By Davit Petrosyan

On 13 March 2025, Yerevan and Baku announced consensus on the peace agreement text, raising hopes of ending the decades-long conflict. The U.S. described it as a “historic peace treaty,” while the European Council encouraged both parties to proceed with signing. However, closer analysis suggests the document is more about formally closing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict than achieving sustainable peace. The failure to resolve key disputes—such as unblocking regional transit routes and border delimitation—combined with growing military imbalance in Baku’s favor and Armenia’s concession of important deterrent tools, suggests that Azerbaijan may launch new escalations when the broader geopolitical climate becomes more permissive. 

Photo source: ffikretow

BACKGROUND: The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to the late 1980s, when a war (1988-1994) broke out between ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region—an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Armenians—and Azerbaijani forces. With backing from the Republic of Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians gained control not only over Nagorno-Karabakh but also seven adjacent districts. A ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia on 5 May 1994 effectively froze the conflict. Although Nagorno-Karabakh achieved de facto independence, it remained unrecognized by any country, including Armenia. The OSCE Minsk Group—co-chaired by Russia, the U.S., and France—was established to facilitate a peaceful resolution.

After sixteen years of stalled negotiations, the conflict reignited on 27 September 2020, when Azerbaijan—backed by Turkey—launched a large-scale offensive, reclaiming the seven surrounding districts and about a third of Nagorno-Karabakh. Following several failed mediation attempts by Russia, France, and the U.S., Russia brokered a ceasefire on 9 November 2020. The agreement commissioned the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the region; the establishment of a joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center; and the transferred control of the Lachin corridor, previously under Armenian control and connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, to Russian peacekeeping forces. 

In the following period, Yerevan and Baku engaged in several rounds of peace talks, initially mediated by Moscow. Over time, however, the EU and the U.S. assumed more active roles. Early negotiations focused on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and later evolved into discussions about the rights and security of Armenians living in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Negotiations also centered on border delimitation, humanitarian issues including the return of prisoners of war and detainees, the handover of landmine maps, and the search for missing persons. A particularly contentious issue was the unblocking of regional transit routes (connectivity), including the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which would connect Azerbaijan to its western exclave, Nakhichevan. 

Despite ongoing talks, Azerbaijan launched military incursions into Armenia’s internationally recognized territory between 2021 and 2022, occupying approximately 215 square kilometers. In response, Armenia invited the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to monitor its border with Azerbaijan. In December 2022, Azerbaijan blockaded the Lachin corridor—with the tacit approval of Russian peacekeepers—and, following a ten-month blockade, launched an offensive that resulted in the forced displacement of 120,000 ethnic Armenians from the region. 

Since then, peace talks have continued, with Armenia seeking to avoid further escalation and Azerbaijan advancing new demands. On 13 March 2025, both parties announced a consensus on the text of the peace agreement. However, Azerbaijan added two conditions: the “amendment” of Armenia’s Constitution and the dissolution the OSCE Minsk Group. 

IMPLICATIONS: The agreement fails to resolve all disputes, leaving flashpoints that could trigger new escalations. One major issue is connectivity—the modalities for restoring road links, which is absent from the finalized text. Azerbaijan continues demanding unhindered access to its western exclave Nakhichevan, and has repeatedly threatened to open the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” by force. Conversely, Armenia views any extraterritorial corridor as a red line, signaling its resolve to respond proportionally. This marks a shift from earlier Azerbaijani incursions, when Armenian forces adopted a defensive posture, with Prime Minister Pashinyan declaring that Armenia would not retake occupied territories militarily. 

The diverging stances of regional powers on connectivity could either deter or ignite a future conflict. On February 14, 2025, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova blamed Armenia for “freezing” trilateral efforts to reopen routes. On March 26, 2025, Turkish President Erdoğan declared plans to build regional trade corridors centered on Zangezur. Conversely, on September 7, 2024, a senior Iranian official reaffirmed that the “Zangezur Corridor” was a red line for Iran. Joint Armenia-Iran military exercises in April 2025, amid increased Azerbaijani activity along the border, aimed to demonstrate Iran’s readiness to deter Azerbaijani attempts to take the route by force.

The agreement also leaves border delimitation unresolved, which has already led to military clashes, with Azerbaijan occupying 215 km² of Armenian territory. To date, only one portion of the border has been delimited. Key areas where Azerbaijani forces have advanced remain undelimited. Azerbaijan has shown no intention of withdrawing, raising doubts about the agreement’s ability to resolve tensions and establish lasting peace. Importantly, Russia can leverage disputes on this issue and connectivity to maintain its influence in the region. 

The EUMA’s removal from the Armenian–Azerbaijani border would significantly weaken Armenia’s security. Since EUMA’s deployment in mid-February 2023, not a single square meter of Armenian territory has been occupied. The mission has served as an effective external balancing tool, deterring Azerbaijani advances. Given that large portions of the border remain undelimited, EUMA’s withdrawal would eliminate a key stabilizing presence and increase the risk of new Azerbaijani aggression. 

