By Farkhod Tolipov

In mid-December 2025, several Russian state-controlled media outlets spread a rumor that Russia could apply for membership in the Central Asian Community. This statement followed Azerbaijan’s entry into the regional grouping in November at the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent. The rumor reminded of Russia’s accession to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization in 2004, which led to the merger of that body with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community. Once again, Russia seeks to join the Central Asian Community, potentially worsening geopolitical tensions in the region.

BACKGROUND: Twenty years ago, in 2004, Russia applied for membership in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). At that time, the presidents of two key states, Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev of and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, were unable to refuse Moscow. This external membership in CACO eventually led to the organization’s collapse. One year after Russia’s admission, CACO was merged with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES) on the grounds that the two organizations duplicated each other. Uzbekistan withdrew from EvrAzES in 2008. The structure itself existed until 2014, and in 2015, it was replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Only two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are now members of the EAEU. 

In 2019, the Russian side suddenly announced that Uzbekistan could become a member of the EAEU. Uzbekistan never confirmed either its desire or the possibility of such membership but decided in December 2020 to become an observer in the EAEU. Since then, Moscow has constantly and officially reminded Uzbekistan that the EAEU is waiting. Recently, the President of Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko even stated that “we are looking forward to Uzbekistan’s membership in the EAEU.” Notably, such statements come only from Russia or Belarus; other EAEU states are not focused on this, and Uzbekistan does not show a strong interest in joining the organization.

Against this backdrop, two geopolitical issues cause concern in Moscow. First, without Uzbekistan in the EAEU, Central Asia cannot be brought under full Russian control. Second, the EAEU remains a very small entity, consisting of only five former Soviet republics. This limited composition does not support Russia’s image as a great power but, on the contrary, highlights its difficulty in asserting such a status.

It has become a tradition that the informal summits of the EAEU and the CIS are held in Saint Petersburg on the same days. On 22–23 December 2025, both events took place in the city. Reports on the CIS/EAEU summits were quite modest and contained no serious statements, except positive remarks about increased trade within the CIS/EAEU during the year. These largely symbolic events took place against the background of the war in Ukraine, which has dealt a serious blow to Moscow’s international reputation. In this context, Russia is using different means to preserve its influence in Central Asia while losing control over other parts of the former Soviet space.

IMPLICATIONS: Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev did not attend the EAEU summit, citing his country’s non-membership in the organization. He also did not travel to Saint Petersburg for the CIS summit, referring to his busy schedule. However, in November Azerbaijan became a full participant in the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia (CMHS).

Although Baku’s accession to the CMHS is assessed differently across the region, this expansion of the “C5” format into a “C6” is likely viewed in Moscow as a new challenge to Russia’s position in the region of the “stans.” This may explain the appearance of rumors that Russia could apply for membership in the CMHS. At the same time, the increasingly pro-Russian policies of all Central Asian states, whether genuine or aimed at avoiding Moscow’s displeasure, raise concerns that history may repeat itself and that the Central Asian Community could again open its doors to Russia.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev delivered a speech at the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council that resembled a statement from a full member. He described EAEU countries as “our strategic and natural partners.” According to the president, Uzbekistan actively participates in all key Eurasian formats. He also stated that “we believe it is necessary to strengthen coordination between the institutions of the CIS and the EAEU.”

Mirziyoyev highlighted several issues, including the elimination of trade barriers and the creation of an Uzbekistan–EAEU coordination group on tariff and non-tariff barriers; the development of industrial cooperation and the launch of joint projects in machinery, energy, agriculture, and the chemical sector; the digitalization of trade and customs administration; participation in EAEU technological platforms, from biomedicine and new materials to robotics; and the creation of a unified tourism space that would combine products of the Union’s member states.

Overall, the narrow, trade- and business-centered rhetoric surrounding the EAEU does not indicate the emergence of a shared regional identity among its member states, which is both a key condition for and an outcome of meaningful integration. In contrast, a broader vision of Central Asia, based on a natural sense of common identity among its peoples, is far stronger than a solely economic grouping of states. Indeed, the November summit of Central Asian leaders in Tashkent produced notable signs of deeper regional integration. In particular, it was announced that the CMHS format could be transformed into a Community of Central Asia (CCA).

