By Suren Sargsyan

On November 17, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Alison Hooker visited Yerevan and Baku to promote the U.S. president’s vision of regional peace and security. During the visit, she discussed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project with the leadership of both countries. On November 18, Jonathan Asconas, Senior Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, visited Georgia to discuss the country’s possible participation in TRIPP. Beyond the economic implications of the route, these steps indicate an evolving regional U.S. approach toward the South Caucasus.

Credit: Diego Delso

BACKGROUND: The announcement regarding the construction of TRIPP and an increased U.S. activity in the South Caucasus has received significant political and analytical attention. However, five months after the announcement, it remains unclear what the timeline for implementation will be and which company will handle its operations. 

The announcement of the TRIPP project and the increase in U.S. activity in the South Caucasus have attracted significant political and analytical attention. However, five months after the announcement, it remains unclear what the implementation timeline will be and which company will be responsible for operating the project.

The central question is whether the U.S. is seeking a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, a goal it has historically avoided, or whether its involvement remains primarily economic and business-oriented. Washington’s previous approaches towards the South Caucasus have fallen short of both a coherent strategy or ambitions to establish a lasting strategic presence in the region. In light of developments over recent months, it is therefore important to assess how U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus is evolving under the revitalized approach of the Trump administration.

TRIPP is primarily a business project, but it also has the potential to develop into a strategic asset by giving Washington a new presence in a region traditionally viewed as Russia’s sphere of influence. While it would first create a commercial foothold, the route could acquire broader strategic importance by connecting Asia and Europe while bypassing both Russia and Iran. The inclusion of pipelines, oil and gas corridors, and railway links would also allow Central Asian energy resources to reach Europe through the Caspian Sea, fully circumventing Russian territory.

On December 17, 2025, the Armenia–U.S. Bilateral Working Group, established to support the outcomes of the August 8, 2025, Peace Summit, held its inaugural meeting. 

IMPLICATIONS: To establish lasting influence in the South Caucasus, a global power must exert leverage over at least two of the region’s three states. At present, no external actor meets this condition, unlike Russia, which for years maintained decisive influence by using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to exert control over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict-based dependence shaped their political priorities, foreign policy orientations, and economic choices, while also preventing the development of effective regional cooperation mechanisms.

Russia deliberately relied on the continuation of conflict as a tool of influence, a well-established method of maintaining strategic presence. When conflicts end, however, influence weakens and a vacuum emerges, which is often filled by another power. By contrast, the U.S. is seeking influence through the promotion of peace, economic development, and mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, presenting itself as an arbiter seeking to maintain long-term engagement in the region. The possible inclusion of Georgia in discussions on TRIPP further increases the strategic importance of this approach.

While Moscow relied on managed instability, Washington is investing in regional consolidation based on shared economic interests. This approach inevitably conflicts with the interests of states that oppose both TRIPP and the expansion of U.S. influence. Given the deep historical, institutional, and economic links between the South Caucasus and Central Asia, through organizations such as the EAEU, CSTO, CIS, and the Organization of Turkic States, any change in the balance of influence in one region will directly affect the other.

Within this broader framework, the Trump administration has sought to extend the Abraham Accords beyond their original Middle Eastern context. By including economically important, Muslim-majority but secular states such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, both of which already have strong relations with Israel, the aim is not normalization, but the institutionalization of cooperation. This approach represents another U.S.-led multilateral mechanism designed to promote regional prosperity while expanding long-term strategic influence.

Judging from recent practical developments, it becomes clear that current U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus is growing more complex and nuanced. On November 30, 2024, the U.S. suspended its strategic partnership agreement with Georgia, a document it had been the first among South Caucasus states to sign in 2009. Shortly thereafter, in the final days of the Biden administration, the U.S. signed a strategic partnership agreement with Armenia on January 14, 2025. On November 8, 2025, the Trump administration signed a memorandum with Azerbaijan to establish a working group tasked with preparing a strategic partnership agreement. At the same time, President Trump waived Section 907, enabling expanded cooperation between Azerbaijan and the U.S. across a range of areas. 

These steps suggest that the Trump administration is prioritizing a regional approach toward the South Caucasus. In addition, the U.S. provided Armenia with US$ 145 million in assistance as part of the first tranche of funding for the TRIPP project and related agreements reached on August 8. This support is intended to finance investments in trade, infrastructure, critical mineral supply chains, and border security.

