By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Pakistan and India, the longstanding rivals in South Asia, have instigated an arms race in the South Caucasus region. This development comes amid a broader arms supply deficit caused by Russia's preoccupation with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While India is deepening its military partnership with Armenia, Pakistan is enhancing the defense capabilities of Azerbaijan. Both states are actively seeking to fill the vacuum in arms procurement left by Russia's reduced presence in the region. India has aligned with Armenia, leveraging this partnership to pursue strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus. Conversely, Pakistan views Azerbaijan as a strategic ally, with their collaboration deemed essential for countering India in the competition for regional influence.

BCKGROUND: India and Pakistan have shared a contentious relationship since their emergence as independent states in 1947. The two states have engaged in three full-scale wars, primarily over Kashmir, a territory claimed by both. In 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests shortly after India, marking a significant escalation in their rivalry. This ongoing antagonism often manifests in international forums, where the two countries accuse each other of fostering cross-border terrorism. Their rivalry extended to the South Caucasus in 2020, during the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Pakistan supported Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. However, the close relationship between the two countries predates this conflict, with their cordial ties dating back to Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was among the first nations to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, second only to Türkiye. After Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region shortly after its independence, both Türkiye and Pakistan strongly condemned Armenia's actions. Since then, they have consistently supported Azerbaijan’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in international forums, both politically and diplomatically. Pakistan has gone so far as to refrain from recognizing Armenia, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the country. In return, Azerbaijan has endorsed Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute, a position that has antagonized India.

During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Islamabad was alleged to have sent military advisers to support Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even claimed that Pakistani soldiers were actively fighting alongside the Azerbaijani army against Armenia during the 44-day conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan, however, categorically dismissed these allegations, labeling them as "baseless and unwarranted." Ultimately, Azerbaijan emerged victorious in the six-week war over the disputed region.

Türkiye strongly backed Pakistan's position on Kashmir, reciprocating Pakistan’s unequivocal support for Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war. The mutual endorsements of Islamabad's stance on Kashmir by Ankara and Baku provoked concern in New Delhi. Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan during the conflict played a pivotal role in fostering closer ties between India and Armenia in the aftermath of the war. Observing its rival’s activities during the Karabakh conflict, India responded by significantly enhancing its defense partnership with Armenia over the subsequent four years.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Türkiye formalized their alliance by signing the Trilateral Islamabad Declaration in 2021, underscoring their solidarity with Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war.

IMPLICATIONS: The supply of military equipment by India and Pakistan has significantly reduced Azerbaijan's and Armenia's dependence on Russia for weapons and ammunition. Historically, both South Caucasian nations relied heavily on Russia for defense supplies, particularly in the period preceding the 2020 Karabakh War. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia accounted for 94 percent of Armenia's major arms imports, including armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks. Similarly, Azerbaijan depended extensively on Russian military supplies during the same period, purchasing armored vehicles, air defense systems, Smerch rockets, transport and combat helicopters, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks.

India considers Armenia a strategic partner in the South Caucasus and has consequently deepened its military ties with Yerevan. Armenia has emerged as the largest foreign recipient of Indian weapons, with defense contracts concluded since 2020 estimated at US$ 2 billion. According to a report by the Indian Ministry of Finance, Armenia has become the leading importer of Indian arms, securing deals for the purchase of Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems and Akash anti-aircraft systems. This development reflects a significant realignment in the defense landscape of the region.

In September, Azerbaijan formally introduced Pakistan’s fourth-generation JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter jets to its air force, marking a significant milestone in defense cooperation between the two nations. This development followed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement signed in February for the acquisition of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal includes not only the supply of aircraft but also ammunition and pilot training provided by Pakistan. The advanced combat capabilities of the JF-17 Block III are expected to enhance Azerbaijan's military edge in the South Caucasus. Notably, Azerbaijan has requested 60 JF-17 jets, intended to replace its entire fleet of aircraft, making this the largest defense export deal in Pakistan’s history.

The defense agreements between India and Armenia, as well as those between Pakistan and Azerbaijan, have significantly diminished Russia’s position as the principal supplier of weapons and ammunition to the South Caucasian nations. This shift has been exacerbated by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, which has undermined its ability to deliver weapons in a timely manner under previously signed contracts. The entry of India and Pakistan into the regional defense market has provided Armenia and Azerbaijan with an opportunity to diversify their military procurement, reducing their historical reliance on Russian defense supplies.

