BACKGROUND: Widespread repression of political opponents is a fact of daily life in Uzbekistan. So is the persistent problem of the country’s weak Soviet-style economy which has caused living standards to fall for substantial segments of the population. As organized secular political opposition to Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov is all but erased within Uzbekistan, the main remaining source of opposition to the government is based on Islam and often influenced by Islamic extremist thought. With ordinary Uzbeks increasingly willing to challenge the authority of the government, the question remains how to interpret these challenges. Do we witness the emergence of a fundamentally secular political opposition, or something encompassing more violent and anti-Western attitudes? The evidence at this point remains ambiguous, yet a few facts seem clear. First, there is growing support for Islamic extremism in Uzbekistan, often but not invariably caused by poverty and relative deprivation, and these sentiments are widely aimed at the removal of Karimov and the introduction of an Islamic state. Second, small but persistent networks of extremists, variously known as jamaats or in a more organised form, the Islamic Jihad movement, exist in Uzbekistan and are at least in occasional touch with international terrorists in hiding in Pakistanand Afghanistan. The latter comprise two distinct but not fully separated groups: remnants of the fundamentally Uzbek terrorist group known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), but also Arab or Pakistani jihadists of the Al-Qaida network. Both groups support acts of terrorism committed in Uzbekistan. Third, the cities in the Ferghana valley, where most recent violence has occurred, has a history of revolts and deep religious feelings that go back at least to 1885 when the first anti-Russian revolt broke out. In 1898, peasant unrest in Andijon was used by local religious and secular groups to challenge local administrators as much as Russian control. Other revolts followed the establishment of Soviet rule. In more recent years, the IMU originated in the Islamic movement called Adolat (Justice), a faction of a larger group called Islom lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam), which arose in the city of Namangan in the Ferghana valley in 1990 as a response to widespread corruption and social injustice exposed by the liberal perestroika era. However, Adolat soon turned to violence and was banned in 1992.

IMPLICATIONS: As long as Uzbek president Karimov enjoys the full support of the international community, in particular the United States and Russia, he, or at least government authority, is likely to survive limited popular protests. Yet international support to a regime with falling legitimacy could also create hatred and resentment within Uzbekistan towards the West. Such resentment can be kept in check but not erased by repression. Realaxation of repression could therefore lead pent-up hatred to explode in popular unrest. In Uzbekistan, well-intentioned Western attempts to reduce oppression may therefore paradoxically serve to destabilize the government and ultimately encourage the very extremism that the outside world wishes to contain. Following the 1953 coup in Iran, in which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in collaboration with Iranian army officers restored Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi to power, America remained a staunch supporter of the Shah despite periodic reports of killing of demonstrators, imprisonment of opposition activists, and torture of political prisoners. As long as U.S. financial, material, political, and military support was forthcoming, the Shah remained in power. After assuming office in January 1977, President Jimmy Carter stressed human rights as an integral part of his foreign policy. Carter also hinted that he might stop arms deliveries or aid, or both, to states that continued to violate human rights. Realizing his need for American support, the Shah in February 1977 responded by initiating a liberalization process, including concessions to the Islamic movement. But each concession brought further demands. The Islamic opposition, feeling a surge in confidence, adopted increasingly militant methods, positive that the security organs would not dare to suppress the protesters as ruthlessly as they had done in the past. Demonstrations, protests, and militant activities increased in number and intensity. Within two years, the Shah had fallen, and Ayatollah Khomeini had assumed control of the country. As Islamic militants occupied the U.S. embassy and the Islamic revolution entered a fiercely anti-American phase, the U.S. responded to the aggression by turning as virulently anti-Iranian as Iran had turned bitterly anti-American. The U.S. stance in Iran in 1979 could become an unfortunate precedent for the current Western stance toward Uzbekistan. Ironically, any attempt by the West to pressure Karimov into political liberalization might backfire just as easily as President Carter’s policy towards Iran did in 1979.

CONCLUSIONS: By first supporting, then censoring Karimov, the West might eventually release the very same forces in Uzbekistan that overthrew the Shah of Iran a generation ago. Considering the intensity of the American-Iranian hatred and all violence this heritage has engendered in recent decades, the world hardly needs a new generation brought up on more of the same. The outside world, and in particular the West, accordingly needs to respond carefully to domestic developments in Uzbekistan. To issue blanket condemnations of the Uzbek government’s admittedly violent attempts to maintain order and to sanction the Uzbek government for human rights violations might make Western leaders feel good, but such initiatives are unlikely to result in real improvements for the average Uzbek. A more constructive approach would be to enter into a dialogue with the Uzbek government, in effect offering full support while concurrently indicating which means to maintain internal order are acceptable and where the limit must be drawn. In other words, the message to Western governments is: look before you leap.

AUTHOR’S BIO Michael Fredholm is a historian and defense analyst who has written extensively on the history, defence strategies, and security policies of Eurasia. He is currently affiliated to the Department of Central Asian Studies at Stockholm University, where he has made a special study of Central Asian geopolitics, Afghanistan, and Islamic extremism.