As for Georgia, despite tensions in bilateral relations, the country continues to play an important role in U.S. regional policy. Georgia has sought to align itself with Washington’s agenda of promoting peace in the South Caucasus, while also discussing possible participation in the TRIPP project and its implementation. This approach appears to correspond with U.S. expectations, as Washington moves toward deeper engagement with Georgia within this framework.

Current U.S. policy extends beyond the bilateral level and has regional ambitions, seeking to strengthen cooperation with South Caucasus states individually while emphasizing shared regional priorities. 

CONCLUSIONS: Despite the apparent principled agreement of all parties on the route, its timeline for implementation and the duration of the process remain unclear. If realized, the route would give the U.S. a unique opportunity to establish a presence in the South Caucasus, and this commercial presence could evolve into a strategically significant one, especially if the route’s scale and capacity become significant enough for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the U.S. companies responsible for its operation and security. Whether the U.S. can counter the long-standing influence of Russia and Iran in the region, both of which may view the project as undermining their interests, will depend on the consistency of the Trump administration’s policy, its sustained commitment, and the broader competition among global actors in the South Caucasus.

According to Armenian authorities, Yerevan and Washington plan to establish a consortium that would act as the main company responsible for constructing and operating the railway. The consortium could also build, manage, and operate pipelines, power transmission lines, and other related infrastructure. In addition to road transport, rail capacity is crucial to sustain the transport of Chinese goods along this route in order to ensure its economic viability and maximize cargo volumes.

From this perspective, overall U.S.–China relations are also critical. As a result, the U.S. faces the compound challenge of promoting peace and stability in the region and limit potential spoilers, while simultaneously improving relations with China and resolving outstanding tariff issues, tasks that pose a particularly difficult test for the Trump administration.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

By Nargiza Umarova

The Islamic Republic of Iran is intensifying its transport diplomacy with Central Asian states, driven by a shared interest in enhancing their competitive positions in transit transport amid the growing importance of east–west and north–south land corridors. Despite international economic sanctions and sustained pressure from the U.S., Iran continues to pursue mutually beneficial partnerships with neighboring countries to consolidate its role as a regional transit hub. This strategy is particularly evident in its promotion to Europe of the Southern Corridor, which involves virtually all Central Asian states, as well as China

BACKGROUND: In recent years, Central Asia has emerged as a focal point in the transformation of Eurasia’s transport architecture, reinforcing momentum for the development of sustainable trade routes through Iran to West and South Asia and to Europe. This trend aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Iran formally joined in 2021 following the signing of a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with Beijing.

China has shown growing interest in operating the southern branch of the New Silk Road, as heightened maritime tensions and the war in Ukraine, which have constrained the Northern Corridor through Russia and Belarus, have compelled Beijing to redirect part of its Europe-bound cargo to continental routes. Central Asia and the South Caucasus provide an alternative through multimodal transport across the Caspian and Black Seas. China is already engaged in trans-Caspian logistics: in 2024, cargo volumes transported from China via the Middle Corridor exceeded 27,000 containers, representing a 25-fold increase compared to 2023. At the same time, Beijing is pursuing the development of the Southern Transit Route for both economic and geopolitical reasons.

The EU is China’s second-largest trading partner. Mutual trade reached US$ 762 billion in 2024 and rose to almost US$ 850 billion in 2025. Given that Chinese exports to the EU are dominated by high-technology goods, Beijing naturally prioritizes containerized transport for overland logistics. From a technical perspective, the transit corridor through Iran is particularly well suited to this purpose. This corridor is expected to become monomodal following the completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the railway line linking Marand in Iran with Cheshmeh Soraya and onward to the Turkish border in the Aralık region. The latter project will eliminate the need for ferry transport across Lake Van in Turkey, which currently constrains the smooth functioning of the Southern Corridor.

In 2025, Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development announced plans to construct nine transit railway corridors with a total length of 17,000 kilometers, at an estimated cost exceeding US$ 10 billion. Upon completion, Iran’s rail network is expected to handle up to 60 million tons of cargo annually. Several of these projects, including the 200-kilometer Marand–Cheshmeh Soraya railway, are aligned with the Southern Railway Corridor and are intended to position it as the shortest trade route between East and West.

