BACKGROUND: President Mikheil Saakashvili has attempted, but failed to normalize relations with Russia following his election in 2004. Frustrated at the lack of progress in political relations, as well as regarding the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Saakashvili’s administration made the issue of Russia’s Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases a test of the Kremlin’s goodwill to improve bilateral ties. In March 2005, the Georgian parliament, with nuanced support from the government, passed a resolution laying out a plan for forcefully withdrawing the Russian bases, if no progress was reached in political talks. A handshake agreement was reached on April 25 between the foreign ministers of the two countries, foreseeing Russian withdrawal by the end of 2007. However, Russian defense minister Sergey Ivanov refused to follow through on the deal, and as a result no agreement between Vladimir Putin and Mikheil Saakashvili was signed at the May 9 Victory day celebrations in Moscow. In fact, Saakashivili chose not to attend the celebrations due to this issue. Contrary to the Georgian public’s expectations, U.S. President George W. Bush did not throw his personal weight behind the Georgian demands for Russian withdrawal, and instead in his address advised Georgia to continue talks with Russia. On May 12, the Georgian parliament’s speaker Nino Burjanadze reaffirmed that Parliament’s March decision would enter into force on May 15, and that the executive would implement it. However, on May 13, presidential spokesperson Gela Charkviani said the Kremlin “offered certain proposals, which constitute a chance for renewed negotiations and certain progress.” Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili agreed that the new document provides for significant rapprochement of the two sides’ positions. Despite the softened tone, the press office of the Georgian Foreign Ministry confirmed on May 17 that no visas will be issued to Russian servicemen starting from May 15.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s tough stance on Russian military bases is not without a precedent. A similar position was taken by the Baltic states, with European and U.S. backing, and helped them to steer clear of traps in the wording of agreements with Russia, and to maintain a clear negotiating position. However, observers say, Western powers strongly urged the Georgian administration to refrain from upstaging the already rather irritated Vladimir Putin for yet another public relations fiasco. Tbilisi fears the loss of Western support, and seemingly agreed to soften its rhetoric, albeit through gritted teeth. Saakashvili’s administration fears that backtracking on its tough stance would be taken in Moscow as a lack of political spine. Foreign Minister Zourabichvili, who engineered the policy of pressure, should be the most disappointed. On the other hand, if the parliamentary decision is not implemented, speaker Nino Burjanadze may consider it a heavy blow to her own political credibility. Some of Tbilisi’s fears have already materialized: after a long silence, the Russian General Staff resumed talk of the funding needed for withdrawing its forces, and presented an unrealistic bill of US$300 million. Burjanadze unveiled one significant detail of the Russian proposals on May 16, saying Russia agrees to withdraw the bases by February 2008, which is in line with Georgia’s preferred options. However, it is clear that the proposals remain vague on the schedule of withdrawal, which, Tbilisi fears, can be used by Russia to drag out a process citing various logistical obstacles. If the optimism of Georgian authorities regarding the proposals is exaggerated, Tbilisi risks finding itself back on square one, with a significant loss of political muscle in future diplomatic rows with Russia. Seeing this peril, Tbilisi tries to present its new position as a change in attitude, but not in policy towards the bases. The Chair of the Parliament’s Defense and Security Committee, Kote Gabashvili, said the parliamentary decision will enter into force, as foreseen, on May 15. However, the initial measures against the bases would be rather mild, including stricter visa requirements. The hawkish defense minister Irakli Okruashvili treads the government line, saying Tbilisi would be “as liberal as possible” on the bases, but also points out that his agency plans for other contingencies. It now seems that if Georgia wants to resolve the issue, it must meet Russia midway. As Russia seems to have agreed to the Georgian vision of the deadline, there will be other areas where Russia will seek a tradeoff. Another option is to put the issue on the backburner and bide time, however this might be politically dangerous as the opposition would make use of such backtracking during the parliamentary and presidential elections due in 2008-2009. Still, objectively, Tbilisi has been successful in persuading Russia to withdraw and Saakashvili’s administration can take due political credit. Foreign Minister Lavrov said on May 16 that “in principle” the decision to withdraw was taken by Russia’s top political leadership. Only some months ago, the official Russian line walked carefully around even the term “withdrawal”, saying the talks were about “the mode and the period of functioning” of the Russian military bases. Nonetheless, the talks are hanging on a very thin thread, constantly tested by the inflammatory political talk both in Moscow and in Tbilisi. A total collapse of talks would be damaging in the medium term and more so for Georgia. In Russia, the parliament will be tempted to come up with hardliner retaliation scenarios. As the role and relevance of the legislature in Russia is in constant decline, this would provide the Duma with a welcome nationalist publicity. Such moves are likely to cause a new wave of anti-Russian sentiment in Georgia, possibly dragging the hawkish wing of Saakashvili’s administration along. Georgia’s foreign policy team would need to keep a cool head and seal the deal without rushing into an agreement that they might regret in only a few years time.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia has agreed to soften its tactics in talks with Russia as the wholehearted Western support it hoped for failed to materialize. By putting the centre of gravity on closed-door talks rather than publicly announced policies, Tbilisi is exposing itself to the tactics of the Kremlin and could be compromising its negotiating position. Pressure to agree on a less-than-perfect compromise might damage the faith of Georgians in Western support, and could make pro-Western democratic reforms harder to sell at home.

AUTHOR’S BIO Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (civil.ge) and a works at the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.