By Nargiza Umarova

The Islamic Republic of Iran is intensifying its transport diplomacy with Central Asian states, driven by a shared interest in enhancing their competitive positions in transit transport amid the growing importance of east–west and north–south land corridors. Despite international economic sanctions and sustained pressure from the U.S., Iran continues to pursue mutually beneficial partnerships with neighboring countries to consolidate its role as a regional transit hub. This strategy is particularly evident in its promotion to Europe of the Southern Corridor, which involves virtually all Central Asian states, as well as China

BACKGROUND: In recent years, Central Asia has emerged as a focal point in the transformation of Eurasia’s transport architecture, reinforcing momentum for the development of sustainable trade routes through Iran to West and South Asia and to Europe. This trend aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Iran formally joined in 2021 following the signing of a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with Beijing.

China has shown growing interest in operating the southern branch of the New Silk Road, as heightened maritime tensions and the war in Ukraine, which have constrained the Northern Corridor through Russia and Belarus, have compelled Beijing to redirect part of its Europe-bound cargo to continental routes. Central Asia and the South Caucasus provide an alternative through multimodal transport across the Caspian and Black Seas. China is already engaged in trans-Caspian logistics: in 2024, cargo volumes transported from China via the Middle Corridor exceeded 27,000 containers, representing a 25-fold increase compared to 2023. At the same time, Beijing is pursuing the development of the Southern Transit Route for both economic and geopolitical reasons.

The EU is China’s second-largest trading partner. Mutual trade reached US$ 762 billion in 2024 and rose to almost US$ 850 billion in 2025. Given that Chinese exports to the EU are dominated by high-technology goods, Beijing naturally prioritizes containerized transport for overland logistics. From a technical perspective, the transit corridor through Iran is particularly well suited to this purpose. This corridor is expected to become monomodal following the completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the railway line linking Marand in Iran with Cheshmeh Soraya and onward to the Turkish border in the Aralık region. The latter project will eliminate the need for ferry transport across Lake Van in Turkey, which currently constrains the smooth functioning of the Southern Corridor.

In 2025, Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development announced plans to construct nine transit railway corridors with a total length of 17,000 kilometers, at an estimated cost exceeding US$ 10 billion. Upon completion, Iran’s rail network is expected to handle up to 60 million tons of cargo annually. Several of these projects, including the 200-kilometer Marand–Cheshmeh Soraya railway, are aligned with the Southern Railway Corridor and are intended to position it as the shortest trade route between East and West.

IMPLICATIONS: The granting of exclusive rights to the U.S. to develop the Zangezur Corridor, proposed to be named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), is increasingly prompting China to provide tangible support for the Southern Corridor through Iran. A joint venture, the TRIPP Development Company, has been announced, with the U.S. holding a 74 percent stake. Beijing may interpret this initiative as an effort by Washington to gain leverage over freight transport along the Middle Corridor. To mitigate this risk, China requires reliable transport routes that bypass the Caspian Sea.

China is currently constructing the Sarakhs railway terminal on the Turkmenistan–Iran border, a project expected to accelerate container transport along the China–Central Asia–Iran–Turkey–EU and Gulf routes. In August 2025, Iranian authorities reported that more than half of the project had been completed.

Beijing and Tehran have also agreed to electrify a 1,000-kilometre railway section from Sarakhs to Razi on the Turkish border. The project includes the construction of additional track segments, which are expected to triple freight capacity to 15 million tons annually.

Meanwhile, Iran and Turkmenistan plan to lay additional 1,435 mm- and 1,520 mm-gauge tracks between the Sarakhs stations to accelerate freight movement and expand border-crossing capacity. The objective is to raise cross-border freight volumes to 20 million tons annually, including up to 6 million tons transported by rail. Both countries have reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the Southern Railway Corridor westward and the Central Asia–Persian Gulf multimodal transport corridor, the latter launched in 2016 under the Ashgabat Agreement by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Oman.

Uzbekistan’s policy of diversifying its trade flows and establishing efficient transport links with global markets has provided significant momentum to the development of the southern branch of the East–West transit corridor. As early as 2022, Tashkent, in cooperation with Ankara, launched freight rail services along the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey route. This corridor, with potential extension to the EU, was presented as the fastest and most efficient option for bilateral export and import deliveries.

