S. Frederick Starr

March 20, 2025

This article was originally delivered as a speech in March 2025 at an Asian Development Bank conference on connectivity and trade under their Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program. 

Read Coordinating the Corridors (PDF)

By Sergey Sukhankin

Weakened by economic sanctions and bearing significant consequences for their geopolitical endeavors, Iran and Russia have solidified their post-2022 partnership, elevating it to the status of a comprehensive strategic partnership. The imperative to secure their borders and mitigate the impact of economic sanctions positions the South Caucasus and certain areas of the Caspian Sea as the focal points for deepening cooperation between Tehran and Moscow. Among the smaller regional actors, Azerbaijan is likely a primary beneficiary due to its geographically strategic location. Simultaneously, Russia may be inclined to reclaim some of its regional influence. This prospect is both precarious and potentially destabilizing for the region, as Russia’s historical engagement in the area has been characterized by conflict and disruptive interventions.

BACKGROUND: On January 17, Russia and Iran signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, marking the first high-level agreement between the two nations since 2001. Although historically characterized by tension and complexity, bilateral relations have undergone a significant transformation after 2022, in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its resulting international isolation. This period has seen a rapid elevation of Russian-Iranian ties, with some experts even suggesting the formation of an Entente.

The primary impetus behind this strengthening of relations lies in the challenges faced by both states. Politically isolated and subjected to extensive sanctions, Russia has become embroiled in a protracted and costly war. With limited strategic alternatives, Russian leadership has increasingly aligned itself with authoritarian regimes and internationally marginalized states—such as North Korea and Belarus—in an effort to mitigate the effects of its diplomatic and economic isolation and to secure critical military support.

Iran’s situation is arguably even more precarious. In addition to ongoing economic struggles and internal social unrest, Iran experienced a series of significant geopolitical setbacks between 2023 and 2024. At the end of 2024, the Tehran-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown by the Turkish-supported opposition. Furthermore, the Israel-Hamas war inflicted severe damage on another of Iran’s key Middle Eastern proxies. These developments have reportedly exacerbated internal divisions within the Iranian political establishment, leading segments of Iran’s military-political elite to adopt a more critical stance toward Moscow.

Despite these disagreements, Russia and Iran remain compelled to act as close partners—if not outright allies—in the domains of defense and security, and perhaps even more so in trade and economic cooperation, as both seek to mitigate the detrimental effects of international sanctions. In this context, collaboration in the Caspian Sea region—particularly in specific areas of the South Caucasus—is expected to play a pivotal role in reinforcing Russo-Iranian ties.

IMPLICATIONS:  The strengthening ties between Russia and Iran are expected to have a significant impact on the geo-economic landscape. As emphasized by Russian President Vladimir Putin, "the essence of the Treaty [between Russia and Iran] is about creating additional conditions [...] for the development of trade and economic ties. We need less bureaucracy and more action." This objective is explicitly outlined in Clause 13 of the Treaty.

At present, economic and trade cooperation between Tehran and Moscow remains limited. In 2024, the reported trade volume between the two countries did not exceed US$ 4 billion. However, this may change in the future, primarily due to Russia’s evolving geopolitical strategy. Given its significantly weakened global position after 2022, Moscow increasingly views Iran as its “window to Asia”—a crucial conduit for circumventing Western-imposed economic sanctions and mitigating their severe economic impact.

In pursuit of this objective, Russo-Iranian cooperation is expected to strengthen in two key domains. First, there will likely be an intensification of trade along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—a 7,200-kilometer multimodal freight route encompassing ship, rail, and road networks that connects India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Central Asia. The INSTC is increasingly regarded as a viable alternative to traditional maritime trade routes such as the Suez Canal and the Bosphorus Strait.

Within this framework, Azerbaijan stands to be a primary beneficiary, as its strategic geographic position between Iran and Russia will elevate its role as a crucial transportation hub, significantly enhancing its economic and geopolitical importance within the region.