Under the peace deal, Armenia agreed to withdraw international lawsuits against Azerbaijan, forfeiting another deterrent. Four applications to the European Court of Human Rights documented widespread Azerbaijani human rights violations during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, while Armenia's complaint to the International Court of Justice accused Azerbaijan of systematic racial discrimination. Dropping these cases not only erases the record of violations but also removes a major constraint on Azerbaijan’s future actions, freeing its hands for provocations. 

The peace agreement lacks enforcement mechanisms. No third party is designated to oversee compliance, further increasing the risk of escalation. It also fails to address the fate of at least 106 Armenian prisoners of war (POWs) and detainees, making the document resemble a “punitive” conclusion to the war rather than a genuine peace agreement. 

One of the primary motivations behind Azerbaijan’s additional conditions, “amending” Armenia’s Constitution and dissolving the Minsk Group, is to bury the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Constitution’s preamble cites the 1990 Declaration of Independence and references the joint statement of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan portrays this as evidence of Armenian territorial claims. The dissolution of the Minsk Group is intended to symbolize the closure of the conflict it was created to resolve.

Finally, the military balance continues to shift in Azerbaijan’s favor. While both countries allocate 4–5 percent of their GDP to defense, Azerbaijan’s spending was 3.5 times higher in 2020, 4.4 times higher in 2021, 3.8 times higher in 2022, and 2.7 times higher in 2023. Projections show that Azerbaijan’s defense budget was 2.7 times higher in 2024 and is expected to be 2.9 times higher in 2025. As the imbalance grows, Azerbaijan’s confidence in resorting to force to compel Armenia into new concessions is likely to increase.

CONCLUSION: The current peace agreement fails to resolve crucial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, depriving Armenia of important balancing and deterrent mechanisms. The two additional conditions put forward by Azerbaijan suggest that at this stage, Baku's aim is not to achieve a comprehensive peace, but to decisively close the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The failure to address the issue of Armenian POWs and detainees held in Baku, as well as the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, demonstrates that this agreement is not aimed at bringing sustainable peace to the South Caucasus but rather at formally confirming Azerbaijan's achievements so far. 

The weak peace agreement and the continually shifting military balance in Azerbaijan's favor enables Baku to retain the necessary levers to escalate the situation when the geopolitical environment appears more favorable. It reserves options to compel Armenia into new concessions, such as securing the route to Nakhichevan on its own terms and constraining Armenia's post-conflict recovery efforts. Finally, diverging positions over the reopening of regional transit routes and conflicting interests among regional powers could serve as additional triggers for renewed escalation, providing Russia with opportunities to maintain its influence in the region. 

AUTHOR BIO: Davit Petrosyan is a Fulbright Scholar pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. Previously, he served as an Assistant to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia and as Chief Program Officer of Restart Civic-Youth Foundation.

By Tomáš Baranec

On March 1, 2025, the second round of the de facto presidential elections took place in Abkhazia. The incumbent de facto President, Badra Gunba, secured 55.66 percent of the vote, defeating opposition candidate Adgur Ardzinba, who received 42.25 percent. The 2025 elections were marked by two notable features. First, Russia directly intervened in the electoral process for the first time since the 2004 presidential elections, during which Moscow openly supported Raul Khajimba. Second, a political faction recently ousted through mass protests returned to power through electoral means. Both developments may have significant consequences for Abkhazia’s political trajectory.

Photo source: Andrey Danilov

BACKGROUND: The latter half of 2024 in Abkhazia was characterized by widespread public mobilization against the proposed so-called investment agreement with Russia. Critics expressed concern that the agreement would strip the region of its remaining de facto sovereignty and potentially threaten the precarious demographic majority held by ethnic Abkhazians. These tensions culminated in an assault on the presidential palace in Sukhumi and the subsequent resignation of de facto President Aslan Bzhania and de facto Prime Minister Alexander Ankvab on November 19.

Following the first round of the presidential elections held on February 15, 2025, two traditional political factions competed for power. Gunba represented the interests of the Ankvabist bloc (United Abkhazia), aligned with Alexander Ankvab and the ousted president Aslan Bzhania. Adgur Ardzinba of the Abkhazian National Movement led the opposing group—the Khajimbists. Initially, Ardzinba received support from Kan Kvarchia, chairman of the Aidgylara movement, and Leuan Mikaa, chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Abkhazia’s Sovereignty. However, both opposition figures ultimately refrained from actively participating in Ardzinba’s election campaign.

The catalyst for the early elections was the "unfinished revolution" of November 2024, during which President Bzhania and Prime Minister Ankvab were compelled to resign, leading to the abandonment of the highly unpopular investment agreement with Russia.

