By Robert M. Cutler

In late December 2025, Armenia’s Central Election Commission pointed to June 7, 2026, as the likely date for parliamentary elections, implicitly tightening the timetable for any referendum linked to the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. With the text initialed but unsigned, Yerevan and Baku face steps towards ratification, slowly continuing border demarcation work, and interim arrangements. Russia, Turkey, and Iran are signaling their interests, but Armenia’s domestic politics will be decisive for the treaty’s signature and entry into force, and for the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

Credit: Shutterstock

BACKGROUND: Early in 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan moved the peace process beyond a notional document toward a text whose core provisions are settled. On March 13, 2025, the two foreign ministries publicly stated that they had concluded negotiations on the draft “Agreement on Peace and the Establishment of Interstate Relations.” At the same time, Azerbaijan framed its signature as contingent on changes to Armenia’s constitution. 

While the March 2025 step did not produce an immediate signature, it shifted the process from drafting to preconditions and sequencing. Whereas Baku treats language in the preamble to Armenia’s constitution as a territorial claim, Yerevan rejects that interpretation, pointing to the possibility of a constitutional referendum without setting a definite timeline. The draft also contains language that would bar deployment of third-country personnel along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. That provision bears directly on any monitoring presence near the frontier and, more broadly, on how the parties intend to manage security before demarcation is complete.

On August 8, 2025, the process advanced again in Washington. The parties initialed the text, and on August 11, Armenia published the full draft by mutual agreement. This U.S.-brokered step still stopped short of formal signature. The published text is explicit on several foundational points: it affirms mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity on the basis that former Soviet administrative borders become international borders; it renounces territorial claims; and it bars the use or threat of force as well as the use of each party’s territory by a third party for force against the other.

The draft also specifies the intended machinery for implementation. Diplomatic relations are to be established within a specified number of days after completion of ratification, although the published draft leaves that number blank. Border commissions are tasked to negotiate a separate delimitation and demarcation agreement. In the interim, the parties commit not to deploy third-party forces along the border and to adopt mutually agreed confidence-building measures pending demarcation. Additional “modalities” to be negotiated later include the detailed handling of missing persons and the working rules for the bilateral commission that is meant to oversee implementation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Armenia’s domestic political timetable has become a binding constraint on the pace and sequencing of decisions. On December 24, 2025, Armenpress reported that the chairman of the Central Election Commission said that June 7, 2026, was widely regarded as the likely election day, although a presidential decree had not yet been issued. That prospective date matters because Azerbaijan’s constitutional precondition points toward a referendum route in Armenia, while the treaty text itself anticipates domestic procedures and ratification steps before it can take effect. As of January 2026, the agreement’s core commitments are public and the text has been initialed, but signature and operational implementation still depend on how Yerevan and Baku sequence domestic legal assurances, border-related work, and interim security arrangements.

The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework stipulates that the route remains Armenian sovereign territory, while granting the U.S. exclusive development rights for 99 years. Washington would presumably pay Yerevan for the lease, with the land sub-leased to an Armenian-U.S. joint venture that would serve as the operator, holding a long-term mandate to construct and manage rail, road, pipelines, and fiber-optic infrastructure along the approximately 25 miles of Armenian territory linking Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. The U.S. might potentially deploy limited security personnel to ensure corridor security, but official texts remain vague on any on-the-ground presence. 

The peace text, as well as official Armenian statements, emphasize that the route is to be operated under Armenian law, with Yerevan retaining jurisdiction and administrative control. That emphasis, which is intended to foreclose putative concerns about extraterritorial claims by Azerbaijan, is necessary to placate and manage domestic and diaspora opinion. However, the framework agreement does not resolve key practical questions, including customs and border management details such as who stamps cargo, how fees are shared, and whether streamlined or special customs procedures will apply.

