By Sergey Sukhankin

Uzbekistan, the most populous nation in Central Asia, has announced a strategic objective to significantly enhance the proportion of green energy within its energy portfolio and to utilize the surplus as a revenue source by exporting it to energy-demanding countries.This prioritization of green energy stems from ecological, economic, and geopolitical considerations. Given Uzbekistan's vast but largely untapped potential in this sector, Tashkent's initiative has been positively received internationally, with investors from China, the Gulf region, and the European Union expressing readiness to provide financial resources and technical expertise. However, despite growing international interest and the political elite's professed commitment, certain domestic challenges have led experts to question Uzbekistan's capacity to fully realize its considerable green energy potential.

Photo by Vladimir Jirnov

BACKGROUND: The end of 2024 witnessed a potentially transformative event for the development of green energy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. On November 13, during the World Leaders Climate Action Summit in Baku, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership agreement focused on the production and transmission of green energy. According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy, the country plans to commence exporting green electricity, primarily generated from solar and wind power, to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan by 2030.

This agreement reaffirms and solidifies the previously signed protocol in Astana, which outlined the establishment of the Central Asia-Azerbaijan-Europe Green Energy Corridor project. Beyond benefiting Uzbekistan, this initiative aims to strengthen ties between the two most influential Central Asian nations—despite their existing challenges—and enhance connectivity between Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby fostering improved inter-regional trade and cooperation. Uzbekistan is strategically positioned to develop its green energy potential, benefiting from a surplus of inexpensive labor and over 320 sunny days annually. Studies indicate that Uzbekistan possesses the most promising wind and solar energy potential in Central Asia.

By 2027, Uzbekistan plans to construct twelve state-of-the-art thermal power plants across the Bukhara, Tashkent, Khorezm, Kashkadarya, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, and Syrdarya regions. These projects are expected to generate an additional 49.7 billion kWh of electricity annually and, as asserted by Uzbekistan’s political leadership, will be realized through public-private partnerships financed primarily by foreign investments. Moreover, alongside its collaboration with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan’s green energy initiatives present opportunities to enhance economic and political cooperation with other Central Asian countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose competitive advantage in green energy lies in hydropower generation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Uzbekistan stands to benefit from developing its significant green energy potential in three primary ways. First, by mitigating environmental impacts and reducing natural gas consumption. Given the country’s rapidly growing population and its economic model, the political leadership has recognized the critical role of clean energy in supporting the local economy. By late 2024, Uzbek officials reported that solar and wind power plants had generated 4.5 billion kWh of electricity, conserving 1.36 billion cubic meters of natural gas and preventing 1.89 million tons of harmful emissions. Successes in green energy carry notable diplomatic and political implications. Uzbekistan’s leadership is actively positioning the country as a key regional player in green energy and sustainability, a stance explicitly articulated by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev during the 2024 annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Samarkand. This strategy not only enhances the country’s international image but is also expected to generate significant economic benefits.

Second, the development of green energy offers Uzbekistan an opportunity to strengthen economic ties with the European Union (EU). Historically, EU-Uzbekistan relations have been marked by challenges, primarily due to differences in values. However, the geopolitical shifts following Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 have underscored the mutual economic benefits of collaboration between the resource-rich Uzbekistan and the economically powerful EU.

In early 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized Uzbekistan’s export potential in green energy, stating that the country plans to produce 13 billion kilowatt-hours of green electricity, far exceeding domestic demand by a factor of 10 to 12, with the surplus available for export. According to Uzbek officials, the country is ready to supply between 2 and 5 gigawatts (GW) of green energy to Europe. In support of this initiative, the Italian company CESI is already conducting a feasibility study to facilitate the export of green energy to the EU.

Importantly, collaboration in green energy may serve as a stepping stone toward broader mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Uzbekistan, particularly in the economic sphere. The EU and individual member states, notably France, have shown significant interest in Uzbekistan's natural resources, especially critical metals, whose production Uzbekistan is determined to expand. In the context of China's assertive actions in the critical metals sector, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, holds the potential to significantly enhance its role as a key supplier of essential metals and resources to the EU, addressing the bloc's strategic needs.

Third, Uzbekistan seeks to strengthen ties with Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These resource-rich nations, equipped with advanced technologies, are particularly attractive to Uzbekistan due to their lack of a geopolitical agenda in Central Asia, unlike Russia or China, and their non-interventionist approach to local norms and values, which sometimes contrasts with the EU.

