BACKGROUND: Russia under Putin wants the Central Asian states to adhere to Russian foreign policy goals on terrorist threats as demonstrated by the war in Chechnya. Russia has defined its attitude to the matter-we are fighting terrorists, not Muslims. On 24-25 October 1999, Kyrgyz Prime Minister A. Muraliyev visited Putin, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, and Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu where the Russian side told Kyrgyzstan how to rid the country of terrorists. Tajikistan, already on board the Russian program, voiced support for Kyrgyzstan. In November 1999, Putin went to Dushanbe to meet with Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov to discuss regional terrorism. Terrorists strikes in Central Asia began in earnest in 1999. In February 1999, bombs in Tashkent killed nine and injured 15 people. Later in the year, up to 1,000 Islamic rebels infiltrated the Batken region in the Ferghana Valley of southern Kyrgyzstan kidnapping foreign nationals, including four Japanese geologists, and engaging Central Asian troops.

The Kyrgyz military was caught completely off guard by the Batken militants, as was President Askar Akayev who decided to call on Russia and Kazakhstan for help. Moscow and Astana were only too happy to comply and sent technical assistance including air assets. Now, just like Russia, the Central Asian states are becoming interested in border demarcation and law enforcement. In 11 February 2000, Kyrgyz Security Council Secretary Bolot Dzhamuzakov stated that the Kyrgyz Armed Forces and authorities are ready to repel possible incursions by bandit formations from abroad. Measures to strengthen the guarding of the state border are being stepped up, new posts have been established in the republic's border areas, and a southern group of troops of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces has been set up. This group is receiving more resources and equipment. Such aid is spreading to other Central Asian states.

Moreover, border posts and visa regimes are springing up along the borders to prevent incursions similar to Russia's wishes in the Caucasus, particularly Georgia and Azerbaijan. Precisely around the time of the January 2000 CIS summit, a border dispute between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan started. Uzbek border guards, supported by an armored personnel carrier, unilaterally demarcated a stretch of the border advancing several miles into Kazakhstan's territory. It is suspected that Russia might have supported this unprovoked incident aiming to cause instability in the Central Asian region and placing Putin in the role of savior. One month later, Chairman of the Kazakh National Security Service Alnur Musayev, in response to Batken events, stated that the border troops, particular the Arystan (lion, rapid reaction) troops have trained and practice for terrorist attacks later this spring and summer. Finally, in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek National Security Council called on 3 March 2000 for unity among the intelligence and armed services to fight against extremism. Uzbek National Security Chairman Rustam Inoyatov is on record saying: "This is war and its is serous."

IMPLICATIONS: Central Asian leaders believe that Putin's hard-nosed approach to dealing with terrorism is what they need to put a stop to the rise of militant Islam in the region to preserve their power. At the end of August 1999, SVR Director Vyacheslav Trubnikov went to Bishkek. By October, Russia had to fly in troops to help expel the Batken invaders. On 4 February 2000, Trubnikov visited Astana to discuss the "very serious problems relating to national interests" in Kazakhstan.Kyrgyz officials are already anticipating another attack by Islamic guerrillas in the spring or early summer. Russia is coming to the rescue and exacting a price that reduces the independence of the Central Asian presidents. In Uzbekistan, On 11 December 1999, Putin and Uzbek President Islam Karimov signed a military agreement to joint efforts to stop the spread of terrorism and extremism. One month later, Putin signed a decree on the Russian Federation's national security where the Russian president noted that terrorist activities in Central Asia are becoming increasingly threatening.

Putin and the Ministry of Defense are establishing an air defense network in Central Asia partly in response to Kosovo, and partly due to lessons learned by Russian aviation in Chechnya. Russia has convinced Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to participate in this air defense network. The importance of such a development was illustrated when Putin appointed First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Mikhailov, an expert on air defenses, as a representative to the State Duma to explain Russia's position on why Russian forces are necessary in Tajikistan in January 2000. By March 2000, Russia tried to establish an air shield. While in Bishkek, Russian Air Force CINC Anatolii Kornukov stated that Russia and Kyrgyzstan would sign an agreement in supporting cooperation between anti-air forces. Kornukov then traveled to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to elaborate on the Kyrgyz anti-air cooperation deal and how it would fit into the general defense of Central Asia. On 14 March, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan announced that they had set up a joint air defense system. According to Kyrgyz officials, the restoration and perfection of the air-defense forces is a major priority issue of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Putin's drive into Central Asia resurrects part of the old Soviet-era intelligence network by exporting Russian ideas of threat perception and by pushing a campaign to oust intelligence officers unfriendly to Moscow's position. Clearly, only intelligence managers who can balance the relationship between Moscow and the Central Asian capitals while maintaining stability at home will retain their positions. In 21 October, the Kazakh Senate approved Alnyur Musayev, 45, as chairman of the National Security Committee. Musayev, 45, replaced Kazakh National Security Chairman Nurtay Abykayev who was implicated in illegal arms transfers to North Korea and capital flight to Switzerland. Kyrgyzstan has faced similar events. On 9 November, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev appointed Tashtemir Aitbayev, 56, as national security minister and in February 2000 appointed General Miroslav Niyazov as a deputy to Aitbayev. With Musayev, Aitbayev, and Niyazov in place, Putin, spoke to the Council of CIS interior ministers on 10 March, stating that events in Central Asia "confirm the need to combine the efforts of the power-wielding structures of our countries to oppose terrorism and extremists."

CONCLUSION: Russia is boldly reasserting itself in Central Asia. Putin's hard-nosed approach to dealing with terrorism is what the Central Asian leaders believe they need to put a stop to the rise of militant Islam in the region. It also serves to counter NATO interests in the region. In the Russian threat assessment of 1999, Moscow saw Central Asia as key component of Moscow economic and security future and it is now seizing the initiative. What in contrast is the United States doing to counter Russian moves? In an unprecedented move, both directors of the United States CIA and FBI have traveled to Central Asia to coincide with a six day visit of Secretary of State Madeline Albright to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The discussions primarily focused on counter-terrorism and high tech methods to combat it. CIA Director George Tenet met with Uzbek Security Service Chief Rustam Inoyatov in Tashkent to discuss American aid with satellite intelligence information and other special equipment to combat terrorism.

The heightened visits of Russian and United States officials illustrate the growing importance of the former Soviet periphery to both Russia and the West, particularly the United States. When FBI Director Louis Freeh met on 7 April 2000 with Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev and other Kazakh security officials in Astana, they discussed various methods of combating the flash-points causing instability in the country namely terrorism, money laundering, organized crime, corruption and drug trafficking in the region. But it is clear that Moscow influence is already extremely strong in Central Asia and center-periphery relations between Moscow and Central Asia solidifying over fears of terrorism are leading to integration within the former Soviet Empire. Implementation of anti-air defenses and the resurrection of the old Soviet era intelligence network is at the heart of the matter. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are part of Russia's forward assets and the security of such assets is critical to Russian foreign policy and security objectives.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Theodore Karasik is a Resident Consultant with the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. He is Editor of Russia and Eurasia Armed Forces Review Annual from Academic International Press. Dr. Karasik received his Ph.D in History from the University of California Los Angeles.

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