At this stage, the issue is less about drafting than durability. If the corridor arrangement proceeds under a 99-year U.S. development right, regional capitals will treat it as a strategic marker as well as a transport project. Moscow will judge it against its South Caucasus position; Tehran will weigh it against its red lines on transit and foreign presence; Ankara and Brussels will look for leverage on connectivity and standards. In Armenia, the sovereignty formula will be measured against day-to-day control at the route. Those pressures will shape prospects more than the text itself.

The attitudes of the three major regional players – Russia, Turkey, and Iran – are important conditioning factors, but none seems willing and able to block a peace deal definitively. For example, Moscow publicly welcomed the U.S.-brokered step but also warned that involvement by “non-regional players” should not create new divisions. Russia’s core attitude appears to be conditional acceptance of a peace text, paired with resistance to a long-duration U.S. operational footprint in a sensitive strip of Armenia. The warning language is less about the agreement’s existence than about who institutionalizes it and who physically manages it. A predictable Russian preference is that any corridor implementation be folded back into regionally branded formats. Indirect Russian-linked participation remains structurally available because a subsidiary of Russian Railways holds a concession to manage Armenia’s railway network.

Iran ostensibly welcomes the peace while warning against foreign “intervention” near its borders. Its attitude thus refuses to tolerate any outcome that looks like a change in the geopolitical configuration around Armenia’s southern border. Iranian commentary has linked the TRIPP specifically to concerns about a NATO-adjacent presence on the border. A senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader used escalatory deterrent rhetoric portraying the corridor concept as unacceptable and explicitly threatened to prevent “geopolitical changes.” Tehran’s interests are actually best served by a re-ignition of the conflict and the economic impoverishment of the Armenian population, both of which would decrease Yerevan’s autonomy and open for enhanced Iranian influence. Yet of course, it cannot say this out loud. Tehran’s lacks any actual capacity for vetoing the agreement but can exercise coercive signaling through military exercises, political warnings, and pressure through regional alignments.

Turkey strongly favors any route that de-isolates Nakhchivan, welcoming the corridor concept as a gain for strategic connectivity linking Europe to Asia via Turkey. However, despite its conditional welcome of a U.S.-anchored commercial structure, Ankara still wants the region’s political center of gravity to remain in the Ankara–Baku axis rather than shifting to Washington as the indispensable actor. A commercially functioning route will accelerate Turkey’s own normalization goals with Armenia, which are explicitly tied to an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty outcome. In late December 2025, Armenia and Turkey implemented a limited but concrete confidence step on visa procedures for certain official passport holders, effective January 1, 2026. Turkey will want a formula that works for Armenia, because a route that triggers prolonged Armenian internal instability would not be in Turkish interests.

CONCLUSIONS: To summarize, Russia would like to keep the process “regionalizable” and resist a precedent of long-term U.S. operating control, while Iran will treat optics as substance, especially regarding anything that looks like foreign security infrastructure adjacent to Iran’s border. Turkey’s attitude is broadly enabling, because the route advances Ankara’s connectivity vision and strengthens its ties with Azerbaijan. The evolution of domestic Armenian politics, however, is what will really determine the outcome: whether Pashinyan’s forces receive a majority of seats in the June parliamentary election, and whether a subsequent referendum will approve the necessary change in Armenia’s constitution.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler is Director and Senior Fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada. He was for many years a senior researcher at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

By Anna Gevorgyan

The foreign and security architecture of Armenia has been largely shaped by the transformations of the role and capacity of regional actors after the 2020 Second Karabakh War. Russia’s continuing weakness due to its invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s growing role in the region, and Iran’s increasing vulnerability due to security challenges and economic crisis have been the key drivers shaping regional developments. At the global level, the US's growing interest in involvement in regional affairs has become another important feature in Armenia’s future.

Read Crossroads of Uncertainty

By Eduard Abrahamyan

In recent months, Armenia and Russia have strengthened their relations. A series of high-level meetings shows not just a return to normal diplomacy but a purposeful reshaping of their alliance. Alongside President Putin’s renewed ties with Azerbaijani President Aliyev and the Kremlin’s broader adjustment of its regional strategy, the revived dialogue between Putin and Prime Minister Pashinyan forms part of a wider diplomatic renewal. This shift marks a clear easing of the tensions that strained their bilateral relations from September 2022 to mid-2024.



