BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan is both blessed and cursed. Producing over half a million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) and with well over 60 billion barrels of estimated oil reserves, landlocked Kazakhstan has the potential to be a major, regional oil producer. Unfortunately, with a current population of less than 17 million and the increasing outflow of skilled workers, the remaining Kazakhs face the ravages of infectious diseases and future generations that are stunted and weak. Moreover, with the ineffective public health infrastructure, a reversal is unlikely. Although Kazakhstan is ratcheting up its defense budget to fight the spread of Islamic militarism, the decline in the mental and physical capabilities of a majority of Kazakhstan’s younger population will affect its ability to build and secure pipelines, pumping stations, and refineries in the future.
Russia has not come to Kazakhstan’s rescue in preserving manpower, and thereby, security. Facing a demographic crisis, Russian counterinsurgency support to Central Asian states will not be forthcoming or effective. Russia’s population decreased by 768,000 people (0.5 percent) to 144.9 million between January and November 2000. It is anticipated that Russia could lose another 2.8 million people over the next three years. Only about 25 percent of Russian babies are born healthy and only 5 to 10 percent of Russian children are healthy. With all its blustering about military reform, Russia can do little to improve the quality and quantity of its manpower to protect Central Asia in general, or current and future Kazakh resource extraction specifically.
While the Russian and Central Asian population dwindles and falls ill, China’s successful one-child and economic policies have produced a different type of demographic crisis in which the male share of the population, life expectancy, and meat consumption have risen. Currently, millions of workers are unemployed and searching for new opportunities.
IMPLICATIONS: The one child policy and a wealth-induced increased life expectancy have resulted in the ‘graying’ of China. By 2030, China will have 15% fewer children in urban areas while the population older than sixty-five is scheduled to constitute more than 25 percent of population. In order to support this future demographic shift, China will need to increase the productivity of its population by shifting more human resources from agriculture to industry, and to provide workers with adequate wages to pay for a functioning social security system. Clearly, Beijing needs access to secure energy resources if continued industrial growth is to occur. China has been a net oil importer since 1993. By 2010, the gap between oil production and consumption will reach 90-177 million tons, and this shortfall will have to be covered by increased imports. Beijing needs oil and gas to keep the country running with its large and growing population.
China needs to become less dependent on resources extracted from or transported on the world’s oceans. At the same time, Beijing must develop resources in regions that negate US military strengths. Reports of Chinese immigration to Russia and Kazakhstan abound. Moreover, China has won major oil concessions and bought majority stakes in Kazakh petroleum firms and plans to build a 2,000 mile-long pipeline to carry oil to China’s industrial cities. Although there are few economic justifications for the pipeline, it would provide Beijing with a long-term, large and dependable source of oil. Kazakhstan, rightfully, fears an increased Chinese presence, to both build and defend its future energy infrastructure. A government whose population is in poor and declining health, combined with am increasing need for manpower, including in manpower- intensive security to protect the state borders against Islamic militants has few choices. Clearly, Kazakhstan’s future is tied to the East.
CONCLUSIONS: The need to control militarily significant resources and quell insurgency in Central Asia has long been a goal of Chinese foreign policy. The basis of Chinese power is manpower, plenty of equipment, and a viable industry based on fossil fuels – which is likely to increasingly rely on Central Asian resources. Weak neighbors, unhealthy states, and a growing Islamic insurgency guarantee Chinese involvement in Central Asia’s security, particularly in Kazakhstan.
AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Karasik is an Analyst at RAND also a Visiting Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. He is Editor of Russia and Eurasia Armed Forces Review Annual from Academic International Press.Copyright 2001 The Analyst All rights reserved