By Irakli Kiknavelidze and Tomáš Baranec

Ilia II of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GeOC) died on 17 March. Over nearly five decades, he consolidated the Church’s position as one of Georgia’s most influential and trusted institutions. His tenure was characterized by a dominant patriarchate, a relatively constrained Holy Synod, and a cautious approach to partisan politics and foreign policy alignment. The accession of Shio III marks the beginning of a new era for the GeOC, bringing expectations of a redefined balance between the patriarch and the synod, as well as potential consequences arising from the Church’s increased engagement in domestic and international politics.

BACKGROUND:

Under the 1995 Statute of Administration of the GeOC, the Holy Synod plays the central role in the election of the Patriarch. It is responsible for nominating three candidates and is the only body granted voting rights within the Extended Council, which selects the final candidate. All other participants, unlike under the pre-1995 system, serve solely in an advisory capacity.

Ideologically, the Holy Synod can currently be divided into three principal blocs. The conservative bloc is characterised by a dogmatic stance on cultural and ethical issues, scepticism towards Western integration, and, to varying degrees, openness to cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).

The national-conservative bloc often adopts an even more dogmatic position on cultural and ethical issues than the conservative bloc, while remaining strongly anti-Russian. Consequently, it is particularly sceptical of both the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and Georgia’s integration with Western institutions.

The liberal bloc, the smallest of the three, advocates more moderate positions on socio-ethical issues and is broadly supportive of Georgia’s political integration with Western institutions.

A heterogeneous yet numerically significant group within the Holy Synod consists of centrists, whose members are generally less ideologically committed and more pragmatic in their outlook than those belonging to the principal ideological blocs.

At its session on April 28, the Holy Synod nominated three candidates for the patriarchate, broadly reflecting the three principal ideological currents within the Church. Metropolitan Shio Mujiri, backed by the conservative wing, received 20 votes. The national-conservative bloc nominated Iob Akiashvili, who secured 7 votes, while the liberal wing put forward Grigol Berbichashvili, who also received 7 votes.

In the final vote held on 11 May, Metropolitan Shio Mujiri was elected head of the GeOC with 22 votes. Metropolitan Iob received nine votes, while Metropolitan Grigol secured seven. Mujiri was enthroned the following day, assuming the title Shio III.

IMPLICATIONS:

As one of the few senior figures within the GeOC to have received theological education in Russia, Shio has frequently been portrayed in the media as “Moscow’s candidate,” a characterisation openly used by Archbishop Zenon Iarajuli, among others. Critics have also pointed to his close relationship with Georgia’s ruling party. In contrast, Patriarch Ilia II maintained close ties with the Georgian state as an institution while generally avoiding overt alignment with any particular political party.

The accession of Shio III can be regarded as a significant success for the ROC, particularly with respect to the question of recognising the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which is a fully independent, autocephalous national church. Both of Shio’s rivals, Iob and Grigol, stated that they would support recognition of the OCU’s independence if elected. Shio, by contrast, avoided taking a public position on the issue during the election process. Given his longstanding ties to the ROC, it appears unlikely that he will endorse recognition of the OCU and will instead support the Moscow-affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). As a result, the ROC can expect continued support from the GeOC on an issue of major strategic importance to Moscow, potentially for decades to come.

To an extent that remains uncertain, Shio’s accession is also likely to ensure the continuation of relatively close relations between the two Churches and to preserve a degree of ROC influence within the GeOC, at least intellectually and ideologically. 

Compared with Ilia II, the new Patriarch’s initial public statements and appearances indicate that he may adopt a more uncompromisingly conservative stance, which will be difficult to reconcile with Georgia’s integration with Western institutions.

In this way, Shio may contribute to the strengthening of anti-Western attitudes among segments of the Georgian population. Such a development would align with Russia’s broader geopolitical interests while simultaneously reinforcing the legitimacy of the ruling Georgian Dream party among parts of its domestic constituency.

Even before his accession, Shio departed from Ilia II’s principle of supporting state institutions rather than specific political parties. Moreover, unlike Ilia II, Shio III is likely to enter his relationship with Bidzina Ivanishvili, the de facto leader of the ruling party, as a junior partner, at least initially.

An important factor in assessing the outlook of the new Patriarch is his background as a black (monastic) priest. Orthodox monasticism has traditionally been closer to the ROC (which is based on monasticism) than to the Greek Orthodox Church, which relies more heavily on white (married parish) clergy. As a result, Shio’s affinity with the Russian Orthodox world extends beyond his education in Russia. Whereas Ilia II’s faith was based on "Georgian Orthodoxy;" a faith with regard to the interests of the state, Shio III emphasizes Orthodoxy as a superior and supranational religious identity.