Prominent Gulf-based corporations, such as ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia) and Masdar (UAE), are already actively engaged in developing Uzbekistan’s green energy potential and have announced ambitious future plans. For Uzbekistan, access to the Gulf's financial and technological resources addresses a critical need, enabling it to navigate the complex dynamics between Russia, China, and the EU—traditional power players in Central Asia. Moreover, if Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan cooperation in green energy proves successful, Uzbekistan could leverage these Gulf partnerships to diversify its foreign economic policy more effectively and enhance its regional and global strategic position.

However, these optimistic projections are tempered by concerns raised by experts regarding Uzbekistan's ability to translate its substantial potential into tangible outcomes. The primary issue lies in the country’s persistent challenges with deeply entrenched corruption and the ineffective management of resources, both of which hinder economic growth and deter foreign investment.

Unfortunately, the clean energy sector appears to be no exception. For instance, one investigative analysis uncovered structural corruption within the sector. Another recent investigation highlighted significant deficiencies in innovation within Uzbekistan's power grid and exposed multiple corruption schemes, while also drawing attention to Uzbekistan’s strengthening ties with Russia, which is reluctant to support Uzbekistan's modernization and transition to a green economy.

A second concern relates to the high cost of green energy production. Experts argue that even in economically and technologically advanced Western countries, green energy remains secondary to traditional energy sources. For Uzbekistan, unless production costs are significantly reduced—a process that could take considerable time—green energy may remain a luxury rather than a feasible primary energy source.

A third challenge, even if the first two are successfully addressed, is the region’s increasingly arid climate. Uzbekistan is already experiencing the adverse effects of sandstorms and similar natural phenomena, which disrupt the operations of solar panels and wind turbines. If these trends persist, they could undermine Uzbekistan's ability to achieve economies of scale, a key factor for reducing costs through the mass production of green energy. This climatic volatility poses a significant risk to the long-term viability of Uzbekistan's green energy ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan's potential success in transforming its significant green energy potential into practical achievements could yield substantial multidimensional benefits for both the country and the broader region. However, achieving this outcome requires effectively addressing two interdependent challenges.

The first is tackling endemic corruption and the ineffective management of resources—longstanding issues that have plagued Uzbekistan and its leadership since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although President Mirziyoyev has initiated reforms, progress in combating these systemic problems remains insufficient.

The second challenge is Uzbekistan's strengthening ties with Russia, which could hinder its ambitious initiatives. Russia has little interest in supporting Uzbekistan's economic growth or its transition to a cleaner energy mix. Moreover, Moscow is unlikely to favor efforts to enhance intra-regional economic and political cooperation, as these developments would bolster Central Asia's autonomy and reduce its dependence on Russia. Addressing these issues is critical for Uzbekistan to realize its green energy ambitions and contribute to regional development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

China is moving forward with the long-delayed 523-kilometer railway connecting Kashgar in northwest China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, proposed in the 1990s, officially began construction on December 27 in Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan. This route offers a faster, cheaper alternative to existing connections between China and Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia.

Excluding Russia from the project has drawn criticism from Moscow, which views Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, Russia, heavily reliant on China due to Western sanctions over its 2022 Ukraine invasion, is unable to oppose the development.

The CKU railway, seen as a regional game-changer, promises to enhance trade and connectivity across Central xAsia. However, it also raises security concerns, as the route may facilitate cross-border activities of drug traffickers, terrorist groups, and militant organizations.

BACKGROUND:  The CKU railway, first conceived in 1997, faced significant delays due to financial, political, technical, and geopolitical challenges. A major obstacle was political instability in Kyrgyzstan, which stalled progress for 15 years. The project was revitalized in 2012 following a visit to Beijing by then-Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, renewing momentum for this strategic initiative under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Geopolitical factors also contributed to delays in the CKU railway project. Kazakhstan and Russia opposed the new route connecting China to Europe, as they benefited significantly from the existing northern corridor via Russia, which generated substantial revenue. Concerns over losing this economic advantage fueled their resistance. Financing the mega-project was another major challenge. In 2023, reports emerged suggesting the CKU railway’s postponement for an indefinite period due to unresolved funding issues.

Technical complexities have also hindered the execution of the CKU railway project. A key issue is the incompatible railway gauges between China and Central Asian countries. While China uses a standard gauge of 1,435 mm, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan rely on a broader gauge of 1,520 mm. This mismatch has posed significant logistical and engineering challenges to the project's implementation.

