By Suren Sargsyan 

The U.S.–Iran conflict, along with repeated failed negotiations, shows no clear path to resolution, and its future trajectory, consequences, and broader implications remain uncertain. Although a substantial body of research and commentary seeks to forecast developments in the Middle East, there is limited analysis of how this conflict may affect the South Caucasus, particularly in terms of future U.S. engagement in the region and the prospects of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project. From Tehran’s perspective, TRIPP may constitute a legitimate target, as it conflicts directly with Iranian interests. It is therefore essential to assess the risks that the Iran–U.S./Israel conflict poses to the TRIPP project.

BACKGROUND:

A defining feature of the Trump administration, distinguishing it from its predecessors, is a marked increase in U.S. engagement with the South Caucasus. This was demonstrated by the approval of the TRIPP project and the announcement of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan under U.S. mediation. However, U.S. involvement in the region clearly extends beyond relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan alone.

The implementation of TRIPP also aligns with broader U.S. regional interests, particularly in terms of isolating Iran. Currently, Azerbaijan’s shortest direct land connection to its exclave, Nakhichevan, runs through Iranian territory. If implemented, TRIPP would enable Azerbaijan to reduce its reliance on Iran by providing an alternative route. Such a development would also diminish Iran’s importance for Armenia, making Yerevan less dependent on the Iran–Armenia border, especially if accompanied by substantive progress in Armenia–Turkey relations, a goal the U.S. has supported since the George H. W. Bush administration.

Therefore, TRIPP should not be understood merely as a mechanism for regulating Armenian–Azerbaijani relations through the establishment of direct connectivity between the two states. Rather, it should be viewed as a broader geopolitical project, which will among other outcomes diminish the strategic significance of Iran for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly by reducing their reliance on shared borders and transit routes through Iranian territory.

IMPLICATIONS:

Since the outbreak of the war, the United States and Israel have targeted not only Iranian military assets but also infrastructure of major strategic importance. Iran has incurred substantial losses, including damage to its naval capabilities, the elimination of senior political and military figures, and significant economic disruption. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has further imposed considerable costs on the Iranian economy. In response, Iran has launched missile strikes not only against Israel but also against U.S. military bases within its operational range, despite these bases being located on the sovereign territory of states that have not formally joined the anti-Iran coalition.

Moreover, Iran has expanded its targeting beyond U.S. military installations in neighboring states to include economic infrastructure linked, directly or indirectly, to U.S. interests. From Iran’s perspective, there appear to be few meaningful geographical constraints. Rather, its strategy is to impose maximum costs not only through direct confrontation but also by targeting U.S.-associated economic projects and interests across the region and its immediate periphery. 

From this perspective, the TRIPP project could also emerge as a potential target. As a major infrastructure initiative involving significant U.S. investment and the presence of U.S. security personnel, it carries clear strategic implications. Therefore, if tensions persist over an extended period and the conflict’s geographical scope expands, it cannot be excluded that this transportation corridor may eventually be targeted by Iran, despite Tehran’s relatively cooperative relations with Armenia.

This risk is underscored by reports of Iranian drones appearing over Azerbaijani territory, developments that have already provoked strong reactions. Although Iran denied these allegations, the incident nevertheless generated significant strain in bilateral relations and may be interpreted as a signal. There is no guarantee that Iran would refrain from deploying drones in the area, conducting limited troop movements, or undertaking other preventive or deterrent measures against the TRIPP project. Such a scenario becomes more plausible if tensions persist, hostilities intensify, and U.S. forces begin targeting Iranian infrastructure that has thus far remained largely intact, including power grids, transportation networks, and other critical facilities.

At the same time, it should be noted that there is currently no official information regarding the status of the project’s construction, at least on Armenian territory, where it is reportedly financed by the U.S. government. Although Armenia’s Foreign Minister has indicated that the intensity of Armenian–U.S. contacts concerning the project has not diminished, he has not addressed the timeline for the implementation of construction activities.

Even a single strike on this corridor would likely make potential investors and commercial actors significantly more cautious about using it for cargo transportation or committing to further infrastructure investments, given the associated security risks. Although detailed data on the expenditures of Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with U.S. contributions, remain unavailable, it is evident that the project entails substantial costs for both countries, even if only part of the planned infrastructure has been completed to date.