IMPLICATIONS: The granting of exclusive rights to the U.S. to develop the Zangezur Corridor, proposed to be named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), is increasingly prompting China to provide tangible support for the Southern Corridor through Iran. A joint venture, the TRIPP Development Company, has been announced, with the U.S. holding a 74 percent stake. Beijing may interpret this initiative as an effort by Washington to gain leverage over freight transport along the Middle Corridor. To mitigate this risk, China requires reliable transport routes that bypass the Caspian Sea.

China is currently constructing the Sarakhs railway terminal on the Turkmenistan–Iran border, a project expected to accelerate container transport along the China–Central Asia–Iran–Turkey–EU and Gulf routes. In August 2025, Iranian authorities reported that more than half of the project had been completed.

Beijing and Tehran have also agreed to electrify a 1,000-kilometre railway section from Sarakhs to Razi on the Turkish border. The project includes the construction of additional track segments, which are expected to triple freight capacity to 15 million tons annually.

Meanwhile, Iran and Turkmenistan plan to lay additional 1,435 mm- and 1,520 mm-gauge tracks between the Sarakhs stations to accelerate freight movement and expand border-crossing capacity. The objective is to raise cross-border freight volumes to 20 million tons annually, including up to 6 million tons transported by rail. Both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the Southern Railway Corridor westward and the Central Asia–Persian Gulf multimodal transport corridor, the latter launched in 2016 under the Ashgabat Agreement by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Oman.

Uzbekistan’s policy of diversifying its trade flows and establishing efficient transport links with global markets has provided significant momentum to the development of the southern branch of the East–West transit corridor. As early as 2022, Tashkent, in cooperation with Ankara, launched freight rail services along the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey route. This corridor, with potential extension to the EU, was presented as the fastest and most efficient option for bilateral export and import deliveries.

Tashkent views the Southern Corridor, whose current capacity is limited to 10 million tons per year for technical and political reasons, as a potential driver of its own economic growth through a significant expansion of transport service exports. This prospect is closely linked to the completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, scheduled for 2030. Once integrated with Iran’s rail network within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s unified transport space, the East Asia–Europe route will be shortened by approximately 900 kilometers, reducing delivery times by seven to eight days. As a result, the Southern Railway Corridor is expected to become the shortest monomodal link between these two economically advanced regions. In parallel, the construction of an international highway connecting China with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is projected to generate additional cargo flows in the Iran–Turkey direction and to support the development of the China–Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU multimodal transit corridor. Pilot implementation of this project is expected in 2026.

At the same time, the China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU and China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU railway corridors are under development. Their advancement is being coordinated through regular consultations among the railway authorities of the six participating countries, with two meetings held in 2025. The first took place in Tehran in May, after which China dispatched its first freight train from Xi’an to Aprin, Iran’s largest dry port, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This route reduces delivery times to approximately 15 days, around half the duration of maritime transport. By the end of 2025, 40 cargo trains had been dispatched from China to Iran, compared to only seven over the previous seven years. The significance of these developments extends beyond China–Iran trade, contributing to broader improvements in transport connectivity between East Asia and Europe.

On August 2, 2025, the heads of the railway companies of Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey held a further round of negotiations in Beijing on the operation of the southern branch of the East–West Corridor. Building on the May meeting, the parties elaborated a preliminary agreement establishing uniform transport tariffs along the China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU railway route, as well as measures to increase freight volumes, including standardized delivery times and simplified procedures.

Central Asian states seek transit through Iran not only to access Turkey and Europe by land, but also to reach the Indian Ocean via Iran’s major southern ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas. In 2023, Uzbekistan announced plans to build a terminal and warehouse facilities at Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar. In 2025, Kazakhstan declared its intention to construct a transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Seaport, part of the Bandar Abbas Port. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan likewise attach high priority to transport cooperation with Tehran and are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure via Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These developments reflect the accelerated expansion of multimodal transport corridors along the north–south axis and the growing importance of Central Asia in global logistics.

CONCLUSIONS: Amid ongoing transformations in Central Asia’s logistics landscape, cooperation between the region’s states and Iran, whose geography provides ocean access and a diversified transport infrastructure ranging from highways to major seaports, is becoming increasingly critical. Despite international sanctions, the five Central Asian republics have adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach toward Iran, using transport diplomacy to strengthen their transit capacities. The key challenge ahead is the collective resolution of bottlenecks along the Southern Transit Corridor. This will require harmonization of transport policies and legislation, technical and technological standards, the adoption of unified transport documentation, and the establishment of a coordinating body to align the activities of the railway administrations along the route. 