Despite this major trend in Central Asia, the pro-Russian, or seemingly pro-Russian, policies of regional leaders may have a reverse effect and lead to a repetition of history, including a renewed Russian application for membership in the CCA for purely geopolitical reasons. In a recent and telling statement, Russia’s ambassador to Uzbekistan claimed that “Uzbekistan assured the Russian Federation that the era of the Great Game has passed into oblivion.” The remark suggests the opposite: the Great Game may be entering a new phase in which it is not Uzbekistan or other Central Asian states that shape geopolitical rivalry, but Russia itself, which continues to view the region through the lens of great-power competition. Throughout its independence, Uzbekistan has sought to avoid geopolitical entanglements. Therefore, if assurances about the end of geopolitical games are needed, they should come from great powers themselves, rather than from Central Asian states.

Moscow may believe that Russia’s membership in CAC would signal the end of the Great Game, whereas in reality it would represent yet another expression of Russia’s enduring geopolitical modus vivendi.

CONCLUSIONS: Central Asia is entering a new round of the geopolitical Great Game, and this game is being driven primarily by Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, this outcome is hardly surprising. Moscow’s foreign policy and its broader international behavior are clearly dominated by geopolitical considerations.

At present, one can observe the emergence of two opposing geopolitical configurations, the “Eurasian Five” of the Eurasian community versus the “Central Asian Six” of the Central Asian Community. The paradox of this dual trend, however, is that two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are members of both EAEU and CAC.

In 2004, Russia’s accession to CACO distorted, weakened, and ultimately destroyed the organization and the broader process of integration among the five Central Asian states. As a result, regional integration was halted for a decade and revived only in 2017. Integration in Central Asia is a distinct phenomenon: from the outset, it has been shaped in part to avoid geopolitical entanglements. By its nature, Central Asian integration cannot include any major power, regardless of which one it is, because such inclusion would inevitably introduce a dimension of geopolitical competition into the integration process.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge Caravan”) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

By Aleksandar Ivanović 

On October 10, 2025, the CIS heads of state summit was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The leaders established the “Commonwealth of Independent States Plus” (CIS+) format, further integrating external partners in CIS initiatives. Turkmenistan was chosen to chair next year’s summit in October. Multiple packages of documents were signed, targeting trade, crime, and most importantly, security. Security challenges from Afghanistan, including extremism and border conflicts, have continued since the Taliban takeover, and these recent agreements make up another component of Central Asia’s lengthy efforts to reduce the recurring concerns that can potentially spill over into their territories.

                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon hosts high-ranking representatives from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Belarus in Dushanbe for this year’s CIS Heads of State Summit, their annual tradition marks another year of important security partnerships.

The leaders signed multiple packages of documents, including the decision “on the Program of cooperation of the member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the field of countering terrorism and extremism for 2026-2028, strengthening border security at external borders for 2026-2030,” and military cooperation until 2030.

Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed Russia’s open support for the signed proposals, stating that “an important area of joint work among the CIS states is the fight against terrorism, extremism, corruption, and so on.” Russia has been a victim of terrorism in the past, most notably in March 2024 when a bomb detonated in a Moscow concert hall killed 144 and wounded more than 500. The attack was carried out by ISIS-recruited Tajiks from both sides of the Afghan border, demonstrating how Afghanistan-based extremism can strike major regional powers.

The summit occurs at a critical juncture where the regional balance of power undergoes an increasingly global shift. Russia and China have taken significant actions to cooperate with Afghanistan, where the now-Taliban run state poses a greater challenge to regional security. China has offered economic-based strategies, accelerating infrastructure investments like its copper mining project at Mes Aynak, which is possibly the world’s second-biggest copper deposit. Russia, taking a more political route, formally recognized the Taliban government in July 2025, becoming the first country to do so.

The recent moves from external powers have complicated Central Asia’s own efforts to manage threats relating to Afghanistan. However, its leaders were also eager to comment on how to address security while pursuing economic opportunities with the Taliban. In his remarks, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined his interest in developing economic partnerships in Afghanistan, mentioning “joint participation in the implementation of major investment and infrastructure,” and stating that “Uzbekistan is resolutely committed to ensuring long-term peace, stability, and sustainable development in Afghanistan.” Despite its relatively small border, Uzbekistan is in a constant battle with extremist activity and border conflicts coming from its unstable southern neighbor. As a result, Tashkent has approached the Taliban government with a more open-minded attitude compared to its Central Asian counterparts to support the Afghan economy and infrastructure, hoping to address poor economic indicators that instigate external threats including extremism.