Moreover, if the war does not produce a significant systemic transformation in Iran’s regime, an outcome that currently appears unlikely, the project may remain a long-term potential target for Tehran, as it represents a form of U.S. presence in close proximity to the Iranian border. Under such conditions, it would be difficult for Armenia and Azerbaijan to advance the U.S.-mediated peace agenda in the absence of the project’s implementation, as the failure of one of its key components would raise uncertainty about the viability of the broader framework.

CONCLUSIONS:

At present, it is difficult to determine how long the war and/or negotiations with Iran will continue or what their eventual outcome will be. Statements from the Trump administration suggest that a clear strategy or exit plan has yet to be fully articulated. Nevertheless, it is essential to consider Iran’s likely post-war approach toward U.S. economic projects in its immediate vicinity. On the one hand, if the U.S. and Iran reach a peace agreement, the significance of the TRIPP project could be fundamentally transformed, with its purpose and structure potentially redefined, possibly even allowing for Iran’s participation.

On the other hand, if tensions between the United States and Iran remain elevated even after the cessation of active hostilities, Tehran may come to view TRIPP as a legitimate target and act accordingly. In this sense, whereas the project’s future previously depended largely on U.S. policy, it is now also contingent on Iran’s strategic priorities, policy choices, and perceptions of regional dynamics.

Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities have several options to reassure Tehran that the project cannot serve as a basis for a U.S. strategic or military presence in the South Caucasus, nor be used offensively against Iran. Despite relatively stable relations with both Yerevan and Baku, Tehran may still perceive the initiative as a threat to its core strategic interests and border security. In this context, Iran could find a receptive partner in Moscow, which has also expressed skepticism toward the project. At present, however, the implementation timeline has effectively been suspended, with all stakeholders awaiting either stabilization or further escalation.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

By Saima Afzal

The escalation of conflict in the Middle East following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran is exposing the geopolitical vulnerability of Central Asia’s trade diversification strategy. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have invested significant political and financial capital in developing alternative transit corridors including southbound routes through Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to reduce reliance on northern pathways historically oriented toward Russia and to secure access to global maritime markets.
The current crisis is rapidly testing their underlying assumptions. Instability across key transit regions now threatens emerging logistics networks, raising concerns about the reliability of corridors that were intended to enhance economic resilience.

BACKGROUND:

The latest escalation in the Middle East is reverberating well beyond the immediate theatre of conflict, disrupting energy markets, trade routes, and regional economic planning. Oil prices rose sharply following strikes on Iran and subsequent retaliation, reviving concerns about disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery through which a significant share of global oil supplies transits daily. For energy-importing economies across Asia, the shock echoes earlier inflationary pressures experienced during previous geopolitical crises.

For Central Asia, the effects are both systemic and immediate. As landlocked economies, states such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have long prioritized the diversification of trade routes as a strategic objective. This has involved developing southbound connectivity through Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, alongside east–west alternatives linking the region to China and Europe.

Iran has played a central role in these plans, offering access to maritime trade via ports such as Chabahar within the framework of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Regional initiatives such as the proposed Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway have likewise aimed to provide direct access to Pakistani ports and shorten transit times to global markets.

These initiatives were conceived well before the current crisis. What the escalation has done is bring into sharper focus the extent to which their viability depends on political stability across multiple transit regions.

At the same time, the conflict is already producing tangible disruptions. Airspace closures and security risks have forced flight cancellations and rerouting, reduced cargo capacity and raising transport costs. Border crossings that serve as key trade arteries are also under pressure, with increased congestion and tighter controls affecting both freight and passenger movement.

In several cases, these disruptions intersect directly with everyday economic activity. Iran’s temporary suspension of selected exports and interruptions in cross-border trade have affected the flow of food and consumer goods into neighbouring Central Asian markets, particularly in countries with strong import dependence. Localized shortages and price increases have already been reported in border regions reliant on Iranian supplies.

IMPLICATIONS:

The unfolding conflicts across Iran and the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor highlight a structural feature of Central Asia’s connectivity strategy: diversification reduces dependence on any single route, but it also distributes exposure across multiple geopolitical environments.

Southern corridors illustrate this dynamic most clearly under current conditions. Routes passing through Iran now face heightened uncertainty linked to maritime disruption, rising insurance costs, and sanctions-related risks. Even without a formal closure of the Strait of Hormuz, security concerns have slowed tanker traffic and increased freight premiums, costs that are disproportionately borne by landlocked economies.

Overland connectivity through Afghanistan and Pakistan remains constrained by persistent insecurity and fragile political relations. Escalating tensions between Kabul and Islamabad further complicate both the implementation and long-term reliability of projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway. Existing road and rail links are vulnerable to disruption, while transit agreements risk suspension under political pressure, creating uncertainty for trade flows.

