BACKGROUND: Since the U.S. deployment into Kyrgyzstan’s only international airport at Manas in 2001 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the choice of location for the CRDF airbase was limited to a series of less capable regional or military airfields. The airfield at Kant was a former Soviet flight-training base for foreign pilots, and is ideally situated 20 km east of Bishkek, away from densely populated areas. Kant was one of the deployment airfields offered to the US in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. An Air Force Survey Team inspected Kant along with other proposed sites, preferring Manas. The Team reportedly found that Kant, which was designed to support training operations and use by light aircraft, was in poor condition and did not meet the U.S. military’s specific operational needs or safety standards. When the base is fully operational for the CRDF in 2003, plans are to station a combined aviation group with more than 20 Russian aircraft and 700 servicemen and civilian personnel there. It is estimated that the cost of maintaining the airbase at Kant will reach $50 million per annum. The Russian and Kyrgyz governments are expected to conclude an agreement in May 2003 on permanent basing of the CRDF aviation group. Topoyev defined the aviation group’s dual mission as partly a united air-defense system, which includes Su-27 aircraft, and partly to support land forces. These are army aviation Su-25s attack fighters. Since the Kyrgyz air force is comparatively weak and its personnel poorly trained, the majority of the aviation group’s operational assets will consist of VVS fighters and transport planes. Russia’s Su-27 fighter, like the US F-15, is designed for gaining air supremacy and supporting air operations. It can operate up to 1,600 km from its base, allowing it to be stationed further from the target and crisis zone than other CRDF aircraft. The Kyrgyz have no comparable aircraft and it likely would protect Bishkek from aerial attack, intercepting separate targets in Kyrgyz and Tajik airspace and escorting cargo or passenger planes. In Chechnya, the Su-27 is more frequently used to attack ground targets with special and precision munitions and would likely perform a similar role with the CRDF. Like the U.S. A-10, Russia’s Su-25 was specifically designed as a ground attack aircraft, getting its first combat exposure in Afghanistan. The lessons from operations against the Mujahideen as well as the Chechens resulted in many improvements in both the aircraft and how it’s employed. Soviet and Russian air forces found that it is ideal for direct troop support because of its relatively low-speed (subsonic), armored underbelly, weapons mix and load, and day/night capabilities. It is highly maneuverable and able to attack when there is limited space over the target. The Su-25 appears to be well suited to attack targets in the rugged and mountainous parts of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The IL-76 and An-26 transport aircraft are designed for moving troops and delivering weapons and supplies and will carry out theatre and tactical transportation duties, with the Mi-8 handling most of the tactical transportation, medevac and search and rescue operations. The Mi-8 can also be used effectively to enhance ground force mobility and supply battlefield firepower, or as a forward air controller platform, providing final targeting instructions to attacking aircraft.

IMPLICATIONS: An assessment of the aviation group’s antiterrorist function must be based upon what the respective governments believe its purpose to be as well as Russia’s operational and tactical use of airpower in a similar operational context, i.e., Afghanistan and Chechnya. The Russian government views the aviation group as a lifeline for the CRDF, providing essential support for ground forces in combat operations against groups of international or regional terrorists. Politically it is intended to strengthen bilateral ties between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, promote stability through the Collective Security Treaty, demonstrate Russia’s proactive military role in combating the region’s terrorist threat, and reinvigorate Russia’s security links with Central Asian Republics. However, in the Chechen conflicts, the Russian military has used airpower without achieving a convincing demonstration of its utility against insurgents. Airpower has a predominantly supporting role to play in antiterrorist operations and as demonstrated by US forces in Afghanistan, it is most effective when used in concert with ground troops that concentrate enemy forces, provide clear target data/ID, and vector in the air. Terrorist tactics can also influence the decision on whether the use of airpower is appropriate, as witnessed during the Batken campaign in 1999; militants were avoiding being brought to battle and timing their operations to coincide with poor weather conditions or nightfall. The Mi-24, used so frequently in the Chechen conflict, is notably absent from the planned deployment to Kant and the close air support/ground attack mission is assigned exclusively to fixed-wing aircraft. It may reflect an assessment that the Su-25 is the preferred platform, or an unwillingness to permanently deploy these helicopters to Bishkek, as they can easily be added if needed.

CONCLUSION: The Kyrgyz armed forces believe that the aviation group now provides them with much needed dedicated combat aviation assets, increased combat capabilities and directly commits Russia to the antiterrorist mission. The Kyrgyz air force also hopes that it provides them with a base from which to improve the quality of its pilots, the readiness and effectiveness of its existing platforms and the future modernization of the service. In this complex and slowly evolving security environment, Bishkek will seek to maximize all foreign military assistance in its multifarious efforts to acquire genuine security. If Kyrgyzstan is to develop and strengthen the antiterrorist capabilities of its armed forces, it will require real investment in the training and combat readiness of its Special Forces and the improvement of its air force. Whilst the deployment of the VVS seems crafted to promote Moscow’s regional security interests, encouraging Bishkek to rely upon military help from Russia and through CIS regional bodies, the prospect of enhancing security through the Kyrgyz themselves appears more distant.

AUTHORS’ BIO: William D. O’Malley is a retired Army Foreign Area Officer specializing in Russian and Eurasian military and political affairs. He is now an independent contractor working a series of defense support projects in the region. Roger N. McDermott is an honorary senior research associate, department of politics and international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK). He is also the editor (together with Anne C. Aldis) of the forthcoming Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, London/Portland: Frank Cass, 2003.