Shio III’s ties to Russia and support for the government appear to stem from deeply held personal convictions rather than political expediency. Consequently, a significant shift in these positions during his patriarchate is unlikely.

Nevertheless, the impact of Shio’s enthronement is likely to remain limited, at least during the initial years of his patriarchate. The fact that, after the first round of voting, when his victory had become virtually certain, there was no significant shift of centrist support in his favour (his tally increased by only two votes) suggests that members of the Holy Synod are not subservient to the new Patriarch and are prepared to oppose him if necessary.

Shio III has yet to display the political acumen that characterised Ilia II. His leadership is constrained by dogmatism and introversion, although he has shown an ability to rely on politically skilled allies and possesses some political instinct. The first major challenges of his patriarchate will reveal which of these traits proves more influential.

The GeOC will soon face several important internal challenges, including the appointment of seven vacant episcopal positions and the reform of the 1995 Statute of Administration. While there is broad agreement within the Holy Synod that the current statute requires revision, opinions differ sharply regarding its replacement. In addition, some bishops are actively advocating for the Church to publicly call for the release of political prisoners.

None of these issues falls within Shio III’s formal authority to decide unilaterally. To advance his preferred policies, he will need to secure the support of the Holy Synod. His handling of these challenges will provide an indication of his ability to shape the Church in accordance with his worldview.

CONCLUSIONS:

If Shio III consolidates his position, he could enable greater Russian influence within the GeOC and bolster the legitimacy of Georgian Dream among conservative voters. In the long term, however, this may weaken the Church’s broader social authority and deepen political polarization in Georgia.

In an alternative scenario, the Holy Synod could gain influence at the expense of the Patriarch. Even so, a major shift in the Church’s domestic or foreign policy positions is unlikely, as the recent patriarchal election demonstrated the continued dominance of the conservative wing within the Synod.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Tomáš Baranec is a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He worked for several years as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague. 

Irakli Kiknavelidze is a Georgian journalist, television host, political commentator, and media professional specializing in Georgian politics, democracy, religion, and South Caucasus affairs. He has worked in television, print, and digital media, producing interviews, analysis, and public affairs programming. Throughout his career, Kiknavelidze has focused on political developments, international relations, and the intersection of religion and public life in Georgia.

By David Dondua

The August 2008 Russo-Georgian war achieved less than Moscow had hoped. Russia seized 18 per cent of the country's territory, areas it had already controlled since the early 1990s, but failed to alter Georgia's strategic direction. What military force could not achieve, Moscow pursued through other means — disinformation, economic leverage, elite capture, and a sustained cognitive campaign targeting Georgian society's deepest cultural anxieties. Over the following decade and a half, these tools proved far more effective than tanks. Yet Moscow's campaign found the ground partly prepared for it. Western partners, through a series of miscalculations, inadvertently made the cognitive campaign easier to wage. Understanding what went wrong and why is essential not only for Georgia's future but also for every country facing Russian hybrid warfare.

Read How Russia Won the Hybrid War in Georgia

By Giorgi Gvalia and Ivane Lomidze

Georgia’s foreign policy thinking is undergoing a notable shift. For much of the past two decades, the country’s strategic discourse was framed by democratic alignment and Euro-Atlantic integration. Today, however, the rhetoric of the ruling elite increasingly reflects a geopolitical logic, emphasizing survival, insecurity, and strategic calculation over value-based commitments. This shift is understandable for a small state operating in a highly vulnerable security environment. Yet the emerging approach also reveals an important limitation. While focused on avoiding risks vis-à-vis Russia, Georgia’s leadership gives insufficient attention to the equally important need to preserve and balance relations with Western partners that remain essential to Georgia’s long-term security, prosperity, and independence.

 Photo by Czerep rubaszny, 2020

BACKGROUND:

Georgia’s foreign policy has long been associated with a clear strategic orientation toward Europe and the transatlantic community. For years, the dominant language of Georgian statecraft emphasized democratic reform, integration with Western institutions, and a value-based foreign policy identity. That discourse has not disappeared entirely, but it is no longer the main organizing principle of the ruling elite’s public messaging. Especially since Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, senior representatives of ruling Georgian Dream party have described foreign policy in much starker terms: the state must avoid steps that could trigger retaliation from Russia and must calibrate every decision with extreme caution.

This shift is rooted in Georgia’s hard security environment. Russia still occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia and remains the overwhelmingly dominant military power in the region. The memory of the 2008 war continues to shape official thinking in Tbilisi, especially the lesson that strong Western political backing does not automatically translate into direct security protection. Against that background, the government has argued that Georgia cannot afford symbolic gestures that carry unclear benefits but potentially serious costs.

