By Nargiza Umarova

Azerbaijan is strengthening its political and economic ties with the Taliban government by playing an active role in creating and developing promising transport routes to South Asia. At the forefront is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, launched in 2018 through a joint initiative of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Turkmenistan, similar to the ancient route of the Great Silk Road. The possibility of extending the corridor to South Asia is being considered, which would have geo-economic and geopolitical implications for Uzbekistan.

                                                                       Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: The US$2 billion Lapis Lazuli Agreement was signed by Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan on 15 November 2017. The route runs from the Afghan cities of Aqina in Faryab Province and Torghundi in Herat Province, through the Caspian Sea ports of Turkmenbashi and Baku, and the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti or Batumi, to Istanbul or Kars in Turkey, with further access to the European transport system.

The first test shipment along the Lapis Lazuli logistics chain was carried out in 2018. In January 2021, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan signed a trilateral roadmap to develop this route. However, implementation of the document was suspended due to the Taliban's seizure of power in Kabul in August 2021.

Against the backdrop of pragmatic interactions between Central Asian states — particularly Uzbekistan — and the current Afghan leadership, Azerbaijan is also seeking to strengthen its position in Afghanistan as a partner in trade, the economy, transport, and logistics.

Baku’s main priority is the Middle Corridor project, a vital logistics link between China and Europe. The Lapis Lazuli Corridor essentially extends the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan. This enables Kabul to take part in trans-Caspian shipping and to redirect some of its export cargo bound for the European market from Pakistan or Iran, to the South Caucasus and Turkey.

In 2024, Afghanistan’s total trade with the EU was approximately US$ 42 million, which is 15.9 percent higher than the previous year’s figure. Experts predict that this growth trend will continue. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is attempting to accelerate these processes by adopting a proactive approach to its relations with the Taliban.

On July 2, 2025, on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, met with Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov. They emphasized Baku’s readiness to increase export and import volumes with Afghanistan. The Afghan delegation visited the Baku International Seaport, where they discussed expanding the geography of freight transport along the South Asia-Caucasus-Europe route and integrating Afghanistan into the Middle Corridor.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have made significant efforts to develop the infrastructure of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. Azerbaijan has invested approximately US$ 1 billion in two vital elements of the project: the Alat Port in Baku and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan constructed the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Aqina railway in 2016, and connected the Afghan cities of Aqina and Andkhoy by rail in 2021. The Caspian port of Turkmenbashi is also being modernized to increase its capacity. In order to generate economic returns on their investments and reap the long-term benefits of transport service exports, it is crucial for Baku, Ashgabat and other stakeholders along the route to maximize its utilization. This justifies the idea of extending the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to Pakistan and India, which would run contrary to Uzbekistan’s interests.

IMPLICATIONS: It is assumed that the transport corridor from Europe to India via the South Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan will become an alternative to Tashkent’s strategic plan for connecting Eastern Europe with the Indian subcontinent. This plan involves linking the Trans-Afghan Railway (Kabul Corridor) with the Northern Railway Corridor through Russia. To this end, Uzbekistan has initiated the formation of the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Ocean ports transit route, which is set to launch in multimodal format soon.

The main benchmark for calculating the Kabul Corridor’s economic efficiency and feasibility is India’s growing potential for trade with Central Asian countries, the EU, China and Russia.

In the 2024 fiscal year, India’s trade turnover with the EU exceeded US$ 137 billion, with China US$ 118 billion, with Russia US$ 70 billion, and with Central Asian countries US$ 1.7 billion. The majority of Indian goods are delivered to promising markets by sea, which incurs high financial and time costs. The integration of India and Pakistan's transport space into the Eurasian road network is expected to stimulate land transportation along the South Asia-Europe axis. This shift holds great potential for the Kabul Corridor, with a projected annual cargo volume of up to 22 million tons, most of which will be in transit. 

However, the extension of the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan and the development of further access to Pakistan and India will redistribute the flow of cargo from South Asian countries to Europe in favor of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, who are connected by the Caspian Sea. In turn, this risks diminishing Uzbekistan’s exclusive role as a trans-Eurasian transport link. 

