By Umair Jamal

Pakistan has approved and operationalized new land routes to connect Central Asian markets to Pakistani ports and beyond, utilizing strategic corridors through Iran and China to bypass Afghanistan entirely. This shift was solidified in April 2026 when Pakistan Customs launched the first export consignment from the Karachi Export Processing Zone to Kyrgyzstan via the Sost Dry Port in China under the TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers) regime. Pakistan’s decision to diversify transit away from Afghanistan follows the indefinite closure of the Torkham and Chaman border crossings in October 2025 due to unmanageable security risks and cross-border militancy. By activating the Pakistan-Iran Transit Corridor and the Sost-Kyrgyzstan-China Corridor, Islamabad is dismantling Afghanistan’s traditional transit monopoly. Amidst the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis, these land routes, coupled with the rising prominence of Gwadar Port, position Pakistan as a critical, multi-modal bridge between the landlocked Eurasian heartland and global warm-water ports. These new land routes circumvent both maritime chokepoints and regional instability and provide Central Asian nations with secure and diversified avenues for trade and logistics.

BACKGROUND:

For decades, Pakistan’s overland access to the Central Asian countries was almost exclusively dependent on the Chaman and Torkham gateways through Afghanistan. From Pakistan’s perspective, this geographical bottleneck granted Kabul significant leverage, which was frequently used as a political tool during bilateral friction. However, since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, this lifeline for both Central Asian states and Pakistan has transformed into a strategic liability.

Central Asian leadership has grown increasingly frustrated with the instability of the Afghan route. For instance, recurrent border closures, unpredictable transit fees, and the persistent threat posed by militant groups have undermined the region’s trade ambitions. This collective annoyance reached a decisive moment in October 2025, when in response to persistent cross-border militant attacks from Afghanistan, Pakistan decided to completely shut down the Afghan-Pakistani trade routes connecting Central Asia.

Seeking to bypass traditional transit hurdles, Pakistan recently proposed new trade corridors for Central Asian countries. In April 2026, senior representatives from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan gathered in Karachi for a coordination ceremony, where Pakistan offered a permanent alternative to the Afghan route for global connectivity.

The ceremony marked the official activation of the Iran-based land route, with the first convoy of refrigerated trucks carrying frozen meat and assorted exports destined for Tashkent and Bishkek. The development signaled a regional consensus whereby Central Asia is no longer willing to wait for Afghan stability and seem poised to work with Pakistan to operate these new routes. Early data reflects this momentum, with over 14,000 metric tons of cargo successfully processed across both corridors.

Simultaneously, Pakistan’s private sector has already demonstrated that it can work via the northern bypass that sits on China’s Sost border, with the Hemani Group successfully delivering a 23.9-tonne consignment to Kyrgyzstan, cleared electronically via the Pakistan Single Window (PSW) system. This 3,300-kilometer Bishkek-Karachi route under the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA) has now seen its first reciprocal commercial runs, with Kyrgyz transport fleets bringing minerals and textiles south. Crucially, the cargo proved the viability of two-way transit over high-altitude passes, shifting the framework from a unilateral export pipeline into a functional bilateral trade loop.
These strategic developments are taking place at a crucial time in the region’s geopolitics and are set to have far reaching implications.

IMPLICATIONS:

These new corridors have immense strategic significance for Central Asia, as they offer a permanent exit from the long-standing Afghan dilemma. For instance, by utilizing the Gabd-Rimdan from Iran and Sost that relies on China, landlocked nations such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have secured a reliable Southern route to the Arabian Sea. Uzbekistan has been particularly active along the western axis, using the Gabd-Rimdan border terminal, which was recently upgraded by the National Logistics Corporation (NLC) with modern scanning facilities, to consistently move agricultural equipment and industrial raw materials.

The diversification provides these countries with a professionalized trade environment characterized by reduced transit costs, effectively bypassing the unpredictable informal taxes and security delays inherent in the Afghan route. 

Furthermore, the distance from the Iranian border to Gwadar port offers a significantly shorter alternative to the traditional northern routes through Russia or the volatile western corridors, while maintaining stability through direct institutional oversight via the TIR regime and electronic tracking under the Pakistan Single Window (PSW) system. This structural predictability has provided Central Asian exporters with a reliable maritime gateway that avoids the costly and multi-border transit loops through eastern Europe.

In the wake of these developments, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port is set to transition from a conceptual hub into the functional heart of Central Asian trade. Within the framework of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor’s Phase 2, the integration of trade from Central Asian countries via Iran and China validates the massive infrastructure investments previously made in Baluchistan. 

This development is particularly critical given the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis. Gwadar is situated 400 km east of the strait and serves as a virtual bypass of the conflict zone, allowing Central Asian exports to reach international waters without entering the high-risk zones of the Persian Gulf. 