Tashkent views the Southern Corridor, whose current capacity is limited to 10 million tons per year for technical and political reasons, as a potential driver of its own economic growth through a significant expansion of transport service exports. This prospect is closely linked to the completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, scheduled for 2030. Once integrated with Iran’s rail network within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s unified transport space, the East Asia–Europe route will be shortened by approximately 900 kilometers, reducing delivery times by seven to eight days. As a result, the Southern Railway Corridor is expected to become the shortest monomodal link between these two economically advanced regions. In parallel, the construction of an international highway connecting China with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is projected to generate additional cargo flows in the Iran–Turkey direction and to support the development of the China–Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU multimodal transit corridor. Pilot implementation of this project is expected in 2026.

At the same time, the China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU and China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU railway corridors are under development. Their advancement is being coordinated through regular consultations among the railway authorities of the six participating countries, with two meetings held in 2025. The first took place in Tehran in May, after which China dispatched its first freight train from Xi’an to Aprin, Iran’s largest dry port, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This route reduces delivery times to approximately 15 days, around half the duration of maritime transport. By the end of 2025, 40 cargo trains had been dispatched from China to Iran, compared to only seven over the previous seven years. The significance of these developments extends beyond China–Iran trade, contributing to broader improvements in transport connectivity between East Asia and Europe.

On August 2, 2025, the heads of the railway companies of Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey held a further round of negotiations in Beijing on the operation of the southern branch of the East–West Corridor. Building on the May meeting, the parties elaborated a preliminary agreement establishing uniform transport tariffs along the China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey/EU railway route, as well as measures to increase freight volumes, including standardized delivery times and simplified procedures.

Central Asian states seek transit through Iran not only to access Turkey and Europe by land, but also to reach the Indian Ocean via Iran’s major southern ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas. In 2023, Uzbekistan announced plans to build a terminal and warehouse facilities at Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar. In 2025, Kazakhstan declared its intention to construct a transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Seaport, part of the Bandar Abbas Port. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan likewise attach high priority to transport cooperation with Tehran and are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure via Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These developments reflect the accelerated expansion of multimodal transport corridors along the north–south axis and the growing importance of Central Asia in global logistics.

CONCLUSIONS: Amid ongoing transformations in Central Asia’s logistics landscape, cooperation between the region’s states and Iran, whose geography provides ocean access and a diversified transport infrastructure ranging from highways to major seaports, is becoming increasingly critical. Despite international sanctions, the five Central Asian republics have adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach toward Iran, using transport diplomacy to strengthen their transit capacities. The key challenge ahead is the collective resolution of bottlenecks along the Southern Transit Corridor. This will require harmonization of transport policies and legislation, technical and technological standards, the adoption of unified transport documentation, and the establishment of a coordinating body to align the activities of the railway administrations along the route. 

It is equally critical to develop a consolidated approach to the conflict-generating situation in Iran, which poses a serious threat to the prospects of regional transport projects. In this context, Central Asian states should clearly define and defend their interests vis-à-vis Western partners, including the U.S., by seeking favorable conditions for promoting trans-Iranian routes.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Farkhod Tolipov

In mid-December 2025, several Russian state-controlled media outlets spread a rumor that Russia could apply for membership in the Central Asian Community. This statement followed Azerbaijan’s entry into the regional grouping in November at the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent. The rumor reminded of Russia’s accession to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization in 2004, which led to the merger of that body with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community. Once again, Russia seeks to join the Central Asian Community, potentially worsening geopolitical tensions in the region.

BACKGROUND: Twenty years ago, in 2004, Russia applied for membership in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). At that time, the presidents of two key states, Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev of and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, were unable to refuse Moscow. This external membership in CACO eventually led to the organization’s collapse. One year after Russia’s admission, CACO was merged with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES) on the grounds that the two organizations duplicated each other. Uzbekistan withdrew from EvrAzES in 2008. The structure itself existed until 2014, and in 2015, it was replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Only two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are now members of the EAEU. 

In 2019, the Russian side suddenly announced that Uzbekistan could become a member of the EAEU. Uzbekistan never confirmed either its desire or the possibility of such membership but decided in December 2020 to become an observer in the EAEU. Since then, Moscow has constantly and officially reminded Uzbekistan that the EAEU is waiting. Recently, the President of Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko even stated that “we are looking forward to Uzbekistan’s membership in the EAEU.” Notably, such statements come only from Russia or Belarus; other EAEU states are not focused on this, and Uzbekistan does not show a strong interest in joining the organization.

Against this backdrop, two geopolitical issues cause concern in Moscow. First, without Uzbekistan in the EAEU, Central Asia cannot be brought under full Russian control. Second, the EAEU remains a very small entity, consisting of only five former Soviet republics. This limited composition does not support Russia’s image as a great power but, on the contrary, highlights its difficulty in asserting such a status.

