BACKGROUND: Over six years since its inception, the impact of Russia’s ongoing campaign in Chechnya on the Russian polity has been minimal. The conflict has found little resonance across Russian society at large, which, according to polls, tends to regard the conflagration as a vague, undefined irritant, altogether far removed from ordinary life. The Putin administration has proved remarkably adept at insulating Russian society from the tumultuous situation in the North Caucasus, and has successfully forged a broad political consensus on how the “Chechen problem” should be addressed. Policy-making regarding Chechnya has become the preserve of the Russian president and a small group of influential advisors. While arguments within the Putinite camp concerning, for example, the direction of Russia’s economic policy sometimes bubble to the surface, no one within this constituency dares to offer so much as a single independent thought regarding the administration’s Chechnya policy. It is, therefore, almost impossible to gauge how any pro-Putin politician of significance – Ivanov and Medvedev included – truly perceives Russia’s current policy toward Chechnya. Of course, cross-political unanimity frequently emerges when nations are faced with “threats to national security.” During the conflict in Northern Ireland, for example, Westminster politicians – whether government MPs or oppositionists – readily sang from the same political hymn sheet when forced to address this troublesome issue, although they may have been at daggers drawn over other, arguably less urgent political matters. Therefore, Russia’s prevailing political consensus on Chechnya, while perhaps remarkable in the wake of six years of unmitigated turmoil in the region, is far from unprecedented. The Kremlin’s policy toward Chechnya has latterly been directed by a troika comprised of Putin, his Deputy Chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov, and the Presidential Representative to the Southern Federal District, Dimitri Kozak. It is widely believed that Surkov functions as Ramzan Kadyrov’s patron within the corridors of power; and while Kozak’s attitude toward Chechnya’s pro-Moscow premier is rather more ambiguous, both he and Surkov are united in their mutual devotion to Putin. This loyalty stems from a certain ideological affinity, as well as the stark realization that their future political prospects are dependent on the president’s continued patronage. It is uncertain whether Surkov and Kozak would figure quite as prominently under a different administration. Surkov, in particular, has fallen afoul of both Ivanov and Medvedev in recent months. Medvedev has taken issue with him over his bold expostulation of the concept of “sovereign democracy”. Ivanov, meanwhile, has for reasons as yet unclear, attempted to tar Surkov and Kozak with the same political brush, eagerly revealing to the Russian media how both men served together in a secretive military unit during the 1980s. Thus, Surkov and Kozak – and by extension, Ramzan Kadyrov – figure to be among the biggest losers in any change of administration that might occur in 2008. IMPLICATIONS: This analysis has direct implications for Chechnya. Ramzan Kadyrov’s political ambition is gradually becoming increasingly unrestrained. By consistently demanding that Moscow cede control over Chechnya’s natural resources to his government, he has quite brazenly thrown down the gauntlet to the influential siloviki clan.( http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=4490) Furthermore, Kadyrov is demanding financial concessions for the republic, as well as an increased federal budgetary allocation, in order, he claims, to expedite the reconstruction of Chechnya’s demolished infrastructure. Up to this point, Kadyrov’s boisterous political behavior has been excused on the grounds of his close relationship with Putin and Surkov. But let us imagine for one moment that either Ivanov or Medvedev becomes president in 2008. With Putin gone from the presidency, Surkov stand likely to be weakened or even dismissed. How would Kadyrov react to this hypothetical turn of events? Focusing on similar hypothetical scenarios, certain political theorists have previously suggested that Kadyrov might react rashly and turn against Russia. In truth, the state of relations between the Chechen premier and the two presidential frontrunners is a matter of conjecture. Ramzan’s dealings with both men have been limited. However, it is worth noting that any existing relations between him and Ivanov may have been strained somewhat by Putin’s decision on December 21, 2005 to place the Defense Minister in charge of Chechnya’s reconstruction efforts – a decision which was perceived in some quarters as an affront to Kadyrov. Overall, however, relations between Kadyrov and these two presidential aspirants can be most accurately categorized as ambiguous. But perhaps this ambiguity is no bad thing. Kadyrov’s present political injudiciousness can be attributed in large part to the manner in which he is handled by his Kremlin benefactors.( http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=4234) Both Putin and Surkov tend to treat the Chechen premier with kid gloves, and are seemingly unperturbed by his consistently errant behavior on the political stage. Should these two luminaries depart from atop Russia’s political Olympus in 2008, then Kadyrov’s political position will become extremely tenuous. Kadyrov has long shown a prodigious aptitude for making enemies, both in Chechnya itself and in Moscow. As a result, Kadyrov would be left mortally vulnerable should the incumbent Putin-Surkov axis depart from the political arena in its current guise. But rather than provoke him into opposing Russia, this unsettling interruption in relations between the Kremlin and its client regime in Grozny might induce Kadyrov to temper his characteristic impulsiveness and affect a more conventional political persona. However, it is by no means certain that Putin will leave office in 2008. If anything, the so-called “third term party” – of which Surkov and Kadyrov are paid-up members – is gathering strength, with almost 60 percent of Russians believed to be generally supportive of the idea of a third presidential term for Putin. CONCLUSIONS: The prospect of either Medvedev or Ivanov ascending to the Russian presidency would be unlikely to be welcomed by Ramzan Kadyrov. Because of the definite (though hardly intimate) relationship he enjoys with the siloviki clan, Ivanov, in particular, would represent an undesirable interlocutor in the eyes of Kadyrov. A Medvedev presidency, meanwhile, would be similarly unwelcome in that the prevailing “rules of the game” governing relations between Kadyrov and the Kremlin would likely be revised to a greater or lesser degree. In light of this analysis, Kadyrov’s advocacy of a third term for Putin is, politically speaking, entirely logical. Should Surkov and the “third term party” fail to convince Putin of the utility of remaining in office for a further four years, then it is likely that Kadyrov will quickly throw his political weight behind whichever alternative candidate this constituency puts forth. Indeed, Ivanov’s vaguely curious revelation about Surkov and Kozak’s shared history might indirectly indicate that Surkov has already begun the process of tapping alternative candidates. Kozak, incidentally, has previously been touted in certain quarters as a man with presidential pedigree. AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations from University College Cork, Ireland.