That logic was most clearly visible in the government’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Georgian officials have maintained that the country has cooperated with international efforts to prevent sanctions circumvention, but they have resisted taking additional unilateral steps that could be interpreted by Moscow as escalation. From the government’s perspective, such caution is not ideological sympathy for Russia but a practical response to Georgia’s exposed position. The argument is simple: a small country with occupied territories, no formal security guarantees, and limited means of self-defense should avoid unnecessary confrontation with a stronger and hostile neighbor.

This position has domestic resonance. Many Georgians remain deeply pro-Western, but there is also broad public sensitivity to the risks of war and instability. The government has used that sentiment to justify a foreign policy of restraint, presenting itself as the actor most capable of keeping Georgia out of the wider regional conflicts. In that sense, Georgian Dream’s message is not only strategic but political: it links restraint abroad to stability at home. The result is a more defensive and geopolitical foreign policy vocabulary than the one that dominated Georgian politics in the previous decades.

IMPLICATIONS:

The problem with Georgia’s current course is not that it recognizes geopolitical reality. Any rational Georgian foreign policy must take account of Russian power and the risks of direct confrontation. The problem, rather, is that the government appears to treat this as its overriding strategic priority, while underestimating the cost of alienating the Western partners that help Georgia offset its structural weakness. For small states, survival cannot be reduced to managing immediate threats alone. It also requires maintaining the external relationships that expand their room for maneuver and reduce the risk of abandonment.

Any viable national strategy must therefore be assessed along two dimensions simultaneously: whether it mitigates immediate threats and whether it preserves the external relationships on which long-term autonomy and resilience depend. In practice, this requires small states to reduce risks while sustaining partnerships that provide economic, political, and – over time – security support. However, recent developments suggest that Georgia’s current strategy has managed only one side of this equation. In other words, the government’s strategy appears to have minimized certain risks while simultaneously generating others. By prioritizing the avoidance of confrontation with Russia, Georgian Dream has struggled to maintain the political trust and strategic confidence of its Western partners.

Over the past years, Georgia’s relations with the West have deteriorated significantly. This trend has become increasingly visible in tensions surrounding Georgia’s EU candidacy process, the controversy over the “foreign agents” law, and growing Western criticism of the country’s political trajectory. Government officials have largely attributed this deterioration to Western pressure – particularly from the EU – for Georgia to adopt a harder line against Russia, including the imposition of unilateral sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine. However, that explanation is incomplete. Disagreements over sanctions policy alone do not account for the depth of mistrust that has emerged. Even where Tbilisi may have had legitimate reasons to resist certain Western demands, such differences could likely have been managed more effectively through sustained political engagement and clearer strategic communication. So far, Georgian Dream has not convincingly demonstrated that it has invested sufficient diplomatic effort in explaining Georgia’s security concerns to its Western partners while maintaining their confidence in the country’s broader strategic direction.

This matters because, for Georgia, relations with the West are not just symbolic. The EU remains central to Georgia’s trade, institutional modernization, and broader economic orientation. The U.S. has played a major role in strengthening Georgia’s state institutions and defense capacity. These links are not simply a matter of identity or values; they are practical assets that increase Georgia’s room for maneuver in a difficult neighborhood. If those relationships weaken, Georgia does not become more secure or more autonomous. It becomes more exposed.

The costs could rise further as the regional environment changes. Georgian policymakers have sought to position the country as a key corridor between Europe and Asia, especially through transit and connectivity projects crossing the South Caucasus. But Georgia’s geographic importance should not be taken for granted. Progress in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process and the discussion of alternative transport routes could gradually reduce Georgia’s comparative advantage as a regional connector. If Georgia’s strategic value becomes less automatic, the quality of its political ties with Western actors will matter even more.

For Georgia, geopolitical thinking remains unavoidable. Geography and power asymmetries ensure that any responsible foreign policy must account for the risks posed by Russia. The real challenge, however, is how to apply that thinking in a way that manages immediate security threats while preserving the partnerships that remain essential for Georgia’s long-term prosperity and independence. For a small state caught between powerful neighbors and strategic partners, the art of survival lies precisely in maintaining that balance.

CONCLUSIONS:

Georgia’s foreign policy is entering a new phase defined less by idealistic rhetoric and more by the language of risk, constraint, and survival. That adjustment is understandable. Russia’s military presence on Georgian territory and the wider regional security climate leave little room for carelessness. But this approach, if applied too narrowly, can ultimately undermine its own objectives.

