 2026. Kambolov is expected to become the President of South Ossetia after snap elections planned September 18.

Kambolov’s ascension is part of a continuous effort of Ossetian aspirations for annexation into the Russian Federation. Indeed, since 1991 and with Russian backing, the Ossetians have maintained de facto independence from Georgia and alignment with Russia.

Generally, the South Ossetian separatist project is concerned with the unification of their people, whether it be within a sovereign state or under Russian rule. Indeed, the Ossetians are a transnational people, inhabiting Georgia, the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia, as well as the Russian federal subject, the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania. As the vast majority of Ossetians reside in North Ossetia, it has been the wish of many in the south form a union with the north, to share a common state.

Ossetian demands for union with the north began in the early 90s, when the region broke from Tbilisi. In 1992, South Ossetia held a referendum that saw overwhelming support for independence by Ossetians and a 99.89 percent vote in favor for “reunion” with Russia.

Serious promotion of annexation did not begin until 2008, however, when Russia formally recognized the small de facto republic. After the election of Leonid Tibilov as South Ossetian president in 2012, it began making moves towards unionship. Tibilov stated after winning the 2012 elections that “We will certainly continue along the course towards Russia that has been chosen by our people – a course of further integration ... in all existing spheres, including the economy, as well as military, technical, and defense cooperation.” Other efforts towards union, such as the partial integration of the South Ossetian armed forces into the Russian army, also occurred during this period. In 2016, Ossetia signed the bilateral Treaty on Union Relations and Integration with the Russian Federation, strengthening ties between the two countries. Further plans for full annexation emerged at this time as well, with Tibilov suggesting closer union with Russia.

Plans for an annexation referendum did not pan out until 2022, where in March, South Ossetian president Bibilov announced a referendum following the 2022 presidential elections. Bibilov suggested it should take place the day after the presidential elections, thus constituting concrete executive action in contrast with earlier parliamentary debates on the organization of referendums. The referendum was delayed, however, by Gagloev who after winning the elections stated that the time was not right and signed a decree cancelling it.

Despite continued delays, Russo-Ossetian cooperation has continued with the culmination of talks leading to the signing of a bilateral treaty in 2026. On May 9, Vladimir Putin and Alan Gagloev signed a “Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction,” which the Russian Duma ratified on May 13. The document outlines provisions that would enable Russian citizens to hold office in South Ossetia and establish greater energy, transportation, telecommunication integration between the Russian Federation and the de facto republic. In effect, the agreement would bring de facto annexation. Gagloev, the former president of South Ossetia, called it, a “step towards the reunification of the Ossetian people,” further emphasizing that “South Ossetians perceive Russia as [their] great homeland.”

IMPLICATIONS:

The recent appointment of Marat Kambolov as Prime Minister and his ascension to the role of acting president is a continuation of the integration and unification of Russia and South Ossetia, a process that has been ongoing since the South Ossetian war in 1991. Kambolov is a demonstration that Moscow is now installing administrators rather than cultivating local elites.

The events in South Ossetia demonstrate Moscow’s continuing exercise of influence in the South Caucasus, which is otherwise waning against the backdrop of its economic, military and political overextension due to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Russia has lost considerable influence in Armenia, as Prime Minister Pashinyan moves the country Westward and as President Aliyev of Azerbaijan continues to elevate Baku’s strategic autonomy.

This is evident as Gagloev noted that one of the reasons for the delay of the 2022 referendum was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As he stated, “I believe that the current authorities of the Russian Federation, represented by President Vladimir Putin, are still busy with other issues, I think with more serious ones.”

Setting aside Russia's insufficient political capital for outright de jure annexation, indirect rule is also part of Moscow’s strategy to manage Russo-Georgian relations. Since the Georgian Dream (GD) party’s rise to power in the early 2010s, Georgia began to employ a foreign policy that was multi-axis oriented, engaging in attempts at rapprochement with Russia. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the GD government refused to engage in the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow. GD likely believed that a swift Russian victory in 2022 was inevitable, and that maintaining friendly relations with Russia was Georgia’s most rational course of action. It is unclear whether there is a definitive grand strategy to GD’s foreign policy, yet the Georgian government clearly believes that cultivating better relations with Russia is in their interest.