It is equally critical to develop a consolidated approach to the conflict-generating situation in Iran, which poses a serious threat to the prospects of regional transport projects. In this context, Central Asian states should clearly define and defend their interests vis-à-vis Western partners, including the U.S., by seeking favorable conditions for promoting trans-Iranian routes.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Anna Gevorgyan

The foreign and security architecture of Armenia has been largely shaped by the transformations of the role and capacity of regional actors after the 2020 Second Karabakh War. Russia’s continuing weakness due to its invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s growing role in the region, and Iran’s increasing vulnerability due to security challenges and economic crisis have been the key drivers shaping regional developments. At the global level, the US's growing interest in involvement in regional affairs has become another important feature in Armenia’s future.

Read Crossroads of Uncertainty

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

The U.S.-brokered peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, culminating in the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), have triggered a sharp strategic reaction from Iran. The 20-mile corridor through Zangezur grants Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhchivan under long-term U.S. management, reshaping regional connectivity and bypassing Iran. Tehran perceives the initiative as a U.S. encroachment on its northern frontier, eroding its leverage in the South Caucasus. The muted Russian response and Armenia’s growing openness to Western—and potentially Israeli—security ties deepen Iran’s unease, fueling fears of encirclement and diminishing its role as a key regional transit hub.

BACKGROUND: Brokered by the U.S., the latest Armenia–Azerbaijan peace talks have quietly but decisively reshaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus. At the heart of the deal is a newly designated transit Zangezur Corridor, officially named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which would grant Azerbaijan direct access to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenian territory. Moscow has responded with unusual silence, while Tehran has openly bristled at the emergence of a U.S.-designed transit network on its northern frontier.

Iran’s initial reaction to the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework has been visceral, with some prominent media organs terming it a “betrayal”. Tehran explicitly sees TRIPP as a U.S. footprint pressed onto its northern frontier. The plan envisions a 20-mile corridor through Armenia’s Syunik region, linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, with development rights leased to a U.S. consortium for up to 99 years. More than redrawing borders, the project reshapes the balance of power and places a sustained U.S. commercial and political presence in the narrow strip where Iran has long turned geography into strategic leverage.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran interprets the recent Azerbaijan–Armenia peace talks not only as a potential shift in the regional balance of power but also as part of a broader geopolitical environment increasingly hostile to its interests. Tehran worries that a settlement, especially one facilitated or backed by Western actors (including Turkey), could strengthen Azerbaijan’s position, deepen Baku’s security and economic ties with the West and Israel, and reduce Iran’s leverage in the South Caucasus. These concerns are amplified by the expanding footprint of the U.S. and Israel in Azerbaijan, from intelligence cooperation to defense technology transfers, which Tehran perceives as part of a containment strategy aimed at its northern flank. Against this backdrop, any peace process that sidelines Iran or solidifies the U.S. influence in the region risks, in Tehran’s view, to tighten the strategic noose around its borders.

Iran’s historical memory of regional threats plays a significant role in shaping its foreign policy reflexes. In addition to the growing perception of U.S. and Israeli threats following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further heightened Tehran’s sense of vulnerability. Iranian officials, suspecting that the Soviets might use the Baloch as a stepping stone toward making Iran their next target, began seeking countermeasures. After the Soviet collapse, the country continued to frame its foreign policy around an intensifying rhetoric of U.S. and Israeli danger and the cooperation of Azerbaijan with these powers. Today, Washington’s renewed bid to reassert influence in the region is likely to aggravate Iran’s geopolitical anxieties, with indirect repercussions visible in Iran–Azerbaijan relations.

Tehran’s messaging, while varied in tone, consistently reflects unease about the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, warned that the corridor would become a “graveyard” for its backers; a classic piece of deterrent rhetoric aimed at raising costs and sowing doubt. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry expressed conditional support for a peace deal in principle, while cautioning against “foreign interference” near Iran’s borders. President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran’s core demand had been met, yet voicing unease over U.S. corporate involvement.