For Pakistan, this creates a substantial economic windfall as well. By positioning itself as the primary transit state for a massive market, the country is positioning itself to secure consistent revenue through port handling, logistics, and transit fees. In the wake of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, tariff at the Gwadar port has multiplied.

Ultimately, these shifts represent a permanent structural setback and the long-term erosion of Afghan leverage. For decades, Kabul relied on its geographic status as a bridge between South and Central Asia to extract economic concessions and maintain political relevance. However, by demonstrating that trade can flow efficiently through Iran and China, Pakistan and the Central Asian countries have rendered the Afghan routes entirely optional. 

If the Taliban regime remains unable or unwilling to secure its borders and dismantle militant sanctuaries, it faces the grim prospect of total economic isolation as regional trade patterns permanently realign around a more stable and predictable maritime-linked architecture.

Moreover, the strategic expansion of these corridors comes at a pivotal moment in the shifting Eurasian geopolitical landscape. 

As the Iran-U.S. war reshapes regional alignments and trade security, these new routes grant Pakistan and Central Asia much-needed strategic maneuverability. They serve as a vital hedge, insulating regional economies from the instability of maritime corridors and the growing risk of chokepoint weaponization.

Furthermore, this realignment signals the emergence of a Middle-Power bloc where regional players like Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics are prioritizing economic connectivity over historical ideological or security frictions. 

For Pakistan, this transition from a security state to a geo-economic hub is not just about transit fees; it also constitutes an attempt to embed its stability with the economic wellbeing of its neighbors. 

By providing a new route for Eurasian goods, Pakistan is trying to ensure that regional powers now have a vested interest in the security of Pakistan and the success of Gwadar port where Central Asian states will now have significant stakes. 

CONCLUSIONS:

The approval of these alternative corridors demonstrates an important elevation of Islamabad’s regional standing. By linking Gwadar to Iranian and Chinese land routes to better serve Central Asia, Pakistan is effectively seeking to decouple its economic future from the instability of traditional Afghan transit. This development offers a stable gateway for regional states and signals a shift away from reliance on uncooperative neighbors. As the idea of Eurasian trade flowing through this multi-dimensional network gains relevance, Pakistan is going to position its southern coast as the indispensable hub of a new and more resilient economic order.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Umair Jamal is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Otago, New Zealand, and an analyst at Diplomat Risk Intelligence (DRI). His research focuses on counterterrorism and security issues in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader Asia region. He offers analytical consulting to various think tanks and institutional clients in Pakistan and around the world. He has published for several media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Foreign Policy, SCMP, The Diplomat, and the Huffington Post.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

A recent succession of visits by Central Asian leaders to Islamabad over the past four months has drawn attention in New Delhi. In response, India has intensified its diplomatic engagement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) to counter Pakistan’s expanding regional influence. Indian officials have conducted discussions with counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to strengthen economic ties. Concurrently, Pakistan has undertaken a significant policy shift by activating alternative trade corridors through China and Iran, reducing its reliance on routes via Afghanistan to access Central Asia. Despite this strategic rivalry, certain connectivity initiatives reveal areas of convergence and potential cooperation between India and Pakistan. 

 Photo by Alexander Lukatskiy, 2022

BACKGROUND:

Both India and Pakistan view post-Soviet Central Asia as a region of considerable geostrategic and geo-economic importance. Endowed with substantial hydropower capacity, the region possesses significant untapped energy reserves and critical mineral resources. For both states, primary interests in Central Asia include energy security, infrastructure development, trade, and connectivity.

India has advanced a proactive “Connect Central Asia” policy aimed at strengthening political, economic, and cultural engagement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. By 2025, India’s trade with these five states reached approximately US$ 2.5 billion, nearly three times the volume of Pakistan’s trade with the region.

Afghanistan, serving as a critical bridge between Central and South Asia, remains central to the strategic competition between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s historical support for the Taliban has contributed to strained relations with the CARs, many of which have been wary of the Taliban’s rise due to concerns over regional stability and extremism. In contrast, CARs have often aligned with anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

India, during the Taliban’s first regime (1996–2001), opposed the movement and supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, a stance that strengthened its political alignment with the CARs. This policy brought India closer to the region, where skepticism toward Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy persisted. Although regional dynamics have evolved in recent years, India’s earlier opposition to the Taliban and its engagement with alternative Afghan actors significantly shaped its favorable ties with Central Asia.