The entry of India and Pakistan into the South Caucasus has resulted in the formation of two rival blocs competing for regional influence. One alliance, referred to as the Three Brothers, comprises Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan, while the opposing group includes Armenia, Iran, France, and India.

For India, Armenia holds strategic importance as a potential bridge to access the vast market of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). New Delhi views Armenia as a vital transit hub for connecting Indian goods to EU countries and envisions its role in facilitating bilateral or multilateral partnerships with nations such as Iran, France, and Greece to implement strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus.

Conversely, Islamabad considers its partnership with Azerbaijan critical for countering India's influence in the region. Azerbaijan has also emerged as a key player in the energy transit corridors connecting the Black Sea, South Caucasus, and Europe, further enhancing its geopolitical significance. This dynamic positions Azerbaijan as a strategic ally for Pakistan, particularly in the context of their shared interests in limiting India's regional ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan's defense cooperation with Azerbaijan and India's arms sales to Armenia are shaping new security dynamics that link the South Caucasus and South Asia. The extensive defense contracts between India and Armenia are poised to strengthen Armenia's position as a strategic ally for India in the region.

India's military partnership with Armenia is influenced by its geopolitical rivalry with Pakistan, which is actively supporting Azerbaijan's defense capabilities. Both Pakistan and India aim to secure reciprocal cooperation from the South Caucasian nations to advance their strategic interests. For Pakistan, Azerbaijan holds particular importance as a potential partner in trans-regional energy cooperation, given Pakistan's energy deficiencies. Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the energy transit corridor connecting South Asia and the South Caucasus further underscores this strategic alignment.

Conversely, India, as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), is working to deepen its cooperation with Armenia across economic sectors, with a particular emphasis on defense. Armenia's strategic position could also facilitate India's broader connectivity initiatives with Europe. Meanwhile, Pakistan is likely to leverage its relationship with Azerbaijan to counterbalance India's growing influence in the region, highlighting the interconnected and competitive geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and South Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst of the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.

By Laura Linderman and Michael Hikari Cecire

In early October, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov declared a blood feud against three North Caucasian federal lawmakers, accusing them of plotting his assassination amid a power struggle over the Wildberries e-commerce platform. This incident highlights the escalating tensions and fragility of power within Russian politics, revealing vulnerabilities in the Kremlin's governance amid ongoing conflicts. As regional elites assert their interests, the potential for broader instability increases, particularly against the backdrop of Russia's war in Ukraine. The situation underscores the complex interplay of patronage networks and regional autonomy that could lead to significant shifts in Russia's internal power dynamics.

BACKGROUND:  In early October, Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov declared a blood feud against three federal lawmakers—two Dagestani and an Ingush deputy—whom he accused of planning his assassination. The dispute is tied to control over the Russian Wildberries e-commerce website, which had been wrested by forces backed by the Dagestani and Ingush deputies against Kadyrov’s allies, culminating in a deadly shootout at the company’s Moscow headquarters. The company's contentious expansion has also led to intimidation beyond Russia's borders - in October 2024, a JAMnews editor in Georgia received threats of violence from an apparent Chechen supporter after criticizing Wildberries' entry into the Georgian market despite international sanctions. Kadyrov’s rhetoric indicates a profound willingness to use violence and intimidation, highlighting Kadyrov’s belief that he operates beyond Moscow’s control.

More broadly, the Wildberries saga highlights an ongoing scramble among Russian elites for key economic assets, and a deepening sense of growing instability throughout the contest Russian political economy arena. The North Caucasus, is a notable theater for this contestation given its historically restive and fractured contexts. Further, Kadyrov’s willingness to level threats—and the limited reaction it elicited—highlight the privileged position that Kadyrov continues to enjoy in Russia, but also the way other factions are contesting his authority. Kadyrov's comments also mark an escalation in the tensions between regional leaders and the Kremlin, illustrating the fragile balance of power within Russian politics. Kadyrov has long been known for his authoritarian rule, and this incident further showcases his leverage in the ongoing political competition among regional and federal authorities.

