The Nagorno-Karabakh war is over a decade old and has hitherto defied solution. International efforts have foundered upon rivalries among the key players, locally Armenia and Azerbaijan and internationally  Russia, Turkey, and the United States. The prospective importance of the huge energy supplies at stake has also complicated efforts at peacemaking. Whereas Baku has used energy as its political weapons, with Azerbaijan and the United States arguing that pipelines will bring peace, in Armenia things have been quite different. Armenian politics have largely been hijacked by militants determined to hold onto their conquests over Azerbaijan and to annex the disputed province to Armenia. They have relied upon military forces and have frequently been able to elude any kind of democratic or civilian control over those forces.  Indeed, they have resorted to coups d’etat and even assassinations of key leaders to try and maintain the military’s privileged position and the tough, uncompromising line on Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia's current President, Robert Kocharian actually came to power in this fashion.

IMPLICATIONS: The other side of this tough policy is that no reconciliation with Turkey is possible, Western support remains limited and Armenia has essentially become a Russian client state with a sizable Russian military presence.  Yet none of this helps Armenia's economy which has been ravaged by war, embargoes, power shortages, corruption, etc. Although Kocharian, like his predecessor whom he ousted, now realizes the need for broader relations with Turkey and the West and the overriding need for peace to begin a real economic reconstruction, his opponents in the military refuse to find a solution for Nagorno-Karabakh that will secure the local Armenians' rights without annexing the province and other territories conquered from Azerbaijan. That stance has precluded any meaningful progress with Baku, which naturally will not accept the outright and overt loss of territories that include non-Armenian populations, and entails Armenia's military-political dependence upon Russia.

The recent American-inspired mediation of this war that took place in Key West, seems to have made progress in overcoming the logjam. But it instantly aroused opposition in Armenia among those forces that wish to continue the state of war, hold on to the conquered territories, and make the Russian connection Armenia's primary foreign policy relationship and military alliance. Naturally their stance has coincided with Moscow’s ambition to keep Western and especially Turkish influence out of the Caucasus and given Moscow a section of Armenia’s elite which can be counted on to support Moscow – a traditional instrument of Russian imperial policies

CONCLUSIONS: Armenia’s choice for peace or for war and the benefits, and sacrifices, of either course will not only determine its policies for years to come.  That choice will also exert profound influence over the  evolution of international alignments in the South Caucasus and efforts to tie the region to Europe through pipelines connecting it with either Turkey or Russia. A policy based on holding onto nationalistic perspectives and the  gains of war entails dependence upon Moscow and military elites at the expense of a politics based on the primacy of economic restoration, peace, and European integration. Equally importantly, the decision between war and peace will determine whether or not a reconciliation with Turkey can be achieved and whether or not Armenia’s armed forces can be brought under effective civilian and democratic control over time. Since that latter condition is also an indispensable requirement of integration with Europe, it becomes clear how Armenia’s internal politics are imbricated with major decisions about its future course on defense and foreign policies.

AUTHOR BIO: Prof. Stephen Blank is a Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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