Gunba, as a representative of the recently ousted political faction, was initially expected to enter the early elections as a marginal contender. Despite the apparent achievements of the revolution, it remained incomplete. Prior to the elections, Ankvab’s faction continued to control all key ministries, administrative apparatuses, and the media landscape.

The Ankvab faction also secured a strategic advantage during the election campaign. Employing black PR tactics, they compelled Ardzinba’s campaign team to focus their efforts on countering numerous accusations and rumors. Consequently, the opposition leader had limited opportunity to engage with issues that were critical and sensitive for the Ankvab group, including cryptocurrency mining, the investment agreement, and the deterioration of the energy infrastructure.

The Ankvab faction structured its campaign around two principal narratives. In the first, Ardzinba was portrayed as anti-Russian, implying that only Gunba could guarantee the continuation of Russian support. In the second, Ardzinba was depicted as a proponent of Turkish interests, thereby suggesting that the opposition harbors hostility toward the Armenian community in Abkhazia.

By maintaining control even after the revolution, Ankvab’s supporters were able to utilize the local media’s propaganda apparatus and deploy the standard array of administrative resources in the lead-up to the elections.

However, the Kremlin’s overt intervention in support of Gunba introduced a new variable into an otherwise conventional electoral equation. In addition to supplying Abkhazia with so-called humanitarian gas at a reduced rate, senior Kremlin officials publicly aligned themselves with the candidate representing the Ankvab faction. Simultaneously, Russian media at all levels, along with coordinated bot networks on social media, intensified the black PR campaign against Ardzinba and the opposition with unprecedented intensity. Within this framework, the revocation of Russian citizenship from Mikaa and Kvarchia at the end of January functioned as a broader signal of warning to the entire Abkhazian populace.

IMPLICATIONS: The Ankvab faction secured electoral victory shortly before the plebiscite through the implementation of several active measures. At the last moment, it blocked the establishment of a polling station in Turkey, out of concerns that the diaspora electorate there might favor the opposition. Conversely, reports of significant, organized voter fraud surfaced at polling stations in Moscow and Cherkessk. Additionally, allegations emerged that Abkhaz authorities were distributing driver’s licenses in exchange for votes cast in favor of Gunba.

However, none of these measures alone guaranteed a seamless victory. The decisive factor was a targeted campaign directed at the Armenian minority, bolstered by substantial support from Russian media and the influential Armenian diaspora based in Sochi. For the first time, a majority of this demographic explicitly endorsed a single candidate—Gunba. Given that ethnic Armenians constitute approximately 17 percent of the population, according to local expert Said Gezerdava, their unified support proved pivotal in enabling the Ankvab faction to retain political control.

Despite achieving a lead of over 13 percent against the opposition candidate, the position of the Ankvab faction remains precarious, particularly considering probable expectations from Moscow. A victory by the Khajimba faction would have brought minimal change for Russia regarding Abkhazia, as one pro-Russian bloc would have merely supplanted another. The intensity with which the Kremlin committed to overtly supporting Gunba—even at the expense of discrediting the opposition and estranging segments of the local populace—indicates that it anticipates reciprocal concessions.

Moscow’s demands are well known. The Kremlin outlined them in the so-called protocol of August 19, calling on Sukhumi to lift restrictions preventing Russian citizens from purchasing real estate in Abkhazia and to adopt a commercial pricing model for electricity supply. An additional, longstanding demand includes the privatization of Abkhazia’s energy sector in favor of Russian enterprises.

In such a scenario, the outcome of the presidential election would merely represent a return to the political deadlock of summer 2024, which culminated in Bzhania’s downfall only a few months later. Given this reset, it is unreasonable to expect that identical measures, implemented under the same conditions, will yield a different result.

Therefore, if Russia and the de facto administration under Gunba aim to produce a different outcome, they will be compelled to fundamentally alter either the basic conditions or their approach.

Altering the terms in this context effectively entails changing public opinion within Abkhazian society regarding the agreements, which are widely perceived as posing a threat to the survival of the Abkhazian nation. A more conciliatory final version of the agreement, accompanied by a comprehensive and persuasive information campaign, could potentially lessen societal resistance. However, this would necessitate significant concessions from oligarchic groups in Russia closely affiliated with the Kremlin. A shift in approach would likely involve heightened repression, relying on coercion and intimidation to impose compliance amid sustained and widespread local opposition.

Events following Gunba’s electoral victory quickly revealed that the Kremlin is amenable to this scenario. On March 7, prominent Abkhazian journalist Inal Khashig was added to Russia’s list of foreign agents. That Khashig’s case was not an isolated incident, but indicative of a broader trend became evident two weeks later, when two other well-known journalists, Izida Chania and Nizifa Arshba, were similarly designated as foreign agents.