Under the current Taliban regime, India has engaged pragmatically with Kabul amid escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Taliban authorities of harboring anti-Pakistan militant groups, contributing to a deterioration in bilateral relations. This conflict has prompted a notable shift in the Afghan policies of both states. Pakistan has adopted a more confrontational stance, reportedly launching Operation Ghazab lil-Haq in February to target militant sanctuaries within Afghanistan. In contrast, India has maintained a pragmatic approach, guided by a strategic calculus often characterized as “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Simultaneously, Pakistan has extended support to the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front (NRF), formerly known as the Northern Alliance. This shift in Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy has facilitated closer alignment with the CARs, many of which remain wary of the Taliban regime.

In December 2025, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov visited Pakistan, the first such visit by a Kyrgyz leader in over two decades, marking a revival of bilateral relations. Both countries agreed to increase trade from approximately US$ 16 million in 2024 to US$ 200 million by 2027–28. In February 2026, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev undertook a two-day visit to Islamabad, during which the two sides committed to expanding bilateral trade to US$ 2 billion over the next five years. In the same month, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also visited Pakistan, with discussions focusing primarily on developing transport corridors to provide landlocked Kazakhstan access to Pakistan’s Arabian Sea ports.

In response to the deepening economic engagement between Pakistan and CARs, India has intensified its diplomatic outreach to the region to advance trade and investment ties. In March 2026, Turkmenistan’s Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Baymyrat Annamammedov, and India’s Ambassador to Turkmenistan, Bandaru Wilsonbabu, held discussions in Ashgabat on expanding cooperation in industry, construction, chemicals, and fertilizers.

Concurrently, India is pursuing a proposed US$ 3 billion agreement for the import of uranium from Kazakhstan, currently under consideration by Kazatomprom, the country’s national nuclear energy agency. In addition, India’s Tata Power is reportedly nearing agreements in Tajikistan’s energy sector. 

The escalating conflict with Afghanistan has prompted Pakistan to operationalize alternative trade corridors to Central Asia via Iran and China. In April 2026, Islamabad dispatched its first shipment to Tashkent through the Gabd–Rimdan border crossing with Iran, thereby establishing a functional route toward Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Concurrently, Pakistan activated a trade corridor through China via the Khunjerab Pass, facilitating connectivity with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan.

IMPLICATIONS:

During recent visits to Islamabad, officials from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan discussed trade and strategic connectivity initiatives aimed at linking Central and South Asia and providing landlocked Central Asian economies access to Pakistan’s seaports at Karachi and Gwadar. Geographically, Pakistan holds a comparative advantage over India in facilitating commercial access to Central Asia.

Key projects include the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway and the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The UAP corridor is intended to connect Central Asia to Pakistan’s seaports via Afghanistan. Similarly, the CKU railway would enhance regional connectivity by linking China’s Kashgar to Central Asia, with onward access to Gwadar port through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), thereby providing Central Asian states with routes to open seas.

In contrast, India faces geographical constraints in accessing Central Asia, as overland connectivity via Afghanistan would require transit through Pakistan. To circumvent this limitation, India has invested in Iran’s Chabahar Port as an alternative route to the region. Located on the Gulf of Oman, Chabahar constitutes a key node in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links India with Iran, Russia, and Central Asian states, thereby facilitating trade while bypassing Pakistan.

Islamabad no longer views Afghanistan as the principal transit route to the rest of Central Asia, largely due to security concerns. The activation of alternative trade corridors via China and Iran reflects a significant shift in Pakistan’s connectivity strategy, driven by tensions with the Taliban regime over cross-border militancy. As one senior Pakistani official noted, “The China and Iran corridors are not just alternatives anymore – they are becoming the preferred routes for regional connectivity.”

Geopolitically, India’s alignment with Israel in the ongoing Iran–Israel conflict risks undermining its strategic interests in Iran, particularly regarding the Chabahar port project. In contrast, Iran has moved closer to Pakistan amid the US–Israel war with Iran, with Islamabad positioning itself as a mediator between Washington and Tehran. Pakistan’s emerging role as a diplomatic intermediary has enhanced its geopolitical profile, including in Central Asia, a region significantly affected by instability in the Middle East.

India’s withdrawal last year from the Ayni airbase in Tajikistan, its only overseas military facility near Afghanistan, signals a decline in its intelligence capabilities and strategic influence in the region. Established in 2000, the base served as a strategic counterbalance to Pakistan’s influence and as a key platform for India’s engagement with Central Asia.

India and Pakistan have primarily competed for influence in Central Asia due to the region’s substantial energy resources. However, the viability of key energy connectivity projects depends on cooperation rather than rivalry between the two states. For example, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline cannot function effectively without mutual coordination, as it is designed to transport Turkmen gas to energy-deficient markets in both India and Pakistan. Similarly, the CASA-1000 hydropower project, which aims to export electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, has the potential to transform strategic competition into convergence between the two countries.

Conversely, an armed conflict between India and Pakistan would have significant repercussions for Central Asia. A war could disrupt trade and energy corridors, undermine major connectivity initiatives such as the INSTC and CPEC, exacerbate militancy, and pose serious risks to regional stability.