It has become a tradition that the informal summits of the EAEU and the CIS are held in Saint Petersburg on the same days. On 22–23 December 2025, both events took place in the city. Reports on the CIS/EAEU summits were quite modest and contained no serious statements, except positive remarks about increased trade within the CIS/EAEU during the year. These largely symbolic events took place against the background of the war in Ukraine, which has dealt a serious blow to Moscow’s international reputation. In this context, Russia is using different means to preserve its influence in Central Asia while losing control over other parts of the former Soviet space.

IMPLICATIONS: Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev did not attend the EAEU summit, citing his country’s non-membership in the organization. He also did not travel to Saint Petersburg for the CIS summit, referring to his busy schedule. However, in November Azerbaijan became a full participant in the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia (CMHS).

Although Baku’s accession to the CMHS is assessed differently across the region, this expansion of the “C5” format into a “C6” is likely viewed in Moscow as a new challenge to Russia’s position in the region of the “stans.” This may explain the appearance of rumors that Russia could apply for membership in the CMHS. At the same time, the increasingly pro-Russian policies of all Central Asian states, whether genuine or aimed at avoiding Moscow’s displeasure, raise concerns that history may repeat itself and that the Central Asian Community could again open its doors to Russia.

Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev delivered a speech at the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council that resembled a statement from a full member. He described EAEU countries as “our strategic and natural partners.” According to the president, Uzbekistan actively participates in all key Eurasian formats. He also stated that “we believe it is necessary to strengthen coordination between the institutions of the CIS and the EAEU.”

Mirziyoyev highlighted several issues, including the elimination of trade barriers and the creation of an Uzbekistan–EAEU coordination group on tariff and non-tariff barriers; the development of industrial cooperation and the launch of joint projects in machinery, energy, agriculture, and the chemical sector; the digitalization of trade and customs administration; participation in EAEU technological platforms, from biomedicine and new materials to robotics; and the creation of a unified tourism space that would combine products of the Union’s member states.

Overall, the narrow, trade- and business-centered rhetoric surrounding the EAEU does not indicate the emergence of a shared regional identity among its member states, which is both a key condition for and an outcome of meaningful integration. In contrast, a broader vision of Central Asia, based on a natural sense of common identity among its peoples, is far stronger than a solely economic grouping of states. Indeed, the November summit of Central Asian leaders in Tashkent produced notable signs of deeper regional integration. In particular, it was announced that the CMHS format could be transformed into a Community of Central Asia (CCA).

Despite this major trend in Central Asia, the pro-Russian, or seemingly pro-Russian, policies of regional leaders may have a reverse effect and lead to a repetition of history, including a renewed Russian application for membership in the CCA for purely geopolitical reasons. In a recent and telling statement, Russia’s ambassador to Uzbekistan claimed that “Uzbekistan assured the Russian Federation that the era of the Great Game has passed into oblivion.” The remark suggests the opposite: the Great Game may be entering a new phase in which it is not Uzbekistan or other Central Asian states that shape geopolitical rivalry, but Russia itself, which continues to view the region through the lens of great-power competition. Throughout its independence, Uzbekistan has sought to avoid geopolitical entanglements. Therefore, if assurances about the end of geopolitical games are needed, they should come from great powers themselves, rather than from Central Asian states.

Moscow may believe that Russia’s membership in CAC would signal the end of the Great Game, whereas in reality it would represent yet another expression of Russia’s enduring geopolitical modus vivendi.

CONCLUSIONS: Central Asia is entering a new round of the geopolitical Great Game, and this game is being driven primarily by Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, this outcome is hardly surprising. Moscow’s foreign policy and its broader international behavior are clearly dominated by geopolitical considerations.

At present, one can observe the emergence of two opposing geopolitical configurations, the “Eurasian Five” of the Eurasian community versus the “Central Asian Six” of the Central Asian Community. The paradox of this dual trend, however, is that two Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are members of both EAEU and CAC.

In 2004, Russia’s accession to CACO distorted, weakened, and ultimately destroyed the organization and the broader process of integration among the five Central Asian states. As a result, regional integration was halted for a decade and revived only in 2017. Integration in Central Asia is a distinct phenomenon: from the outset, it has been shaped in part to avoid geopolitical entanglements. By its nature, Central Asian integration cannot include any major power, regardless of which one it is, because such inclusion would inevitably introduce a dimension of geopolitical competition into the integration process.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge Caravan”) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

By Eduard Abrahamyan

In recent months, Armenia and Russia have strengthened their relations. A series of high-level meetings shows not just a return to normal diplomacy but a purposeful reshaping of their alliance. Alongside President Putin’s renewed ties with Azerbaijani President Aliyev and the Kremlin’s broader adjustment of its regional strategy, the revived dialogue between Putin and Prime Minister Pashinyan forms part of a wider diplomatic renewal. This shift marks a clear easing of the tensions that strained their bilateral relations from September 2022 to mid-2024.