CONCLUSION: For Russia, the 2025 Abkhazian presidential election was less about preserving regional influence and more about securing the passage of a widely unpopular investment agreement. Two key factors support this interpretation: the unprecedented extent to which the Kremlin committed its support to Gunba, despite the fact that an Ardzinba victory posed no real threat to its position; and the revocation of citizenship from Kvarchia and Mikaa—not for their early endorsement of Ardzinba, but for their involvement in the events of November 2024.

Gunba’s victory, secured with Russian support, is likely to result in three key developments: increased direct control by Moscow over the region (with both Bzhania and Ankvab reportedly being gradually sidelined from power, according to Gezerdava); the advancement of Moscow’s interests through the use of repressive measures; and heightened tensions between ethnic Abkhazians and Armenians.

Drawing on the experience of recent years, it is reasonable to expect that local resistance to Russia’s unpopular demands will persist. However, the effectiveness of this resistance will largely depend on the extent to which the new repressive strategy impacts local elites, journalists, and activists. A key early indicator of future developments will be whether self-censorship emerges among local journalists following the designation of three of the most prominent media figures as foreign agents.

AUTHOR BIO: Tomáš Baranec is the Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Black Sea Studies as well as a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He worked as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague. 

By Michael Tanchum

The Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea are one natural waterway forming the core of a multi-modal connectivity arc that can serve as the transportation backbone of a commercial corridor spanning the Middle East and Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s inclusion in a wider Abraham Accords framework could radically reconfigure trade patterns and manufacturing value chains across the southern rim of Eurasia, to the benefit of U.S. strategic interests and those of its partners. While strengthening U.S.-Israel-Azerbaijan trilateral defense cooperation is a response to the looming prospect of a military showdown with Iran, the geo-economic significance of Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords is of long-term strategic consequence. With the ports on Israel’s Eastern Mediterraneancoast and Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea coast serving as anchor points, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor can be linked to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, creating an crescent of commercial cooperation from India to the Central Asian Republics via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, providing counterweight to the westward expansion of Chinese economic hegemony across the Central Asia-Caucasus region and the Middle East.

Photo source: Michael Tanchum

BACKGROUND: In early March 2025, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu made public that it favors elevating the trilateral partnership between Israel, Azerbaijan and the U.S.. Following a motion in the Israeli Knesset on "Upgrading the Strategic Alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan," a flurry of calls arose for Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords. The September 15, 2020, agreement normalized relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, followed by the establishment of relations between Israel and Bahrain and Sudan, respectively, and the restoration of relations with Morocco. The Abraham Accords also consists of an expanded framework of strategic and economic initiatives among the participants, developed in partnership with the U.S.

Azerbaijan and Israel have enjoyed an all-weather strategic relationship since diplomatic relations were established in the early 1990s following Azerbaijan’s independence. The two states have developed deep defense cooperation over the past 30 years, based on countering the threat Iran poses to both Israel and Azerbaijan, which shares a 428-mile (689 km) border with the Islamic Republic. Key proponents of extending the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan have emphasized the Azerbaijani-Israeli defense relationship’s durability and Azerbaijan’s reliability as a principal oil supplier to Israel. Azerbaijan and Israel enjoy commercial cooperation in telecoms and other technology sectors. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) recently established the new subsidiary “SOCAR Tamar” following its March 17, 2025 acquisition of a 10 percent stake in Israel’s Tamar offshore natural gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. Azerbaijan has also played an important mediating role between Baku’s close partner Turkey and Israel during times of tension.

Netanyahu’s public commitment to strengthen Israel’s trilateral relationship with Azerbaijan and the U.S was preceded by a collection of letters sent to U.S. President Donald Trump at the end of February by prominent rabbis advocating Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords. Among them was a senior rabbi in the UAE and personal friend of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who played a key role in the signing of the Abraham Accords. Additionally, opinion pieces from Israeli and American policy communities, including in the Wall Street Journal, added further political momentum amidst escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Two days after Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s March 12, 2025, rejection of the U.S. proposal to hold negotiations about Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff visited Baku after an overnight visit to Moscow, in what appears to be a coordinated effort to prepare for possible military action against Iran by Israel or the U.S., following the exhaustion of diplomatic efforts.

IMPLICATIONS: Beyond defense cooperation, a compelling strategic and geo-economic logic exists to include Azerbaijan in a wider Abraham Accords framework, building upon the Azerbaijan’s parallel and separate bilateral economic relations with Israel and the UAE. Extending the Abraham Accords framework outside the Arab World has precedence in the quadrilateral cooperation among India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S. – the “I2U2” framework – emerging from India’s robust yet parallel commercial cooperation and joint venture investments with Israel and the UAE. Trilateral cooperation emerged organically from the synergies between India’s commercial ventures with Israel and the UAE, traditionally India’s third-largest trading partner and Arabian Sea neighbor.