Another factor contributing to delays was the failure of participating countries to reach a consensus on the railway route due to conflicting interests. China and Uzbekistan favored a southern route, which offered shorter and faster transit to Europe. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan advocated for a northern route that, while longer and more expensive, would connect the north and south of Kyrgyzstan, fostering development and boosting its economy. Ultimately, under pressure from China and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan conceded to the shorter and less costly southern route.

In May 2023, China and Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement to commence the CKU railway project during an official visit by the Kyrgyz President to Beijing, with the China Railway Construction Corporation completing a feasibility study the same year.

In June 2024, officials from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement to implement the project, establishing a robust legal framework for constructing the railway. The line will begin in Kashgar, Xinjiang, pass through Kyrgyzstan, and extend into Uzbekistan, with future plans for extensions to West and South Asia.

After nearly three decades of deliberation, the CKU rail corridor is now progressing. The project promises to reduce freight transit times by one week and shorten the China-Europe route by 900 kilometers, marking a significant milestone in regional connectivity.

IMPLICATIONS: Beijing's decision to advance the CKU railway project represents a strategic masterstroke, poised to deepen China's influence across Central Asia and beyond. The initiative comes at a critical juncture, as Russia remains embroiled in the Ukraine conflict and faces crippling Western sanctions, creating a vacuum in the region's geopolitical landscape.

The CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes by providing a direct, efficient corridor to the continent. This development not only strengthens China’s connectivity but also enhances its role as a dominant trade and infrastructure player in the region.

In the future, the CKU railway could become a central hub for rail connectivity in Asia, linking Central Asia with South and West Asia. Once completed, the railway may be expanded east-west or north-south by integrating it with other countries' rail networks. Potential extensions include a route from Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Additionally, Uzbekistan's existing connections with Turkmenistan and Iran could position the CKU railway as one of the shortest routes between China and Western Europe.

With the CKU corridor operational, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are set to emerge as vital transit countries for Chinese exports. Both nations stand to gain significant economic benefits from transit fees, enhancing their economic roles in regional and global trade.

As a pivotal element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the CKU railway represents a strategic project to enhance China's connectivity with Central Asia. This landmark railway will traverse the challenging terrain of western China and Kyrgyzstan’s highest mountains, linking the railway networks of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In its final phase, the project aims to integrate with railway systems in Europe, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Türkiye.

The CKU rail corridor is poised to boost regional trade, foster economic cooperation, and provide the landlocked nations of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with critical access to global markets. Furthermore, the project will deliver essential infrastructure to both countries, strengthening their economic resilience and regional standing.

The CKU railway project is estimated to cost US$ 8 billion, with US$ 4.7 billion allocated for constructing the Kyrgyz section. Given Kyrgyzstan’s GDP of $9 billion, this expenditure represents a significant economic burden. As a result, the financially constrained country has sought a US$ 2.35 billion loan from China to fund its portion of the project, raising concerns about Kyrgyzstan potentially falling into a Chinese debt trap.

Once completed, the CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes. Geopolitically, this project is crucial for China, offering an alternative to the current route through Russia and reducing reliance on Moscow for trade with Europe.

On the other hand, the CKU railway raises significant security concerns as it will pass through opium-producing areas, potentially creating a new route for drug smuggling. The corridor could also facilitate the cross-border movement of terrorist and militant groups. This poses a particular threat to China’s Xinjiang province, which has been targeted by separatist and Islamic extremist groups. The railway’s potential to exacerbate regional security challenges underscores the need for robust measures to address these risks.

CONCLUSIONS: The CKU railway has the potential to be a transformative project for Central Asia, elevating the region’s significance as a transit hub between China and Europe. It marks the realization of Beijing’s decade-long ambition to expand its connectivity with Eurasian countries.

The ongoing Ukraine war and Western sanctions against Russia, following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have further amplified the importance of the CKU corridor. This new route provides an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia, currently the primary transit route between East and West, thereby diminishing Moscow’s strategic relevance in regional trade.

Geopolitically, Beijing views the timing as opportune to advance the CKU railway project in Russia's so-called backyard, leveraging the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. The launch of this mega project is poised to enhance China’s influence in Central Asia, potentially shifting the balance of power between Beijing and Moscow in the region.