                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The intensified Armenia–Russia bilateral reengagement commenced on October 8, 2024, with the Moscow meeting between Putin and Pashinyan, ostensibly ending a two-year estrangement stemming from Moscow’s inaction and the CSTO’s reluctance to deter or even explicitly identify Azerbaijan as the initiator of the September 2022 incursions into Armenian territory. Equally detrimental was the perception that Moscow had tacitly approved Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation in Karabakh.

The October 2024 meeting set both sides on a path toward a “new rhythm” in strategic relations, creating the basis for a renewed partnership aimed at resolving the “misunderstandings” that had emerged, as later described by Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Sergey Lavrov. The two leaders have since maintained regular contact through phone calls and in-person meetings throughout 2025. Yerevan also hosted several high-level Russian delegations, underscoring the breadth and institutional depth of the renewed dialogue. Diplomatic sources described this reset as a key turning point that effectively ended the period of tension, with both governments instructing their institutions to pursue a full realignment across all areas of strategic cooperation.

In January and May 2025, the foreign ministers made reciprocal visits, each reaffirming the start of a “new page” in the strategic partnership through “genuine and open discussions on accumulated issues.” This diplomatic thaw reached its peak in June 2025 with the visit of Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of Russia’s Federation Council, to Yerevan, aimed at strengthening parliamentary cooperation. Matviyenko’s visit not only supported Armenia’s evolving foreign policy direction but also highlighted the Kremlin’s engagement in Armenia’s domestic politics. Her meetings in Yerevan were widely seen as a sign of Moscow’s friendly neutrality, or even quiet support for the ruling Civil Contract party ahead of Armenia’s general elections planned for June 2026. After her meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan on 6 June, Matviyenko stated that “[Pashinyan] conveyed greetings to our president and emphasized that, despite insinuations, he and [Putin] have always maintained constructive, substantive relations without any issues,” sending a clear message to the “ill-wishers” that no divisions exist between the Armenian and Russian leadership.

The revival of high-level diplomacy has taken place alongside Pashinyan’s participation in international forums led or co-funded by Russia. In May 2025, he attended Moscow’s Victory Day parade, one of Putin’s most visible displays of state power and ideological authority. Pashinyan also traveled to Kazan to join the sixteenth BRICS Summit, which the Kremlin presented as proof that Western efforts to isolate Russia had failed. In July, Armenia’s Prime Minister took part in the International Conference on Nature and Environmental Protection in the Altai, supporting Putin’s broader vision of portraying Russia not as a marginal actor in the Turkic world but as the guardian of its historical and cultural origins amid the growth of the Organization of Turkic States. Later, Pashinyan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where Pakistan blocked Armenia’s application for full membership. Armenia would otherwise likely have joined one of the most rapidly consolidating non-Western frameworks, arguably challenging the West.

The recent strengthening of Armenia–Russia relations is closely linked to economic interdependence and the gradual improvement of Russia’s public image in Armenia. Economically, Russia has reaffirmed its role as Armenia’s main trading partner, with trade turnover reaching a record US$ 12.4 billion in 2024, more than twice the level recorded in 2022. According to investigative reports, this increase reflects the function of both Armenia and Azerbaijan as logistical intermediaries in Moscow’s sanction-evasion networks. Armenia’s re-export channels have supported the transfer of dual-use goods to, and embargoed gold from, Russia, while Azerbaijan has discreetly facilitated the re-export of Russian hydrocarbons. Together, these practices have formed a coordinated and mutually beneficial regional mechanism that reinforces the Kremlin’s economic resilience. In September 2025, during the World Atomic Week conference in Moscow, Pashinyan and Putin agreed that Rosatom would extend the operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant for another decade, ensuring continued supply of over 30 percent of Armenia’s electricity. Official statements also noted that the two leaders discussed the potential construction of a new reactor by Rosatom to address Armenia’s concerns about the ageing Soviet-era facility.

