BACKGROUND: The surprise and uneasiness with which the authorities faced the riots and demonstrations during 2006 can be understood by taking into consideration that nothing in Russian society had provided a clue for the events to come. Indeed, while there were signs of Russian nationalism spreading among the masses of ethnic Russians, for whom it had become a form of social animus, there was no sign of protests that could be violent and comparatively well organized. All these signs of tranquility, and a general deep despise of the Russian masses, induced the authorities to ignore the signs of potential problems. It is clear that the events in Kondopoga of late August and early September 2006, were a serious shock for the authorities. The surprise was not just the scale of events - several hundred people were involved - but the level of organization. The locals had made an attempt to create a parallel power structure and directly related their grievances with the regime. The participants also tried to create a local militia of sorts to defend Russians from ethnic minorities, mostly those whom Russians call “people of Caucasian nationality”, people coming from the Caucasus. There was also an attempt to spread the upheaval to other cities. The authorities, who had assumed that the only real danger was Muslim extremists, mostly from the Caucasus, now felt that they faced even bigger problems from the tide of Russian nationalists. And they decided to take the initiative in their drive against “Caucasians,” whose presence in Russia was seen by the participants in the Kondopoga revolt as a major problem. Russia’s complications with Georgia provided the regime a needed excuse. Russia’s relationship with Georgia became quite tense after the “orange revolution” that brought Saakashvilli’s pro-American regime to power. It almost reached a breaking point after the arrest of a few Russians whom Georgia accused of spying. Putin used these events as an excuse for the arrest and deportation of hundreds of Georgian citizens. Georgians who were Russian citizens were also harassed, including such prominent figures as writer Boris Akunin and sculptor Zurab Tsereteli. Other people from the Caucasus were also mistreated, regardless of whether they were Russian citizens. Putin publicly announced that he understood the public concern with “illegal immigration” and that the state should pay more attention to “native (korenoe) populations,” an unmistakable reference to ethnic Russians. Still, despite playing the nationalistic card and with no sign of mass revolts, the authorities continued to be worried as the second anniversary of the November 4 celebration approached. IMPLICATIONS: While constructing a new post-Soviet identity, the Putin regime has also been constructing a new past, which requires changing the country’s holidays. Following the models of the Bolshevik regime in his early years, Putin replaced November 7, the day of the Bolshevik Revolution, the memory of which the regime wished to erase. He proclaimed November 4 a celebration of national unity, a kind of replica of the American July 4, related to the end of the “Time of Trouble” at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The first celebration, in 2005, was a disappointment for the authorities, for instead of national unity it demonstrated the strength of the nationalistic animus. This was an embarrassment for Putin, who tried to advertise Russia as both a civilized Western country and a friend of Muslims. Now, after the event in Kondopoga, they saw in the nationalist march not just an embarrassment but a potentially serious threat, especially in Moscow: a repetition of the fall 1993 scenario when a motley crew of rebels challenged the very existence of Yeltsin’s regime. The authorities first tried to forbid what the organizers called a “Russian march.” When they realized it would take place anyway, they made serious preparations. Thousands of riot police were assembled; according to some rumors, regular troops and even tanks were ready. The crowd that participated in the demonstration was smaller than in 2005 but apparently much more hostile to the government, screaming “Russians!” to show defiance. The crowd was also clearly against all people of “Caucasian nationality,” that preferred not to show themselves on the streets. The continuing strength of the nationalists, their ability to organize, and the fact that not just elderly (as in the “Red - Brown” demonstrations of the Yeltsin era) but young folk participated not only alarmed the authorities but also reinforced the increasing streak of Russian nationalism among the elite. While Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff, a major regime ideologist, and a Chechen on his father’s side, proclaimed in his theory of “sovereign democracy” that Russia belonged to all ethnic groups of the state, an increasing portion of the Russian elite seems to be moving in the direction of seeing the Russian Federation as primarily a state for ethnic Russians, and where the presence of non-European-looking people should be reduced to a minimum. And those who live in the Federation, even as Russian citizens, should understand that they live not in the state of a “Eurasian” brotherhood of “Rossiane,” but in the state of ethnic Russians, unquestioned masters of the house. Moreover, this new Russian nationalism is Russo-centric in the sense that it is free of not only any “Eurasianism” but even of traditional Slavophilism. This increasing sense of Russian nationalism has implications for Russian internal and foreign policy. The repercussions on internal policy were immediate after the November 4 Kondopoga riots. Soon afterward, a government decree promised to minimize the presence of “foreigners” - people from Central Asia and the Caucasus - in the markets. Some “Caucasians” in the market could well be Russian citizens. Still, the general “anti-Caucasian” drive could complicate even their situation. Moscow also brushed off the recent demands of local Chechen authorities to calculate the damage inflicted on Chechnya by Moscow during the long war, which implied that Chechnya had existed as an independent or semi-independent political entity. Still, while increasing the pressure on Muslim minorities, Moscow is moving cautiously, avoiding direct confrontation. At the same time, Moscow’s Russo-centric nationalism became much bolder in foreign affairs, using oil and gas supplies as its major weapon. Oil and gas prices have risen sharply not just for geopolitically ambivalent Azerbaijan but even friendly Slavic Belarus, challenging the very nature of a “Eurasian” commonwealth, with Russia as a friendly power generously sharing oil and gas largesse with friendly states. CONCLUSIONS: The series of events - the Kondopoga riots and the “Russian march”, as well as the government’s response - indicate not only the increasing dissatisfaction of the disfranchised Russian populace with economic arrangements manifested in libidinous hatred of non-European-looking minorities, mostly those of “Caucasian” nationality, but also has stimulated an evolving Russian elite in the direction of a Russo-centric state. In such a state, its relationship with its neighbors, whether from the Caucasus, Central Asia or even Slavic Belarus, would be based on pragmatic imperialism rather than a loose “Eurasianism,” which implies a broad autonomy for the players. Response to the pressure could, of course, be manifold, ranging from complete submission and possible direct incorporation in Russia to resistance to pressure, as is evident by the increasing gravitation to each other by Azerbaijan and Georgia. The response in Russia proper could also be manifold and depend on the level of pressure. While the official pressure on minorities from the Caucasus who are Russian citizens is still moderate, its increase could lead to new inter-ethnic tensions with the spread of underground Islamic extremism as a possible scenario. AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh is an Associate Professor of History at Indiana University, South Bend.