BACKGROUND: Since the May 1994 cease-fire, which left Nagorno Karabakh de facto independent and with a territorial link to Armenia, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is effectively in deadlock. Since spring 1999, both the level of dialogue between the parties and the degree of international involvement increased considerably. The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Robert Kocharian and Heidar Aliyev, have met sixteen times to discuss the conflict. The last two meetings in March and April 2001 were held in the presence of the OSCE co-chairs, Russia, the U.S. and France. The latest Key West talks also heralded a new format of the consultations. The system of  ‘proximity talks’ was employed, in which the negotiating parties do not meet directly but use the services of mediators. The same negotiation format will be used at the next round scheduled to take place in Geneva this Summer.

The current positive dynamics are shaped by several favorable factors. Firstly, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan no longer consider the status quo viable and see the final settlement of the conflict as both possible and desirable. Secondly, the commitment of the United States and Russia to reaching a settlement is higher than ever. Russia’s position is currently more constructive than before. Cooperation between the U.S. and Russia generates a favorable psychological and political framework for the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents. President Kocharian can address his own political establishment pointing at the support of Russia, Armenia’s protector and strategic partner. Aliyev, in turn, can exploit U.S. support to reassure his own political opponents of a counterbalance to the perceived Russian support for Armenia. These psychological dynamics could generate the crucial sense of ‘ripeness’ in the minds of the two sides, both decision-makers and the wider public. Unfortunately, at this point in time, it seems that the presidents are ahead of their constituencies.

IMPLICATIONS: Any peace settlement will be a tough compromise and may be out of the range of what the public in either Azerbaijan or Armenia consider fair and just. There is likely to be many opponents of the settlement who will try to pressure the presidents. Presidential signatures on a peace settlement plan is a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, condition for bringing lasting peace to the region. There are clear political and practical obstacles to the implementation. The withdrawal of the Armenian units from occupied territories, which is a necessary part of any deal, will be followed by the movement of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan to their places of origin. Such major population movements will create a severe burden on the crisis-ridden Azerbaijani economy, as well as political pressures.

To offset the possible destabilizing implications of a peace settlement, the international community will need to engage actively and decisively in the implementation of the settlement. The involvement must surpass post-conflict rehabilitation to include de-mining, reconstruction and long-term development. International support for the peace solution must also be tangible – from withdrawal of section 907(a) of the Freedom Support Act limiting U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan, to the provision of post-settlement assistance packages. Extensive foreign involvement will also have international implications. To avoid delays in international programming, there is a need to decide on the lead international agencies for the rehabilitation and development projects with a clear delimitation of responsibilities and built-in contingency planning.

The OSCE, which leads the negotiations, should carefully decide what information from the negotiation process can be shared with international organizations at this stage in order to allow them for timely planning of their involvement. The OSCE should seek the consent of Armenia and Azerbaijan to allow for a needs assessment missions prior to the actual signature of a settlement. Such field visits to at least some of the territories of concern should allow for more adequate international planning and shorten the deployment time of the international programs.

It is crucial for the UN and OSCE not to miss the short window of opportunity after an agreement is reached – if it is. The time gap between the announcement of a settlement and the actual field engagement of the international community often leads to a situation where the momentum of political will of the parties created by the agreement has slowed down, stopped or even reversed by the time international projects are launched. There is a need for efforts to avoid this scenario in Nagorno-Karabakh, if and when a settlement to this protracted conflict is reached.

CONCLUSION: A peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would have a significant stabilizing effect on the Caucasus. It would enable the reconstruction of war-damaged areas, and facilitate economic and political development of the whole South Caucasus. It would strengthen Azerbaijan and Armenia and therefore limit their vulnerability to foreign, most importantly Russian, dictate. In addition, the agreement could serve as an example and incentive for other breakaway regions, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestria, to consider serious compromises in exchange for lasting and guaranteed solutions and economic assistance packages.

The absence or slow implementation of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development projects in the region would strengthen the opponents of the deal and feed into the negative stereotypes between the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations. It would have a negative impact on the stability of the regimes during the uneasy post-settlement period and the future cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It could also have a serious damaging impact on the peace process itself. The failure of the peace process at a given moment is likely to generate an overwhelming negative momentum, which will destabilize the regimes in Armenia and Azerbaijan. A failure of the negotiations to produce a settlement may not result in a continuation of the current status quo, but could compel leaders to seek a military solution to the situation. The use of ‘other means than negotiation’ if the negotiations do not lead to a settlement have already been mentioned as possible options, specifically in Azerbaijan.

AUTHOR BIO: Blanka Hancilova is a PhD Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

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