IMPLICATIONS: The documents signed in Dushanbe mark another example of Central Asian resilience and solidarity in assuring regional security, and for dealing with Afghanistan in the future. Central Asian states have already grappled with these efforts since 2021 and have collectively reflected on Afghanistan on multiple occasions. In August in Tashkent, special representatives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan stressed the importance of fighting threats emanating in Afghanistan, highlighting extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, and cross-border crime.

Extremism stemming from Afghanistan has most significantly been propagated by ISIS-K, the Islamic State’s branch in the historic Khorasan region. It mostly consists of non-Pashtun minority ethnic groups living in the northern region of Afghanistan, including Uzbeks and Tajiks. A portion of their fighters also include extremists or government dissidents in Central Asia, who go to Afghanistan and join their cause. ISIS-K seeks to radicalize and recruit young men from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and spread propaganda through media to appeal to extremists and those dissatisfied with their governments. Major campaigns include criticizing governments for poor economic conditions in their respective countries, and the Taliban, a majority-Pashtun group and adversary that has undermined the presence of ethnic minorities like Uzbeks and Tajiks in Northern Afghanistan. President Rahmon has publicly acknowledged the issue, and has deemed ISIS-K a “plague,” and that “hell awaits” any Tajik that joins ISIS.

In addition to its media strategy, the group also actively works against the Taliban’s effort to build partnerships and expand security efforts in Central Asia. A notable example was when Uzbekistan, which holds the most cooperative relationship with the Taliban, was attacked in its border region by ISIS-K missiles in 2022, a strike aiming to undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy and security assurances to Central Asian governments.

Collective efforts with Afghanistan to combat extremism have not been substantial. With an already strengthened regional presence of ISIS-K, the Taliban’s internal power dynamics further complicate security assurances to Central Asia. The tension between Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in the southern city of Kandahar and the more accessible and pragmatic Sirajuddin Haqqani in Kabul creates uncertainty about whether commitments to suppress extremist groups will be honored consistently across Afghan territory.

Central Asian states have mostly conducted autonomous campaigns to limit the spread of extremist groups and their potential influence. In February 2024, the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan neutralized multiple extremist groups and detained 23 individuals, including adherents of destructive religious movements, in 8 regions of Kazakhstan for promoting terrorism. Tajik forces similarly followed three months later, raiding villages in its Eastern region to arrest 30 people for connections to their terrorist group Jamaat Ansarullah, Tajik extremist allies of the Taliban.

Tajikistan, the most vocal state, was the only Central Asian government to call out the Taliban and categorize it as purely a threat. Dushanbe refused to send a diplomatic mission after the Taliban seized political power and has demonstrated security concerns through conducting multiple military drills along the Afghan border, some in cooperation with the Uzbek military. In a June 2024 session of the CSTO Parliament Assembly in Almaty, Rustom Emomali, son of the Tajik president, declared Afghanistan a “breeding ground of terrorism.” The Taliban has repeatedly assured Central Asian governments that it will not allow its territory to serve as a platform for extremist groups to strike its neighbors. However, this assurance has lately been viewed more as a desperate plea for legitimacy rather than a valid promise, as hostile attacks by ISIS-K and the presence of other terrorist groups like Jamaat Ansarullah continue.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have pursued a dual-track approach, recognizing that economic engagement may prove more effective than isolation. Both countries expect to conduct US$ 3 billion worth of trade with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 2025, viewing the country as their most important underdeveloped economic opportunity. They also seek to revitalize the historic Great India Road trade corridor which runs through Afghanistan, and it remains their highest priority for reducing dependence on northern routes through Russia. However, this strategy requires delicate balancing – economic ties that could reduce the sources of extremism must not legitimize a regime that harbors terrorist groups.

CONCLUSIONS: The past four years have demonstrated that Central Asian states face a complex trilemma: they must counter immediate security threats from Afghanistan, pursue long-term economic integration through Afghan territory, and navigate the competing interests of Russia and China – both now deeply engaging with Kabul.