However, the project carries significant security risks. The presence of drug smugglers and militant groups in the region raises concerns that the CKU corridor could be exploited by these armed groups, further complicating Central Asia's already fragile security environment.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

COMPETITION VS PARTNERSHIP: UZBEKISTAN-KAZAKHSTAN RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT AND TRANSIT

By Nargiza Umarova

Recent geopolitical crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have created favorable conditions for the development of intercontinental land trade routes, significantly enhancing the role of Central Asia as a transit region linking major Eurasian markets. This shift was anticipated to improve intraregional transport connectivity and facilitate the integration of Central Asian republics into global supply chains – both essential for the region’s economic growth. However, unity among the five Central Asian states on these initiatives remains elusive. Currently, these countries prioritize the creation of international transit corridors over local connectivity. Low coordination between them leads to duplication of projects, and the focus on their own interests becomes a source of unhealthy competition. Rivalry is particularly evident in the actions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, each seeking alternative access to Turkish and European markets via the Caspian Sea.

BACKGROUND:  In 2018, the Central Asian states initiated a mechanism for regular Consultative Meetings aimed at enhancing multilateral cooperation in transport communications. A key priority identified was the alignment of national transport systems, a crucial prerequisite for boosting mutual trade and expanding the transit potential of the region’s countries. To facilitate this alignment, plans were proposed to establish a Regional Center for the Development of Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations, to develop a Strategy for Regional Transport Corridor Development in Central Asia, and to adopt a Regional Program for Transport Communication Development. However, years later, these initiatives remain unimplemented, although some positive developments have occurred. In 2018, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan resumed railway service along the critical Galaba-Amuzang-Khoshadi route, resulting in nearly a twofold increase in mutual trade. A similar outcome was observed between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan following the launch of the multimodal corridor Tashkent-Andijan-Osh-Irkeshtam-Kashgar in the same year.  Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have demonstrated considerable activity in advancing local transport projects. As the largest economies in Central Asia, these nations account for nearly the entire volume of intraregional trade, motivating them to develop new mutually beneficial freight routes. In 2021, the two countries agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda road and railway, which will connect Kazakhstan's Kyzylorda region with Uzbekistan's industrial Navoi region, effectively reducing the distance between them by more than three times. Additional plans include the construction of the Darbaza-Maktaaral railway line and the Beineu-Shalkar road. Despite successful cooperation within the region, Astana and Tashkent occasionally find themselves in competition in the external transport and logistics arena, which can be characterized as a conflict of interests. A prominent example of this rivalry is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. Following the onset of the war in Ukraine, demand for the Middle Corridor among global cargo-generating centers in both the East and West has surged significantly. This land trade route from China to Europe traverses Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and Turkey. The TITR serves as an alternative to the Northern Corridor, whose operations are hindered by anti-Russian sanctions. The route is experiencing robust development, with transportation volumes reaching 2.7 million tons in 2023 and projected to increase to 4.2 million tons in 2024. Since the start of this year, container transit from China through the Middle Corridor has increased by a factor of 14. Within a few years, the route’s capacity could expand to accommodate 10 million tons of cargo annually. With appropriate infrastructure improvements and enhanced terminal capacities, the Trans-Caspian route is projected to become 35 percent faster and 40 percent more cost-effective than the Northern Corridor in the near future.

IMPLICATIONS:  It is important to emphasize that nearly all Central Asian countries are involved in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), not solely Kazakhstan. According to experts from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), there are three primary transit routes within the Middle Corridor: the northern route, which passes through northern Kazakhstan; the central route, which traverses southern Kazakhstan; and the southern route, which runs through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan occupies a uniquely advantageous position within the Central Asian segment of the China–European Union–China supply chain. This strategic edge stems from its shared borders with both China and Russia. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is also striving to establish a significant role in transit transportation between China and Europe. Uzbekistan’s involvement in multimodal transport routes such as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Caspian Sea–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Black Sea region, or Georgia–Turkey–European Union (part of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, TRACECA), as well as Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey–European Union, supports its ambitions in this area. It is relevant to highlight the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, which allows cargo from China to reach Uzbekistan in two days, compared to the ten days required via Kazakhstan. Plans are underway to construct a railway along a similar route, which would considerably enhance the positions of Tashkent and Bishkek in railway freight transportation from China to the Middle East, thereby bypassing Kazakhstan’s current monopoly. At present, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country with railway checkpoints on its border with China. In the development of trans-Caspian transport routes toward the West, Central Asian states operate as both partners and competitors. Partnership is evident in their collaborative efforts to develop connecting routes that enable the nations of the region to link up with various transit branches of the Middle Corridor. For instance, as noted earlier, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have agreed to construct the Uchkuduk-Kyzylorda railway, which will be integrated into the Kazakh section of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). In 2019, Uzbekistan, in collaboration with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, launched an alternative trade route to Europe via the Caspian Sea, known as the CASCA+ (Central Asia–South Caucasus–Anatolia+) corridor. Recently, the participating countries agreed to establish a consortium—a specialized body to coordinate the activities of this route. This development marks the project’s advancement to an institutional level, which provides a solid foundation for enhancing its competitive potential and boosting the transit capabilities of both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is also worth noting that, as early as 2014, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia institutionalized the Middle Corridor by first forming a Coordination Committee, which later evolved into the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.” These instances highlight the ongoing fragmentation among Central Asian states in the development of extra-regional transport routes. This fragmentation carries the risk of fostering unhealthy competition, which could generate discord among the countries in the region.