                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The intensified Armenia–Russia bilateral reengagement commenced on October 8, 2024, with the Moscow meeting between Putin and Pashinyan, ostensibly ending a two-year estrangement stemming from Moscow’s inaction and the CSTO’s reluctance to deter or even explicitly identify Azerbaijan as the initiator of the September 2022 incursions into Armenian territory. Equally detrimental was the perception that Moscow had tacitly approved Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation in Karabakh.

The October 2024 meeting set both sides on a path toward a “new rhythm” in strategic relations, creating the basis for a renewed partnership aimed at resolving the “misunderstandings” that had emerged, as later described by Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Sergey Lavrov. The two leaders have since maintained regular contact through phone calls and in-person meetings throughout 2025. Yerevan also hosted several high-level Russian delegations, underscoring the breadth and institutional depth of the renewed dialogue. Diplomatic sources described this reset as a key turning point that effectively ended the period of tension, with both governments instructing their institutions to pursue a full realignment across all areas of strategic cooperation.

In January and May 2025, the foreign ministers made reciprocal visits, each reaffirming the start of a “new page” in the strategic partnership through “genuine and open discussions on accumulated issues.” This diplomatic thaw reached its peak in June 2025 with the visit of Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of Russia’s Federation Council, to Yerevan, aimed at strengthening parliamentary cooperation. Matviyenko’s visit not only supported Armenia’s evolving foreign policy direction but also highlighted the Kremlin’s engagement in Armenia’s domestic politics. Her meetings in Yerevan were widely seen as a sign of Moscow’s friendly neutrality, or even quiet support for the ruling Civil Contract party ahead of Armenia’s general elections planned for June 2026. After her meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan on 6 June, Matviyenko stated that “[Pashinyan] conveyed greetings to our president and emphasized that, despite insinuations, he and [Putin] have always maintained constructive, substantive relations without any issues,” sending a clear message to the “ill-wishers” that no divisions exist between the Armenian and Russian leadership.

The revival of high-level diplomacy has taken place alongside Pashinyan’s participation in international forums led or co-funded by Russia. In May 2025, he attended Moscow’s Victory Day parade, one of Putin’s most visible displays of state power and ideological authority. Pashinyan also traveled to Kazan to join the sixteenth BRICS Summit, which the Kremlin presented as proof that Western efforts to isolate Russia had failed. In July, Armenia’s Prime Minister took part in the International Conference on Nature and Environmental Protection in the Altai, supporting Putin’s broader vision of portraying Russia not as a marginal actor in the Turkic world but as the guardian of its historical and cultural origins amid the growth of the Organization of Turkic States. Later, Pashinyan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where Pakistan blocked Armenia’s application for full membership. Armenia would otherwise likely have joined one of the most rapidly consolidating non-Western frameworks, arguably challenging the West.

The recent strengthening of Armenia–Russia relations is closely linked to economic interdependence and the gradual improvement of Russia’s public image in Armenia. Economically, Russia has reaffirmed its role as Armenia’s main trading partner, with trade turnover reaching a record US$ 12.4 billion in 2024, more than twice the level recorded in 2022. According to investigative reports, this increase reflects the function of both Armenia and Azerbaijan as logistical intermediaries in Moscow’s sanction-evasion networks. Armenia’s re-export channels have supported the transfer of dual-use goods to, and embargoed gold from, Russia, while Azerbaijan has discreetly facilitated the re-export of Russian hydrocarbons. Together, these practices have formed a coordinated and mutually beneficial regional mechanism that reinforces the Kremlin’s economic resilience. In September 2025, during the World Atomic Week conference in Moscow, Pashinyan and Putin agreed that Rosatom would extend the operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant for another decade, ensuring continued supply of over 30 percent of Armenia’s electricity. Official statements also noted that the two leaders discussed the potential construction of a new reactor by Rosatom to address Armenia’s concerns about the ageing Soviet-era facility.