In theory, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to Pakistan by constructing a railway line from Torghundi station on the Afghan-Turkmen border to Naibabad station, which marks the beginning of the Afghan section of the Kabul Corridor. Although this would exclude Uzbekistan from the India-EU supply chain, it would enable the Kabul Corridor to attract additional cargo from the South Caucasus and Turkmenistan. However, this advantage would not offset Uzbekistan’s loss of transit flows from the larger economic centers of Eurasia.

Connecting the Lapis Lazuli and Kabul corridors would motivate constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway, which would breathe new life into the long-standing Five Nations Railway Corridor project, running through China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The Five Nations Route bypasses Uzbekistan, significantly reducing the distance between East and West. This will probably diminish the importance of the Southern Railway Corridor, which runs through Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which is intended to be an important component of this route.

At the same time, constructing the Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway could undermine the Lapis Lazuli Corridor’s competitive advantage by increasing Iranian transit. Iran already has rail access to northern Afghanistan via the Khaf-Herat route, which is used to deliver Afghan cargo to Europe. Extending the Khaf-Herat railway to Naibabad station near Mazar-i-Sharif and connecting it to the Kabul Corridor would enable Iran to divert potential cargo traffic from India and Pakistan to Turkey and Europe via itself, thereby depriving Central Asian and South Caucasian countries of transit benefits. Consequently, there is a possibility that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor could be extended to South Asia, bypassing Kabul and instead passing through Kandahar. This would stimulate the development of the western Trans-Afghan Railway along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak route. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan promote the project as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor. 

Russia should be considered a potential stakeholder in the extension of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor along any of the trans-Afghan routes. Moscow has already announced plans to connect with Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea, utilising Turkmenistan’s port and rail infrastructure, which would integrate Russia into the Lapis Lazuli Corridor. This would establish a connection between India and Russia, and potentially Europe, through Turkmenistan and the Caspian port of Turkmenbashi, rather than through Uzbekistan.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan’s best option for maintaining and enhancing its competitive advantages in trans-Eurasian and trans-Afghan transport is to accelerate construction of the Kabul Corridor, involving all Central Asian states financially to the maximum extent possible. Kazakhstan’s practical support for developing the Kabul Corridor is important, as connecting it to the Northern Railway Route to Europe will enable Astana to receive an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons per year. This will preempt any potential competition from Astana and Ashgabat in developing trans-Afghan transport connections. 

It would be worth proposing to Baku the joint promotion of a new multimodal corridor from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the EU. This would stimulate the development of the Middle Corridor by increasing transport from South Asia and Afghanistan to Europe via the Caspian Sea.

Moreover, an alternative should be developed to the Five Nations Route, instead envisaging a connection between China, Afghanistan and Iran through Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. This would ensure the profitability of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway project for Tashkent.

AUTHOR'S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution ‘Knowledge Caravan’, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Her research activities focus on developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of great powers on this process. She also explores Uzbekistan’s current policy on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be contacted at  This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

S. Frederick Starr

April 3, 2025

This article is an English version of an article to appear in Uzbek in Vatan (Motherland), Uzbekistan's leading journal.

Read Uzbekistan and the Institutionalization of Greater Central Asia PDF

By Farkhad Tolipov

January 29, 2025

The remnants of the Russian imperial modus vivendi is revealing in current Moscow’s manipulative policy in Central Asia where Moscow tries to embody its own version of Monroe Doctrine. This region looks like the last bastion of Russian imperialism. Uzbekistan, the biggest Central Asian country by population and the most central by location, provides an obvious illustrative case to observe and analyze this new/old regional order. Moscow’s manipulation of Uzbekistan and leverage-keeping policy is conducted with the help of a specific toolkit including propaganda, information attacks, geopolitical pressure and show visits.

Read Russia’s Central Asian Underbelly: The Case of Uzbekistan (PDF)

By Sergey Sukhankin

Uzbekistan, the most populous nation in Central Asia, has announced a strategic objective to significantly enhance the proportion of green energy within its energy portfolio and to utilize the surplus as a revenue source by exporting it to energy-demanding countries.This prioritization of green energy stems from ecological, economic, and geopolitical considerations. Given Uzbekistan's vast but largely untapped potential in this sector, Tashkent's initiative has been positively received internationally, with investors from China, the Gulf region, and the European Union expressing readiness to provide financial resources and technical expertise. However, despite growing international interest and the political elite's professed commitment, certain domestic challenges have led experts to question Uzbekistan's capacity to fully realize its considerable green energy potential.