In February 2022, the UAE signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with India followed by the May 2022 signing of a similar UAE-Israel free trade agreement. The two trade agreements paved the way for initiating three-way coordination in developing an India-Middle East Corridor. Quadrilateral cooperation involving the U.S. was then formalized with the July 2022 I2U2 summit.

The extended Abraham Accords cooperation gave rise to a vision of an India-to-Europe commercial corridor in which the UAE’s ports serve as the Indian Ocean connectivity node with Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean ports serving as the maritime outlet to Europe, connected by a UAE-to-Israel railway network transiting Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Once the transportation route is operational, Indian goods leaving Mumbai could arrive on the European mainland in as little as 10 days. An initiative to realize this corridor, now known as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) was formalized with the signing of the September 9, 2023, Memorandum of Understanding at the New Delhi G20 Summit, with India, the U.S., the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the EU as signatories.

Research has shown that commercial corridors only emerge where the requisite large investments in port and rail infrastructure are coupled with an industrial base anchored in manufacturing value chains. The IMEC is highly conducive for value chain integration because of the existing synergies between India’s commercial ventures with its Arab Gulf partners and its commercial ventures with Israel, as exemplified by the manufacturing value chain in food production that is one of the leading drivers of the IMEC’s development. India’s “Food Corridor to the Middle East” is driven by India’s investment partnerships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia that rely on the transformation of India’s agriculture and water management sectors being implemented through India’s partnership with Israel. Similar synergies exist in other sectors, with the most promising in green energy and innovative technology, which has already lead to joint venture production facilities in green manufacturing.

The inclusion of Azerbaijan, along with Georgia, in the wider Abraham Accords framework holds a similar potential to create a new trans-regional commercial architecture. The UAE is Azerbaijan’s top Arab trading partner, accounting for 40 percent of Azerbaijan’s trade with the Arab World. The UAE is also the largest Arab investor in Azerbaijan and one of the top 10 global investors in Azerbaijan, accounting for 7 percent of Azerbaijan’s FDI inflow. In 2023, the UAE’s Abu Dhabi National Oil Company acquired a 30 percent stake in Azerbaijan’s Absheron natural gas field in the Caspian Sea. Similarly, the UAE is Georgia’s largest trading partner in the Arab world, accounting for 63 percent of Georgia’s trade with the region. Trade is likely to increase further with the UAE-Georgia CEPA, which came into effect in June 2024. The UAE is also invested in solar power plant development in both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Most significantly, in March 2024, the UAE’s AD Ports group, acquired a 60 percent ownership share in the Tbilisi Dry Port, a new custom-bonded and rail-connected intermodal logistics hub in Georgia. At the heart of the Trans-Caspian Route, the port is a key logistics facility for the rail connection linking Georgia’s Black Sea coast and Azerbaijan’s Caspian coast.

Azerbaijan’s Baku port is the connectivity node from where the Wider Black Sea region connects to Central Asia across the Caspian Sea. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) connecting the Caspian and Black Seas via Azerbaijan and Georgia, commonly referred to as the Middle Corridor, was developed as an alternative to the Russia-based Northern Corridor for China-to-Europe trade. The TITR consists of multi-modal transportation links for container transshipment via Kazakhstan’s Caspian port Aktau to the specially constructed port of Baku at Alat from where goods can be shipped by railway connection from Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea ports and in turn to Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean ports. By linking IMEC and the TITR, India will possess its own multi-modal corridor to access Central Asia, enabling India to effectively compete with China in Eurasia without being reliant on Russia or Iran. IMEC provides India with a streamlined alternative to its 25-year effort to establish the troubled International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) to access Central Asia through Iran’s Chabahar port, serving as the Indian Ocean connectivity node with overland transportation links running northward via Iran and Afghanistan.

The multi-modal corridor connecting India to Central Asia would also open the opportunity for Turkey to participate in IMEC. The UAE’s ports and logistics giant DP World operates Turkey’s Yarımca port, reputed to be the most technologically advanced in Turkey. Yarımca’s Marmara coast location is highly suited for intermodal transportation in which cargo can be transshipped to the Black Sea or Georgia and Azerbaijan by rail from Kars via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway.

CONCLUSION: The September 2023 signing of the IMEC declaration was preceded by the July 2022 I2U2 summit, the first convening of the heads of government of India, Israel, the UAE, and the U.S. As a step toward linking IMEC with the Trans-Caspian Corridor, a CC-I2U2 summit should be convened with the heads of Azerbaijan and Georgia participating. The format can be extended to include Central Asian Republics as well as Saudi Arabia and Jordan in anticipation of the extended arc of joint venture manufacturing investments and commercial cooperation.

