By Jacob Zenn

May 3rd, 2016, The CACI Analyst

For more than a decade after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was the “bogeyman” of Central Asian militancy. It was the most well-known militant group in Central Asia and abroad, even though it was in exile in Afghanistan and Pakistan under the protection of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Years of drone strikes and counter-insurgency operations failed to eliminate the IMU. Ironically, however, it was neither the U.S. nor coalition forces that destroyed the IMU. Rather, it was the Taliban who liquidated the IMU in late 2015 as punishment for its “betrayal” of the Taliban (and al-Qaeda) by pledging loyalty to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, leader of the terrorist organization calling itself the Islamic State (ISIS). This will change the nature of the militant threat to Central Asia and force a reconsideration of Uzbekistan’s counter-extremism measures.

By Mirzohid Rahimov

April 19th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

Central Asian nations consider the development of alternative regional transport communications important aspects of their national economic and political strategy, and the republics have become active participants in various international projects to promote economic cooperation with different countries and regions of the world. The development of internal Central Asian communication networks in general, and Uzbekistan in particular, gives the possibility of extending not only national communications, but also broaden networks in Central Asia. The Angren-Pap rail project is very important for national connectivity and for increased international communication. Different international experiences in economic transformation are relevant for Central Asia’s regional connectivity.

By Stephen Blank 

March 15th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

For years, Moscow has fulminated against the Taliban as a terrorist force that represented a threat not only to Afghanistan’s security but also to Central Asia and even to Russia itself. Yet news surfaced in December that Russia is sharing intelligence with the Taliban and apparently has been in discussions with it since 2013. According to U.S. intelligence sources, these discussions have also been accompanied by weapons transfers. Thus, while Russia is constantly, along with Central Asian leaders, playing up the ISIS threat and selling weapons to the Afghan government, it also shares intelligence and possibly sells weapons to its Taliban adversaries. These contradictions expose some of the problems in Russia’s regional policies in Central Asia and in its approach to terrorism. 

By Rohullah Osmani

January 21st, 2016, The CACI Analyst

The groundbreaking ceremony of the US$10 billion natural gas pipeline project linking Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) took place in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan on December 13, 2015, with the Afghan President, India’s Vice-President and Pakistani Prime Minister in attendance. The breakthrough on the long-delayed TAPI gas pipeline project came when the 22nd TAPI Steering Committee, consisting of representatives of the participating countries, as well as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as the acting transactional advisor for the project, approved Turkmenistan’s state-owned Turkmengaz as the consortium leader to oversee efforts in constructing, financing and operating the 1,000 mile long natural gas pipeline. 

By Sudha Ramachandran

January 18th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

As the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project gathers momentum, concern is mounting over the security situation in the restive Baluchistan province. The Pakistani government has promised to beef up security for the project, but will this work? Its strategy to deal with Baluch nationalism, which has focused on military operations, has contributed to the emergence of an array of armed militias – Baluch nationalist, Islamist and sectarian. Can the economic corridor thrive or even survive in the midst of this bubbling cauldron?