BACKGROUND: Through its strong backing of U.S. efforts to oust Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Georgia has solidified its image as Washington’s chief strategic partner in the Caucasus. On March 21 the Georgian parliament ratified a long-awaited military agreement with the United States, establishing a framework within which U.S. military advisors will work in Georgia. Georgia invited U.S. experts to examine military bases to determine whether American planes could use the facilities to carry out missions against Iraq. Georgia has also permitted U.S. U-2 spy planes to fly within its airspace of late. Tbilisi’s unwavering support of the U.S. campaign in Iraq is understandable. Georgia views strategic cooperation with the United States and membership in NATO as essential to overcoming its own current security dilemma, and Georgia’s desire to move toward Euro-Atlantic institutions is beyond question. Moreover, on March 24 Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze intimated that after the Iraq operation, the United States would step up its role in the settlement of the elusive Abkhaz problem and help expedite Moscow’s stubborn refusal to withdraw from Soviet-era bases in Batumi, Gudauta and Akhalkalaki. Georgia has finally started to take baby steps in NATO’s direction. In September 2002 the Georgian parliament passed a resolution that led to the creation of the “State Program of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Georgia,” a plan for how Tbilisi intends to solicit membership in the Euro-Atlantic community. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) formally established a NATO Integration Department to assess military measures necessary for membership. And after 11 years of independence, Georgia has at last begun formulating a National Security Concept. During a meeting with Georgian Foreign Minister Irakly Menagarishvili on March 14, NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson welcomed the establishment of Georgia’s Coordination Council for Integration into Euro-Atlantic Structures, and stated that NATO would provide the maximum assistance to Georgia in its bid to join the alliance. Georgian leaders have met with NATO officials before, most recently in February, but never at such a high level. Two events scheduled for late April or early May – the opening of the NATO regional office in Georgia and a visit by Lord Robertson – contribute to Tbilisi’s optimism.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgia’s most daunting problems afflict society as a whole, namely widespread crime, corruption, flawed elections, and poverty. While these questions will undoubtedly impact potential NATO accession, military matters are more “solvable” per se – provided sufficient political will exists to carry them out. Lack of funds continues to plague Georgia’s military development. Parliament doubled defense spending in 2003 over 2002 levels, but allocation problems still exist. Two months into 2003, the Ministry of Defense had still received only 46 percent of the funds budgeted for that period. The Georgian military is also undergoing what Irakly Batiashvili, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, describes as “optimization and civilianization.” Optimization involves streamlining the military and downsizing its top-heavy military ranks. Georgia’s armed forces have 30 general officer positions. Andro Barnoff, Chief of Staff on the Committee on Defense and Security, noted that pending legislation would reorganize the military force structure and reduce its numbers from 20,000 troops to 16,000 by 2003, and to 13,000 by 2004. This legislation, while positive, may generate other problems, such as greater unemployment. MoD proposals, such as offering retiring officers 10-month salary bonuses or providing titles to plots of farmland, are intended to entice officer retirement. The Georgian government supports the civilianization of the MoD. While this is a difficult transition, Georgian Defense Minister Davit Tevzadze is considering a number of reorganization measures to facilitate the process. The MoD is committed to having a civilian defense minister by 2004 as well as a civilianized Office of the MoD, similar in ways to Washington’s Office of the Secretary of Defense. Of course, the transition will be challenging, but the Georgian government is firmly behind this process. The two-year, $64 million U.S.-funded Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), designed to enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of Georgia’s military and its preparedness to NATO standards, holds promise, but real problems remain on the ground. The recently graduated Commando Battalion, now assigned to the Georgian 11th Brigade at Vaziani military base, focuses primarily on platoon and company-level training, but plans for battalion or brigade strength exercises, integrating artillery and air mobile operations, are still lacking. Without such exercises, Georgian forces will be limited to small operations. Moreover, the MoD has not clearly identified a plausible plan to sustain GTEP forces once U.S. trainers leave. That is, plans to carry on a schedule of training exercises, maintain existing facilities, and ensure pay for GTEP troops are not fully realized. Beyond this, Tbilisi must focus on selling the country’s candidacy to NATO, rather than focusing narrowly on how Georgia benefits from membership. Geopolitical considerations may be paramount, but Georgia must also develop some unique, specialized “niche” capabilities, a sort of “comparative advantage” new members must provide to complement the larger alliance structure. One plan suggests that Georgian forces will participate in international peacekeeping efforts. A Georgian peacekeeping platoon has been operating in Kosovo within a Turkish battalion since 1999, and Germany recently started training Georgian peacekeepers to serve within a German brigade. The Latvian MoD also offered to train Georgian divers, or “frogmen,” necessary for any modern Navy. Another proposal calls on the MoD to establish a regional language institute to teach English to military personnel from the Caucasus and Central Asia, highlighting the importance of language skills for NATO interoperability. Furthermore, Georgia is currently exploring ways to support the rebuilding of Iraq. Western collaboration in the initial construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz gas pipeline demonstrate rising U.S. economic interests in Georgia. Three attacks in January 2003 on energy transportation networks in Georgia, however, suggest that pipeline security is insufficient. The pipeline will require Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Turkish security cooperation. Georgia could take the lead with a tripartite anti-terrorism center in Tbilisi, thus further developing its military and creating another niche capability.

CONCLUSIONS: Shevardnadze is capitalizing on the war on terrorism and the U.S. campaign against Iraq to achieve NATO membership, but Georgian goodwill alone will prove insufficient to earn a place in NATO. The initial steps are important, but Georgia’s progress remains tenuous. Its inability, or unwillingness, to crack down on issues like corruption and election fraud could render them moot. For membership to become a reality, Tbilisi must overcome political and economic challenges as well as military development issues.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Eric A. Miller, Ph.D., is an Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, Virginia, and Managing Editor of the journal Comparative Strategy.