BACKGROUND: In the wake of the political upheavals in March 2005, the influence of drug trafficking on the political system in Kyrgyzstan has expanded and reached unprecedented levels. A number of contract killings of high-level public figures have allegedly been connected to the illegal narcotics industry. The country is a preferred route for drug smuggling, with an estimated 15-20 percent of the opiates produced in Afghanistan transiting its territory. The law enforcement body most directly linked to the fight against the drug trade in Kyrgyzstan is the Drug Control Agency (DCA). Established in 2003, the exclusively U.S.-funded DCA took over and expanded upon the responsibilities of its predecessor, the State Commission on Drug Control. It has its own law enforcement capability, including investigative personnel, its own detention rooms, and the status as law implementing body, making it a key pillar in the country’s fight against drug trafficking. The DCA is however an institution suffering from severe problems, which raise serious doubts regarding its future viability. Three main factors with a determining impact on the future nature of the DCA can be singled out: geopolitics; domestic power politics; and the lack of efficiency and need for organizational restructuring. To begin with the international dimension, the fact that the DCA’s entire budget is supplied by the U.S. carries some serious implications that must be viewed in the light of the strategic rivalry that is unfolding in Central Asia between America on the one hand and China and Russia (within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) on the other. Currently, there are frictions in the relationship between Kyrgyzstan and the US concerning the hosting of American troops at the Ganci airbase in the outskirts of Bishkek, including disagreements over rents as well as the duration of American forces. The origins of these tensions is to be found in the increased pressure that President Kurmanbek Bakiev is facing from SCO, and in particular Russia. One of the outcomes of the SCO summit in Astana in 2005 was the resolution that all US bases in Central Asia should be removed. Bakiev agreed to the resolution, but in contrast to Uzbekistan’s decision to ask U.S. troops to leave, used a more cautious strategy, mainly manifested by indicating that if the U.S. wants to continue its military presence in Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. Government would need to pay considerably more than presently. It is against this background that the DCA makes an illustrative case of how great power competition can have a direct impact on local institutional bodies. It is important to emphasize that the agency was created in June 2003 on the basis of a three-year contract. Thus, the contract has officially come to an end. High-level sources, however, indicates that the U.S. may not extend its payment. This could be interpreted as a component in the strategic game. Since U.S. money is what keeps the DCA alive, its withdrawal would call the future existence of the organization into question, at the very least in its current form. In this sense, it is clear that the DCA does not rest on an indigenous institutional ground.

IMPLICATIONS: As a response to these uncertainties, the last several weeks have seen an increased level of activity on the part of the DCA. This does not seem to be a coincidence, but mirrors its perceived need to manifest its indispensability to the President. Last week, two seizures were reported in Bishkek. Furthermore, two weeks ago, a new Eastern office was created in Issyk-kul, to supplement the leading Northern office in Bishkek and the Southern branch in Osh. That the DCA has started working hard is also suggested from the leading role it has taken in the preparations for the upcoming annual International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking on June 26. The leadership structures of the DCA are also subject to power politics, but this time from a domestic point of view. It is rumored that the recently removed Head of the National Security Service, Tashtemir Aitbaev, a close relative and ally to President Bakiev, is interested in acquiring the position as Head of DCA, while the present Head, Bolotbek Nogoibaev, is a candidate for replacing Murat Sultalinov as Minister of Interior. The reasons for this reshuffling is assumed to be linked to the latter’s close relationship with Prime Minister Felix Kulov; a relationship not to the liking of the President. Such reshuffling is far from unrealistic in Kyrgyzstan, where a systemic feature is that top-level officials, when removed, seldom disappear from the political scene but just reappear in other positions. Finally, it is estimated that only about 3 percent of the drugs that are smuggled through Kyrgyz territory are confiscated. This brings up the point of the need for restructuring of the DCA. At present, the agency is not an effective anti-narcotics tool. For instance, in 2005, 60 percent of drug seizures were conducted by the forces of the Ministry of Interior, while no more than 25 kg of drugs were confiscated by the DCA. In comparison, its Tajik counterpart seized more than a ton. Here, the problem is located at the structural level. The main office is placed in Bishkek, while the southern branch in Osh only comprises 30 percent of all the personnel, despite the fact that the main drug trafficking activity is taking place in the southern parts of the country, not in the north. The status of the DCA is also considerably lower in the south. In order to improve the overall functioning of the institution, a geographical reorganization is required, and that implies moving the base to where the main counter-narcotics battle needs to be fought, i.e. at the center of the leading southern drug trafficking hubs. As it is now, resources are not allocated to where they are most needed. An additional problem that needs to be addressed is the harmonization between the DCA as a U.S. transplant and its local anchorage. Requirements for being appointed at the agency include procedures, like lie detector tests, alien to Kyrgyz law.

CONCLUSIONS: In sum, the combination of high-level political games and internal organizational problem plays a major role in shaping the nature of the DCA as well as its future destiny in Kyrgyzstan, and is a source of considerable worry. Indeed, conversations with officials further underline the lack of confidence in the future of the organization. Many express that they are seriously considering the possibility to leave for other law enforcement bodies. In case the problems identified above remain unresolved, the outlook for winning the battle against drugs in Kyrgyzstan looks gloom. However, even worse would be if the DCA would be dissolved. That would basically symbolize a capitulation to drug trafficking. It remains an open question, moreover, whether European powers would be interested in contributing to the DCA’s financial security.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Johan Engvall is a Lecturer with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. Kairat Osmonaliev is Associate Professor at the Kyrgyz National University, and author of Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia, published by the Joint Center.