This certainly incentivizes Moscow to maintain a friendlier attitude  Georgia, however, at the same time Moscow acknowledges the utility of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the relationship. By continually utilizing South Ossetia as a bargaining chip, Moscow can promise Georgia speculative future talks on the fate of South Ossetia, and in return Georgia retains a neutral, or even semi-positive attitude towards Moscow. Of course, Russia has no intention of giving away South Ossetia, yet this strategy continues to work as GD continues its attempts at a multi-axis oriented foreign policy.

CONCLUSIONS:

Georgia remains strategically important for Russia, which hopes to control a North-South Axis, from the North Caucasus through Georgia and Armenia, cutting through the Middle Corridor and further linking up with Iran. This competes with the ongoing establishment of a West-East Axis from Turkey, through Armenia/Georgia and Azerbaijan and further to the Caspian and Central Asia.

It is evident that Russia, at least under the current strategic policies of the Putin regime, will seek to retain its influence in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future. Moscow’s approach to integration in South Ossetia demonstrates its continued interest in the region, but also the limitations to its capacity for fulfilling them.

AUTHOR’S BIO:

Nicola Ilario is an undergraduate at the University of Pennsylvania. He studies Economics and History, with a concentration in the history of diplomacy. Nicola interned at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute the Summer of 2026, assisting fellows in their research. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Vali Kaleji

Russia and Iran are moving closer to implementing a long-negotiated natural gas agreement. Officials from both countries have confirmed that Azerbaijan has been selected as the preferred transit route for Russian gas exports to Iran, a route that recalls Iran's natural gas exports to the Soviet Union through the same corridor in the 1970s. The project will constitute part of the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic reconfiguration of Eurasia following the Ukraine war, in which Russia seeks to redefine its energy export routes while Iran seeks not only to reduce its domestic natural gas imbalance but also to strengthen its geoeconomic and transit position within regional energy networks.

BACKGROUND:

Energy cooperation between Iran and Russia dates back to the Soviet era. In January 1966, Iran and the Soviet Union signed a gas agreement under which Iran exported 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually from its southern gas fields to the Soviet Caucasian republics through a pipeline terminating at Astara, now on the Iran–Azerbaijan border. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to build the Isfahan Steel Plant and the Arak Machine Manufacturing Plant. The pipeline became operational in 1970, but gas exports ceased in 1980 following the Islamic Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War. Although exports briefly resumed in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended this framework of cooperation.

Rather than expanding energy ties with the Russian Federation, Iran subsequently developed cooperation with the newly independent states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, including gas imports from Turkmenistan, oil swap arrangements with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, gas exports to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, and the Iran–Armenia Gas-for-Electricity Swap agreement. 

Despite UN sanctions, Iran and Russia reached an “oil-for-goods” agreement in 2014 under which Russia would purchase Iranian oil in exchange for Russian goods and equipment. The arrangement lost momentum after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) enabled Iran to increase oil exports and regain access to international markets. 

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the reimposition of sanctions, combined with Western sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, created new incentives for bilateral energy cooperation. In July 2022, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and Russia’s Gazprom signed a US$ 40 billion memorandum of understanding covering joint investment in oil and gas projects, including gas pipelines and swap arrangements. In June 2024, Gazprom and the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) signed an agreement on Russian gas supplies to Iran, with Tehran aiming to import up to 20 bcm annually. During 2025, negotiations focused on pricing, financing, volumes, and transportation routes. Azerbaijan emerged as the preferred transit corridor, with Russian gas expected to enter Iran through the Astara border crossing, replicating the route used during the Soviet era. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev confirmed this route in January 2025. Russia has proposed an initial supply of about 2 bcm annually, potentially expanding to 55 bcm in later phases.  

During a meeting with Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad on 13 July, Tsivilev also emphasized that the main provisions of the contract had been settled, and that the agreement would be finalized in the near future. 

Azerbaijan has taken a cautious position. Unlike Russia and Iran, whose officials have repeatedly commented on the project, Baku has largely refrained from public statements regarding the proposed Russian gas exports to Iran. This silence may reflect the fact that Azerbaijan has become one of the EU's key natural gas suppliers, particularly since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, and does not wish to create the impression that it is serving as a new export route for Russian gas under the current sanctions regime. Azerbaijan may also prefer to avoid taking a public position until the commercial and legal arrangements of the project have been finalized. 

From a technical and operational perspective, two key pipelines could potentially facilitate gas supplies from Russia to Azerbaijan and Iran. The 200km Novo-Filya (Russia) – Baku Gas Pipeline was built during the Soviet era, with a capacity of 10 bcm per year. It runs along the Caspian Sea coast and can operate in reverse mode, forming part of the larger Mozdok-Hajigabul gas pipeline system. The 1,474.5km Hajigabul (Azerbaijan) – Astara – Abadan (Iran) Gas Pipeline is another Soviet-era construction, connecting Azerbaijan to Iran. It has a capacity of 10 bcm per year but is currently inactive. 

To enable significant Russian gas supplies, substantial investments in modernizing the entire pipeline system would likely be necessary. By mid-2026, imports have not yet begun, as negotiations continue over commercial terms, infrastructure development, Iran’s role in gas swaps and re-exports, and transit arrangements with Azerbaijan.

IMPLICATIONS:

The most immediate implication of the prospective Russian gas exports to Iran is its contribution to mitigating Iran’s gas imbalance in the country’s northern regions during the cold autumn and winter seasons. Although Iran possesses the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves after Russia and, in 2025, its total annual natural gas production exceeded 280 bcm, equivalent to approximately 7 percent of global natural gas production. The rapid growth in domestic consumption, the deterioration of parts of its infrastructure, two decades of extensive economic sanctions, and a lack of foreign investment in the development of gas fields and refinery capacity have created a structural imbalance between gas production and consumption. As a result, in recent years Iran has faced a daily gas shortage of 200–300 million cubic meters (mcm) during peak consumption periods. During the recent U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, parts of the South Pars gas facilities and processing plants were targeted, resulting in the loss of approximately 230 mcm of gas production capacity and further exacerbating the country’s energy imbalance. 

The gas imbalance in northern Iran is particularly acute during the cold autumn and winter seasons because most of the country’s oil and gas resources, as well as its refineries, are located in the southern regions. Hydrocarbons must therefore be transported by pipeline to Iran’s densely populated northern provinces, a process that is both costly and associated with energy losses. At the same time, Iran has not developed the oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea for a variety of reasons. Under these circumstances, gas imports from Russia, as well as Turkmenistan, enable Iran to increase gas supplies to its northern regions during the cold autumn and winter months.

A second implication, strongly emphasized by supporters of the project in Iran, is the use of surplus Russian gas, after meeting demand in the northern regions, to increase Iran’s gas exports to Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, Pakistan, and Oman, thereby strengthening Iran’s position as a regional energy hub. The realization of this objective, however, will largely depend on a final agreement between Iran and the U.S., the lifting of UN sanctions, and the removal of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran.

A third implication is the deepening of strategic interdependence between the two countries. Alongside the expansion of close political relations, the conclusion of the 20-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Iran and Russia, the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral economic and trade cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and military-defense cooperation, energy will constitute a new dimension in Tehran–Moscow relations. Nevertheless, competition between Iran and Russia in the regional gas market, particularly in the South Caucasus and especially in Armenia, cannot be overlooked in the context of routing Russian gas exports to Iran through Azerbaijan. In fact, rather than routing the pipeline through Georgia and Armenia, both of which are consumers of natural gas, Russia has opted for Azerbaijan, a producer and exporter of natural gas, in order to ensure that Gazprom’s long-term commercial interests are not threatened.

A fourth implication is the strengthening of Azerbaijan’s role and position between Iran and Russia in both transit—the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—and energy, through the export of Russian gas to Iran. This development has been shaped by a number of factors, including sanctions on both Iran and Russia, the Free Trade Agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the changing geopolitical environment resulting from the war in Ukraine, the recent U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, and Iran’s growing energy imbalance. Although the fluctuating nature of Iran’s and Russia’s relations with Baku could affect the sustainability of Russian gas exports to Iran, the re-export of part of the imported gas from Iran to Pakistan, a close partner of Azerbaijan, could disincentivize Baku from disrupting or suspending Russian gas transit to Iran.