CONCLUSIONS:

With their ambitious regional strategies, India and Pakistan could turn Central Asia either into a site of rivalry or a platform for cooperation. Pakistan’s shift in Afghan policy, its counterterrorism operations against militant groups under the Taliban, and its use of alternative corridors via China and Iran, bypassing Afghanistan, are key developments encouraging the CARs to favor Pakistan. From geographical and geopolitical perspectives, Pakistan may be a more viable partner for the landlocked CARs, which seek to expand trade through connectivity to Arabian Sea ports. In contrast, deteriorating India–Iran relations cast uncertainty over the future of India’s Chabahar port project.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email,  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

By Sudha Ramachandran

Afghanistan currently finds itself in an exceptionally precarious position. To the west, neighboring Iran has become an active war zone, while to the east, Pakistan has initiated what it describes as an “open war” against Afghanistan. After decades of conflict, Afghanistan’s capacity to manage the far-reaching consequences of the situation in Iran remains severely limited. The country’s already fragile economy is being further strained by rising global oil prices. At the same time, its access to maritime trade routes via Pakistan has been effectively closed for several months, while alternative trade corridors through Iran, the only viable substitute, are increasingly under threat. The likelihood of a substantial influx of refugees, including returning Afghan nationals, is expected to exacerbate an already critical humanitarian situation. Concurrently, the Taliban authorities are closely observing how the Iranian government responds to external pressures aimed at regime change.

BACKGROUND:

On the night of February 21-22, Pakistan launched “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq” against Afghanistan. Islamabad said that its missile and air strikes were targeting camps and hideouts of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province based on Afghan soil. Over the past month, Pakistan’s strikes have intensified and expanded in terms of the nature of targets and their geography. If initially Islamabad targeted border posts and alleged terrorist camps in Afghanistan’s border provinces, soon it was hitting Taliban military assets and ammunition depots as well as civilian targets, including a drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul.  

Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s western neighbor, Iran, came under devastating missile and air strikes launched by the U.S. and Israel on February 28. Since then, leadership compounds, military infrastructure, and economic and energy locations, including the country’s oil production and storage facilities have been destroyed. Top Iranian political and military leaders have been killed in the strikes as have hundreds of civilians. The war has spread beyond Iran. Tehran retaliated to the U.S.-Israel attacks by hitting Israeli targets as well as U.S. bases and oil infrastructure in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. South Asia was soon drawn into the war when the U.S. torpedoed an Iranian warship, IRIS Dena, 40 nautical miles off the Sri Lankan coast. On March 20, Iranian missiles reached deep into the Indian Ocean to target the U.S.-UK base in Diego Garcia. The war could draw in more countries, such as Pakistan. The destruction of production and refining infrastructure in the Gulf and Iran’s blocking of the Strait of Hormuz have led to fuel shortages and surging prices worldwide. What started as a war on Iran has set economies across continents ablaze. 

Among the countries that will be hit the hardest by the Iran war is Afghanistan. Several factors make it particularly vulnerable. It is Iran’s neighbor; the two countries share a 921 km-long border. Afghanistan is also a landlocked country, dependent on Iran and Pakistan for access to ports. Importantly, Afghanistan was ravaged by war for decades and internationally isolated since the Taliban captured power in August 2021. Its capacity to withstand the impact of the war in West Asia was limited to begin with. This capacity is being further weakened by Pakistan’s ongoing military strikes on Afghanistan.

IMPLICATIONS:

The Taliban regime strongly condemned the U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran, describing them as an “act of aggression.” Following the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it expressed its condolences to the Iranian government and people. Especially since the Taliban came to power in August 2021, relations between Iran and Afghanistan have grown, especially with regard to trade. Although there are several issues of conflict between the two, anti-Americanism serves as glue. The Taliban’s chief spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, has said in the past that if Tehran requests assistance in the event of a U.S. attack, Afghanistan is ready and willing to extend help.