The CIS summit’s security packages represent one pillar of this strategy, but they can only succeed through continued economic and diplomatic initiatives. What defines this unique current moment in Afghanistan is the erosion of Western engagement following the near-complete cessation of U.S. humanitarian assistance under the Trump administration. This vacuum has allowed Russia and China to position themselves as Afghanistan’s primary external partners, potentially foreclosing Central Asian hopes for a more balanced regional order. The next couple of years will test whether Central Asian solidarity, as demonstrated in Dushanbe, can effectively manage Afghan challenges without becoming dependent on their northern and eastern neighbors. How these dynamics unfold will indeed remain an essential conversation in Turkmenistan next year.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Aleksandar Ivanović is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council
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By Nargiza Umarova

Azerbaijan is strengthening its political and economic ties with the Taliban government by playing an active role in creating and developing promising transport routes to South Asia. At the forefront is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, launched in 2018 through a joint initiative of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Turkmenistan, similar to the ancient route of the Great Silk Road. The possibility of extending the corridor to South Asia is being considered, which would have geo-economic and geopolitical implications for Uzbekistan.

                                                                       Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The US$2 billion Lapis Lazuli Agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan on 15 November 2017. The route runs from the Afghan cities of Aqina in Faryab Province and Torghundi in Herat Province, through the Caspian Sea ports of Turkmenbashi and Baku, and the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti or Batumi, to Istanbul or Kars in Turkey, with further access to the European transport system.

The first test shipment along the Lapis Lazuli logistics chain was carried out in 2018. In January 2021, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan signed a trilateral roadmap to develop this route. However, implementation of the document was suspended due to the Taliban's seizure of power in Kabul in August 2021.

Against the backdrop of pragmatic interactions between Central Asian states — particularly Uzbekistan — and the current Afghan leadership, Azerbaijan is also seeking to strengthen its position in Afghanistan as a partner in trade, the economy, transport, and logistics.

Baku’s main priority is the Middle Corridor project, a vital logistics link between China and Europe. The Lapis Lazuli Corridor essentially extends the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan. This enables Kabul to take part in trans-Caspian shipping and to redirect some of its export cargo bound for the European market from Pakistan or Iran, to the South Caucasus and Turkey.

In 2024, Afghanistan’s total trade with the EU was approximately US$ 42 million, which is 15.9 percent higher than the previous year’s figure. Experts predict that this growth trend will continue. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is attempting to accelerate these processes by adopting a proactive approach to its relations with the Taliban.

On July 2, 2025, on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, met with Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov. They emphasized Baku’s readiness to increase export and import volumes with Afghanistan. The Afghan delegation visited the Baku International Seaport, where they discussed expanding the geography of freight transport along the South Asia-Caucasus-Europe route and integrating Afghanistan into the Middle Corridor.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have made significant efforts to develop the infrastructure of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. Azerbaijan has invested approximately US$ 1 billion in two vital elements of the project: the Alat Port in Baku and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan constructed the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Aqina railway in 2016, and connected the Afghan cities of Aqina and Andkhoy by rail in 2021. The Caspian port of Turkmenbashi is also being modernized to increase its capacity. In order to generate economic returns on their investments and reap the long-term benefits of transport service exports, it is crucial for Baku, Ashgabat and other stakeholders along the route to maximize its utilization. This justifies the idea of extending the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to Pakistan and India, which would run contrary to Uzbekistan’s interests.

IMPLICATIONS: It is assumed that the transport corridor from Europe to India via the South Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan will become an alternative to Tashkent’s strategic plan for connecting Eastern Europe with the Indian subcontinent. This plan involves linking the Trans-Afghan Railway (Kabul Corridor) with the Northern Railway Corridor through Russia. To this end, Uzbekistan has initiated the formation of the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Ocean ports transit route, which is set to launch in multimodal format soon.

The main benchmark for calculating the Kabul Corridor’s economic efficiency and feasibility is India’s growing potential for trade with Central Asian countries, the EU, China and Russia.