By including Azerbaijan in a wider Abraham Accords framework, the U.S. can upend the geopolitics of connectivity in Central Asia, halting the westward expansion of Chinese commercial hegemony across the Eurasian landmass. Linking the IMEC corridor to the Caspian shores of Kazakhstan via a multi-modal sea route with trans-shipment across Georgia and Azerbaijan will effectively end India’s isolation from Central Asia – a strategic objective long sought by New Delhi. Consolidating the triangle of bilateral economic relationships among Azerbaijan, Israel, and the UAE into a multilateral framework through U.S. facilitation under the Abraham Accords is a necessary first step and a boon to the U.S. strategic position across Eurasia’s southern rim.

AUTHOR BIO: Prof. Michaël Tanchum teaches international relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Navarra, Spain and an associate fellow in the Economics and Energy at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES) and an affiliated scholar of the Centre for Strategic Policy Implementation at Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM) and the NTU-SBF Centre for African Studies in Singapore. @michaeltanchum 

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Pakistan and India, the longstanding rivals in South Asia, have instigated an arms race in the South Caucasus region. This development comes amid a broader arms supply deficit caused by Russia's preoccupation with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While India is deepening its military partnership with Armenia, Pakistan is enhancing the defense capabilities of Azerbaijan. Both states are actively seeking to fill the vacuum in arms procurement left by Russia's reduced presence in the region. India has aligned with Armenia, leveraging this partnership to pursue strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus. Conversely, Pakistan views Azerbaijan as a strategic ally, with their collaboration deemed essential for countering India in the competition for regional influence.

BCKGROUND: India and Pakistan have shared a contentious relationship since their emergence as independent states in 1947. The two states have engaged in three full-scale wars, primarily over Kashmir, a territory claimed by both. In 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests shortly after India, marking a significant escalation in their rivalry. This ongoing antagonism often manifests in international forums, where the two countries accuse each other of fostering cross-border terrorism. Their rivalry extended to the South Caucasus in 2020, during the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Pakistan supported Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War in 2020. However, the close relationship between the two countries predates this conflict, with their cordial ties dating back to Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Pakistan was among the first nations to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, second only to Türkiye. After Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh region shortly after its independence, both Türkiye and Pakistan strongly condemned Armenia's actions. Since then, they have consistently supported Azerbaijan’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in international forums, both politically and diplomatically. Pakistan has gone so far as to refrain from recognizing Armenia, refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the country. In return, Azerbaijan has endorsed Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute, a position that has antagonized India.

During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Islamabad was alleged to have sent military advisers to support Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan even claimed that Pakistani soldiers were actively fighting alongside the Azerbaijani army against Armenia during the 44-day conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan, however, categorically dismissed these allegations, labeling them as "baseless and unwarranted." Ultimately, Azerbaijan emerged victorious in the six-week war over the disputed region.

Türkiye strongly backed Pakistan's position on Kashmir, reciprocating Pakistan’s unequivocal support for Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war. The mutual endorsements of Islamabad's stance on Kashmir by Ankara and Baku provoked concern in New Delhi. Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan during the conflict played a pivotal role in fostering closer ties between India and Armenia in the aftermath of the war. Observing its rival’s activities during the Karabakh conflict, India responded by significantly enhancing its defense partnership with Armenia over the subsequent four years.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Türkiye formalized their alliance by signing the Trilateral Islamabad Declaration in 2021, underscoring their solidarity with Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war.

IMPLICATIONS: The supply of military equipment by India and Pakistan has significantly reduced Azerbaijan's and Armenia's dependence on Russia for weapons and ammunition. Historically, both South Caucasian nations relied heavily on Russia for defense supplies, particularly in the period preceding the 2020 Karabakh War. Between 2011 and 2020, Russia accounted for 94 percent of Armenia's major arms imports, including armored personnel carriers, air defense systems, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks. Similarly, Azerbaijan depended extensively on Russian military supplies during the same period, purchasing armored vehicles, air defense systems, Smerch rockets, transport and combat helicopters, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and tanks.

India considers Armenia a strategic partner in the South Caucasus and has consequently deepened its military ties with Yerevan. Armenia has emerged as the largest foreign recipient of Indian weapons, with defense contracts concluded since 2020 estimated at US$ 2 billion. According to a report by the Indian Ministry of Finance, Armenia has become the leading importer of Indian arms, securing deals for the purchase of Pinaka multiple-launch rocket systems and Akash anti-aircraft systems. This development reflects a significant realignment in the defense landscape of the region.

In September, Azerbaijan formally introduced Pakistan’s fourth-generation JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter jets to its air force, marking a significant milestone in defense cooperation between the two nations. This development followed a US$ 1.6 billion agreement signed in February for the acquisition of JF-17 Block III aircraft. The deal includes not only the supply of aircraft but also ammunition and pilot training provided by Pakistan. The advanced combat capabilities of the JF-17 Block III are expected to enhance Azerbaijan's military edge in the South Caucasus. Notably, Azerbaijan has requested 60 JF-17 jets, intended to replace its entire fleet of aircraft, making this the largest defense export deal in Pakistan’s history.