So far, Afghanistan has not been hit by Iranian or U.S/Israeli drones or missiles. Indeed, it is western and south-western Iran that has borne the brunt of U.S. and Israeli strikes. Eastern Iran, which borders Afghanistan, has escaped being hit so far. It is therefore an attractive safe haven for those fleeing western Iranian cities and towns. These internally displaced people can be expected to cross into Afghanistan and Iran’s other eastern neighbors should the war intensify, prolong or spread to eastern Iran. Afghanistan is already grappling with the economic burden imposed by the mass deportation of an estimated 5.4 million Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan since October 2023. The new refugee flows from Iran will substantially intensify the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Persecution of Afghan refugees in Iran is set to increase as Iranians have often suspected that they are spying for Israel. Such perceptions are likely to intensify. They will be hounded by Iranian police and people, forcing them to join the exodus into Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s weak economy is poised to fray further amid fuel shortages and surging prices. Given its low capacity for manufacturing, Afghanistan has depended on Iran for consumer goods. Afghanistan’s landlocked status has made it dependent on Pakistan and Iran for access to the sea, however, as access to Pakistani ports has been shut off, Afghan dependence on Iranian markets and trade corridors to the sea have deepened. Although Iranian border posts remain open to Afghan goods, the trade corridor through Iran to the sea is insecure as it runs through the conflict zone. While it continues to function, it is vulnerable to missile strikes as the war in Iran intensifies. There is a risk that Chabahar port could be bombed. The closure of the Iranian trade corridor would bring the Afghan economy to its knees and shatter Afghan lives and livelihoods. Afghanistan will have to strengthen its trade and transit ties with other Central Asian states.

Notwithstanding its condemnation of the U.S and Israeli strikes on Iran, Pakistan has benefited somewhat from the war in Iran. As the international community is preoccupied with the West Asia crisis, it has ignored the Pakistani military strikes on Afghanistan. Pakistan has therefore escaped global opprobrium for the horrific suffering its strikes have caused to Afghan civilians. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime is watching how Pakistan is responding to the crisis in West Asia. Should the Saudis decide to join the war against Iran, Pakistan, which has a mutual defense pact with Riyadh, is obligated to join the Saudis. Drawn into the West Asian crisis, the Pakistani military would need to halt its ongoing “open war” against Afghanistan. A termination of ‘Operation Ghazab Lil Haq’ would be welcomed by Afghanistan.

Taliban leaders will also be watching Iran closely to see how pressure from outside in the form of military strikes and war impacts an authoritarian regime. Will decapitation and war trigger unrest and lead to regime change? Or will it strengthen national unity and see the population rally behind the regime against the foreign invader? In the event of regime change in Iran, its leaders could seek sanctuary in Afghanistan.

CONCLUSIONS:

The conflict involving Iran has arisen at a particularly challenging moment for Afghanistan, which is simultaneously facing missile and air strikes from Pakistan. As a landlocked state, Afghanistan is especially vulnerable to external disruptions; its economic difficulties are likely to intensify due to fuel shortages linked to the conflict in Iran and the resulting constraints on access to seaports. In addition to its geographic proximity to the West Asian conflict zone, Afghanistan’s already limited institutional and economic capacity is expected to come under severe strain. This pressure will be exacerbated by a further economic downturn and by the anticipated influx of refugees, including returning Afghan nationals, from Iran.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr Sudha Ramachandran is an independent South Asian political and security analyst. She is also South Asia editor at The Diplomat. Her articles have appeared in publications like The Diplomat, Asia Times, China Brief and Terrorism Monitor.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider 

On February 26, Pakistan launched Operation Ghazab lil-Haq (Righteous Fury) against the Taliban regime in Kabul. The operation is widely interpreted as an attempt by Islamabad to pursue regime change in Afghanistan. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has effectively become a base for terrorist activities targeting not only Pakistan but also other Central Asian states, including Tajikistan. Russia has warned that Afghanistan-based ISIS seeks to expand its so-called caliphate in Central Asia, while China has expressed concern over the presence of Uyghur militants and other anti-China groups in the country. In this context, regime change in Kabul has emerged as a strategic priority for Islamabad and Beijing. Meanwhile, the persistence of terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan and the ongoing war has stalled major trans-Afghan connectivity projects intended to link Central Asia with Pakistani seaports. 

BACKGROUND:

Since 2021, following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal under the Doha Agreement, Pakistan has experienced a significant increase in terrorist attacks. Islamabad has accused Afghanistan-based militant groups of conducting cross-border operations within its territory. Prominent among these are Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which have been responsible for numerous high-profile attacks. Pakistan has repeatedly urged the Taliban government to take action against these groups, which continue to operate from Afghan territory with relative impunity; however, these requests have largely gone unheeded.

China, which shares a 47-mile border with Afghanistan, has long been concerned that the country could become as a sanctuary for Uyghur separatists in proximity of its Xinjiang region. The Taliban government has assured Beijing that Afghan territory would not be used for activities against China. In return, China has offered economic assistance and investment to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, and has since emerged as the largest foreign investor in the country.

Other anti-China groups operating from safe havens in Afghanistan include the TTP and the BLA. Both organizations have been implicated in several high-profile attacks targeting Chinese nationals in Pakistan.

In March 2024, a suicide attack on a van killed five Chinese engineers working on the Dasu dam project in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A similar attack at the same site in 2021 resulted in the deaths of nine Chinese engineers. The TTP was implicated in both incidents. The BLA, in turn, has conducted more attacks on Chinese nationals and assets than any other separatist organization. Notably, in 2022, the BLA deployed its first female suicide bomber, who carried out an attack outside the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi, killing three Chinese instructors.

Although China has pursued a pragmatic engagement policy toward the Taliban since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, investing in mining, energy, and infrastructure, the Taliban have shown limited willingness or capacity to dismantle militant networks such as the TTP and BLA operating from Afghan territory.

Tajikistan, which shares a 1,400-kilometre border with Afghanistan, has also been affected by cross-border militancy. In December 2025, five individuals, including two Tajik security officers, were killed in an armed confrontation on the Tajik–Afghan border when militants attempted to infiltrate Tajik territory.

Russia, the only country that has formally recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has expressed concern that the regime undermines regional stability by allowing jihadist groups to operate from Afghan territory. These concerns intensified following a suicide attack on February 24 outside Moscow’s Savyolovsky Railway Station, which killed a police officer. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov linked the incident to Afghanistan-based groups. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has estimated that Afghanistan hosts between 20,000 and 23,000 militants, including approximately 5,000 to 7,000 affiliated with the TTP. Notably, Russia released this assessment of terrorist networks in Afghanistan two days before Pakistan initiated its military campaign against the Taliban, a move that may be interpreted as implicit political support.

The Taliban have also moved closer to Pakistan’s regional rival, India. Islamabad has alleged that groups such as the TTP and BLA operate as Indian proxies, a claim that New Delhi denies. The Taliban’s growing engagement with India has further raised concerns in Beijing. Amid mounting frustration over the Taliban’s inaction against militant groups operating from Afghan territory, Pakistan launched a large-scale military operation against the Taliban government on February 26, involving airstrikes across major Afghan cities, including Kabul.

IMPLICATIONS:

Operation Ghazab lil-Haq can be interpreted as an attempt to impose regime change in Kabul, though Pakistan is unlikely to achieve such an objective independently, without securing China’s support and involving Tajikistan. It must also obtain backing from anti-Taliban groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Tajik leader Ahmad Massoud, son of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud. Tajikistan presently hosts the NRF leadership. Pakistan’s airstrikes against the Taliban regime may create opportunities for the NRF and other opposition forces to weaken the Taliban’s internal control over Afghanistan.

Officially, Beijing has called on both Islamabad and Kabul to exercise restraint and has advocated a ceasefire. However, Pakistan’s ongoing military campaign against the Taliban likely carries tacit Chinese approval and support for a potential regime change effort. For such an operation, Islamabad would first need to secure control over the Wakhan Corridor in northeastern Afghanistan. This narrow strip of territory, often referred to as Afghanistan’s “Chicken Neck,” extends approximately 350 kilometers to China’s Xinjiang region, separating Tajikistan from Pakistan. Control of the corridor would provide Pakistan with direct access to Tajikistan and Central Asia beyond Afghanistan. For China, the Wakhan Corridor represents a critical node for safeguarding its strategic connectivity with South and Central Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While China appears to be adopting a cautious, “wait and watch” approach, Pakistan is actively seeking to reshape Afghanistan’s political landscape.

The Pakistan–Afghanistan conflict is likely to adversely affect trans-Afghan connectivity projects aimed at linking Central and South Asia, whether in the planning, negotiation, or implementation stages. For example, regional connectivity featured prominently in Pakistan–Kazakhstan discussions during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Islamabad in February 2026. A proposed US$ 7 billion railway project envisaged connecting Kazakhstan to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar via Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.

Similarly, the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (UAP) railway project is a trilateral initiative designed to connect Central Asia with the ports of Gwadar and Karachi through Afghanistan. Envisioned in 2021, the 850-kilometer corridor is expected to provide the first direct railway link between Central and South Asia. The US$ 4.8 billion project, scheduled for completion by 2027, will connect Tashkent to the Pakistani city of Peshawar via Kabul.

The US$ 10 billion Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline is a major strategic energy project intended to transport gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field, the world’s second largest, to energy-deficient markets in South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan. However, the project has already been delayed for over three decades due to persistent instability and conflict in Afghanistan.

Regime change in Kabul that ensures peace and stability in Afghanistan would facilitate a conducive environment for the implementation and completion of strategic connectivity projects between Central and South Asia. Conversely, if such efforts intensify conflict in the already war-torn country, these projects are likely to face indefinite delays.

CONCLUSIONS:

Officially, Islamabad frames its military campaign as an effort to compel the Taliban regime to withdraw support for Afghanistan-based militant groups targeting Pakistan. However, the operation also appears intended to convey that regime change is a clear option, should the Taliban fail to take verifiable action against such groups operating from Afghan territory. For a comprehensive regime change effort, Pakistan, China, and Tajikistan would have to align their positions on the jihadist threats emanating from Afghanistan, which, after more than four years of Taliban rule, has effectively become a safe haven for militant groups. The outcomes of the current operation will in turn have a significant impact on the future of trans-Afghan connectivity projects.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.