Azerbaijan’s role could be further reinforced if the two countries proceed with the construction of a natural gas pipeline through Azerbaijani territory. Initially agreed upon in 2022 and reaffirmed in late 2024, this project represents a significant expansion of regional energy cooperation. In his most recent statement on January 17, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the proposed pipeline would have a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas—equivalent to the Nord Stream 1 capacity—and could potentially be extended to Pakistan and even India.

However, some Russian experts question the economic viability of the project, arguing that its feasibility remains uncertain. They suggest that the pipeline could serve as a political instrument for Russia to exert pressure on China, possibly as a means of persuading Beijing to strengthen its energy ties with Moscow. Nevertheless, if both the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the gas pipeline are successfully implemented, the South Caucasus—and Azerbaijan in particular—will see a marked increase in geopolitical and economic significance as a critical Eurasian transportation and energy corridor.

Although defense and security are not the primary focus of the Russo-Iranian Treaty, as explicitly stated by Iran’s Ambassador to Russia, Kazem Jalali, certain shifts in the regional security landscape are nonetheless anticipated.

One key factor influencing these dynamics is the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020), resulting in an undisputed victory for Azerbaijan which not only received strong backing from Turkey but also enjoyed tacit Russian support. This outcome significantly weakened Iran’s position in the South Caucasus, while simultaneously bolstering its strategic adversary, Turkey. In addition to consolidating its influence over Azerbaijan, Turkey also strengthened economic, political, and energy ties with both Azerbaijan and Georgia, marking a substantial geopolitical success for Ankara and further diminishing Tehran’s leverage in the region.

However, in the post-2022 period, the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus has undergone further transformations, creating additional common ground for Russo-Iranian cooperation. The increasing prominence of Turkey, which directly contradicts the strategic interests of both Russia and Iran, has been a key factor in this shift.

Simultaneously, Russia’s influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan has weakened. Armenia’s signing of a Charter on Strategic Partnership with the U.S. implies a diversification of its geopolitical partnerships, potentially reducing Moscow’s leverage in Yerevan. 

Moreover, by the end of 2024, anti-Russian sentiment became more pronounced in Abkhazia, a breakaway region that has been heavily reliant on Moscow. These developments have raised alarms among Russian analysts, some of whom have warned of Russia’s "approaching loss of the South Caucasus." While such statements may be premature and alarmist, they nonetheless reflect Moscow’s growing concerns regarding its long-term strategic foothold in the region.

Iran and Russia appear to prioritize a shared geopolitical objective: the de-Westernization of the South Caucasus and the prevention of strengthened U.S. regional influence. This strategic alignment is explicitly reflected in Clause 12 of the Russo-Iranian Treaty, which underscores both parties’ commitment to “strengthening peace and security in the Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East [to] prevent destabilizing interference by third parties” in these areas.

In this context, some experts suggest that Iran’s increased diplomatic involvement in regional affairs is likely. One potential avenue for such engagement is the "3+3" format, which includes Armenia, Iran, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Initially proposed by Ankara and Baku, the framework has since received active support from Moscow as a means to reduce the risk of Western powers gaining a foothold in the South Caucasus. Iran’s participation in this diplomatic initiative could further consolidate its regional influence while aligning with Russia’s broader strategic objectives.

CONCLUSIONS:  The expansion of Russo-Iranian ties is expected to have a notable impact on the South Caucasus and parts of the Caspian Sea region. Azerbaijan's geo-economic and geopolitical significance is likely to increase further, particularly if economic sanctions against Russia remain in place, compelling Moscow to deepen its reliance on alternative regional partners.

Russia, whose regional standing is in decline, might unexpectedly benefit from Iran’s strategic weakening. Given its growing security concerns, Tehran may become more inclined to collaborate with Moscow in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region to safeguard its strategic depth and border security.