Tehran is not worried about lines on a map. It is losing the bargaining power that those lines used to confer. A corridor under Armenian law deprives Iran of the sovereignty argument it used against an “extraterritorial” Zangezur model, outside Armenian jurisdiction. However, U.S. stewardship narrows Iran’s room to shape rules, customs, and security practices at the edge of its border. A U.S.-organized logistics spine running from Turkey via Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan (tightening connectivity between Turkey and Central Asia) offers a shorter, more secure east–west route that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

The Russian reaction intensifies Iran’s dilemma. Moscow’s muted response by accepting a U.S. role while cautioning against “foreign meddling” signals that Russia, overstretched and weakened in credibility after the 2020 Second Karabakh War, lacks the capacity or will to reshape the deal. For Tehran, this translates into fewer veto options by proxy and a thinner buffer against Turkish and U.S. coordination. It also incentivizes Yerevan to deepen ties with Western partners, which is not acceptable for Tehran.

Economically, the corridor undermines Iran’s claim to constitute an indispensable regional bridge. Tehran has long positioned itself as the key link between the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, with initiatives like the International North–South Transport Corridor and electricity and gas swaps with Armenia designed to cement that role. A functioning TRIPP route diverts attention and investment toward the “Middle Corridor,” lowering the premium shippers pay for transit through Iran and shrinking Tehran’s leverage to extract side deals on access, security assurances or energy flexibility. Iran’s alternative options remain limited, as seen in its cautious approach to the Gulf of Hormuz closure in June 2025.

Security risks run in both directions. For Tehran, a U.S.-supervised logistics corridor along its northern frontier would invite surveillance and restrict its gray-zone tactics. Yet overt interference such as through intimidation, sabotage, or proxy harassment would likely backfire. Such moves could strengthen U.S.–Turkish coordination (and even Azerbaijani-Israeli coordination), justify reinforced security around the route and push Armenia toward even closer alignment with Washington and Brussels. Iran’s own experience shows that coercion is most effective when opponents lack a unifying patron; TRIPP provides precisely that.

Still, Tehran has a few levers left. The first is regulatory: it can push for “no military use” clauses, real-time customs transparency and verified policing regimes that limit the route’s securitization. The second is connectivity hedging. The new route builds upon Iran’s already existing north–south connections with Armenia, including the Meghri–Julfa railway link, expanded electricity exchanges, and predictable gas swaps. Thus, the U.S.-managed corridor supports, rather than replaces, Iranian routes. The third is political triangulation. Iran maintains open channels with Ankara on trade and energy, where their interests sometimes overlap, while giving Yerevan price and reliability benefits that only a neighboring country can offer.

CONCLUSIONS:  Then, what is the balance sheet? In the short term, Iran faces a strategic setback in shaping the regional agenda. The U.S. has demonstrated its ability to achieve outcomes in the South Caucasus that Moscow could not, and the corridor effectively puts a purely Western hand on the flow of regional connectivity (the role of Turkey is also extremely important). In the medium term, Tehran can still limit the impact by quickly upgrading its own corridors, offering competitive transit pricing, and securing Indian and Gulf participation in north–south routes, turning competition into redundancy rather than outright replacement. Over the long term, the key question is whether Iran can tolerate a U.S. presence next door while extracting enough rules and linkages to avoid strategic encirclement.

An additional factor complicates this calculus: the possibility of an Israel–Armenia security partnership. While historically limited, such a relationship becomes more logical in a post-peace-deal environment where Yerevan seeks diversified defense ties beyond Russia and the West. This possibility is already being discussed in various circles. Israeli defense technology, already embedded in Azerbaijan, could find a foothold in Armenia in the form of counter-drone systems, border surveillance or intelligence sharing, especially if framed as balancing Ankara–Baku military cooperation. For Tehran, this would imply Israeli-linked security infrastructure on both its northwestern and northern flanks, eroding any remaining buffer zones and deepening the perception of encirclement. In such a scenario, even an economically beneficial TRIPP corridor would be overshadowed by the strategic risks it amplifies.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as an academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs. Additionally, he is a member of the Young Turkey–Young America fellowship program at the Atlantic Council and the Korean Society of Contemporary European Studies.

S. Frederick Starr

March 20, 2025

This article was originally delivered as a speech in March 2025 at an Asian Development Bank conference on connectivity and trade under their Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program. 

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