In the 2024 fiscal year, India’s trade turnover with the EU exceeded US$ 137 billion, with China US$ 118 billion, with Russia US$ 70 billion, and with Central Asian countries US$ 1.7 billion. The majority of Indian goods are delivered to promising markets by sea, which incurs high financial and time costs. The integration of India and Pakistan's transport space into the Eurasian road network is expected to stimulate land transportation along the South Asia-Europe axis. This shift holds great potential for the Kabul Corridor, with a projected annual cargo volume of up to 22 million tons, most of which will be in transit. 

However, the extension of the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan and the development of further access to Pakistan and India will redistribute the flow of cargo from South Asian countries to Europe in favor of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, who are connected by the Caspian Sea. In turn, this risks diminishing Uzbekistan’s exclusive role as a trans-Eurasian transport link. 

In theory, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to Pakistan by constructing a railway line from Torghundi station on the Afghan-Turkmen border to Naibabad station, which marks the beginning of the Afghan section of the Kabul Corridor. Although this would exclude Uzbekistan from the India-EU supply chain, it would enable the Kabul Corridor to attract additional cargo from the South Caucasus and Turkmenistan. However, this advantage would not offset Uzbekistan’s loss of transit flows from the larger economic centers of Eurasia.

Connecting the Lapis Lazuli and Kabul corridors would motivate constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway, which would breathe new life into the long-standing Five Nations Railway Corridor project, running through China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The Five Nations Route bypasses Uzbekistan, significantly reducing the distance between East and West. This will probably diminish the importance of the Southern Railway Corridor, which runs through Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which is intended to be an important component of this route.

At the same time, constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway could undermine the Lapis Lazuli Corridor’s competitive advantage by increasing Iranian transit. Iran already has rail access to northern Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat route, which is used to deliver Afghan cargo to Europe. Extending the Khaf-Herat railway to Naibabad station near Mazar-i-Sharif and connecting it to the Kabul Corridor would enable Iran to divert potential cargo traffic from India and Pakistan to Turkey and Europe via itself, thereby depriving Central Asian and South Caucasian countries of transit benefits. Consequently, there is a possibility that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to South Asia, bypassing Kabul and instead passing through Kandahar. This would stimulate the development of the western Trans-Afghan Railway along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak route. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan promote the project as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor. 

Russia should be considered a potential stakeholder in the extension of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor along any of the trans-Afghan routes. Moscow has already announced plans to connect with Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea, utilising Turkmenistan’s port and rail infrastructure, which would integrate Russia into the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. This would establish a connection between India and Russia, and potentially Europe, through Turkmenistan and the Caspian port of Turkmenbashi, rather than through Uzbekistan.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s best option for maintaining and enhancing its competitive advantages in trans-Eurasian and trans-Afghan transport is to accelerate construction of the Kabul Corridor, involving all Central Asian states financially to the maximum extent possible. Kazakhstan’s practical support for developing the Kabul Corridor is important, as connecting it to the Northern Railway Route to Europe will enable Astana to receive an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons per year. This will preempt any potential competition from Astana and Ashgabat in developing trans-Afghan transport connections. 

It would be worth proposing to Baku the joint promotion of a new multimodal corridor from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the EU. This would stimulate the development of the Middle Corridor by increasing transport from South Asia and Afghanistan to Europe via the Caspian Sea.

Moreover, an alternative should be developed to the Five Nations Route, instead envisaging a connection between China, Afghanistan and Iran through Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. This would ensure the profitability of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway project for Tashkent.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

S. Frederick Starr

April 3, 2025

This article is an English version of an article to appear in Uzbek in Vatan (Motherland), Uzbekistan's leading journal.

Read Uzbekistan and the Institutionalization of Greater Central Asia PDF

By Farkhad Tolipov

January 29, 2025

The remnants of the Russian imperial modus vivendi is revealing in current Moscow’s manipulative policy in Central Asia where Moscow tries to embody its own version of Monroe Doctrine. This region looks like the last bastion of Russian imperialism. Uzbekistan, the biggest Central Asian country by population and the most central by location, provides an obvious illustrative case to observe and analyze this new/old regional order. Moscow’s manipulation of Uzbekistan and leverage-keeping policy is conducted with the help of a specific toolkit including propaganda, information attacks, geopolitical pressure and show visits.

Read Russia’s Central Asian Underbelly: The Case of Uzbekistan (PDF)