Email:  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. . 

By Eldaniz Gusseinov and Rassul Kospanov

Pakistan's declaration of “open war” on Afghanistan in late February 2026, following sustained airstrikes on Kabul, Kandahar, and Bagram airbase under Operation Ghazab Lil Haq, has effectively closed the principal corridor through which Afghan trade reached the sea. While attention has been concentrated to the immediate military dimension, a structurally more consequential process is unfolding in parallel: a reorientation of Afghanistan’s external economic links away from Pakistan and toward Central Asia. This shift was already underway, driven by periodic border disruptions, trade friction, and the steady maturation of northern infrastructure, but the war has compressed its timeline considerably. Three concurrent developments: the collapse of Pakistan-Afghanistan commerce, the ratification of a preferential trade agreement between Uzbekistan and Kabul, and the near-completion of the CASA-1000 power transmission project, suggest that Afghanistan's economic geography is quickly being redrawn.

Image Credit: View of the old city of Kabul, Afghanistan, first uploaded on Wikipedia Commons [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User: Casimiri]

BACKGROUND:

Afghanistan’s economic dependence on Pakistan long predated the current escalation. The Torkham and Chaman crossings served as the country’s principal gateways to Karachi and Gwadar, providing access to maritime trade routes that Central Asian landlocked corridors could not replicate. Yet the relationship was structurally vulnerable. Kabul’s refusal to formally recognize the Durand Line as an international border underpinned recurring post‑2001 border closures and trade disruptions, and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 added a new layer of friction as Islamabad’s demands that Kabul curb TTP sanctuaries went largely unmet. By 2024, divergence was increasingly visible: Pakistan substituted Afghan coal for sea‑borne coal imports and other suppliers while Afghan exporters faced tightening customs and transit restrictions. Bilateral commerce between Pakistan and Afghanistan contracted from approximately USD 2.46 billion in 2024 to USD 1.77 billion in 2025. At the same time, Afghanistan’s trade with Central Asian countries increased significantly, rising by 77 percent. The main driver of this growth was trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, which expanded by 53 percent, reaching approximately US$ 1.6 billion.

The February 2026 escalation removed whatever residual reliability the southern corridor retained. Pakistani airstrikes under Operation Ghazab Lil Haq targeted Taliban military infrastructure across multiple provinces, a full trade suspension was imposed, and buffer-zone operations along the Durand Line added a physical barrier to the political and commercial obstacles already in place. For Afghan business networks and logistics operators, the southern route shifted from periodically unreliable to operationally closed.

Uzbekistan’s Hairatan border crossing on the Amu Darya handled approximately 76 percent of Afghanistan’s northern freight transit before the current escalation, channeling goods toward Russia, China, and the Caspian. Afghanistan’s dependence on Central Asian electricity suppliers, principally Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, which together provide 80-85 percent of the country's power imports, had established dense operational relationships at the border long before formal trade policy followed. Total transit volumes through Afghanistan reached 5 million tons in 2024, demonstrating that the trans-Afghan corridor had become integral to Central Asian commerce with South Asia. The Central Asian factor in Afghanistan’s economy was already structural; yet the war changed its relative weight.

IMPLICATIONS:

The most immediate institutional development is the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Preferential Trade Agreement, signed at the Tashkent International Investment Forum on June 10, 2025, and ratified by President Mirziyoyev in March 2026. The agreement eliminates customs tariffs on 14 categories of goods, prioritizing Afghan agricultural exports, streamlines phytosanitary certification for Afghan farm produce, and formalizes 24-hour operations at the Hairatan-Termez border crossing to accommodate increased volumes. Tashkent’s stated ambition is to raise bilateral trade from roughly US$ 1.6 billion toward US$ 5 billion within five years. It is significant not merely as a commercial target but as a political signal. By institutionalizing preferences and creating a structured long-term framework, Uzbekistan has moved well beyond the ad hoc transactional engagement that characterized the immediate post-2021 period.

The CASA-1000 project, which will add approximately 300 megawatts to Afghanistan’s power supply via a transmission line from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, has reached an advanced stage of completion on the Afghan segment, with commissioning targeted for 2027. Uzbekistan has separately committed US$ 1.15 billion in deals for gas-fired generation and transmission infrastructure within Afghanistan, while a 25-year contract for development of the Toti-Maidan gas field deepens the bilateral energy relationship further. In parallel, following the Kazakhstan–Afghanistan business forum held in Shymkent, Astana announced plans to begin geological exploration in Afghanistan’s Laghman province. As part of this initiative, the Kazakh companies Kazatomprom and Kazakhmys conducted two geological missions to assess the potential development of beryllium and lead deposits.