CONCLUSIONS:

Whereas Iran exported natural gas to the Soviet Union in the 1970s, this trend has reversed over the past six decades. If implemented, Russian gas exports to Iran would form part of the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic reconfiguration of Eurasia following the Ukraine war. Russia seeks to redefine its energy export routes, while Iran aims to reduce its domestic gas imbalance and strengthen its geoeconomic and transit role within regional energy networks. However, the project’s success will depend on political cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, Azerbaijan’s role as the main transit route, international sanctions, its economic viability, and developments in global energy markets. 

Within Iran, opinions on Russian gas imports remain divided. Supporters argue the project would reduce winter gas shortages in northern Iran, increase gas exports to neighboring countries, and reinforce Iran’s position as a regional energy hub. Critics, however, view Russia as Iran’s principal competitor in regional and global gas markets, noting that discounted Russian oil and gas have already displaced Iranian exports, particularly in China and India. Russia has similarly expanded its share of Iran’s steel export markets through lower prices. Consequently, if Iran–U.S. negotiations lead to sanctions relief and expanded Iranian energy exports, Russia may already have secured a significant portion of Iran’s potential export markets.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Irakli Kiknavelidze and Tomáš Baranec

Ilia II of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GeOC) died on 17 March. Over nearly five decades, he consolidated the Church’s position as one of Georgia’s most influential and trusted institutions. His tenure was characterized by a dominant patriarchate, a relatively constrained Holy Synod, and a cautious approach to partisan politics and foreign policy alignment. The accession of Shio III marks the beginning of a new era for the GeOC, bringing expectations of a redefined balance between the patriarch and the synod, as well as potential consequences arising from the Church’s increased engagement in domestic and international politics.

BACKGROUND:

Under the 1995 Statute of Administration of the GeOC, the Holy Synod plays the central role in the election of the Patriarch. It is responsible for nominating three candidates and is the only body granted voting rights within the Extended Council, which selects the final candidate. All other participants, unlike under the pre-1995 system, serve solely in an advisory capacity.

Ideologically, the Holy Synod can currently be divided into three principal blocs. The conservative bloc is characterised by a dogmatic stance on cultural and ethical issues, scepticism towards Western integration, and, to varying degrees, openness to cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).

The national-conservative bloc often adopts an even more dogmatic position on cultural and ethical issues than the conservative bloc, while remaining strongly anti-Russian. Consequently, it is particularly sceptical of both the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and Georgia’s integration with Western institutions.

The liberal bloc, the smallest of the three, advocates more moderate positions on socio-ethical issues and is broadly supportive of Georgia’s political integration with Western institutions.

A heterogeneous yet numerically significant group within the Holy Synod consists of centrists, whose members are generally less ideologically committed and more pragmatic in their outlook than those belonging to the principal ideological blocs.

At its session on April 28, the Holy Synod nominated three candidates for the patriarchate, broadly reflecting the three principal ideological currents within the Church. Metropolitan Shio Mujiri, backed by the conservative wing, received 20 votes. The national-conservative bloc nominated Iob Akiashvili, who secured 7 votes, while the liberal wing put forward Grigol Berbichashvili, who also received 7 votes.

In the final vote held on 11 May, Metropolitan Shio Mujiri was elected head of the GeOC with 22 votes. Metropolitan Iob received nine votes, while Metropolitan Grigol secured seven. Mujiri was enthroned the following day, assuming the title Shio III.

IMPLICATIONS:

As one of the few senior figures within the GeOC to have received theological education in Russia, Shio has frequently been portrayed in the media as “Moscow’s candidate,” a characterisation openly used by Archbishop Zenon Iarajuli, among others. Critics have also pointed to his close relationship with Georgia’s ruling party. In contrast, Patriarch Ilia II maintained close ties with the Georgian state as an institution while generally avoiding overt alignment with any particular political party.

The accession of Shio III can be regarded as a significant success for the ROC, particularly with respect to the question of recognising the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which is a fully independent, autocephalous national church. Both of Shio’s rivals, Iob and Grigol, stated that they would support recognition of the OCU’s independence if elected. Shio, by contrast, avoided taking a public position on the issue during the election process. Given his longstanding ties to the ROC, it appears unlikely that he will endorse recognition of the OCU and will instead support the Moscow-affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). As a result, the ROC can expect continued support from the GeOC on an issue of major strategic importance to Moscow, potentially for decades to come.

To an extent that remains uncertain, Shio’s accession is also likely to ensure the continuation of relatively close relations between the two Churches and to preserve a degree of ROC influence within the GeOC, at least intellectually and ideologically. 

Compared with Ilia II, the new Patriarch’s initial public statements and appearances indicate that he may adopt a more uncompromisingly conservative stance, which will be difficult to reconcile with Georgia’s integration with Western institutions.

In this way, Shio may contribute to the strengthening of anti-Western attitudes among segments of the Georgian population. Such a development would align with Russia’s broader geopolitical interests while simultaneously reinforcing the legitimacy of the ruling Georgian Dream party among parts of its domestic constituency.

Even before his accession, Shio departed from Ilia II’s principle of supporting state institutions rather than specific political parties. Moreover, unlike Ilia II, Shio III is likely to enter his relationship with Bidzina Ivanishvili, the de facto leader of the ruling party, as a junior partner, at least initially.

An important factor in assessing the outlook of the new Patriarch is his background as a black (monastic) priest. Orthodox monasticism has traditionally been closer to the ROC (which is based on monasticism) than to the Greek Orthodox Church, which relies more heavily on white (married parish) clergy. As a result, Shio’s affinity with the Russian Orthodox world extends beyond his education in Russia. Whereas Ilia II’s faith was based on "Georgian Orthodoxy;" a faith with regard to the interests of the state, Shio III emphasizes Orthodoxy as a superior and supranational religious identity.

Shio III’s ties to Russia and support for the government appear to stem from deeply held personal convictions rather than political expediency. Consequently, a significant shift in these positions during his patriarchate is unlikely.

Nevertheless, the impact of Shio’s enthronement is likely to remain limited, at least during the initial years of his patriarchate. The fact that, after the first round of voting, when his victory had become virtually certain, there was no significant shift of centrist support in his favour (his tally increased by only two votes) suggests that members of the Holy Synod are not subservient to the new Patriarch and are prepared to oppose him if necessary.

Shio III has yet to display the political acumen that characterised Ilia II. His leadership is constrained by dogmatism and introversion, although he has shown an ability to rely on politically skilled allies and possesses some political instinct. The first major challenges of his patriarchate will reveal which of these traits proves more influential.

The GeOC will soon face several important internal challenges, including the appointment of seven vacant episcopal positions and the reform of the 1995 Statute of Administration. While there is broad agreement within the Holy Synod that the current statute requires revision, opinions differ sharply regarding its replacement. In addition, some bishops are actively advocating for the Church to publicly call for the release of political prisoners.

None of these issues falls within Shio III’s formal authority to decide unilaterally. To advance his preferred policies, he will need to secure the support of the Holy Synod. His handling of these challenges will provide an indication of his ability to shape the Church in accordance with his worldview.

CONCLUSIONS:

If Shio III consolidates his position, he could enable greater Russian influence within the GeOC and bolster the legitimacy of Georgian Dream among conservative voters. In the long term, however, this may weaken the Church’s broader social authority and deepen political polarization in Georgia.

In an alternative scenario, the Holy Synod could gain influence at the expense of the Patriarch. Even so, a major shift in the Church’s domestic or foreign policy positions is unlikely, as the recent patriarchal election demonstrated the continued dominance of the conservative wing within the Synod.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Tomáš Baranec is a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He worked for several years as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague. 

Irakli Kiknavelidze is a Georgian journalist, television host, political commentator, and media professional specializing in Georgian politics, democracy, religion, and South Caucasus affairs. He has worked in television, print, and digital media, producing interviews, analysis, and public affairs programming. Throughout his career, Kiknavelidze has focused on political developments, international relations, and the intersection of religion and public life in Georgia.

By David Dondua

The August 2008 Russo-Georgian war achieved less than Moscow had hoped. Russia seized 18 per cent of the country's territory, areas it had already controlled since the early 1990s, but failed to alter Georgia's strategic direction. What military force could not achieve, Moscow pursued through other means — disinformation, economic leverage, elite capture, and a sustained cognitive campaign targeting Georgian society's deepest cultural anxieties. Over the following decade and a half, these tools proved far more effective than tanks. Yet Moscow's campaign found the ground partly prepared for it. Western partners, through a series of miscalculations, inadvertently made the cognitive campaign easier to wage. Understanding what went wrong and why is essential not only for Georgia's future but also for every country facing Russian hybrid warfare.

Read How Russia Won the Hybrid War in Georgia