BACKGROUND: The Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) of the Collective Security Treaty are designed to combat international extremist groups. This year, collective security exercises will be conducted in a different way than previously. Military units and observers of members states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will take part in massive scale tactical exercises, although they are not part of the CSTO. Country representation in the military exercises will be expanded by the participation of Uzbekistan and China as observers this year. Currently the SCO includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The “Frontier-2004” exercises will be conducted in two stages on the area of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with the participation of Russian aviation located in Kyrgyzstan, 50km from the U.S.-led Coalition air force base at Manas. The scheme of the exercises is based on the battle tactics of the Islamist insurgents during the intrusions into Batken oblast, Kyrgyzstan, in 1999 and 2000. It is assumed that the CRRF will become the force that will enable the member-states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to repulse attacks of Islamic extremists on Central Asian territory. However, the feared insurgents seem to have switched to new battle tactics. After the Antiterrorist Coalition mission in Afghanistan that seemed to destroy most of Al Qaeda’s operations in the region as well as its ally, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the remaining terrorist groupings are implementing the next stage of their plan. The IMU, which strives to establish an Islamic Caliphate based in the Ferghana valley, aims to influence first the population of Uzbek enclaves on Kyrgyz and Tajik territory, then inhabitants of the Ferghana valley more broadly, and eventually the whole Central Asian region to topple governing regimes. The IMU has changed its tactics of large-scale and massive intrusions to targeting vast territories, with smaller and more widespread impact such as terrorist acts and local clashes involving civilians.

IMPLICATIONS: The decision by Uzbekistan and China to cooperate with CSTO members on the military stage shows their inclination to use cooperative mechanisms against terrorist groups, in a sense helping revive regionalism in Central Asia, at least in the security field. China attempts to strengthen its presence in Xingjiang province, eliminating the activities of extremist organizations such as the East Turkestan Liberation Movement. Previously, China conducted military maneuvers with Kyrgyzstan with the involvement of large scale forces. Uzbekistan had until recently not indicated it would participate in the exercises, but the terrorist acts in Uzbekistan as well as recent moves by Russia to revive its strategic relationship with Islam Karimov’s government seem to have changed Tashkent’s attitude. This has boosted attempts to increase military cooperation among states member to the SCO and CSTO variously. In June 2004, the SCO summit will be conducted in Tashkent, and could help clarify Uzbekistan’s view on regional military cooperation. CSTO member-countries have significantly expanded military cooperation. In the last six months, the numbers of the CRRF have doubled. The number of battalions in the forces increased from four to nine, and manpower reached 4,500. Tajikistan contributed two new battalions and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia one each. Besides general purpose forces, plans exist to create a unit of special forces. Recently Russia provided Kyrgyzstan with up-to-date military equipment worth USD 3 million in military aid, as a second part of two packages. The first was provided when the Russian air force base was opened at Kant, outside Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek. In spite of the increasing military cooperation and assistance among regional states, the apparent change of strategy on the part of the IMU could make this shield only a nominal one. The IMU clearly has no real power to wage direct insurgencies or military attack, and is capable neither to fight in Kyrgyz nor in Uzbek territory. For the foreseeable future, direct clashes as happened in Batken are unlikely; in fact the Batken events taught the insurgents to act in a different way. An increasing observable trend has developed of smaller terrorist acts against government targets and civilians in the regional countries which have allowed the stationing of Antiterrorist coalition forces, conducting operations in Afghanistan, specifically Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Recently, the United States Government renewed its earlier warning that extremist Islamic groups may be planning terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens or interests in Kyrgyzstan. Prior this, Kyrgyz security services had once prevented a possible terrorist attack on the Manas air force base. The IMU, much like the avowedly peaceful Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement, which shares the IMU aim to establish a Caliphate in Central Asia, earlier recruited members from poor families, as was the case in the insurgency of 1999. Presently, female terrorists that have been recorded in the recent events in Tashkent and Bukhara according to some reports come from well-educated families. Increasing authoritarianism and continuing economic difficulties seem to boost the recruitment pool of the radical movements, as people seek rescue from poor living conditions in religious organizations. In Kyrgyzstan, a tendency of increasing Mosque attendance has also been recorded. In almost every village, new mosques are built, many funded by money from countries following the Wahhabi tradition. A part of the newly built mosques have still not passed official registration, which was launched three years ago.

CONCLUSIONS: Insurgent troops appear to be changing tactics from geographically large-scale actions to small injections of terrorist attacks across on vast territory. The regional boost in military cooperation and assistance efforts would stand as a nominal shield against terrorists attacks. Yet both SCO and CSTO cooperation are designed to enable member countries to effectively mobilize an expanded CRRF in the case of a large-scale clash with Islamic militants. By contrast, these efforts are ill-placed to handle terrorist attacks of the type that recently occurred in Uzbekistan. It is unclear whether the events in Uzbekistan were a trendsetter, which will be repeated in other parts of Central Asia; But the current capacity of the IMU indicates that this is the most likely form of the threat in the near future. For all its show of force, the current military exercises may not be an effective way of addressing the threat.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Aziz Soltobaev is a Bishkek-based freelance writer.