Energy and infrastructure initiatives are similarly affected. Projects such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline and the CASA-1000 electricity transmission line depend on stable transit conditions across regions that continue to experience volatility. These risks are not new, but they are in the current environment becoming more acute and more difficult for investors and policymakers to discount.

Beyond infrastructure, the economic transmission mechanisms are already visible. Rising fuel prices are feeding into inflation across import-dependent economies such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, increasing the cost of food, transport, and basic goods. Disruptions to supply chains-particularly for agricultural products and consumer goods imported via Iran are compounding these pressures. At the same time, any slowdown in major partner economies such as Russia or China would have secondary effects through trade, investment flows, and remittances.

Rather than triggering a shift in strategy, the crisis is reinforcing an existing trend toward hedging. Central Asian states are likely to deepen engagement with alternative corridors perceived as comparatively stable. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, linking the region to Europe via the South Caucasus, has gained prominence as an east-west option that avoids both Russian territory and southern conflict zones. Similarly, established rail connections to China provide access to global supply chains through more predictable logistical networks.

This does not signal a retreat from southern connectivity. Instead, it reflects a growing emphasis on redundancy-maintaining multiple routes to manage disruption rather than relying on any single corridor to deliver uninterrupted access.

CONCLUSIONS:

At the core of this challenge is a structural dilemma: while diversification reduces dependence on any single route, it also distributes exposure across multiple geopolitical environments. As a result, Central Asia’s broader transport strategy is increasingly shaped not only by infrastructure development, but by the political and security dynamics of regions far beyond its borders. The current Middle East conflict underscores the extent to which this impacts Central Asia’s economic integration. Connectivity initiatives designed to expand access to global markets are now being evaluated through the lens of geopolitical risk and operational resilience.

The immediate impact is not the abandonment of diversification strategies, but their recalibration. Policymakers are increasingly approaching connectivity not only as an economic objective, but also as a risk management tool, placing greater emphasis on flexibility, redundancy, and continuous reassessment of external exposure.

At the same time, the crisis highlights how quickly geopolitical shocks translate into everyday economic pressures-from rising food and fuel prices to disrupted transport links and constrained trade flows. Even without direct involvement in the conflict, Central Asian states are already absorbing its effects.

Ultimately, the resilience of Central Asia’s trade ambitions will depend not only on infrastructure investment, but on the capacity to navigate an increasingly complex and unpredictable geopolitical environment.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Saima Afzal is an independent and freelance researcher specializing in South Asian security, counter-terrorism, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pacific region. Her work focuses on geopolitical developments, strategic affairs, and regional conflict dynamics. She holds an M. Phil in Peace and Conflict Studies from the National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Inal Sherip

April 3, 2025

Ramzan Kadyrov's transformation from a stalwart defender of Russia's policy of support for traditional Islam in the North Caucasus to an increasingly independent actor with divided loyalties represents a significant threat to Russia's regional security strategy. This shift, marked by his growing ties to Gulf monarchies and subtle adoption of the very religious practices he once opposed, signals a critical juncture in Russia's decades-long approach to managing Islamic influence in its southern territories.

Read Kadyrov and the Middle East: Threats to Russia's Strategy (PDF)

 By Tristan Kenderdine

July 17, 2018, the CACI Analyst

A strategic deployment of trade corridors is taking shape across Afghanistan and Iran as both India and China subvert each other’s trade strategies through key geoeconomic states. Afghanistan’s land corridor to Chabahar port connects it to India by sea, creating a Persian-Gulf to Caspian Sea corridor, while the Afghan air corridor to India provides a parallel, more direct trade route. By contrast, China’s twin economic corridors in the region run perpendicular: north-south through Pakistan to the Gulf, and east-west through Iran to Istanbul. Pakistan’s Gwadar and Iran’s Chabahar are thus effectively in the same geopolitical node, connecting very different Great Game trade strategies.

 By Stephen Blank

January 25, 2018, the CACI Analyst

On December 5, 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that all the key issues regarding the delimitation of the Caspian Sea had been resolved and that a treaty was being prepared for heads of state to sign in 2018 in Astana. Yet less optimistic statements from the other parties, particularly Iran, suggest that Lavrov’s assessment was premature. If Russia and Iran can nevertheless reconcile their differences on the demarcation of the Caspian, this would have important strategic consequences not only for the littoral states, but also for the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.