Russia’s public image in Armenia has begun to recover from its low point in 2022–2023. A July 2025 poll by the International Republican Institute shows a clear improvement in public attitudes: the share of respondents viewing Russia as the “greatest threat” fell to 27 percent (down from 40 percent the previous year), while 45 percent now regard Russia as Armenia’s most important political partner, an 18-point increase since 2024. This change in perception is driven less by traditional Russian information campaigns or local pro-Russian media than by a deliberate adjustment of Armenia’s state-controlled narrative, which now tends to present Russia in a “pragmatically” neutral light. The outcome is a gradual restoration of public ambivalence, a sentiment neither strongly pro- nor anti-Russian, that mirrors Yerevan’s cautious process of re-accommodation with Moscow.

IMPLICATIONS: The ongoing renegotiation of the Russia–Armenia alliance, alongside Putin’s renewed rapprochement with Azerbaijan as shown at the CIS Dushanbe summit in October, suggests that the recurring “crises” in Moscow’s relations with Yerevan and Baku are not genuine strategic breaks. Instead of marking major shifts, these episodes usually reflect short-term tactical frictions, temporary disagreements that each side manages or uses to achieve immediate political or diplomatic goals.

Such frictions are often exaggerated in Western discussions as signs of a major geopolitical shift, whether portrayed as Armenia’s “pro-Western pivot” or Azerbaijan’s alleged “anti-Russian turn.” In reality, the situation is more nuanced. Both Yerevan and Baku often highlight the appearance of tension with Moscow for strategic purposes, using the perceived distance from Russia to strengthen their negotiating position with Western partners.

For Armenia, this approach supports a dual narrative: expressing European ambitions to gain sympathy and investment while keeping practical ties with Russia for various reasons. Pashinyan’s shifting engagement with the CSTO reflects this duality—not an actual withdrawal, but an effort to push the bloc to act while maintaining reassurance toward Western partners. Likewise, the 2024 removal of Russian border guards from the Armenia–Iran border was largely symbolic, affecting only the Agarak–Nordooz checkpoint, while Russian software systems and personnel continued to operate.

Azerbaijan follows a similar strategy, occasionally dramatizing its disagreements with Moscow to project strategic independence while maintaining practical cooperation. As Aliyev stated during his meeting with Putin in Dushanbe, despite the December plane incident, the “relationship has successfully developed across many areas,” which Putin hoped would “continue in the spirit of our alliance.” Despite symbolic disputes, Baku and Moscow continue to collaborate in energy, transport, and security, including through the “3+3” regional platform and trilateral projects involving Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran. These selective displays do not mean that all tensions are artificial or coordinated. Real disagreements remain, such as over Moscow’s security obligations to Armenia or the oil contamination scandal involving Russian exports passing through Azerbaijani infrastructure to the EU, but Pashinyan and Aliyev rarely cross Moscow’s strategic boundaries. Thus, what appears as instability often serves to renegotiate hierarchies rather than to overturn them.

For Moscow, this managed ambiguity remains advantageous. By allowing limited dissent and some visible distance, Russia maintains its regional influence while appearing less intrusive, “being present by seeming absent.” This recently adopted strategy enables Putin to exercise influence without attracting too much Western attention. From Moscow’s viewpoint, even Western-backed initiatives such as the August 8 Armenia–Azerbaijan Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) infrastructure deal are not viewed as threatening. Instead, TRIPP is seen as fitting into Russia’s wider connectivity strategy, linking Russia and Turkey through Azerbaijan, similar to how the North–South corridor connects Russia and Iran. The Kremlin’s reasoning assumes that regional realities, codified by the November 9, 2020, trilateral agreement, will eventually force Washington either to cooperate with Moscow or to withdraw from the project.