Photo by Vladimir Jirnov

BACKGROUND: The end of 2024 witnessed a potentially transformative event for the development of green energy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. On November 13, during the World Leaders Climate Action Summit in Baku, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership agreement focused on the production and transmission of green energy. According to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy, the country plans to commence exporting green electricity, primarily generated from solar and wind power, to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan by 2030.

This agreement reaffirms and solidifies the previously signed protocol in Astana, which outlined the establishment of the Central Asia-Azerbaijan-Europe Green Energy Corridor project. Beyond benefiting Uzbekistan, this initiative aims to strengthen ties between the two most influential Central Asian nations—despite their existing challenges—and enhance connectivity between Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby fostering improved inter-regional trade and cooperation. Uzbekistan is strategically positioned to develop its green energy potential, benefiting from a surplus of inexpensive labor and over 320 sunny days annually. Studies indicate that Uzbekistan possesses the most promising wind and solar energy potential in Central Asia.

By 2027, Uzbekistan plans to construct twelve state-of-the-art thermal power plants across the Bukhara, Tashkent, Khorezm, Kashkadarya, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, and Syrdarya regions. These projects are expected to generate an additional 49.7 billion kWh of electricity annually and, as asserted by Uzbekistan’s political leadership, will be realized through public-private partnerships financed primarily by foreign investments. Moreover, alongside its collaboration with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan’s green energy initiatives present opportunities to enhance economic and political cooperation with other Central Asian countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose competitive advantage in green energy lies in hydropower generation. 

IMPLICATIONS: Uzbekistan stands to benefit from developing its significant green energy potential in three primary ways. First, by mitigating environmental impacts and reducing natural gas consumption. Given the country’s rapidly growing population and its economic model, the political leadership has recognized the critical role of clean energy in supporting the local economy. By late 2024, Uzbek officials reported that solar and wind power plants had generated 4.5 billion kWh of electricity, conserving 1.36 billion cubic meters of natural gas and preventing 1.89 million tons of harmful emissions. Successes in green energy carry notable diplomatic and political implications. Uzbekistan’s leadership is actively positioning the country as a key regional player in green energy and sustainability, a stance explicitly articulated by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev during the 2024 annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Samarkand. This strategy not only enhances the country’s international image but is also expected to generate significant economic benefits.

Second, the development of green energy offers Uzbekistan an opportunity to strengthen economic ties with the European Union (EU). Historically, EU-Uzbekistan relations have been marked by challenges, primarily due to differences in values. However, the geopolitical shifts following Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 have underscored the mutual economic benefits of collaboration between the resource-rich Uzbekistan and the economically powerful EU.

In early 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized Uzbekistan’s export potential in green energy, stating that the country plans to produce 13 billion kilowatt-hours of green electricity, far exceeding domestic demand by a factor of 10 to 12, with the surplus available for export. According to Uzbek officials, the country is ready to supply between 2 and 5 gigawatts (GW) of green energy to Europe. In support of this initiative, the Italian company CESI is already conducting a feasibility study to facilitate the export of green energy to the EU.

Importantly, collaboration in green energy may serve as a stepping stone toward broader mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Uzbekistan, particularly in the economic sphere. The EU and individual member states, notably France, have shown significant interest in Uzbekistan's natural resources, especially critical metals, whose production Uzbekistan is determined to expand. In the context of China's assertive actions in the critical metals sector, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, holds the potential to significantly enhance its role as a key supplier of essential metals and resources to the EU, addressing the bloc's strategic needs.

Third, Uzbekistan seeks to strengthen ties with Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These resource-rich nations, equipped with advanced technologies, are particularly attractive to Uzbekistan due to their lack of a geopolitical agenda in Central Asia, unlike Russia or China, and their non-interventionist approach to local norms and values, which sometimes contrasts with the EU.

Prominent Gulf-based corporations, such as ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia) and Masdar (UAE), are already actively engaged in developing Uzbekistan’s green energy potential and have announced ambitious future plans. For Uzbekistan, access to the Gulf's financial and technological resources addresses a critical need, enabling it to navigate the complex dynamics between Russia, China, and the EU—traditional power players in Central Asia. Moreover, if Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan cooperation in green energy proves successful, Uzbekistan could leverage these Gulf partnerships to diversify its foreign economic policy more effectively and enhance its regional and global strategic position.