Russia’s public image in Armenia has begun to recover from its low point in 2022–2023. A July 2025 poll by the International Republican Institute shows a clear improvement in public attitudes: the share of respondents viewing Russia as the “greatest threat” fell to 27 percent (down from 40 percent the previous year), while 45 percent now regard Russia as Armenia’s most important political partner, an 18-point increase since 2024. This change in perception is driven less by traditional Russian information campaigns or local pro-Russian media than by a deliberate adjustment of Armenia’s state-controlled narrative, which now tends to present Russia in a “pragmatically” neutral light. The outcome is a gradual restoration of public ambivalence, a sentiment neither strongly pro- nor anti-Russian, that mirrors Yerevan’s cautious process of re-accommodation with Moscow.

IMPLICATIONS: The ongoing renegotiation of the Russia–Armenia alliance, alongside Putin’s renewed rapprochement with Azerbaijan as shown at the CIS Dushanbe summit in October, suggests that the recurring “crises” in Moscow’s relations with Yerevan and Baku are not genuine strategic breaks. Instead of marking major shifts, these episodes usually reflect short-term tactical frictions, temporary disagreements that each side manages or uses to achieve immediate political or diplomatic goals.

Such frictions are often exaggerated in Western discussions as signs of a major geopolitical shift, whether portrayed as Armenia’s “pro-Western pivot” or Azerbaijan’s alleged “anti-Russian turn.” In reality, the situation is more nuanced. Both Yerevan and Baku often highlight the appearance of tension with Moscow for strategic purposes, using the perceived distance from Russia to strengthen their negotiating position with Western partners.

For Armenia, this approach supports a dual narrative: expressing European ambitions to gain sympathy and investment while keeping practical ties with Russia for various reasons. Pashinyan’s shifting engagement with the CSTO reflects this duality—not an actual withdrawal, but an effort to push the bloc to act while maintaining reassurance toward Western partners. Likewise, the 2024 removal of Russian border guards from the Armenia–Iran border was largely symbolic, affecting only the Agarak–Nordooz checkpoint, while Russian software systems and personnel continued to operate.

Azerbaijan follows a similar strategy, occasionally dramatizing its disagreements with Moscow to project strategic independence while maintaining practical cooperation. As Aliyev stated during his meeting with Putin in Dushanbe, despite the December plane incident, the “relationship has successfully developed across many areas,” which Putin hoped would “continue in the spirit of our alliance.” Despite symbolic disputes, Baku and Moscow continue to collaborate in energy, transport, and security, including through the “3+3” regional platform and trilateral projects involving Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran. These selective displays do not mean that all tensions are artificial or coordinated. Real disagreements remain, such as over Moscow’s security obligations to Armenia or the oil contamination scandal involving Russian exports passing through Azerbaijani infrastructure to the EU, but Pashinyan and Aliyev rarely cross Moscow’s strategic boundaries. Thus, what appears as instability often serves to renegotiate hierarchies rather than to overturn them.

For Moscow, this managed ambiguity remains advantageous. By allowing limited dissent and some visible distance, Russia maintains its regional influence while appearing less intrusive, “being present by seeming absent.” This recently adopted strategy enables Putin to exercise influence without attracting too much Western attention. From Moscow’s viewpoint, even Western-backed initiatives such as the August 8 Armenia–Azerbaijan Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) infrastructure deal are not viewed as threatening. Instead, TRIPP is seen as fitting into Russia’s wider connectivity strategy, linking Russia and Turkey through Azerbaijan, similar to how the North–South corridor connects Russia and Iran. The Kremlin’s reasoning assumes that regional realities, codified by the November 9, 2020, trilateral agreement, will eventually force Washington either to cooperate with Moscow or to withdraw from the project.

For Yerevan, adopting a “region-first” policy means engaging with Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran, even while maintaining pro-Western rhetoric. The March 2025 parliamentary resolution to start EU membership talks serves mostly performative and domestic aims rather than indicating a real policy shift. The Pashinyan government continues to emphasize the advantages of the Eurasian Economic Union and has applied to join the SCO, showing how Western-oriented language coexists with lasting non-Western partnerships.

Moscow’s acceptance of this balancing comes from its belief that Pashinyan’s EU-focused gestures do not present a real threat. This explains the Kremlin’s restrained reaction to events such as the arrest of Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who has fallen out of favor in Putin’s circles. Putin does not oppose either Pashinyan or Aliyev; rather, he views both as cooperative actors within Russia’s changing regional strategy. This approach is reflected in the Kremlin’s “warm neutrality,” expressed by Matviyenko toward Pashinyan before Armenia’s elections, and in Putin’s calculated revelation at the Dushanbe summit about Ramiz Mehtiyev’s planned coup against Aliyev. 