For Yerevan, adopting a “region-first” policy means engaging with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, even while maintaining pro-Western rhetoric. The March 2025 parliamentary resolution to start EU membership talks serves mostly performative and domestic aims rather than indicating a real policy shift. The Pashinyan government continues to emphasize the advantages of the Eurasian Economic Union and has applied to join the SCO, showing how Western-oriented language coexists with lasting non-Western partnerships.

Moscow’s acceptance of this balancing comes from its belief that Pashinyan’s EU-focused gestures do not present a real threat. This explains the Kremlin’s restrained reaction to events such as the arrest of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who has fallen out of favor in Putin’s circles. Putin does not oppose either Pashinyan or Aliyev; rather, he views both as cooperative actors within Russia’s changing regional strategy. This approach is reflected in the Kremlin’s “warm neutrality,” expressed by Matviyenko toward Pashinyan before Armenia’s elections, and in Putin’s calculated revelation at the Dushanbe summit about Ramiz Mehtiyev’s planned coup against Aliyev. 

CONCLUSIONS: At this stage, Armenia–Russia relations highlight the growing gap between outward perception and internal reality in the region. To Western observers, Armenia’s pursuit of European integration and broader multilateral ties may seem like a gradual move away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. Yet beneath this surface lies a more complex and regionally rooted dynamic. It suggests that the Kremlin is rethinking its approach in the South Caucasus, developing a coordinated and flexible form of engagement with both Armenia and Azerbaijan that hides the full extent of Russian influence while strengthening the illusion that Russia is withdrawing. This adjustment gives all three actors subtle room to maneuver, allowing for a shared strategy of cooperative dominance and geopolitical maskirovka.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Eduard Abrahamyan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Analysis and author of Small States, Russia and the West: Polarity, Constellations and Heterogeneity in the Geopolitics of the Caucasus (Routledge, 2025).

By Vali Kaleji 

On August 27, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the unprecedented statement that he recognizes the mass killings of Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks in the early 20th century Ottoman Empire as genocide. Armenia dismissed the gesture as insincere and opportunistic, given Israel’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan and Yerevan’s ongoing normalization talks with Ankara. Netanyahu’s recognition and its aftermath signify the contradictions of the new regional order emerging between the South Caucasus and the Levant.

                                                                              Credit: Pexels

BACKGROUND: To maintain ties with Türkiye, Israel had long avoided officially recognizing the mass killings of Christians in the early 20th century Ottoman empire as genocide. When asked by Patrick Bet-David on his podcast why Israel does not recognize the Armenian genocide, Netanyahu said, “I think we have. I think the Knesset passed a resolution to that effect.” However, Israel’s parliament has not passed any such legislation into law. When asked why no Israeli prime minister has recognized the genocide, Netanyahu responded, “I just did. Here you go.”

Türkiye condemned and rejected Netanyahu’s statements. On August 29, it announced the complete suspension of all commercial and economic relations with Israel and the closure of its airspace to Israeli aircraft. This decision may be interpreted as a reaction to Israel’s renewed ground operations in Gaza as well as Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide. Türkiye’s responses to previous recognitions have consisted of diplomatic tensions, temporary cooling of bilateral relations, the summoning or recall of ambassadors, and critical rhetoric. To date, Türkiye has not severed relations with any of the 33 states recognizing the Armenian genocide.

Internationally, positions taken on the early 20th-century mass killings of Christians can be broadly divided into three categories. The first includes Türkiye and its close ally Azerbaijan, which deny that the events constituted genocide, characterizing them instead as unsystematic outcomes of the turmoil marking the final years of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The second category comprises Asian, Middle Eastern, and African states that neither deny the events nor officially recognize them as genocide. Seeking to preserve relations with Türkiye, these countries employ terms such as “massacre,” “mass murder,” “catastrophe,” “human tragedy,” and “inhumane actions.” 

The third category comprises the governments and parliaments of 33 states that have formally recognized the Armenian genocide. Following Netanyahu’s recent statement, Israel may now be considered the 34th country to join this group. 