From a broader strategic perspective, a greater Russian presence in the region should be viewed as a negative development. Given the region’s complexity and history of conflict, Russia’s potential increased involvement—if it materializes—poses a significant risk. Historically, Moscow’s regional policies have regularly contributed to greater instability rather than fostering long-term security, raising concerns about the potential destabilizing consequences of renewed Russian engagement in the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea region.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Stephen Blank

On November 28, 2024, the Georgian Dream (GD) government announced the termination of Georgian efforts to join the EU. This decision, coming on top of a stolen election and mounting popular disaffection, triggered continuing large-scale demonstrations against the regime despite severe governmental repression. The unfolding Georgian scenario involves continuous information warfare, ongoing efforts at state capture, stolen elections, and creeping annexation through the process of “borderization.” This is a familiar pattern of the process of Russian state capture across Eastern Europe in the Balkans and Ukraine. Georgia is in a major political crisis with considerable international repercussions, which should motivate increased attention and engagement from the EU as well as the U.S.

BACKGROUND: The current Georgian crisis represents a conscious emulation of the 2013-14 Maidan in Ukraine where the population revolted against the Moscow-backed Yanukovych government’s rejection of trade association with the EU, massive corruption, attempts to subordinate Ukraine to Russia, and anti-democratic tendencies. Also mirroring Ukraine, Georgia’s government has employed massive repression, but to no avail. While the Georgian protests evoke the Ukrainian demonstrations of 2013-14, the conditions that gave rise to them embody the Russian pattern of state capture. This pattern of attempted elite and state capture comprises constant information warfare, the use of Russian energy as a political weapon of subversion, threatened or real territorial annexations, and stolen elections. What has occurred in Georgia to lead up to this explosion of popular discontent repeats developments in Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and to some degree Serbia. 

The program of the GD party, e.g. the attempt to impose, as in Russia, a “Foreign Agents Law” intended to suffocate both domestic opposition and its foreign supporters, consciously emulates the pattern of Russian imperialism. Since Georgia’s defeat in its war against Russia in 2008, Moscow has worked assiduously to discredit pro-Western forces and gradually subvert Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Having utilized the same strategy as in Ukraine, Moscow has helped engulf Georgia in a perpetual crisis where its pro-Western forces depend on Western support while GD clearly enjoys Russian support and patronage while utilizing Moscow’s tactics.

Since its independence in 1991, Georgia’s own unresolved political and ethnic cleavages have clearly given Moscow numerous opportunities for suborning and subverting Georgian efforts at democracy and integration with the West, even though most Georgians prefer those pro-Western outcomes. As in other targets of Russian policy, corruption is endemic, exemplified by the head of GD, Bidzina Invanishvili, who is under U.S. sanctions. Transparency International Georgia has identified 95 companies controlled by Ivanishvili that are registered in the notorious tax havens British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. This examination of Georgian politics also highlighted pervasive violence, bombings, attempted assassinations, and now massive police repression against demonstrators. 

This violence reflects the long-running polarization of Georgian politics that has made governing this unruly state difficult and thus enfeebled its efforts to defend itself against Russian subversion and intervention.

Another major problem has been Georgia’s inability to deal with demands by its South Ossetian and Abkhaz populations for more autonomy if not independence. The failure to reach a settlement, admittedly due to considerable Russian meddling, provided a pretext for the war of 2008 that Georgia lost and for the subsequent creation of Russian army, navy, and air force bases in these territories. 

Worse yet, governed by Russian satraps, mainly from the Silovye Struktury (Power or Force Structures) and occupied by Russian troops, these territories have become staging grounds for Moscow’s “borderization” policy that consists of regular encroachments into Georgian territory that is then annexed to these regions. Their ultimate destiny as seen from Moscow is clearly incorporation into the Russian Federation.

IMPLICATIONS:  Hitherto the West has been overly passive regarding Georgia even though it is ultimately Georgians themselves who must overcome the causes of their long-running crisis. Given Moscow’s loss of influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan it is likely to redouble its efforts through GD to convert Georgia into a pliable, quiescent satellite that emulates Russian political processes and laws. 

