Wednesday, 23 April 2003

NGOS – UNLIKELY TARGETS OF AZERBAIJAN’S AND GEORGIA’S WARS ON TERRORISM

Published in Analytical Articles

By Claude Zullo (4/23/2003 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: During the past year, NGOs have been a target of the international war on terrorism in Azerbaijan and Georgian because of the watchdog role they play in these fledgling democracies. In 2001, during a series of high-profile court hearings in Azerbaijan over one environmental NGO’s attempt to register, the Chief of the State Registration Department of the Ministry of Justice, Fazil Mamedov, noted that all NGO applications would be checked for possible connections with international terrorist organizations. In April 2002, Georgian President Shevardnadze argued in a speech that international terrorists might be supporting Georgian NGOs.
BACKGROUND: During the past year, NGOs have been a target of the international war on terrorism in Azerbaijan and Georgian because of the watchdog role they play in these fledgling democracies. In 2001, during a series of high-profile court hearings in Azerbaijan over one environmental NGO’s attempt to register, the Chief of the State Registration Department of the Ministry of Justice, Fazil Mamedov, noted that all NGO applications would be checked for possible connections with international terrorist organizations. In April 2002, Georgian President Shevardnadze argued in a speech that international terrorists might be supporting Georgian NGOs. Both governments have sought to implement NGO laws that are in different ways reminiscent of President Lukashenko’s policies toward NGOs in Belarus. For years, Azerbaijani NGOs have faced a number of government roadblocks. According to an analysis conducted by the International Center for Nonprofit Law (ICNL), the Azerbaijani NGO Law, which was passed in October 2000, leaves critical issues unresolved, one of these being registration. As a result, the Azerbaijan-based Legal Education Society noted that NGOs experience endless delays in registration process and that registration requests are often rejected based on unclear or irrelevant reasons. The inability of independent NGOs to register has complicated their operations and their ability to partner with donors and international institutions. As if the October 2000 NGO law was not enough, the Azerbaijani parliament subsequently passed new legislation in early 2002, the Grants Law of Azerbaijan, which would have required organizations receiving grants to register each grant with the central government before the funding could be used. Fortunately, a coalition of Azerbaijani NGOs and international groups were able to convince Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev to veto the legislation. However, only months later, in December 2002, the new Law on Grants was adopted, which not only requires all organizations that give and receive grants to notify authorities of these grants, but also requires recipient organizations to pay 27 percent of their employees wage in to a social insurance and pension fund. In Georgia, after initially supporting their work, President Eduard Shevardnadze has becoming increasingly suspect of civic groups. On the eve of a visit to the United States in September 2001, President Shevardnadze called for closer government control over NGO grants and reportedly even raised the issue with Secretary of State Powell. Soon thereafter, the government circulated the draft Law on Charity, Grants, and Humanitarian Assistance, which eventually morphed into the draft Law on Grants and Humanitarian Assistance. The latter draft law would have cancelled the existing law and established state control over the utilization of grants. NGOs and reform-minded parliamentarians managed to scuttle passage of the law; however, a little over a year later, the Ministry of State Security circulated a new draft law entitled, “On the Suspension of Activities, Liquidation, and Banning of Extremist Organizations and Organizations under Foreign Control.” The new law, if passed, would suspend, liquidate, or ban any organization under direct or indirect foreign control, including receiving funding, that “aimed at damaging the interests of Georgia.” The draft law does not define the “interests of Georgia” nor does it establish criteria for a definition. Moreover, the draft law states that court decisions to suspend or terminate an organization’s activities can be appealed “based on Georgian legislation;” however, no legislation currently exists that would allow an appeal. If the court decision is revoked, the draft law provides for the state to compensate for damages, but sets out no procedure for doing so.

IMPLICATIONS: In a country with a weak legislature, weak opposition political parties, and a judiciary beholden to the executive branch, Azerbaijan’s NGOs are one of the few collective institutions that to some extent stand against governmental abuse of power. Thus the passage of the restrictive NGO law in Azerbaijan may undermine the country’s already faltering democratic development. In Georgia, governmental institutions are more robust in comparison to its neighbor to the East, but NGOs also play a critical watchdog role. Passage of the Ministry of State Security’s proposed NGO law would not only undermine civic groups, but would also open new avenues for even greater levels of corruption in a society that is already overwhelmed by kleptocratic practices. Still, the effects of increasingly restrictive NGO laws in Azerbaijan and Georgia are not limited to the borders of these two small countries of the Caucasus. As with the Belarusian example, other autocratic rulers in the region may be emboldened to take similar steps in countries throughout Eurasia.

CONCLUSIONS: If one of the main goals of the war on terrorism is to eliminate conditions that promote terrorist activities, then Azerbaijan and Georgia’s attempts to undermine NGOs through legislative restrictions is at odds with this goal. Indeed, by undermining independent civic groups, both countries’ governments will stifle constitutionally sanctioned outlets for free speech and transparency. This can only fuel extremist tendencies in the long run. In both Azerbaijan and Georgia, NGOs have demonstrated an ability to mobilize themselves to advocate against restrictive legislation. There is no reason to believe that they cannot succeed again, but as with previous efforts, the international community has to assume a key, albeit behind-the-scenes role in pressuring both governments to withdraw or amend legislation. In addition, NGOs in Azerbaijan and Georgia can take preventive steps that can help them stay one step ahead of similar future moves by their respective governments. More effective legislative watch programs need to be instituted, so that NGOs will not be caught off guard by debilitating legislation, and perhaps even be able to impact its content before it is put to a vote. The creation of NGO law centers that assist non-profit organizations in understanding the law and potential legal issues, and that can help NGOs to navigate through the registration process would also be helpful. Finally, NGOs need to improve their ability to communicate their mission, goals, and activities to the general public. Unfortunately, in many these societies, the general public does not understand or appreciate this role and often looks at NGOs as they do other private and public institutions, with a jaundiced eye.

AUTHOR BIO: Claude Zullo is Associate Country Director for the Caucasus at the American Bar Association’s Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative.

Read 5163 times

Visit also

silkroad

AFPC

isdp

turkeyanalyst

Staff Publications

Screen Shot 2023-05-08 at 10.32.15 AMSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, U.S. Policy in Central Asia through Central Asian Eyes, May 2023.


Analysis Svante E. Cornell, "Promise and Peril in the Caucasus," AFPC Insights, March 30, 2023.

Oped S. Frederick Starr, Putin's War In Ukraine and the Crimean War), 19fourtyfive, January 2, 2023

Oped S. Frederick Starr, Russia Needs Its Own Charles de Gaulle,  Foreign Policy, July 21, 2022.

2206-StarrSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, Rethinking Greater Central Asia: American and Western Stakes in the Region and How to Advance Them, June 2022 

Oped Svante E. Cornell & Albert Barro, With referendum, Kazakh President pushes for reforms, Euractiv, June 3, 2022.

Oped Svante E. Cornell Russia's Southern Neighbors Take a Stand, The Hill, May 6, 2022.

Silk Road Paper Johan Engvall, Between Bandits and Bureaucrats: 30 Years of Parliamentary Development in Kyrgyzstan, January 2022.  

Oped Svante E. Cornell, No, The War in Ukraine is not about NATO, The Hill, March 9, 2022.

Analysis Svante E. Cornell, Kazakhstan’s Crisis Calls for a Central Asia Policy Reboot, The National Interest, January 34, 2022.

StronguniquecoverBook S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, Strong and Unique: Three Decades of U.S.-Kazakhstan Partnership, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, December 2021.  

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr & Albert Barro, Political and Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan Under President Tokayev, November 2021.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

Newsletter

Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst

Newsletter