IMPLICATIONS: Although no state has ever officially revoked its recognition of the Armenian genocide, the durability of Netanyahu’s stance as an element of Israel’s official policy toward Türkiye remains uncertain. The Knesset has not enacted any legislation formalizing such recognition. It is conceivable that a conclusion of the Gaza war, Netanyahu’s departure from office, changes in the political composition of the Israeli government and Knesset, or a normalization of Israeli–Turkish relations could prompt a reassessment of this position. In that case, Israel’s recognition may remain confined to Netanyahu’s statement amid bilateral tensions with Türkiye, rather than evolving into a permanent state policy.

Syria provides a clear example of how political instability and relations with Türkiye have influenced decisions to recognize the Armenian genocide. For decades, Syria refrained from official recognition, despite its strong ties with the Armenian diaspora and Armenia itself, in order to preserve relations with Türkiye. However, at the height of the Syrian civil war, Syria became the second Arab state, after Lebanon, to recognize the massacres of Armenians as genocide on February 13, 2020. After the fall of the Assad regime, this stance appears to have shifted significantly. The de facto government led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani now maintains close relations with Türkiye. Although it has not yet officially rescinded the earlier recognition, revisions to Syrian school history books, specifically the removal of references to Ottoman-era massacres and Syrian resistance to Ottoman rule, suggest an emerging reorientation in Syria’s approach under the new leadership.

Conversely, the Armenian government’s response to Netanyahu’s statement diverged from its usual reaction to other states’ recognition of the Armenian genocide. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan rejected the Israeli leader’s remarks, emphasizing that Armenia must decide whether it wishes such recognition to become “a geopolitical bargaining chip in the hands of those who have no connection to our reality or the interests of our people.” 

There are four key aspects to the Armenian government’s position. First, Yerevan perceives Netanyahu’s statement as lacking sincerity and genuine historical or moral solidarity with the victims of the genocide, particularly at a time when Israel faces intense international criticism over human rights violations over its war in Gaza. Second, Yerevan attributes this declaration primarily to Israel’s escalating dispute with Türkiye, which has deepened following Israel’s decision to impose a total blockade and occupation of Gaza. Consequently, from Yerevan’s perspective, Netanyahu’s remarks function primarily as an instrument of political pressure on Türkiye. 

Third, Israel maintains a close partnership with Azerbaijan, and Israeli military assistance played a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s victory during the Second Karabakh War in October–November 2020. This conflict resulted in Azerbaijan’s full capture of Nagorno-Karabakh and the mass displacement of Armenians to Armenia. The legacy of Armenia’s political and military defeats, facilitated in part by Israeli support, renders it difficult for the Armenian government to accept or welcome Netanyahu’s recognition. 

Fourth, Pashinyan’s government has actively pursued the normalization of relations with Türkiye in recent years. Following the recent agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump, the likelihood of restoring diplomatic relations and reopening the borders between Armenia and Türkiye has significantly increased.

From the perspective of many Armenians, particularly those within the Armenian diaspora who regard themselves as descendants of the survivors of the genocide, Pashinyan’s government is transgressing the “red lines” of Armenian historical claims by seeking normalization with Türkiye without meeting four key preconditions. These include: official recognition of the genocide by the Turkish government; a formal apology from Türkiye, as the Ottoman Empire’s successor state; compensation for the approximately 1.5 million victims; and the restitution of Armenian homes, lands, and churches, especially in eastern Türkiye. Türkiye has consistently rejected these conditions for the past century. 

CONCLUSIONS: Ultimately, Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide represents the latest manifestation of the contradictions shaping the emerging regional order spanning the South Caucasus and the Levant. This new configuration has arisen in the aftermath of the events of October 7 and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, developments that have diminished the influence of Iran, Russia, and while positioning Arab and Western states, along with Türkiye and, as key actors in post-Assad Syria. Armenia lost an international partner in the al-Assad regime, whereas Azerbaijan has sought to build a productive relationship with its successor. 

Baku has sought to establish a new coalition with Türkiye, Israel, and Syria, attempting to mediate between Ankara and Tel Aviv, as well as between Damascus and Tel Aviv. However, issues such as the Golan Heights, Israel’s support for Syria’s Druze minority, and its military interventions have rendered rapprochement between Israel and Syria particularly difficult. Furthermore, Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide and Türkiye’s subsequent decision to sever all trade and air connections with Israel have severely undermined mediation efforts between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, the divergent political aspirations of Syria’s Kurdish population, perceived as a shared challenge by both Türkiye and Syria’s new leadership, constitute another critical element in the intricate geopolitical landscape of the Levant in the post–October 7 and post-Assad era.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at    This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

The U.S.-brokered peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, culminating in the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), have triggered a sharp strategic reaction from Iran. The 20-mile corridor through Zangezur grants Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhchivan under long-term U.S. management, reshaping regional connectivity and bypassing Iran. Tehran perceives the initiative as a U.S. encroachment on its northern frontier, eroding its leverage in the South Caucasus. The muted Russian response and Armenia’s growing openness to Western—and potentially Israeli—security ties deepen Iran’s unease, fueling fears of encirclement and diminishing its role as a key regional transit hub.

BACKGROUND: Brokered by the U.S., the latest Armenia–Azerbaijan peace talks have quietly but decisively reshaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus. At the heart of the deal is a newly designated transit Zangezur Corridor, officially named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which would grant Azerbaijan direct access to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenian territory. Moscow has responded with unusual silence, while Tehran has openly bristled at the emergence of a U.S.-designed transit network on its northern frontier.

Iran’s initial reaction to the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan peace framework has been visceral, with some prominent media organs terming it a “betrayal”. Tehran explicitly sees TRIPP as a U.S. footprint pressed onto its northern frontier. The plan envisions a 20-mile corridor through Armenia’s Syunik region, linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, with development rights leased to a U.S. consortium for up to 99 years. More than redrawing borders, the project reshapes the balance of power and places a sustained U.S. commercial and political presence in the narrow strip where Iran has long turned geography into strategic leverage.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran interprets the recent Azerbaijan–Armenia peace talks not only as a potential shift in the regional balance of power but also as part of a broader geopolitical environment increasingly hostile to its interests. Tehran worries that a settlement, especially one facilitated or backed by Western actors (including Turkey), could strengthen Azerbaijan’s position, deepen Baku’s security and economic ties with the West and Israel, and reduce Iran’s leverage in the South Caucasus. These concerns are amplified by the expanding footprint of the U.S. and Israel in Azerbaijan, from intelligence cooperation to defense technology transfers, which Tehran perceives as part of a containment strategy aimed at its northern flank. Against this backdrop, any peace process that sidelines Iran or solidifies the U.S. influence in the region risks, in Tehran’s view, to tighten the strategic noose around its borders.

Iran’s historical memory of regional threats plays a significant role in shaping its foreign policy reflexes. In addition to the growing perception of U.S. and Israeli threats following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further heightened Tehran’s sense of vulnerability. Iranian officials, suspecting that the Soviets might use the Baloch as a stepping stone toward making Iran their next target, began seeking countermeasures. After the Soviet collapse, the country continued to frame its foreign policy around an intensifying rhetoric of U.S. and Israeli danger and the cooperation of Azerbaijan with these powers. Today, Washington’s renewed bid to reassert influence in the region is likely to aggravate Iran’s geopolitical anxieties, with indirect repercussions visible in Iran–Azerbaijan relations.

Tehran’s messaging, while varied in tone, consistently reflects unease about the deal. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, warned that the corridor would become a “graveyard” for its backers; a classic piece of deterrent rhetoric aimed at raising costs and sowing doubt. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry expressed conditional support for a peace deal in principle, while cautioning against “foreign interference” near Iran’s borders. President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Iran’s core demand had been met, yet voicing unease over U.S. corporate involvement.