These linkages carry strategic weight beyond their technical specifications: a country that depends on Central Asia for the electricity powering its cities and industries has strong incentives to sustain institutional connectivity with the region, irrespective of the diplomatic nuances in its relations with individual Central Asian capitals.

The Trans-Afghan Railway, whose feasibility framework was signed in July 2025, constitutes the third pillar of this emerging architecture. The corridor, linking Uzbekistan through Mazar-i-Sharif toward South Asian ports, had historically been conceived as a north-south bridge serving Central Asian exporters seeking sea access through Afghanistan. 

Kazakhstan does not oppose Uzbekistan’s project but is promoting an alternative corridor through western Afghanistan. The route Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak is considered technically simpler due to its largely flat terrain, compared to the Uzbek route that passes through the high-altitude Salang Pass. Kazakhstan plans to invest around US$ 500 million, including the construction of railway segments and the creation of a logistics hub in Herat, which is expected to become a key “dry port” for Kazakh cargo.

If realized, this project would represent the first attempt since the nineteenth century to build a railway corridor in this direction. In 1879, British authorities considered constructing a railway to Kandahar. It was never implemented due to resistance from local tribal elites and the ongoing Anglo-Afghan War. After the Russian Empire captured the Panjdeh area north of Herat in 1885, Russian officials explored but never realized the possibility of extending the Trans-Caspian Railway from Krasnovodsk (now Turkmenbashi) through Merv to Herat. Kazakhstan is now demonstrating political boldness by advancing an ambitious initiative seeking to accomplish what the great empires of the past ultimately failed to achieve.

While the Pakistani military campaign has not eliminated the long-term logic of that corridor, it has introduced a medium-term disruption that reinforces Afghanistan’s own interest in northern connectivity, not merely as a transit function enabling others.

The structural dynamic underlying all three of these processes is that Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, have pursued a consistently pragmatic engagement with the Taliban since 2021. Tashkent, Astana, and Ashgabat have avoided formal recognition while building dense working relationships on trade, border management, energy supply, and security coordination. For the Taliban, whose options have narrowed sharply as a result of the Pakistan conflict, this transactional model is comparatively attractive. Central Asian partners do not demand regime change or condition economic engagement on governance reforms and are geographically indispensable for the country’s energy supply. Tashkent and Kabul are not natural allies but increasingly unavoidable partners.

The risks in this trajectory lie in its structural fragility. Afghanistan’s trade deficit reached approximately US$ 9.4 billion in 2024, its export base remains concentrated in agricultural goods and coal, and its settlement infrastructure relies heavily on informal hawala transfers rather than banking channels. Northern trade growth has been accompanied by a persistent imbalance: Central Asian exports to Afghanistan are growing in volume while narrowing in variety, concentrated in flour, fuel, and electricity, with volatility coefficients suggesting that these supply chains remain sensitive to disruption. A durable transformation will require not merely preferential tariff access but energy and industrial investment capable of shifting Afghanistan from a consumer of basic goods to a contributor of productive capacity. For Central Asian states, this is not merely an altruistic objective: without a functional industrial base in Afghanistan, Central Asian exporters will face continued concentration risk in a market that is simultaneously growing and fragile.

CONCLUSIONS:

The Pakistan-Afghanistan war has accelerated Afghanistan’s northward economic pivot. By severing the southern corridor at precisely the moment that Central Asian infrastructure like CASA-1000, the Hairatan-Termez corridor, and the Trans-Afghan Railway framework are reaching operational maturity, the conflict has compressed a decade-long structural transition into a period of months. Uzbekistan has moved most aggressively to institutionalize this realignment through the Preferential Trade Agreement and its energy investment commitments, but the broader dynamic reflects a regional logic that extends to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan: Central Asian states require a stable Afghanistan as a transit corridor and buffer against militant spillover, while Afghanistan requires Central Asian energy, markets, and institutional connectivity as substitutes for a now-hostile southern partner. Whether this convergence of interests consolidates into durable integration will depend on whether both sides can address structural fragilities such as payment infrastructure, export diversification, and logistics gaps, which continue to constrain the corridor’s full potential. The war has resolved an ambiguity in Afghanistan’s foreign economic orientation; the harder task of building a resilient northern integration architecture now begins.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Eldaniz Gusseinov is Head of Research and сo-founder at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int. and a non-resident research fellow at Haydar Aliyev Center for Eurasian Studies of the Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul. Rassul Kospanov is a Senior Researcher at the National Analytical Center under Nazarbayev University, where he coordinates socio-political research projects and prepares analytical reports and policy recommendations for central and local government bodies. His work focuses on political processes in Kazakhstan and across Central Asia, as well as issues of regional cooperation.