CONCLUSIONS: At this stage, Armenia–Russia relations highlight the growing gap between outward perception and internal reality in the region. To Western observers, Armenia’s pursuit of European integration and broader multilateral ties may seem like a gradual move away from Moscow’s sphere of influence. Yet beneath this surface lies a more complex and regionally rooted dynamic. It suggests that the Kremlin is rethinking its approach in the South Caucasus, developing a coordinated and flexible form of engagement with both Armenia and Azerbaijan that hides the full extent of Russian influence while strengthening the illusion that Russia is withdrawing. This adjustment gives all three actors subtle room to maneuver, allowing for a shared strategy of cooperative dominance and geopolitical maskirovka.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr Eduard Abrahamyan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Analysis and author of Small States, Russia and the West: Polarity, Constellations and Heterogeneity in the Geopolitics of the Caucasus (Routledge, 2025).

By Emil Avdaliani

On October 9, the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan met in Dushanbe. Relations appear to be improving and despite the persisting distrust, Baku seeks to maintain a functional relationship with Moscow. At the same time, Baku has taken significant steps to strengthen ties with Washington, with U.S. companies pledging investments in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sector. Close relations with both Russia and the U.S. align with Baku’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy aimed at avoiding dependence on any single major power. Through this approach, Baku seeks to demonstrate that it enjoys increasing flexibility in its international maneuvering.



                                                                   Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: Over the past two months, Azerbaijan’s relations with both Russia and the U.S. have undergone significant changes, reflecting Baku’s continued commitment to maintaining balance in its foreign policy.

On October 9, Vladimir Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. During the meeting, Putin addressed what he called the “most sensitive issue,” the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 jet, caused by a Russian air defense missile. He expressed his condolences and effectively issued an apology. Putin stated that the investigation into the crash had concluded and that the causes of the tragedy had been identified. He attributed the incident to three Ukrainian drones allegedly flying over Russian territory at the time and mentioned technical malfunctions in Russia’s air defense system, which launched two missiles that did not directly strike the plane but exploded about ten meters away.

Between the downing of the Azerbaijani airliner and the meeting in Dushanbe, relations grew even more strained following the arrest of members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg in June 2025. Russian security forces detained a group of Azerbaijani nationals in connection with murders committed in the early 2000s, resulting in the deaths of two suspects during the operation. In response, Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures, arresting eight Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime. The Russian House in Baku was subsequently closed, all Russia-related cultural events were cancelled, and Azerbaijani authorities detained both the director and the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan.

Amid the tensions and eventual reconciliation with Russia, Baku has also improved its relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated during the Biden administration. That period coincided with the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the mass displacement of Armenians, developments that created friction between Washington and Baku. However, with Trump’s return to the presidency, momentum began to build toward reversing this trend. The ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan drew renewed U.S. attention, with Washington showing a clear willingness to act as the main mediator in the process.

This development led to the peace summit in Washington, D.C., on August 8, where Yerevan and Baku reached a landmark agreement granting the U.S. a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of a transit corridor through Armenian territory. Named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), the corridor will connect Turkey with the Caspian Sea, bypassing the traditional route through Georgia. In addition, Azerbaijan secured U.S. President Donald Trump’s approval of an order lifting Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had prohibited U.S. military assistance to Azerbaijan since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. During the summit, Azerbaijan’s SOCAR signed a memorandum of understanding with ExxonMobil, and following the event, Washington and Baku agreed to hold regular meetings on military and economic cooperation.

IMPLICATIONS: For Azerbaijan, Putin’s remarks were seen as an apology, and Baku now appears ready to normalize relations with Moscow. Yet beneath this adjustment lies a deeper motive: Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is shaped by calculations of power balance. Although weakened by the war in Ukraine, Russia remains strong enough to exert pressure on Azerbaijan, and Baku has been cautious not to provoke Moscow’s anger. Positioned geographically between Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan remains vulnerable to possible Russian military or economic pressure, as well as to instability from the Middle East driven by Israeli and U.S. actions against the Islamic Republic.

This explains why, after a relatively extended period of tension with Moscow, Baku ultimately chose reconciliation. Moreover, this approach aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader pattern of behavior toward other powers. Since 2020, when Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, its relations with Iran have worsened. Tehran grew concerned about the shifting balance of power in the South Caucasus, marked by Azerbaijan’s rising confidence and Turkey’s expanding influence. Until late 2024, ties between Baku and Tehran went through several cycles of tension, yet both sides were careful to prevent any major military escalation. This period concluded with a clear rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Iran, marked by bilateral visits and the reopening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran.

