BACKGROUND: Former President Eduard Shevardnadze initiated Georgia’s first steps toward NATO. In 1998, Georgia invited the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) to offer top-down recommendations for comprehensive national security sector reform. In 2002, the United States began training the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) in the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). Both proved to be seminal decisions. “Georgia will be knocking on NATO’s door by 2005,” Shevardnadze said. Unfortunately, his government’s reform record was so feeble that the knock was inaudible. The political will and the budget to carry out serious reforms came only after the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili directed the government to implement without exception ISAB’s recommendations, refocused in early 2004. These concentrated on the changes needed at the national level, across the spectrum of security activities. The IPAP—elaborated by Georgia and agreed by NATO—complemented the ISAB recommendations, extending beyond the security field to matters of democratic development and prescribing specific actions at various level of government. These two documents became the eye of a whirlwind of Georgian activity, fueled by further recommendations and assistance from throughout the alliance. There is room here for only a few examples of the strides forward made since then. The tax system was reformed and commercial licensing procedures streamlined such that the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 2006 rates Georgia’s economy in the second, “mostly free,” category—behind the US and the UK, but on par with NATO allies France, Italy and Spain. The World Bank’s Doing Business report for 2006 ranks Georgia as the second global reformer. In the national security sector, Georgia has published its unequivocally western-oriented National Security Concept. It has abolished the Soviet style Interior Army, and firmly subordinated the National Guard to the General Staff. The Minister of Defense is a civilian, and the civilian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is distinct from the military General Staff. The Land Forces Headquarters is distinct from the General Staff. A draft law to authorize the conversion of the General Staff to a western-style joint staff has passed its first reading in Parliament. The American Army and Marines have trained two Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) brigades and a number of other units and staff organizations, first under GTEP and later under the Security and Stability Operations Program (SSOP). The next phase of SSOP will soon begin to train a third GAF brigade. GAF service under NATO command in Afghanistan and Kosovo and under American command in Iraq has improved Georgia’s integration and interoperability with NATO forces and its overall combat capability, both IPAP requirements. The MoD has published the National Military Strategy. It delayed publication of the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) to insure its quality, however work proceeds on a realistic force structure based on strategy, threat analysis and sustainability. The MoD successfully presented an update on this work at a conference in Tbilisi on May 2. A Law on Defense Planning that establishes three year defense budgeting was passed by Parliament in April. Meanwhile, a team of Dutch experts is advising on MoD financial management reform and UK experts will soon begin helping on personnel management. ISAB’s final report, delivered to Saakashvili in February 2006, concludes, “the conceptual and strategic requirements of modernization have been satisfied.” Robert Simmons, NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, amplified on the alliance’s IPAP assessment: “allies recognize that Georgia is a Euro-Atlantic country that has made significant strides toward reform.”

IMPLICATIONS: These favorable reports were not sufficient to forge a consensus on ID for Georgia at Sofia. “We’re not there yet,” said Simmons. Though the alliance likes to say that an aspiring member’s prospects are performance-based, in reality, performance is necessary but not sufficient. That is because current NATO allies look at Georgia through a variety of political lenses. Some have already concluded that a Georgia in NATO is in their geostrategic interest and are ready to proceed with ID and MAP. Others have been traditionally skeptical of alliance enlargements in principle. Still others want first to consolidate the ten members already admitted in the two post Cold War enlargements. Related to this, some European NATO countries fear that another round of alliance enlargement could become a precedent for further European Union expansion. The upshot appears to have been to delay – that is, to remove any sense of automaticity – but not to derail ID for Georgia. That point made, a consensus is now forming to proceed soon to ID with Georgia. A similar phenomenon will no doubt surface when the time comes for Georgia to move from ID to MAP, whether at the November Riga Summit or later. That means there is hard work ahead. The gainsayers can always find one more task that Georgia has not accomplished or not accomplished well enough. A fairer observation is that many of the IPAP reforms are processes that take time. Now the Georgian MoD must finish the SDR properly, establish sound defense financial management and develop a modern military and civilian career management system. Any loose ends from the IPAP will surely turn up in the MAP. But for Georgia to move to MAP and on to NATO membership will also require changed perspectives in three areas. The first required change is to recognize that a MAP is neither a crown of laurel leaves nor a great political victory, but another reform program – tougher than IPAP – after which NATO will undertake another serious performance evaluation. Second, bearing in mind that IPAP and MAP performance remain important, is to realize that an alliance decision to offer Georgia membership will be fundamentally political. Big picture issues such as judicial reform, efficient local elections this autumn and a thoughtful approach to the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity will be very important. Most important for the west is to avoid any hint that resolution of the territorial disputes in Abkhazia or South Ossetia is prerequisite to Georgia’s NATO membership. That would be tantamount to a Russian veto. Recognizing this, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on May 30 urged NATO countries “to assist in finding mutually acceptable solutions to the conflicts that plague the region.” The third needed change is for the west to concentrate less on its checklist of reforms and more on its own self-interest in having a democratic ally on the strategic eastern shore of the Black Sea. Having Georgia as a NATO ally would help stabilize the region, secure the gateway to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, and strike a blow in the fight against terrorism and contraband of every sort.

CONCLUSIONS: The May 30 NATO Parliamentary Assembly statement endorsed ID for Georgia this summer, and many observers in Brussels and national capitals believe that NATO is near ready for this step. The consensus that eluded the alliance at Sofia appears to be gelling. MAP at the November Riga Summit might still be possible, but the time to forge another alliance consensus would be very short indeed. NATO may leave a MAP for Georgia until 2007. This would still be a remarkable achievement.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ambassador David J. Smith is Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC, and the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi.