By Emil A.Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev
June 10, 2021, the CACI Analyst
Starting in mid-May, a wave of confrontations between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have taken place in disputed border areas after large-scale fighting between the two states ended in November last year. While both sides trade accusations of violating each others’ international borders, there may be logical reasons for the recent spike in Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontations and their timing. Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections, unresolved issues of prisoners of war, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the question of the “Zangezur/Syunik corridor” have all possibly contributed to the recent events.
By Natalia Konarzewska
June 7, 2021, the CACI Analyst
Baku is preparing to open a transit corridor that will link Azerbaijani territory with its Nakhichevan exclave through southern Armenia. President Ilham Aliyev recently announced the construction of a railway that will link Azerbaijan proper with Nakhichevan and ramped up the rhetoric against Armenia, which remains reluctant towards the project. Most of the Armenian public and experts consider the transit corridor to be a geopolitical threat rather than a new opportunity for enhanced connectivity. This standoff recently turned into full-fledged security crisis as Azerbaijan’s army advanced into the territory of southern Armenia in mid-May.
By Robert M. Cutler
May 11, 2021, the CACI Analyst
The implementation of the trilateral agreement brokered by Russia on the night of November 9-10, 2020, between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues in fits and starts. Most near-term questions have been resolved. How intermediate-term issues turn out depend upon the results of the snap parliamentary elections called in June by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. As for the longer-term outcome, this is more difficult to estimate, and it is path-dependent upon those elections. In this regard, events on the ground—but not only the elections—are still in control, even if these are no longer military events.
By Jack Watling
March 25, 2021, the CACI Analyst
The six-week Nagorno-Karabakh war, fought through the Autumn of 2020, may have been principally of local significance politically, but highlights changes in the viability of the use of force as an instrument of statecraft in a new era of great power competition. Extrapolation from the conflict should not be taken too far, but the democratization of precision strike and the constraints imposed on the use of air power pose serious questions for many European medium powers.
By Orhan Gafarli
January 28, 2021, the CACI Analyst
The Second Karabakh War lasted for 44 days, ending on November 10, 2020 with the 9-point ceasefire agreement agreed by Azerbaijan and Armenia under Russian mediation. According to the ceasefire, the Armenian side will withdraw from the seven regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; a Russian Peace Force will control the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia and Russia’s Border Service (FSB) will supervise the highway between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Turkey is also a party to ensuring compliance with the ceasefire, setting up observation points and cooperating with Russia regarding negotiations between the parties. The end of the war might eventually bring the parties to a peace agreement and allow for regular overland transport between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. This perspective could help revive the Silk Road between East and West in the South Caucasus.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.