The reconciliation with Moscow also reflects Baku’s ongoing focus on maintaining balanced relations with its neighbors, particularly major powers. Ties with Russia remain important, as shown by the expansion of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russia’s interior through Iran to the Indian Ocean. A key branch of this corridor passes through Azerbaijan, making it a vital route for Russia’s access to the Middle East. In addition, strong bilateral trade between Azerbaijan and Russia provides another incentive for both countries to avoid any serious deterioration in their relationship.

However, this reconciliation is neither complete nor entirely sincere. Azerbaijan will continue to follow its multi-vector foreign policy, which increasingly limits its dependence on Russia. The broader geopolitical context favors Baku. Engaged in a prolonged conflict that demands vast economic and military resources, Russia has been unable to maintain the dominant position in the South Caucasus that it held before 2022. The regional states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, quickly moved to take advantage of this new flexibility. Azerbaijan regained territories long controlled by Armenia, while Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh largely stood by. Since the fall of the Armenian enclave in September 2023, Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia have steadily worsened. In Baku, the need to rely on Moscow’s goodwill has greatly diminished, giving the country greater confidence in its foreign policy. As a result, Azerbaijan has expanded ties with Israel and Pakistan, improved relations with Iran, strengthened strategic cooperation with Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and, most notably, established a strategic partnership agreement with China.

To balance Russia, Azerbaijan needs not only Turkey, its traditional ally, and stable relations with Iran, but also strong ties with the U.S. Although Washington has at times encouraged dialogue with Moscow over the war in Ukraine, it has also demonstrated its ability to pursue an independent agenda in the South Caucasus, often at odds with Russia’s core interests. The TRIPP agreement is one example of this approach. It angered Moscow because the deal reduced Russian influence and encouraged both Azerbaijan and Armenia to follow Washington’s lead. For Baku, therefore, greater U.S. involvement in the region translates into reduced dependence on Moscow.

CONCLUSIONS: The current level of tension with Russia has eased, following a familiar pattern in Azerbaijan’s dealings with Moscow and other neighboring states. It also shows that Russia cannot afford to abandon Azerbaijan or enter a cycle of escalation with Baku. Moscow is unable to handle another major crisis along its borders and remains dependent on Azerbaijan for transit within the INSTC project. Looking ahead, a continued period of stable but cautious bilateral relations is likely, without major escalation, yet unlikely to develop into deeper cooperation. The relationship will remain based on pragmatic, transactional engagement, while over time the geopolitical gap between the two countries can be expected to grow increasingly evident.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The Caspian Sea is increasingly emerging as a focal point of geopolitical competition. The joint military exercises conducted by Russia and Iran in July, following similar drills by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the northern Caspian a month earlier, underscore the region’s rapid transformation into a nexus of strategic rivalries and evolving security alignments. Among the littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are assuming particularly prominent roles in shaping the strategic landscape. Their efforts are supported by Turkey, which is facilitating the naval expansion of these three Turkic nations. Russia’s ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine has significantly weakened Moscow’s capacity to assert dominance over the Caspian Sea and to effectively utilize it as part of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Russia to Iran and India.


                                                            Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The Caspian Sea was widely regarded as a “Russian lake” during the Soviet era, as Iran, possessing only a short Caspian coastline, showed little interest in utilizing it for power projection. For decades, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla maintained dominance over the waters of the inland sea. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Moscow sought to preserve the existing balance of power in the Caspian. In 2018, Russia secured an agreement among the five Caspian littoral states on territorial delimitation, excluding the military presence of non-littoral actors in the sea.

The region experienced a significant geopolitical shift in 2020 after Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey provided military assistance to Azerbaijan during the conflict. Following the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, the Caspian littoral states expanded their navies. Turkey continues to support Azerbaijan’s requirements for modern weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister, Zakir Hasanov, affirmed that Ankara was Baku’s principal partner in military cooperation.

Over the past five years, Turkey has facilitated the naval expansion of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. These countries, along with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are members of the Turkey-backed “Pan-Turkic Union.” Through this framework, Turkey has assumed a leading role in diminishing Russia’s influence over the military development of these states.

In 2023, Turkey’s Asfar and YDA Group, together with Kazakhstan’s Uralsk Plant “Zenit” JSC, concluded an agreement for the construction of offshore platforms in the Caspian Sea. The agreement included the production of various naval vessels, including main surface combat ships, to fulfill the operational requirements of the Kazakh Navy. Likewise, the deepening relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan signify a broader shift in energy geopolitics and highlight their shared strategic interests. The Bayraktar TB2, Turkey’s first domestically produced unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), is deployed within Turkmenistan’s armed forces. In February, the two countries signed a gas supply agreement that offers Turkmenistan a new export channel while consolidating Turkey’s position as a regional energy hub.

