BACKGROUND: In late December, the government resigned, catching most analysts by surprise, not least the parliamentarians of the country. Former prime minister Felix Kulov explained this by pointing to the “unbearable” confrontation between the parliament and government, growing after the November rallies, which aimed to force the president to embark upon constitutional reforms. The protests were staged by opposition parliamentarians and other civil activists, while Kulov, whose position was critical on the matter, unabashedly appeared supportive of the president’s rigid position. With the resignation of the government on 19 December, Felix Kulov intended to trigger the dissolution of the parliament, so that a new parliament, half elected by party lists and the other by single constituency mandates, would form a new government, ensuring the full work of the new constitution and a “consensus” between the executive and legislative branches. However, primarily owing to the unwelcome prospect of its dissolution, and identifying the situation as a matter for the legislature, parliamentarians found this unnecessary and chose instead to rewrite the constitution. This was exacerbated by stark contradictions in the text of the existing constitution, and lack of provisions about a transitional government. As the legal impasse as to whether to amend the constitution loomed large, the president revealed that he would decide upon the “fate” of the ostensibly fragmented parliament, which was neither willing to vote for early elections, nor able to promptly respond to the matter. Thus, after several discussions with speaker of parliament Marat Sultanov and with the president, pro-Bakiev parliamentarians went along with the president’s preferences. They passed further amendments to the constitution, addressing not only its shortcomings, but also enhancing the power of the president. Unlike in the constitution passed in November, the president regained his power to build a hierarchical administration with secure control over law-enforcement and security agencies. Appearing bound by their previous agreement, President Bakiev proposed Kulov to the premiership, but the parliament turned down his candidacy two times, apparently not being in favor of the president’s choice that just recently had put them on the verge of dissolution. The president’s position seemed little different from parliament’s. The fact that the president proposed Kulov’s candidacy through his representative in the parliament rather than in person left an impression that the president symbolically allowed loyal parliamentarians to reject Kulov’s candidacy. And the fact the Ishak Masaliev, the head of the parliament’s committee on constitutional legislature and a modest pro-Bakiev parliamentarian, adamantly rejected the legal basis for the repeated consideration of the same candidate, put Felix Kulov in a difficult situation and caused doubts about the president’s commitment to the ‘tandem.’ Also, many came to agree that Kulov’s candidacy would have passed if the president had personally proposed him. Nevertheless, the president’s final choice lay on a more loyal and less politically ambitious candidate, Azim Isabekov, the minister of agriculture, water resources, and processing industry, whose career advancement was closely matched to Bakiev’s rise to power. IMPLICATIONS: In general, as prime minister, Kulov appeared a more active politician than President Kurmanbek Bakiev since they came to power. By calling for negotiations and robustly supporting the president during the November rallies with more than a dozen thousand people on the main square showing discontent with the president with the risk of civil war looming, Kulov ensured that the situation would not spin out of control. Notably, he appeared at media outlets debating more with the opposition than with the president, whose image in its turn was rather associated with giving official speeches and awards. In spring 2006, criminal boss Rysbek Akmatbaev’s has initiated an onslaught on Kulov for alleged involvement in the death of his brother, Parliamentarian Tynychbek Akmatbaev. Moreover, as prime minister, Felix Kulov was the only figure taking “personal” responsibility for the impact of the HIPC Initiative on the economy of the country. It seems that the ‘tandem’ was already undermined when President Bakiev opted to sign the amended constitution enhancing his power, rather than to support the initial intention of Felix Kulov to trigger early parliamentary elections. According to Kulov’s statements, “We [the President and the Prime Minister] have anticipated the parliament’s vagueness” and “the president promised to propose my candidacy over and over” showed his confidence in once again becoming prime minister. However, the president drastically changed his position, when faced with the prospect of apparent political advantages. First, Bakiev found that this sort of opportunity to “peacefully” break up the ‘tandem’ with his rival with the direct involvement of parliament might not return in the future. Apparently, it was now easy for him to transfer blame for the dissolution of thr ‘tandem’ on Kulov’s adverse relations with parliament. Second, Bakiev has a chance to form more loyal government, reducing the importance of parliament’s opinions until the next elections, scheduled for 2010, when the winning party in the parliament will form the government. Third, the president hardly sees Kulov as being in line with the opposition, which otherwise would be a considerable political challenge for the president. Kulov’s relationship with the opposition became murky during the November protests, where the opposition leaders were also calling for the resignation of Felix Kulov from the premiership as a “traitor” given his support of the president. Opinions over the impact of the end of the ‘tandem’ on the political environment vary. Some voices imply that Kulov undermined his political reputation by repeatedly striving for the premiership after his resignation. Others contend that the president’s uncompromising position is likely to lead him to lose the confidence of his own supporters, or that the president has in effect presented the opposition with a charismatic leader that it had lacked. Nevertheless, most analysts concur that this split will have a negative influence on the political environment. CONCLUSIONS: Given the fact that he controls a majority in the parliament, now has a loyal and economy-oriented prime minister, that the government will operate without the parliament’s consideration until 2010, and that the law-enforcement agencies are back under his control, the situation highly favors the president. However, with a less independent prime minister, Bakiev may become seen as increasingly responsible for the likely failure of highly risky economic issues, such as the pressing deadlines for repayment of the country’s $2 billion foreign debt, the privatization of hydropower stations, and the reconsideration of contracts with gold mining companies. How long the new prime minister will keep his seat is unclear, but as the history of Kyrgyzstan has showed, he is likely to be the first to leave as soon as economic problems start causing public discontent. AUTHOR’S BIO: Nurshat Ababakirov, American University of Central Asia, Bishkek.