The ongoing conflict has drawn attention not only for its immediate violence but also for what it reveals about Russian and North Caucasus patronage networks. The region has long been characterized by real and fictive kinship affiliations that shape local governance and economic relationships. The fallout from the incident may embolden other North Caucasian factions to assert their interests in Moscow, potentially leading to further, and spiraling, destabilization. The Kremlin's haphazard approach to governance in the North Caucasus only further complicates matters. Moscow has historically relied on regional strongmen like Kadyrov to maintain stability, yet this reliance simultaneously breeds conditions for potential conflict.

Against the backdrop of an exhausting military quagmire in Ukraine, institutionally fragile security services and military apparatus made hollower by that war, and elite infighting and uncertainty as Russian President Vladimir Putin ages, the Wildberries incident reveals how Russia’s weak institutions and semi-feudal mode of control may be contributing to feedback loops of internal deterioration and instability. As the situation unfolds, it will be critical to monitor the responses from both the Kremlin and North Caucasian regional power centers, as this may foreshadow larger shifts in Russia's internal power dynamics.

IMPLICATIONS: The broader implications extend far beyond a mere violent confrontation between business interests and political factions. This event reveals profound vulnerabilities in the Russian state, which are particularly exacerbated amid its ongoing war in Ukraine.

The dynamics exposed by this recent incident suggest shifting balance between Moscow and the North Caucasus, highlighting the Kremlin’s internal fragility and the growing assertiveness of regional elites. As the war in Ukraine continues to stretch Russian resources and resolve, the Kremlin’s reliance on figures like Kadyrov to maintain control—or at least the simulacrum of control—can backfire and may kindle wider instability that can be expressed as a broader challenge to Moscow's authority.

The instability generated by Kadyrov and his patronage-based power structure, or other such triggers, could spiral into larger conflicts, not only within Chechnya but across the entire region. The interconnected nature of intertwined North Caucasian business and family groupings means that tensions in one republic can quickly spill over into others, potentially igniting violence that could further destabilize Russia's southern flank. This spillover effect extends beyond Russia's borders into the South Caucasus, as evidenced by threats against journalists in Georgia who criticize Wildberries' regional expansion. Such incidents demonstrate how Russian patronage networks attempt to exert influence through both economic penetration and intimidation in neighboring states, particularly as sanctions push Russian businesses to seek new markets

In addition, the situation signals a growing challenge to the Kremlin’s narrative of centralized control. The framented web of factional loyalties and business interests belie the formal appearance of a centralized state. As North Caucasian elites gain more visibility and influence in Moscow, the Kremlin may find itself increasingly unable to exert authority over these networks. Distracted and increasingly incapable state security structures and empowered regional elites where societal alienation from the Russian body politic is strong (or, as in the case in the North Caucasus, arguably endemic) could boost nationalist sentiments and separatist movements—particularly in the North Caucasus, which have their own historical grievances against the central government.

Finally, the likely distant but non-zero potential for federal disintegration looms. If the Kremlin's grip continues to weaken, the North Caucasus could witness a resurgence of separatist movements, echoing the conflicts of the 1990s and early 2000s. As regional elites compete for power and influence, those efforts could escalate into open conflict with each other and federal authorities—themselves fragmented patronage networks. This suggests not the need for Russia to more adequately fill the regional power vacuum, but perhaps that its tentative dominion over the region has been fundamentally illegitimate and ill-fitting.

CONCLUSION: North Caucasus instability underscores the intricate power dynamics within the region and its fundamentally contingent relationship with the Kremlin. As the Kremlin grapples with material and systemic exhaustion from nearly three years of full-scale war, the North Caucasus could be a leading indicator for generalized instability and regime weakness.

While President Putin has broadly sought to consolidate power and eliminate challenges to federal authority, the reality is Moscow—and Putin himself—have come to rely on regional elites who has operated with semi-independence and in sometimes open defiance of state structures. Kadyrov's brazen threats against federal lawmakers highlight the potential for personal and political rivalries to escalate into violence. This power struggle reveals the dissonance between Moscow's objectives and the realities on the ground, where informal networks and personalistic loyalties can often dictate political outcomes.