In 2024, the joint military exercises Birleistik (Unity) 2024 were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast, marking the first such drills held without Russian participation. The armed forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly participated in the exercise.

In April, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan announced plans to conduct the joint military exercises Caspian Breeze – 2025 in the northern part of the Caspian Sea near Russia’s coastline. The exercises commenced in June at Aktau, Kazakhstan, with the objective of strengthening the protection of maritime economic infrastructure, naval bases, and shipping routes. A month later, Russia and Iran initiated their own joint naval exercises, CASAREX 2025, under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” These drills were designed to enhance maritime security and promote deeper naval cooperation between the two states.

The two joint military exercises within the span of a single month demonstrate a changing regional balance of power. The Caspian littoral states have expanded their naval capabilities in recent years, thereby challenging Russia’s long-standing hegemony in the Caspian region.

IMPLICATIONS: The navies of the three Turkic littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, have experienced substantial growth and deepened cooperation in recent years. Through a series of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and supported by Turkey, these states have enhanced their strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. These developments have not only strengthened the collective influence and military capacity of the Turkic states but have also posed a significant challenge to Russia’s longstanding naval dominance in the Caspian.

Security cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states in the absence of Russian participation signifies a major geopolitical realignment in the Caspian region. For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have agreed to employ their joint naval forces to protect pipelines on the seabed and vessels operating on the surface. The regional geopolitical competition is likely to intensify following Iran’s decision to resume drilling operations in the Caspian after a 30-year hiatus. This development could generate tensions with the three Turkic littoral states, which are already deeply engaged in offshore oil and gas extraction within the Caspian Sea.

Turkey plays a pivotal role in the ongoing militarization of the Caspian Sea. It initially strengthened Azerbaijan’s defense capabilities, subsequently supported Turkmenistan, and is now actively engaged in enhancing Kazakhstan’s naval power. According to Yuri Lyamin, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), “Kazakhstan is following the ongoing, multi-year process of strengthening the navies of Caspian states. The reasons and necessity of this can be debated, but it is a long-standing trend driven by prestige and the desire to keep up with its neighbors. Over the past decade and a half, Turkmenistan has built a very strong navy in the Caspian, including with Turkey’s assistance. It was to a Turkish design that Turkmenistan’s largest ship, and one of the largest warships in the Caspian, the corvette Deniz Khan, was commissioned and constructed in 2021. A considerable number of missile, missile-artillery, and other boats for the Turkmen border guards were also built based on Turkish designs.” The growing number of actors in the region is complicating Moscow’s ability to utilize the area for strategic connectivity projects. One of these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a Russia-led project designed to connect Russian ports with Iran, the Gulf region, and the Indian Ocean. The INSTC agreement was initially signed in 2000 by Russia, Iran, and India, was later joined by Azerbaijan and several Central Asian states. Meanwhile, Iran is actively seeking alternative trade routes to the EU, including via Armenia.

Conversely, Azerbaijan’s Port of Baku serves as a critical hub within the east–west Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, which links China to the EU via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby bypassing Russia. The Middle Corridor endows Baku’s with an important role for both Europe and Central Asia by providing a viable alternative to Russian transit routes, facilitating efficient east–west connectivity across the Caspian and through the South Caucasus.

Similarly, Turkey promotes the integration of Turkmenistan in the Middle Corridor, which would advance Turkey’s long-standing ambition to position itself as a strategic logistical bridge linking Asia and Europe.

The 2018 agreement grants the Caspian states the right to construct gas pipelines across the seabed. Ankara aims to channel Caspian gas to its territory via Azerbaijan, and onward to the EU, elevating Turkey’s role as a pivotal energy hub. However, this directly contradicts Russian interests and the potential exists for heightened tensions or even confrontation between the Turkey-backed Turkic states and the Russia-Iran alliance over control of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The geopolitical competition between the three Turkey-backed Turkic littoral states and the Russia–Iran alliance could intensify as both sides continue to expand their economic and military presence in the Caspian region. The increase in military exercises conducted over the past two years underscores the emergence of new security alignments within the Caspian basin.

Turkey has taken on a leading role in advancing the naval capabilities of the three Turkic littoral states, a position that was traditionally held by Russia. As Turkey’s involvement in the region deepens, Moscow’s ability to shape the military development of these countries will likely be further marginalized. Russia, meanwhile, continues to bear significant geopolitical costs for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the onset of the conflict, Moscow’s influence across Central Asia and other regions, including the Caspian, has steadily declined and other powers such as China and Turkey have begun to fill the resulting vacuum.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.