CONCLUSIONS:  Given the growing trend of deepening intra-regional ties in Central Asia, driven by the current geopolitical realities, it is increasingly crucial for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to integrate their transport project potential and establish joint coordination mechanisms. A coordinated approach to managing transit transportation through the Caspian Sea along the China-Europe-China axis is necessary, grounded in principles of equality and mutual benefit. Ensuring that the interests of one party do not overshadow those of the other is key to fostering balanced cooperation. Moreover, harmonizing the activities of the CASCA+ corridor consortium with the International Association “Trans-Caspian International Transport Route” appears essential, with the goal of ultimately merging both structures into a unified coordinating body with legal status. Developing common approaches to international transport corridors and accelerating the adoption of the “Strategy for the Development of Transport Corridors in Central Asia,” which was first proposed in 2018, is equally important. Additionally, the proposal to establish a Regional Centre for Transport and Communications Interconnectivity under the auspices of the United Nations remains a pertinent issue.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan” (Tashkent, Uzbekistan). Her research activities are focused on studying the developments of Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors.

By Farkhod Tolipov

August 21, 2024

During a state visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to Uzbekistan in May 2024, after his re-election, it was officially announced that the long-anticipated construction of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) received a green light. A corresponding agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan. This decision caused wide public debate about the NPP, regarding its expediency, the environmental and security risks, as well as the geopolitical consequences associated with it. At the same time, the project signifies Uzbekistan’s growing dependence on Russia and a more pro-Russian drift in Tashkent’s foreign policy. 

BACKGROUND: The first signals of the possible construction of an NPP in Uzbekistan appeared several years ago. It was then stipulated and justified with reference to the lack of sufficient gas reserves in the country. This pretext surprised many economic experts, political analysts as well as the public since Uzbekistan has for a long time, even during the Soviet period, occupied the highest positions in international rankings of gas reserves and gas production.

The issue of dwindling gas reserves is a big and ambiguous question because neither the government nor specialists have provided convincing explanations for the exhaustion of gas fields in Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, frequent blackouts have become a “normal” phenomenon during last two-three years – roughly corresponding to the period during which the NPP project has been officially promoted. Sudden and frequent blackouts taking place across the country have created the suspicion that they are not so much caused by the inability of existing energy infrastructure to satisfy the country’s growing energy needs and a lack of gas reserves, but are man-made and deliberate in order to convince people that there is no alternative to an NPP.
However, the overall agreements between Uzbekistan and Russia regarding the NPP, including the costs of the plant, environmental aspects, the disposal and utilization of nuclear waste, and many other concomitant questions of interest to the public and media remain opaque and secretive. It was in this context that Putin and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev announced the official start of the NPP construction project.

Initially, the NPP project was intended to consist of 2 large reactors of 1.2 Gigawatt each, at a cost estimated to US$ 11 billion. However, it has now been decided that the NPP will be a small plant consisting of 6 small reactors of 55 Megawatt each. Overall, the electricity that will be produced by the NPP is supposed to constitute about 15 percent of the total energy produced in the country. The NPP is supposed to become operational in 2033.

IMPLICATIONS: Proponents of the NPP construction argue that nuclear energy is widely used in the world, pointing to France, Germany, Japan, the U.S. and others. According to them, constructing the NPP is in Uzbekistan’s strategic interests and an instrument of sustainable development, since it will positively affect both economic growth and the population’s living standards. Moreover, they say that nuclear power is the only source of energy generation that meets all three pillars of the so-called energy trilemma established by the International Energy Agency – reliability of energy infrastructure; availability of energy for the population and industry; and no harmful effect on the environment.