Moreover, the ongoing war in Ukraine is exacerbating existing tensions in the North Caucasus, making it increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to maintain stability. The region, with its historical grievances and complex interethnic dynamics, is a potential flashpoint for renewed conflict, especially as federal resources diminish. In a generalized scramble for influence and assets, the North Caucasus may be particularly prone to instability, and under certain circumstances, potentially renewed national movements or separatism. The Wildberries incident thus serves as a harbinger of potential unrest, suggesting that the Kremlin's focus on external conflicts may leave it vulnerable to internal challenges—cultivated by the very system of political economy that it has depended upon to maintain its writ.

More broadly, growing signs of instability in the North Caucasus ask questions of wider regional dynamics, including in the South Caucasus. While separated by certain geographic and especially political features (i.e., borders of the Russian Federation itself), in many respects the North and South Caucasus are a more coherent and permeable cultural space than geopolitical dynamics suggest. Narratives of ethno-linguistic segregation can be politically expedient, but often belie reality. Political controversies aside, Nakh-speaking Chechens and Ingush share a common cultural sphere in many respects with each other and the smaller but prominent Nakh and Georgian-speaking Kist and Bats communities in Georgia’s highlands. Similarly, Ossetians in the Russian Federation have far more regular interaction and exchange with a substantial Ossetian population in Georgia, not to mention with Georgians themselves. Avars and Lezgins, two of the largest ethnic groups in Dagestan, also form substantial minorities in Azerbaijan. And so on.

As such, instability in the Caucasus have dynamic effects on other parts of the Caucasus. Should the situation continue to deteriorate in the North Caucasus, it should be expected to have an effect on the South Caucasus as well, given the inherent and durable (notably, despite broader political conflicts) connectivity and interplay between north and south. Beyond cross-hatched ethnic affinities, comparable patronage dynamics exist in Azerbaijan, increasingly in Georgia, and residually in Armenia—all with business and social interests that have ties to Russia. Just as North Caucasus elites are scrambling for influence in the region and Russia’s power centers, so too are South Caucasus oligarchs and their own networks of allies and clients. Overall—what happens in the North Caucasus cannot be a strictly localized affair, and is likely to trigger instability elsewhere in Russia, and potentially spill over into the South Caucasus as well.

AUTHORS' BIOS: Laura Linderman is a Senior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council. Michael Hikari Cecire is an adjunct associate professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a former senior policy advisor at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

By Vali Kaleji

March 28, 2024

The development of military and defense relations between Azerbaijan and Pakistan and Armenia and India is an important consequence of the political arrangement and the balance of forces after the Second Karabakh War. However, Pakistan’s non-recognition of Israel has prevented Baku from forming a “quadruple alliance” with its three strategic allies, including Turkey, Israel and Pakistan. Armenia, after defeat in the war and amid dissatisfaction with its traditional ally Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), views India, France and Iran as new strategic options, however, Iran prefers Armenia to maintain its traditional and strategic relations with Russia. The tripartite cooperation between Armenia, Iran and India focus efforts on “soft balancing” (economic-transit) instead of “hard balancing” (military-security), against the tripartite ties of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan in the South Caucasus.

Brenda Shaffer

March 27, 2024

In recent years, Türkiye has significantly increased cooperation with the states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. One of the most important geopolitical developments in recent years in Eurasia is the emerging alliance between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. This emerging alliance has given impetus to increased cooperation in the sphere of energy among the states. In addition, the increases in strategic collaboration in the region are also raising the prospects of establishment of cross-Caspian energy projects. Türkiye’s engagement in the energy sphere in Central Asia is likely to grow in 2024 and onward. 2024 is a pivotal year for Türkiye’s energy policies as its main contracts for gas imports from Russia and Iran expire at the end of 2024 and in 2026. Thus, this year Ankara will make decisions on its future natural gas supplier mix. Türkiye’s Sakarya gas field is also ramping up over 2024.

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Ali Hajizade

March 7, 2024

Türkiye’s relations with Azerbaijan have always been the closest of its ties with Turkic states, for reasons of geographic and cultural proximity. Still, the relationship has developed significantly in recent years. Energy and military cooperation remain the main fields of the relationship, which leaders in both countries define as one of “one nation, two states.” Azerbaijan plays a key role in supplying Türkiye with natural gas, while Türkiye serves as Azerbaijan’s gateway for energy exports to European markets. In the field of military cooperation, the two countries have progressed to the building of an alliance and mutual defense treaty, making Azerbaijan the first post-Soviet states to enjoy a defense treaty with a NATO member.

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