It is sensible to avoid policies that would impose immediate and disproportionate costs on the state. However, such caution is insufficient if it rests on the assumption that prudence vis-à-vis Russia alone can secure Georgia’s future. Over the longer term, the country’s sovereignty and prosperity remain closely tied to the preservation of robust relations with the West. If Tbilisi cannot preserve those ties while managing Russian pressure, it will trade one form of vulnerability for another. For Georgia, the central challenge of statecraft lies not merely in avoiding conflict in the present, but in doing so without eroding the external partnerships upon which its future security and development depend.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Giorgi Gvalia is Professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, specializing in small-state foreign policy, Realist IR theory, and South Caucasus geopolitics. Ivane Lomidze is Associate Professor of Sociology at Ilia State University, whose work focuses on the normative and theoretical foundations of political realism.

By Giorgi Tsikolia

In 2025, Georgia’s information technology sector generated $1.15 billion in export revenue—a 67 percent increase year-on-year and more than a thirteen-fold rise from the sector’s 2017 baseline.[1] This paper traces the policy, diplomatic, and private-sector decisions that produced that outcome. It then examines three constraints—labor market restrictions on foreign workers, the absence of government as a technology customer, and Georgia’s exclusion from U.S.-led AI infrastructure investment—that directly affect whether the sector’s growth continues.

Read Georgia’s Technology Export Sector

By Tomáš Baranec and Giorgi Khishtovani

Long-term rapid GDP growth is one of the pillars on which the Georgian government builds its legitimacy amid social and political instability following the October 2024 parliamentary elections. The numbers seemingly confirm the government’s argument. Georgia's GDP growth was 7.8 percent in 2023 and 9.7 percent in 2024. In 2025, overall growth is expected at 7.5 percent and International financial institutionsexpect GDP growth at 5-5.5 percent for 2026. The growth of recent years, however, was driven by several temporary and random factors rather than structural reforms. Numerous indicators suggest that growth in 2025 was artificially inflated and that the Georgian economy is in fact entering a turbulent phase.

BACKGROUND:

Georgia’s high GDP growth after 2020 was driven by three primary and two secondary factors. The first, most short-term, primary factor was natural growth after a sharp decline during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. After a contraction caused by the pandemic in 2020, when GDP fell by 6.3 percent, GDP grew by 10.6 percent the following year. The economy grew rapidly, primarily due to the fading of the initial shock from the pandemic and adaptation of the labour market and supply chains to the new pandemic reality.

While the effect of adaptation to the pandemic gradually faded, two other strong primary factors of GDP growth emerged, both associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the spring of 2022. These were the mass arrival of Russian citizens and the opening of a transport corridor for sanctioned goods to Russia via Georgia. Following 2022, more than 80,000 Russian citizens settled in Georgia, mostly IT professionals, small businesspeople, and other members of higher-income groups. Their arrival stimulated overall demand, particularly growth in housing prices and development of the construction and IT sectors. In addition, Russian capital in the form of deposits from Russian citizens began flowing into Georgian banks in large quantities in 2022.

After 2022, Georgia became one of several transport corridors for the (re)export of sanctioned goods to Russia. Official statistics indicate Georgia’s role as an export corridor for passenger cars. In 2025, Kyrgyzstan (export from Georgia US$ 1.49 billion) and Kazakhstan (export from Georgia US$ 909 million) became Georgia’s main trading partners, and the main official export destinations for passenger cars from Georgia. The export value of this commodity reached US$ 2.81 billion. Passenger cars were also the largest import item to Georgia with a total value of US$ 3.87 billion. It should be noted that the “Georgian corridor” is partly absent from Kyrgyz and Kazakh statistics. While there is an immense increase of Georgian exports to Asia, the corresponding imports from Georgia are missing in the statistics of these countries. For instance, Kyrgyzstan’s official imports from Georgia are at least ten times lower than exports from Georgia to Kyrgyzstan.

The war in Ukraine also became the impetus for the emergence of two secondary factors of GDP growth in Georgia: foreign students and Russian tourists. Before the war, universities in eastern Ukraine were the main competitors of Georgian universities for international students, especially from India. After the war broke out, large numbers of students instead came to Georgia, increasing by an average of 20 percent year-on-year. In the 2024-2025 academic year, 37,100 international students studied in Georgia, more than double the 17,500 foreign students in Georgian universities in 2021-2022. This factor is an often overlooked yet significant secondary driver of Georgia’s GDP growth over the past few years.

Moreover, unlike many Western countries, Georgia has not banned flights to Russia, thereby stimulating growth in tourism. Russians represented 23.32 percent of total visits to the country in 2025.