While these assertions seem aimed to calm the excited public opinion, they do not withstand critical counterarguments. Numerous physicists, environmentalists, energy experts, political scientists and public activists have raised their voices against the NPP. In particular, according to estimates, it will be more expensive to produce electric energy in small reactors than large ones. Uzbekistan will face a large financial burden that will be carried by consumers. Also, according to estimates, Uzbekistan’s renewable energy sources can fully satisfy the country’s energy needs even without the NPP.

Meanwhile, multiple questions related to the construction and operation of the NPP as well as its geopolitical implications have not been addressed and no transparent calculations of key aspects of the NPP’s operation have been provided. These include the enrichment of Uranium from U²¹⁸ to U²³²; the system for cooling the reactor; the utilization of nuclear waste; the overall cost of the project; security aspects; as well as the increased reliance on a Russia that wages a war of aggression against Ukraine and threatens other former Soviet republics with its neo-imperial policy. In addition, the digitalization of the NPP operation raises questions regarding possible cyber-security aspects of the plant, which will definitely be exposed to such threats.
Importantly, this type of small NPP does not exist even in Russia itself, which uses small reactors only for icebreaker engines. Thus, the NPP in Uzbekistan will in fact constitute a first experiment with a number of risks attached.

When journalists and pundits began to inquire about the details of the NPP project and requested relevant information from governmental agencies, they received no response. To the contrary, media organizations were told by authorities that they should refrain from highlighting topics relating to the NPP. Despite the reluctance of government agencies to communicate information on the NPP and attempts to curtail media coverage, social networks and independent experts do discuss the issue and seek to keep it on the public agenda. A special group was even created on Facebook titled “Uzbekistanis are against the NPP.” Simultaneously, a similar NPP project is being discussed in Kazakhstan. In contrast to Tashkent, Astana has officially made it clear that a referendum will be held on NPP construction. However, in Uzbekistan, the decision comes before its justification.
The social and political drama related to the NPP has created the impression that the project corresponds to Russia’s interests rather than those of Uzbekistan. The enthusiasm with which Russia promotes this project cannot be considered and understood independently from the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Indeed, the NPP will serve triple objectives for Moscow. First, it will constitute political leverage for exerting pressure upon Uzbekistan. Second, it will provide one among very few instruments for mitigating economic decline and crisis in Russia due to international economic and financial sanctions. Third, it will help creating a false image that Russia is not isolated in world politics and has partners and allies. Given the establishment of a partnership in nuclear energy, Uzbekistan will hardly vote against Russia at future UNGA sessions.

It should be recalled that since 1997, Central Asia is proclaimed a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). The NWFZ by its nature and essence is a broad concept; its ultimate goal is to safeguard the region against any form of nuclear threat. The question therefore arises whether the NPP can be considered a dual-purpose object, which could in certain circumstances be transformed into a weapon? After Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP, this question cannot be ignored and obscured.

Instead, Uzbekistan’s government seems to reiterate Napoleon’s saying: “One jumps into the fray, then figures out what to do next,” or “You commit yourself, then you see.”

CONCLUSIONS: While a number of countries utilize NPPs to produce electricity, most countries resolve their electricity needs by developing alternative energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro. Many countries are also cancelling their nuclear energy programs in favor of renewable sources. The straightforward and very simplistic attempts by proponents of Uzbekistan’s NPP to propagate for the project, in combination with the secrecy displayed by Uzbek authorities, are not only unconvincing but also raise suspicions that Tashkent engages in a mutual geopolitical gamble with Moscow.

The agreement signed between Tashkent and Moscow on the NPP lacks due scientific elaboration and national debates concerning all aspects and risks involved in the deal. Many experts, media as well members of the public are now raising their voices against the project, claiming that Uzbekistan is losing its sovereignty and independence and falling into dependence on Russia.

Indeed, this issue is far from routine and conventional, just like a nuclear weapon is considered a non-conventional weapon. Accordingly, policy in this special area also should be unconventional, taking into account the vital national interests of the country.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own.

Svante E. Cornell

May 22, 2024

Turkey and Uzbekistan are the two largest countries in the Turkic world. As a result, the rela- tionship between them is a determining factor for the prospects of Turkic cooperation. For most of three decades, the difficulties in the bilateral relationship was a key impediment to Turkey’s influence in Central Asia. Since 2016, however, the arrival of a new leadership in Uzbekistan coincided with Turkey’s turn in a nationalist direction to provide a major boost toward a more fruitful and cooperative relationship. While Turkey’s relations with Uzbekistan have much ground to make up compared to its ties with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the two states have made it priority to do just that.

Click Here to download PDF