However, these optimistic projections are tempered by concerns raised by experts regarding Uzbekistan's ability to translate its substantial potential into tangible outcomes. The primary issue lies in the country’s persistent challenges with deeply entrenched corruption and the ineffective management of resources, both of which hinder economic growth and deter foreign investment.

Unfortunately, the clean energy sector appears to be no exception. For instance, one investigative analysis uncovered structural corruption within the sector. Another recent investigation highlighted significant deficiencies in innovation within Uzbekistan's power grid and exposed multiple corruption schemes, while also drawing attention to Uzbekistan’s strengthening ties with Russia, which is reluctant to support Uzbekistan's modernization and transition to a green economy.

A second concern relates to the high cost of green energy production. Experts argue that even in economically and technologically advanced Western countries, green energy remains secondary to traditional energy sources. For Uzbekistan, unless production costs are significantly reduced—a process that could take considerable time—green energy may remain a luxury rather than a feasible primary energy source.

A third challenge, even if the first two are successfully addressed, is the region’s increasingly arid climate. Uzbekistan is already experiencing the adverse effects of sandstorms and similar natural phenomena, which disrupt the operations of solar panels and wind turbines. If these trends persist, they could undermine Uzbekistan's ability to achieve economies of scale, a key factor for reducing costs through the mass production of green energy. This climatic volatility poses a significant risk to the long-term viability of Uzbekistan's green energy ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Uzbekistan's potential success in transforming its significant green energy potential into practical achievements could yield substantial multidimensional benefits for both the country and the broader region. However, achieving this outcome requires effectively addressing two interdependent challenges.

The first is tackling endemic corruption and the ineffective management of resources—longstanding issues that have plagued Uzbekistan and its leadership since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although President Mirziyoyev has initiated reforms, progress in combating these systemic problems remains insufficient.

The second challenge is Uzbekistan's strengthening ties with Russia, which could hinder its ambitious initiatives. Russia has little interest in supporting Uzbekistan's economic growth or its transition to a cleaner energy mix. Moreover, Moscow is unlikely to favor efforts to enhance intra-regional economic and political cooperation, as these developments would bolster Central Asia's autonomy and reduce its dependence on Russia. Addressing these issues is critical for Uzbekistan to realize its green energy ambitions and contribute to regional development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

China is moving forward with the long-delayed 523-kilometer railway connecting Kashgar in northwest China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, proposed in the 1990s, officially began construction on December 27 in Jalalabad, Kyrgyzstan. This route offers a faster, cheaper alternative to existing connections between China and Europe via Kazakhstan and Russia.

Excluding Russia from the project has drawn criticism from Moscow, which views Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, Russia, heavily reliant on China due to Western sanctions over its 2022 Ukraine invasion, is unable to oppose the development.

The CKU railway, seen as a regional game-changer, promises to enhance trade and connectivity across Central xAsia. However, it also raises security concerns, as the route may facilitate cross-border activities of drug traffickers, terrorist groups, and militant organizations.

BACKGROUND:  The CKU railway, first conceived in 1997, faced significant delays due to financial, political, technical, and geopolitical challenges. A major obstacle was political instability in Kyrgyzstan, which stalled progress for 15 years. The project was revitalized in 2012 following a visit to Beijing by then-Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, renewing momentum for this strategic initiative under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Geopolitical factors also contributed to delays in the CKU railway project. Kazakhstan and Russia opposed the new route connecting China to Europe, as they benefited significantly from the existing northern corridor via Russia, which generated substantial revenue. Concerns over losing this economic advantage fueled their resistance. Financing the mega-project was another major challenge. In 2023, reports emerged suggesting the CKU railway’s postponement for an indefinite period due to unresolved funding issues.

Technical complexities have also hindered the execution of the CKU railway project. A key issue is the incompatible railway gauges between China and Central Asian countries. While China uses a standard gauge of 1,435 mm, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan rely on a broader gauge of 1,520 mm. This mismatch has posed significant logistical and engineering challenges to the project's implementation.

Another factor contributing to delays was the failure of participating countries to reach a consensus on the railway route due to conflicting interests. China and Uzbekistan favored a southern route, which offered shorter and faster transit to Europe. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan advocated for a northern route that, while longer and more expensive, would connect the north and south of Kyrgyzstan, fostering development and boosting its economy. Ultimately, under pressure from China and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan conceded to the shorter and less costly southern route.