Increased state revenues are an additional element that have contributed to strong growth figures and increased government spending in the years 2021-2025. Central government tax revenues rose from US$ 3.5 billion in 2021 to US$ 8.0 billion in 2025, reflecting a 128 percent increase, while state budget appropriations increased from US$ 6.19 billion to 10.3 billion, a 66.3 percent rise.  

IMPLICATIONS:

Several trends indicate that the main drivers of Georgia’s growth have already peaked and are beginning to fade. The economic growth in 2025 was likely inflated mainly by the International Company Status Act adopted in 2020. The Act grants certain types of companies in the IT and maritime sectors the opportunity to qualify for significant tax breaks. The changes adopted in 2020 allow foreign IT companies to register in Georgia, having to pay only a 5 percent corporate tax and 5 percent on employee wages. The ultimate catalyst for growth under the legislation was the arrival of Russian and Belarusian IT experts in 2022. In parallel with this law, the government also introduced simplified permanent residence for employees in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector in 2025.

In the third quarter of 2025, the ICT sector grew by 21.1 percent; in the second quarter of 2025, by 37.1 percent; and in the first quarter of 2025, by 28.6 percent. In the third quarter of 2025, the sector reached 7.4 percent of the country’s GDP, from only 3 percent in 2020. While the state’s revenues from this scheme are rather insignificant, it does contribute to inflating growth statistics.

At the same time, almost all sectors relevant to the real economy and the state budget recorded a decrease in growth or a decline in the third quarter of 2025: energy (-3.3 percent), agriculture (-5.4 percent), construction (0.2 percent), trade (+3 percent) and manufacturing (+2,5 percent).

Other trends also contribute to the slowdown of the real Georgian economy. The number of people employed in the Georgian economy has decreased (most probably due to emigration) in the third quarter of 2025. Meanwhile, growth rates of imports are decreasing as compared to 2024. 

While state budget revenues increased by approximately 25 percent in 2024, they increased by only 10 percent in 2025, with 4 percent offset by current inflation. These trends contradict the estimated 2025 GDP growth rate.

The Georgian economy’s growth was not only an important PR tool for the Georgian government but also a practical means for maintaining its public support in the critical years of 2024 and 2025.

During its time in power, Georgian Dream has created a self-dependent layer of civil servants and citizens receiving various social benefits. Over the past two years, the ruling party has further strengthened their loyalty by increasing salaries and benefits. This was permitted by strong economic figures in 2022-2024. After 2025, Georgian Dream is starting to run short of resources to continue buying the support of these groups.

Most probably, the Georgian government is aware of the real slowdown in economic growth and the threats it poses to its legitimacy. It is currently taking several steps to address this threat. In the summer of 2025, the National Bank of Georgia managed to restore its dollar reserves to the same level as in 2024, before it started to sharply sell US$. 

Keeping a stable currency is one of Georgian Dream’s main priorities. The government has also become more careful in spending budgetary funds in comparison to previous years, and is actively building a financial reserve to limit the impact of slowing economic growth.

Georgian Dream’s ability to prepare for a period of economic turbulence will depend on several factors. These factors cannot currently be estimated accurately, however, the duration of Western sanctions against Russia stands out among the most relevant. Maintaining Georgia’s relevance as a transport corridor to Russia would significantly help Tbilisi weather the upcoming economic turbulence. On the other hand, a quick resolution of the conflict in Ukraine and the restoration of trade relations between Moscow and the West could, indirectly but significantly, weaken Georgian Dream’s position.

CONCLUSIONS:

The slowdown in the Georgian economy’s real growth will likely be the next big challenge for the ruling Georgian Dream party in the coming years, following the protest year of 2025. Unlike the mass protests, a significant deterioration in the population’s socio-economic situation could undermine support for the ruling party, even among its core electorate. Several current government actions indicate that Georgia’s de facto leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, is aware of this threat and is taking steps to maintain the government’s capacity to support the existing social system. However, several key factors in this direction are shaped by other actors and trends and depend only marginally on the actions of the Georgian government. Of these, an end to the war in Ukraine could have the most severe negative impact. Moreover, the data accounted for here precedes the recent outbreak of war in Iran. The fallout from the conflict adds uncertainty to an already precarious economic situation in Georgia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Tomáš Baranec is a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He currently works as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague. Giorgi Khishtovani is a Full Professor and Head of the Department of Finance at Ilia State University (Georgia). He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Bremen (Germany), an MSc in Business Administration, and an LLM in Law from the University of Trier (Germany). His research focuses on political economy, governance, economic and fiscal policy.