The defense agreements between India and Armenia, as well as those between Pakistan and Azerbaijan, have significantly diminished Russia’s position as the principal supplier of weapons and ammunition to the South Caucasian nations. This shift has been exacerbated by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, which has undermined its ability to deliver weapons in a timely manner under previously signed contracts. The entry of India and Pakistan into the regional defense market has provided Armenia and Azerbaijan with an opportunity to diversify their military procurement, reducing their historical reliance on Russian defense supplies.

The entry of India and Pakistan into the South Caucasus has resulted in the formation of two rival blocs competing for regional influence. One alliance, referred to as the Three Brothers, comprises Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan, while the opposing group includes Armenia, Iran, France, and India.

For India, Armenia holds strategic importance as a potential bridge to access the vast market of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). New Delhi views Armenia as a vital transit hub for connecting Indian goods to EU countries and envisions its role in facilitating bilateral or multilateral partnerships with nations such as Iran, France, and Greece to implement strategic connectivity projects in the South Caucasus.

Conversely, Islamabad considers its partnership with Azerbaijan critical for countering India's influence in the region. Azerbaijan has also emerged as a key player in the energy transit corridors connecting the Black Sea, South Caucasus, and Europe, further enhancing its geopolitical significance. This dynamic positions Azerbaijan as a strategic ally for Pakistan, particularly in the context of their shared interests in limiting India's regional ambitions.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan's defense cooperation with Azerbaijan and India's arms sales to Armenia are shaping new security dynamics that link the South Caucasus and South Asia. The extensive defense contracts between India and Armenia are poised to strengthen Armenia's position as a strategic ally for India in the region.

India's military partnership with Armenia is influenced by its geopolitical rivalry with Pakistan, which is actively supporting Azerbaijan's defense capabilities. Both Pakistan and India aim to secure reciprocal cooperation from the South Caucasian nations to advance their strategic interests. For Pakistan, Azerbaijan holds particular importance as a potential partner in trans-regional energy cooperation, given Pakistan's energy deficiencies. Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the energy transit corridor connecting South Asia and the South Caucasus further underscores this strategic alignment.

Conversely, India, as an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), is working to deepen its cooperation with Armenia across economic sectors, with a particular emphasis on defense. Armenia's strategic position could also facilitate India's broader connectivity initiatives with Europe. Meanwhile, Pakistan is likely to leverage its relationship with Azerbaijan to counterbalance India's growing influence in the region, highlighting the interconnected and competitive geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and South Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst of the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation.

By Stephen Blank

As a second Trump Administration takes power it is worth inquiring of its future policies towards Central Asia and the Caucasus. While neither region is likely to be a priority of U.S. policy, both offer Washington numerous opportunities to advance its interests, vis-à-vis the regional states as well as the larger actors bordering them, most prominently Russia, China, and Iran. If the incoming administration adheres to the framework that Trump’s first team propounded of this being an era framed by great power competition, it may indeed come to see the value of upgrading U.S. policy towards these countries. Across Central Asia and in the Caucasus, particularly among the Georgian population now rising against its government, and in Armenia, a stronger U.S. profile would certainly be welcome.

BACKGROUND: For Washington to fully benefit from enhanced relations with the governments of Central Asia and the Caucasus, it must acknowledge and adapt to the current regional realities. These regions have transformed significantly over the past generation, necessitating a rethinking of U.S. engagement strategies. 

First, it is imperative to recognize that Central Asian states, as well as Russia and China, have come to terms with the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan and now consider Afghanistan an integral part of Central Asia. Despite Washington’s current reluctance to adopt a similar stance, advancing economic and political engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus creates a foundation for future dialogues involving Afghanistan. These engagements would prepare the groundwork for meaningful regional discussions and collaborations when conditions become favorable.

Second, Azerbaijan is rapidly emerging as a key player in Central Asia. President Aliyev is frequently invited to and actively participates in regional presidential summits and Azerbaijan takes full part in significant regional economic, trade, and transportation initiatives. These projects, either in progress or under serious consideration, underscore Azerbaijan’s importance in shaping the region’s geopolitical and economic landscape. Consequently, any effective U.S. policy towards the Caucasus or Central Asia must account for these evolving regional dynamics. Recognizing and leveraging the interconnectedness between these regions will allow the U.S. to engage more effectively and with greater agility in advancing its strategic interests.

U.S. policymakers must also rethink both regions in a broader context. Central Asia and the Caucasus have established lasting inter-regional connections and ties to major global actors, including Turkey, Iran, India, South Korea, and Japan, alongside Russia and China. On economic grounds alone, Washington should increase its presence through trade, investment, environmental initiatives, and security cooperation, especially as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development forecasts robust growth for these states. Wider U.S. engagement is needed in contrast to its neglect for the region during the Afghanistan war—when U.S. policy was narrowly focused—and subsequent disengagement after Afghanistan fell to the Taliban. 