Tehran is not worried about lines on a map. It is losing the bargaining power that those lines used to confer. A corridor under Armenian law deprives Iran of the sovereignty argument it used against an “extraterritorial” Zangezur model, outside Armenian jurisdiction. However, U.S. stewardship narrows Iran’s room to shape rules, customs, and security practices at the edge of its border. A U.S.-organized logistics spine running from Turkey via Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan (tightening connectivity between Turkey and Central Asia) offers a shorter, more secure east–west route that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

The Russian reaction intensifies Iran’s dilemma. Moscow’s muted response by accepting a U.S. role while cautioning against “foreign meddling” signals that Russia, overstretched and weakened in credibility after the 2020 Second Karabakh War, lacks the capacity or will to reshape the deal. For Tehran, this translates into fewer veto options by proxy and a thinner buffer against Turkish and U.S. coordination. It also incentivizes Yerevan to deepen ties with Western partners, which is not acceptable for Tehran.

Economically, the corridor undermines Iran’s claim to constitute an indispensable regional bridge. Tehran has long positioned itself as the key link between the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, with initiatives like the International North–South Transport Corridor and electricity and gas swaps with Armenia designed to cement that role. A functioning TRIPP route diverts attention and investment toward the “Middle Corridor,” lowering the premium shippers pay for transit through Iran and shrinking Tehran’s leverage to extract side deals on access, security assurances or energy flexibility. Iran’s alternative options remain limited, as seen in its cautious approach to the Gulf of Hormuz closure in June 2025.

Security risks run in both directions. For Tehran, a U.S.-supervised logistics corridor along its northern frontier would invite surveillance and restrict its gray-zone tactics. Yet overt interference such as through intimidation, sabotage, or proxy harassment would likely backfire. Such moves could strengthen U.S.–Turkish coordination (and even Azerbaijani-Israeli coordination), justify reinforced security around the route and push Armenia toward even closer alignment with Washington and Brussels. Iran’s own experience shows that coercion is most effective when opponents lack a unifying patron; TRIPP provides precisely that.

Still, Tehran has a few levers left. The first is regulatory: it can push for “no military use” clauses, real-time customs transparency and verified policing regimes that limit the route’s securitization. The second is connectivity hedging. The new route builds upon Iran’s already existing north–south connections with Armenia, including the Meghri–Julfa railway link, expanded electricity exchanges, and predictable gas swaps. Thus, the U.S.-managed corridor supports, rather than replaces, Iranian routes. The third is political triangulation. Iran maintains open channels with Ankara on trade and energy, where their interests sometimes overlap, while giving Yerevan price and reliability benefits that only a neighboring country can offer.

CONCLUSIONS:  Then, what is the balance sheet? In the short term, Iran faces a strategic setback in shaping the regional agenda. The U.S. has demonstrated its ability to achieve outcomes in the South Caucasus that Moscow could not, and the corridor effectively puts a purely Western hand on the flow of regional connectivity (the role of Turkey is also extremely important). In the medium term, Tehran can still limit the impact by quickly upgrading its own corridors, offering competitive transit pricing, and securing Indian and Gulf participation in north–south routes, turning competition into redundancy rather than outright replacement. Over the long term, the key question is whether Iran can tolerate a U.S. presence next door while extracting enough rules and linkages to avoid strategic encirclement.

An additional factor complicates this calculus: the possibility of an Israel–Armenia security partnership. While historically limited, such a relationship becomes more logical in a post-peace-deal environment where Yerevan seeks diversified defense ties beyond Russia and the West. This possibility is already being discussed in various circles. Israeli defense technology, already embedded in Azerbaijan, could find a foothold in Armenia in the form of counter-drone systems, border surveillance or intelligence sharing, especially if framed as balancing Ankara–Baku military cooperation. For Tehran, this would imply Israeli-linked security infrastructure on both its northwestern and northern flanks, eroding any remaining buffer zones and deepening the perception of encirclement. In such a scenario, even an economically beneficial TRIPP corridor would be overshadowed by the strategic risks it amplifies.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Dr. Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as an academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs. Additionally, he is a member of the Young Turkey–Young America fellowship program at the Atlantic Council and the Korean Society of Contemporary European Studies.