In May 2023, China and Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement to commence the CKU railway project during an official visit by the Kyrgyz President to Beijing, with the China Railway Construction Corporation completing a feasibility study the same year.

In June 2024, officials from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed a trilateral agreement to implement the project, establishing a robust legal framework for constructing the railway. The line will begin in Kashgar, Xinjiang, pass through Kyrgyzstan, and extend into Uzbekistan, with future plans for extensions to West and South Asia.

After nearly three decades of deliberation, the CKU rail corridor is now progressing. The project promises to reduce freight transit times by one week and shorten the China-Europe route by 900 kilometers, marking a significant milestone in regional connectivity.

IMPLICATIONS: Beijing's decision to advance the CKU railway project represents a strategic masterstroke, poised to deepen China's influence across Central Asia and beyond. The initiative comes at a critical juncture, as Russia remains embroiled in the Ukraine conflict and faces crippling Western sanctions, creating a vacuum in the region's geopolitical landscape.

The CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes by providing a direct, efficient corridor to the continent. This development not only strengthens China’s connectivity but also enhances its role as a dominant trade and infrastructure player in the region.

In the future, the CKU railway could become a central hub for rail connectivity in Asia, linking Central Asia with South and West Asia. Once completed, the railway may be expanded east-west or north-south by integrating it with other countries' rail networks. Potential extensions include a route from Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Additionally, Uzbekistan's existing connections with Turkmenistan and Iran could position the CKU railway as one of the shortest routes between China and Western Europe.

With the CKU corridor operational, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are set to emerge as vital transit countries for Chinese exports. Both nations stand to gain significant economic benefits from transit fees, enhancing their economic roles in regional and global trade.

As a pivotal element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the CKU railway represents a strategic project to enhance China's connectivity with Central Asia. This landmark railway will traverse the challenging terrain of western China and Kyrgyzstan’s highest mountains, linking the railway networks of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In its final phase, the project aims to integrate with railway systems in Europe, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Türkiye.

The CKU rail corridor is poised to boost regional trade, foster economic cooperation, and provide the landlocked nations of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with critical access to global markets. Furthermore, the project will deliver essential infrastructure to both countries, strengthening their economic resilience and regional standing.

The CKU railway project is estimated to cost US$ 8 billion, with US$ 4.7 billion allocated for constructing the Kyrgyz section. Given Kyrgyzstan’s GDP of $9 billion, this expenditure represents a significant economic burden. As a result, the financially constrained country has sought a US$ 2.35 billion loan from China to fund its portion of the project, raising concerns about Kyrgyzstan potentially falling into a Chinese debt trap.

Once completed, the CKU railway will allow China to transport goods to Europe seven to eight days faster than existing land routes. Geopolitically, this project is crucial for China, offering an alternative to the current route through Russia and reducing reliance on Moscow for trade with Europe.

On the other hand, the CKU railway raises significant security concerns as it will pass through opium-producing areas, potentially creating a new route for drug smuggling. The corridor could also facilitate the cross-border movement of terrorist and militant groups. This poses a particular threat to China’s Xinjiang province, which has been targeted by separatist and Islamic extremist groups. The railway’s potential to exacerbate regional security challenges underscores the need for robust measures to address these risks.

CONCLUSIONS: The CKU railway has the potential to be a transformative project for Central Asia, elevating the region’s significance as a transit hub between China and Europe. It marks the realization of Beijing’s decade-long ambition to expand its connectivity with Eurasian countries.

The ongoing Ukraine war and Western sanctions against Russia, following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have further amplified the importance of the CKU corridor. This new route provides an alternative to the Northern Corridor through Russia, currently the primary transit route between East and West, thereby diminishing Moscow’s strategic relevance in regional trade.

Geopolitically, Beijing views the timing as opportune to advance the CKU railway project in Russia's so-called backyard, leveraging the Kremlin’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war. The launch of this mega project is poised to enhance China’s influence in Central Asia, potentially shifting the balance of power between Beijing and Moscow in the region.

However, the project carries significant security risks. The presence of drug smugglers and militant groups in the region raises concerns that the CKU corridor could be exploited by these armed groups, further complicating Central Asia's already fragile security environment.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .