BACKGROUND: Since independence, organized crime has been one of the biggest obstacles to the development of a democratic Kyrgyzstan. Both the Akayev government before March 2005 and the current leadership have done little to relieve this threat. Racketeering has been permitted and organized criminal elements have been used as a tool in political confrontations. As a result, at times two loci of power have co-existed: official state power and, often as a compliment, violent organized crime. Under these conditions, the population perceived the police system as toothless, and in many cases as submissive to the forces of organized crime. For example, infamous organized crime boss Rysbek Akmatbaev organized protests in November 2005 after the assassination of his brother and parliamentarian Tynychbek Akmatbaev. Rysbek mobilized his supporters and set up Yurtas (traditional Kyrgyz tents) at the central square in Bishkek, threatening Prime Minister Felix Kulov as well as some members of the parliament. Several heads of law enforcement agencies went to the square and offered their condolences to Rysbek for the death of his brother. Needless to say, within the police system such acts of submissiveness to organized crime had a demoralizing effect. However, since Omurbek Suvanaliev was appointed acting Minister of Interior by presidential decree during the November 2006 demonstrations in Bishkek, the efficiency of the Kyrgyz police improved significantly. In the fight against the main threats to stability and development in the country – organized crime, corruption and extremism – Suvanaliev created three special divisions. The results were impressive. More than 30 members of organized criminal groups were arrested, of which the majority were leading figures. One of the most high-profile cases was the death of infamous contract killer Aibek Narmatov during a special operation. In the operation, one policeman was killed and two injured. The operation was carried out by the special division combating organized crime. According to the police, Narmatov could be tied to at least seven contract killings. The leading criminal authority in the country, Kamchy Kolbaev, recognized as Kyrgyzstan’s first “thief in law”, is another figure that has come under increased pressure. Presently, he is believed to be hiding outside Kyrgyzstan. The general public in Kyrgyzstan is truly tired of banditry and in the last months, the population has finally sensed a change in the way organized crime is tackled. Members of civil society, such as Edil Baisalov, leader of the Coalition for Democracy, also supported Suvanaliev as Minister, expressing it as a choice between banditry and democracy. Known in Kyrgyzstan as “Catani,” General Suvanaliev’s uncompromising fight against organized criminality has been displayed on numerous occasions in his more than 20 years in the police system. For example, during his time as head of national security in Osh oblast, his administration arrested the murderer of the vice mayor of St Petersburg. In 1998, he was also responsible for the unprecedented seizure of a 700-ton shipment of weapons smuggled from Iran via Osh destined for Afghanistan. He later resigned in protest to the Akaev regime’s decision to close its eyes on the matter and return the shipment to Iran. As a member of the Kyrgyz Parliament from 1995-97, Suvanaliev further compliments his police career with political experience. IMPLICATIONS: It is against this background that President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s recent decision to reject Suvanaliev as Minister of Internal Affairs should be understood. In the weeks leading up to Suvanaliev’s dismissal, a smearing campaign was initiated against him. Behind this campaign stood shadow business interests within the Kyrgyz Parliament. A report was prepared and submitted to the president by the Heads of three Parliamentary Committees – those on law and order and combating corruption; fiscal policy; and budget and finance. The report strongly recommended the president not to appoint Suvanaliev as Minister of Interior in the new government. The main initiator of this campaign was Roman Shin – a member of the Parliament with a political power base that includes casinos. The reason behind his actions was the increased pressure that his casino businesses in Bishkek have been subjected to by law enforcement, due to suspicions of illegal gambling and money laundering. Recently, four Chinese employees at his casino were arrested and handed over to Chinese authorities. In China, they were wanted for organizing illegal gambling. As a response, the Kyrgyz government received a formal letter of appreciation from the Chinese Ministry of Social Security. Shin is an illustrative case of parliamentary interests in Kyrgyzstan. With no background in any state agencies, he managed to build on his financial strength to obtain a seat in the parliament. Due to the strong links that have developed between organized crime and politics, Suvanaliev’s independent stance was not the most convenient for many politicians defending shadow economic interests. Firstly, at present the police has attacked and forced a substantial part of organized crime groups in Kyrgyzstan on the defense. Under Suvanaliev’s leadership, the networks of some politicians with close connections to organized crime had also come under increased pressure. This has in particular been manifested by the capturing of contract killers. Nevertheless, due to the fact that organized crime has been allowed to flourish during 15 years, unofficially protected by the political leadership, these structures can easily be restored if the present initiatives are not upheld. In other words, those who represent the blending of criminal and political interests in the Kyrgyz power system were simply not keen on seeing Suvanaliev continuing his work in the new government. Secondly, it is also important to bear in mind that Suvanaliev has a long-standing and very close relationship with former Prime Minister Felix Kulov. For example, during the latter’s imprisonment, Suvanaliev was appointed as head of the Felix Kulov foundation. He has also been a member of Kulov’s Ar Namys party. Since Kulov was an unpopular prime minister among some parliamentarians, manifested by the fact that his candidature to the post in the new government was twice rejected by the parliament(see archive http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=4691), the same deputies perceived Suvanaliev as a potential insurance for Kulov’s continued influence. Finally, following the resignation of the government before the New Year, political stakes in Kyrgyzstan have been very high. Most positions in the new government appeared to have been decided by the President quite quickly. The only position under vivid discussion was the one of Minister of Interior. According to the new constitution, the formation of the new government is controlled by the President. In this light, Suvanaliev’s independent stance, clean background, and the intensified pressure he has put on organized crime made up a combination that appears to have been incompatible with the interests of some of the people around Bakiev. CONCLUSIONS: In order to provide a prognosis for the future of combating organized crime and the strength of law enforcement in Kyrgyzstan, it is necessary to analyze President Bakiev’s politics. Since coming to power, Bakiev has been showing every sign of ruling the country with a very short time horizon. As such he wants to see loyal ministers. This illustrates a general dilemma in the country. Personal loyalties and narrow interests are promoted at the expense of meritocracy and autonomy. In a government ruled on the basis of meritocracy and professionalism, the leadership’s possibilities to control state institutions for its own benefit decreases. What the standoff between shadow business elements within the parliament and Suvanaliev illustrates is thus a much bigger picture, i.e. the question of the Kyrgyz government’s willingness to fight organized crime, versus a choice to tolerate efforts by corruption and shadow economic interests to dictate politics. In short, the question is what path the country will take in the fight against the evil of organized crime. From another point of view, however, the rejection of Suvanaliev, while most likely having negative consequences for the fight against organized crime in the near future, could provide the opposition with a potential leading figure, given that he is not just a policeman but has also laid the foundation for becoming one of the main actors in Kyrgyz politics. AUTHORS’ BIO: Kairat Osmonaliev, Ph.D. in Jurisprudence, is Professor at the Kyrgyz National University. Johan Engvall is a Researcher and Lecturer at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.