BACKGROUND: The militaries of the South Caucasus states are facing significant problems and challenges as they each work to strengthen the foundation of their armed forces and adjust to their new and rapidly evolving security environment. Although these states are involved internationally, the military commitments remain small and supported by assets and personnel from only a few élite formations, with most of the force still struggling with readiness and capabilities issues. These states are in the midst of reform programs that they know must be effectively completed, but they are most challenged in how to proceed. To this end, they are looking outside for necessary guidance and military assistance to support the process of change and the development of the skilled, professional personnel to both manage and command the planning elements and combat assets of their future force. In looking for military assistance, the principal provider was initially Russia, representing the link to the Soviet Army that they all knew and whose equipment and other assets they inherited. But a number of Western militaries are making inroads into the region and are providing a broad range of assistance, with the Turkish military as the principal mentor for both Azerbaijan and Georgia; post-9/11, the U.S. has become more directly involved. Although Armenia is now receiving nominal military assistance from Western states, it remains heavily tied to Russia for its security assistance. While the bilateral Western military assistance programs are providing positive inputs, they are not as well focused or managed as they could be, ensuring that what is provided fits into an established, time-phased national reform program. The national staffs generally have been ineffective in planning and managing these programs and seek outside help in enhancing the managerial efficiency of these programs, but more importantly developing the staff officers and procedures necessary to successfully do this on their own. Currently, they are looking to NATO and its member states for the critical training and guidance needed, especially in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

IMPLICATIONS: The U.S.-led train-and-equip programs in Georgia has been effective; its continuation is sought as Azerbaijan seeks a similar one, focusing not only on the military but also on counterterrorism training for internal, border, and coastal-guard capabilities for better protection of their maritime borders and economic zones. Other key sectors where assistance is required are air sovereignty through the establishment of air situation data exchanges with NATO, as well as to accelerate the upgrading of civilian and military airports to NATO-compatible standards. However, the U.S. cannot be expected to sustain this burden on its own; this is where NATO comes in. The Alliance’s presence in the South Caucasus is most visible in the growing role of its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. In the 1990s, NATO’s relationship with this region, which Russia regards as in its sphere of influence, evolved very slowly, restricted by ongoing ethnic conflict and the seemingly intractable issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. PfP, however, became NATO’s principal means for deepening its military cooperation with the states of the South Caucasus, as it proved to be an effective security cooperation tool, not least in allowing inexperienced defense structures to learn from the experience of western militaries, but also in facilitating bilateral relations with NATO member states. PfP contributed to the military education and professionalism of partner states, promoted democratic control over the armed forces and in general terms promoted democratic values. NATO was uniquely qualified to carry out this task, providing a framework for such large-scale efforts. Moreover, the new NATO accession states have recently confronted many of the same challenges that the states of the South Caucasus currently are working through. In the South Caucasus, this was especially important as PfP helped in the building of security systems as well as structures under unfavorable political and economic conditions. It has succeeded in this arena and all three states are currently involved with NATO in at least one peacekeeping operation. PfP also has given them broader access to the Alliance community. Beyonf PfP, the Alliance is looking for ways to better address regional security concerns, through the Planning and Review Process (PARP), the development of Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), and other initiatives. In its current configuration and management, many question whether PfP can provide the assistance envisioned. To meet evolving needs, it appears that a strategic change is required in the nature of the program or in the relationship of the partner states to the Alliance. As part of a regional security concept, applied on a country-by-country basis, the Alliance can address: peace-support and conflict-resolution efforts, traditional and new types of threats to security, acceleration and broadening of security sector reforms.

CONCLUSIONS: The Istanbul summit provides the right forum and timing for political recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan’s aspirations to eventual membership. Such recognition can take the form of offering them a clear prospect of membership through Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) leading to Membership Action Plans (MAPs). With established benchmarks, standards and timetables for progress, such plans hold built-in incentives to the aspiring countries, as well as non-declaratory political recognition of their membership goals. In sum, anchoring the South Caucasus to the Euro-Atlantic system begins by projecting security into this region. The costs and the draw on resources would be a fraction of U.S. and NATO efforts elsewhere; the social and political environment in this region is friendly and receptive; and the strategic payoff to the Alliance would be of historic proportions. Until now, the U.S. has taken the lead in this effort, with only nominal support from other Alliance members. However, the EU seems at present to be revising its earlier decision to leave the South Caucasus out of the ‘Wider Europe’ framework, inciting hope that Euope too could increase its contributions to building security in the South Caucasus. NATO’s and the EU’s new members, familiar with this region and sharing their recent experience as post-Soviet legacy states and NATO aspirants, are enthusiastic about contributing to this effort.

AUTHORS’ BIO: William D. O’Malley is a retired U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer specializing in Russian and Eurasian military and political affairs. He is now an independent contractor working a series of defense support projects in the region. Roger N. McDermott is an honorary senior research associate, department of politics and international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK). He is also the editor (together with Anne C. Aldis) of the recently published Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, London/Portland: Frank Cass, 2003.