Continued U.S. and Western inattention gives Moscow and Beijing opportunities to solidify hegemonic influence, despite local governments’ explicit preference for multivector foreign policies. While the Biden Administration accepted Kazakhstan’s 5+1 presidential summit, this event has not become a recurring engagement, nor have there been significant high-level visits. Initiatives like the Economic Resilience in Central Asia (ERICEN) program are underfunded and lack alignment with an overarching strategy. This pattern of inadequate resources and strategic disconnect has long characterized U.S. initiatives in the region.

Similarly, strategy documents, such as the Trump Administration’s Central Asia Strategy to 2025, have achieved little, reflecting a lack of both intellectual and institutional commitment to the strategic importance of these regions. This is further evidenced by the absence of a strong U.S. response to Russian interference in Georgia, minimal involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, and the overall lack of a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia. Such bipartisan neglect highlights the critical need for a reformed and proactive approach to U.S. policy in the region.

IMPLICATIONS: To reverse this record of failure, the new administration must rethink its approach to these regions, recognizing their growing linkages and the potential of regional and international cooperation. Such collaboration will strengthen these states’ independence from Beijing and Moscow, aligning with vital U.S. interests. However, this objective requires large-scale institutional reform.

The State Department, Pentagon, and the National Security Council should establish a dedicated structure for Caucasus and Central Asian affairs. At the State Department, this would involve appointing an Assistant Secretary of State to oversee this portfolio, to whom the corresponding country desks report directly. In turn, he or she can report directly to the Under Secretary, Secretary of State, their opposite numbers at the Pentagon, and the White House at the National Security Council. Such a structure would elevate these regions’ importance in policymaking and provide the president with a more transparent and effective process for addressing issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

This reorganization would enable an integrated “whole-of-state” approach, ensuring that that U.S. policies align with its strategic interests and that regional voices are heard. It also allows the U.S. government to conduct policies towards these areas based on its interests rather than on the values of junior bureaucrats as in the State Department’s Bureau of Labor and Democracy. Its members previously boasted that they were going to impose democracy on Central Asian states and achieved merely an ignominious failure. They failed because they refused to take into account that every one of these governments has alternatives to Washington and factions within them who lean towards Moscow and Beijing. Therefore, in the absence of sustained U.S. engagement, all that these lectures achieved was increased anti-American resentment and a turn to other powers who took these states as they are. This outcome is visible in U.S. relations with Azerbaijan, which has many other patrons and several pro-Russian figures in its government. Baku spurned Congressional and Administration demands for democratization and subsequently moved closer to Russian policy. Undoubtedly, they saw these demands as moves initiated by this bureau and the Armenian lobby who influenced Congress in the absence of any coherent U.S. strategy.

Structural and intellectual reorganization will allow Washington to engage strategically and consistently with regional governments. By connecting democratization efforts with significant economic, political, and defense projects, these governments will find it harder to forgo the benefits of cooperation. Additionally, this structure minimizes the

influence of single-interest Congressional lobbies by emphasizing comprehensive and strategic policies. As Central Asia and the Caucasus gain prominence, increased administrative capability will enable better collaboration with Congress to shape balanced and forward-looking strategies. A proactive, strategic approach will not only enhance U.S. influence but also support the independence and development of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Addressing the importance of these regions in U.S. policymaking is critical to securing long-term stability and countering hegemonic ambitions by other powers.

CONCLUSIONS: The opportunities of the future and lessons from the past are unmistakable. Previous U.S. policies failed for reasons detailed in academic and professional literature. However, the Trump administration has a chance to respond to the region’s desire for enhanced U.S. economic, political, and military cooperation. Possibly excepting the pro-Moscow Georgian government, every state in the region seeks greater U.S. engagement, albeit on their terms.

This desire signifies a positive development that Washington should support by implementing the structural and policy changes outlined here. These adjustments would bolster the independence of Central Asia and the Caucasus and facilitate their cooperation with international institutions to spur regional development. This progress would empower these states to shape their futures independently, and not according to the wishes of Moscow or Beijing.

Failure to seize these opportunities and continuing inaction will leave these regions vulnerable to becoming backward, conflict-ridden dependents of Russia and China. The new generation, more aligned with Western values, may lose its chance for a brighter future. Rather than becoming stable regions fostering global cooperation, Central Asia and the Caucasus risk devolving into conflict zones where international rivalries escalate.

The U.S. must act decisively to prevent such an outcome. By prioritizing these regions and adopting a proactive strategy, Washington can mitigate great power competition and avert prolonged instability across Eurasia. The stakes are too high to ignore the transformative potential of effective engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, www.fpri.org.