From the standpoint of its values, the EU should intensify its activity with stiffer sanctions against the leaders of GD, issue stronger and more persistent denunciations of what is happening in Georgia and keep the issues of repression and Georgian aspirations before Western publics. By doing so the West and pro-democracy organizations can then increase pressure on both GD and its patrons in Moscow. Moreover, it is also necessary for U.S. diplomacy to weigh in on the side of Georgian democracy in unison with the EU and other organizations so that Georgia can begin to resolve its pressing political and economic issues.

Admittedly the Trump Administration is unlikely to be swayed by invocations of democratic values and solidarity although earlier U.S. administrations have previously promised this to Georgia. However, multiple important strategic considerations growing out of Georgia’s strategic location in the Caucasus and on the eastern shores of the Black Sea could influence Washington to become involved. Since the framework for the Trump Administration’s foreign policy will likely be great power competition and within it the U.S. search for new or improved foreign trade markets, Georgia’s strategic importance can manifest itself to Washington.

If the West continues to adopt the passive position of the last 15 years, Georgia will be lost to Russia, and its economy will be turned to a Russo-Chinese orientation rather than a Western one. That orientation has already had profound consequences for U.S. firms. In particular, U.S. firms who bid on the giant construction project for a projected Georgian port at Anaklia on the Black Sea lost out to a Chinese-led consortium, not least due to the political hegemony of GD. 

However, the stakes involved in the port at Anaklia and other comparable projects transcend Georgia. This port, along with other investments in infrastructure are vital for bringing Azerbaijani and ultimately Central Asian energy to Europe and expanding European trade to both the Caucasus and Central Asia. Central Asia also has considerable potential for exporting green energy and, even more importantly, has large quantities of rare earth minerals. To the degree that Georgia is an independent actor whose infrastructure is integrated with that of the other Black Sea littoral states, Central Asian states will then enjoy much greater opportunities for trade, investment, connectivity, and linkages with the global economy. 

If Georgia falls prey to Moscow’s agenda, then its economy and politics will be reoriented to Russia and China, denying Central Asian states much of the opportunities they seek to integrate with the global economy. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to state that Georgia’s freedom is the key to and precondition for both the Caucasus’ and Central Asia’s full emancipation from the remaining imperial ambitions of both Russia and China.

CONCLUSIONS:  Georgia is clearly in a major political crisis not unlike that of Ukraine in early 2014. As in Ukraine, Moscow seeks to impose a Russian-type regime upon a recalcitrant population and once again triggered a political explosion with considerable international repercussions. Foreign support is desperately needed in this case as well, although finally Georgians must resolve their political problems themselves. This Western support obviously is bound up with Western values to which most Georgians subscribe.

This is not solely an issue pertaining to the fight for democratic governance in Georgia. Russia has long looked askance at Armenia’s effort to democratize and now that it is breaking free of Russia, to the degree that Russia can suborn Georgian democracy it will certainly seek to undermine Armenia’s own experiment in democratization. It will also continue to seek inroads into Azerbaijani politics even though that country’s government is not democratic. As the war in Ukraine and thirty years of previous Russian policy shows, empire is in Moscow’s genetic code, and nothing is more antithetical to empire than democracy. 

Major strategic issues, i.e. the future destiny of both the Caucasus and Central Asia and of peace in Eurasia are at stake. Russia’s efforts to restore its empire are utterly incompatible with peace and any concept of international order not only in Ukraine and Europe but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The argument therefore needs to be made both to Washington and European capitals that dedicated support for Georgia’s sovereignty and democracy are necessary not only to uphold common Western values but also the peace and security of the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as countries beyond the Black Sea.

AUTHOR BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.

By Alexander Scrivener

Georgia’s political crisis rumbles on as the government of the increasingly anti-Western Georgian Dream party faces widespread protests from the country’s overwhelmingly pro-EU populace. But as the number of demonstrators dwindle due to a combination of oppression, fatigue, and demoralisation, the question of how Georgian Dream will manage the situation going forward becomes crucial.

Will Georgian Dream choose to “muddle through” and ignore the dissenters, or will it seek to cement a more fully-fledged authoritarian regime through brute force? It is too early to make definitive predictions, but the current status quo may evolve into a longer-term state of permanent low-level political crisis in which neither government nor opposition possesses the resources to gain a decisive victory over the other.

BACKGROUND: Georgia’s street protest movement has now entered its third month. The protests began on November 28 in response to the announcement by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze that the country would be suspending its bid to join the EU until 2028.

The announcement came soon after a disputed parliamentary election on October 26, in which the ruling Georgian Dream party claimed victory with almost 54 percent of the vote. None of the four opposition forces recognised the result, which they allege was falsified. This position was also supported by President Salome Zourabichvili who claims to remain in office despite her term ending on 29 December. International and domestic observer missions gave at best mixed verdicts about the conduct of the election, casting further doubt on the result’s legitimacy. For example, the OSCE mission found that in 24 percent of observations, voter secrecy was “potentially compromised.”

But the election itself only prompted small-scale, relatively subdued protests. It was not until PM Kobakhidze’s suspension of membership talks with the EU that hundreds of thousands of Georgians came out onto the streets spontaneously. Polls have indicated that at least 80 percent of Georgians support EU membership, and the abrupt announcement caused a significant eruption of public anger.

Unlike previous protests, which had been mostly centred on the capital Tbilisi, the protests this time included sizable demonstrations in the regions, including the cities of Kutaisi, Batumi, Ozurgeti, and even the normally politically quiescent small town of Khashuri.

The protests were at first accompanied by a steady stream of resignations, including Georgia’s ambassadors to the US, France, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. Footage of widespread police brutality against protesters in the initial weeks fuelled further anger. This violence was also perpetrated by unofficial regime enforcers, the so-called titushky, who targeted opposition leaders and activists for unprovoked beatings, in some cases with police looking on and refusing to intervene.

Meanwhile Georgian Dream-aligned media attempted to paint the protesters as violent, pointing at demonstrators’ use of fireworks against police.

As domestic and foreign pressure on Georgian Dream increased, the government changed tack. The use of indiscriminate violence fell, replaced instead by more targeted actions. Fines for breaking the rules around protest rose tenfold, and the blocking of “strategic” roads of international importance was made a criminal offense.

The combination of fatigue, holidays, and government crackdowns have meant that numbers at the street protests are not currently as high as at their peak in early December. But a determined core of activists continue to protest and shut roads.

Georgia is now at a crossroads. It is unclear whether the protests will slowly peter out, or whether they will gain new strength as spring approaches. It also remains to be seen whether Georgian Dream continues to follow a policy of balancing crackdowns with a policy of ignoring the demonstrators.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s domestic politics is at an impasse, with supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party and opposition-minded Georgians increasingly inhabiting parallel realities.

The reality Georgian Dream is attempting to project is one of business-as-usual. It is assisted in this by the fact that, since the end of President Zourabichvili’s term on December 29, Georgian Dream now has monopoly control of all major state institutions. Georgian Dream MPs sit alone in Parliament, and officials shuttle between Tbilisi and its remaining foreign partners such as Hungary and the UAE.

The other reality is one in which none of these institutions are now recognised as legitimate by the opposition. Many Western countries maintain strategic ambiguity, neither recognising the government’s legitimacy, nor formally cutting ties. Despite Georgian Dream’s hopes that the Trump Administration would agree to a reset in frayed U.S.-Georgia relations, it was pro-opposition Salome Zourabichvili, and not her Georgian Dream-appointed successor as president, Mikheil Qavelashvili, who was invited to attend President Trump’s inauguration.

What happens next is difficult to predict.

Perhaps the most likely scenario is one in which both domestic society and foreign partners remain split between those who recognise the Georgian government as legitimate and those who do not. This stalemate between a government that maintains sufficient resources to cling to power, and a pro-EU protest movement that is both too weak to topple Georgian Dream but too strong to be comprehensively defeated could endure for an extended period.

In this scenario, Georgian Dream may continue to oscillate between broad crackdowns on protesters and more passive and targeted methods of dealing with dissent, including merely ignoring demonstrations until they peter out by themselves. It is possible that, especially in a world in which Georgia is far from the top of international agendas, Georgian Dream manages to “muddle through” and serve out its term until the 2028 parliamentary election, despite large sections of the population refusing to recognise its legitimacy. A similar situation ensued between 2008 and 2012 when large parts of the then opposition to the United National Movement government of President Mikheil Saakashvili boycotted Parliament.

However, a more troubling scenario is also possible. Georgian Dream’s recent rhetoric has often suggested a lurch towards fully fledged authoritarianism. Senior officials including PM Irakli Kobakhidze have vowed that “co-habitation” with the opposition would soon come to an end and that many parties would be banned. Threats against the country’s largest liberal-leaning university, Ilia State University, machinations around the ownership of the main pro-opposition TV channel Mtavari, and systematic beatings and arrests of opposition leaders all point to a rapid deterioration in democratic freedoms.

At worst, Georgia could end up more closely resembling Azerbaijan or Belarus than it ever has before. Authoritarian consolidation in Georgia is unlikely to look exactly like it does in those countries – but the emergence of a syncretic “Khachapuri Putinism” that borrows from both the Hungarian and Russian models of governance cannot be ruled out.

Finally, many Georgians hope that somehow the government can be forced to leave office or make major concessions. Some hope that the Trump Administration will continue to pile pressure on Georgian Dream through sanctions. Others talk of the falling value of the Georgian lari as evidence that prolonged political crisis could impact investor confidence, forcing Georgian Dream to the negotiating table in order to save the economy.

These hopes may be exaggerated. Trump’s initial actions in office have only emboldened Georgian Dream as its civil society critics are stripped of USAID funding and support. And while a major economic shock cannot be ruled out, the double-digit growth Georgia has enjoyed as a result of the influx of Russian money has so far more than cancelled out the impact of any jitters amongst the relatively small number of Western investors in the country. A recently announced US$ 6 billion in investment from the UAE demonstrates that investors that do not prioritise democratic values are more than happy to fill economic gaps vacated by more scrupulous investors.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if the pro-EU protest movement in Georgia is to have any chance of success, it must cease waiting for external deliverance and focus on mobilising its supporters more strategically.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s pro-EU protest movement is far from dead. But the prospect of it succeeding in replacing the ruling Georgian Dream party look slimmer by the day. A combination of fatigue, weak leadership, and foreign allies distracted by the upheaval being wrought by the Trump Administration, do not amount to favourable conditions for Georgia’s opposition.

Georgian Dream, on the other hand, are not in an ideal position either. Increasingly isolated on the international stage, they alternate between going through the motions of day-to-day ordinary governance and lurches into outright authoritarianism that leave the impression of a government under siege.

It is difficult to predict how this stalemate ends. But a broad range of outcomes between full authoritarian consolidation and a fracturing of the regime is possible. However, despite the opposition’s apparent fixation on securing foreign support to bolster its position, it seems increasingly likely that the fate of Georgia will be largely decided by the balance of domestic forces, rather than in some grand bargain between global powers whose main priorities lie elsewhere.

AUTHOR BIO: Alexander Scrivener works at the Democratic Security Institute (DSI) in Tbilisi, where he leads policy research on advancing democratic security across Eurasia. His work spans policy advocacy and media analysis, with past roles at the BBC, International Criminal Court, and Transnational Institute.

By Farkhad Tolipov

January 29, 2025

The remnants of the Russian imperial modus vivendi is revealing in current Moscow’s manipulative policy in Central Asia where Moscow tries to embody its own version of Monroe Doctrine. This region looks like the last bastion of Russian imperialism. Uzbekistan, the biggest Central Asian country by population and the most central by location, provides an obvious illustrative case to observe and analyze this new/old regional order. Moscow’s manipulation of Uzbekistan and leverage-keeping policy is conducted with the help of a specific toolkit including propaganda, information attacks, geopolitical pressure and show visits.

Read Russia’s Central Asian Underbelly: The Case of Uzbekistan (PDF)