BACKGROUND: On Sunday July 10, Kyrgyzstan elected Kurmanbek Bakiev as its new president with the astonishing figure of 89 percent in an election that was a considerably improvement over the February parliamentary elections, according to the OSCE. This was considered by many as the final act in the “Tulip Revolution” that started with the fraudulent elections in February and led to the ousting of longtime president Akaev. The most basic dividing line in Kyrgyz politics is the north-south divide, the south being politically marginalized since Soviet times and more traditional and characterized by a large Uzbek minority. Akaev was a northerner and basically staffed his administration with fellow northerners, and consequently ignored the south. A notable previous challenge to Akaev’s power was the events that culminated in the southern region of Aksy in March 2002, which left at least five people dead. The issue at that time was parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov’s critique of Akaev’s transfer of territory to China. The newly elected president, Bakiyev, was Prime Minister at the time and an Akaev supporter, but resigned as a consequence of police firing into the crowds. The presidential campaign that began immediately after the revolution was from the beginning destined to be a struggle between the two strongmen of the revolution, Bakiev and Kulov. The race was predicted to be very competitive until Kulov suddenly agreed on May 12 to withdraw and to become Bakiev’s Prime Minister once elected. Kulov had been in prison for the last five years on charges of abuse of office, charges that were apparently politically motivated. In the wake of the revolution in March, he was freed from prison and charged with coordinating the security situation during the post-revolutionary chaos. Soon thereafter he stepped down until he entered the government as a consequence of the Bakiev-Kulov agreement, which basically meant that Kulov would withdraw from the presidential race and immediately be appointed Deputy Prime Minister, and that he would become the PM in the case of a Bakiev victory. Moreover, a new constitution would be adopted that would increase the powers of the PM. The agreement, which was publicly announced twice, and especially the part of it that states that the powers of the Prime Minister will be increased, will most likely be the defining element of Kyrgyz politics this fall. In the pre-election period, the security situation was marked by three serious incidents of violence, one being an attempt to seize the Government Building on June 17. Urmat Baryktabasov, a member of parliament from the north with ties to Akaev’s clan, carried this out as a response to being deregistered as a presidential candidate. Some observers saw the mobilization of the public association “Mekenim Kyrgyzstan”, which Baryktabasov leads, as an attempt at counter-revolution. It ended with the offices of “Mekenim Kyrgyzstan” being searched and sealed by law enforcement authorities.

IMPLICATIONS: The revolutionary changes in the government of Kyrgyzstan can be considered as a new opening for Kyrgyzstan, especially when it comes to clearing out the most corrupt elements of the government. The power balance of the country is nevertheless still in flux, with possibly divisive fights to be expected. Everything boils down to the Bakiev-Kulov power struggle, with its main ingredient being working out a new constitution, of which a draft was accepted by the parliament 8 June. Whether any real changes in patterns of governance will take place or whether Bakiev will simply bring in his own people without changing the recruiting structures and enhancing the professionalism of the public administration, remains an open question. If, however, what is happening is an emerging parliamentarism in Kyrgyzstan, it would be a unique and novel development in the entire region, dominated by authoritarian presidential systems. At this stage is far too early to tell whether this will materialize or not. This question will be a defining element of the power struggle between Bakiev and Kulov. Nevertheless, the composition of the new parliament does not inspire hope for the development of the country, since many of the members have criminal records and ties to corrupt business. Since being a member of the parliament offers immunity, the February elections could essentially be characterized a politicization of criminals. One possibility is for new general elections to be announced, something that Bakiev strongly advocated in the aftermath of the revolution. In terms of foreign policy, Bakiev needs to balance Russia, China, and the United States, which is getting increasingly tricky. At the press conference after being elected, Bakiev referred to discussions about the closing of the U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) raised the issue at a summit in Astana, Kazakhstan last week, and being a member, Kyrgyzstan is pressured by Russia and China to get the U.S. out of Kyrgyzstan. Bakiev mentioned the changing situation on the ground in Afghanistan and said that discussions about setting a date for U.S. withdrawal was “the right thing to do”. Up to this date the SCO has been considered a paper tiger, but with upcoming joint training sessions and energy cooperation it will be interesting to follow Kyrgyzstan’s positioning in the organization.

CONCLUSIONS: Real work begins now for newly elected president Bakiev, the outcome being uncertain at the time of writing. One thing is clear and that is the willingness of the donor countries of the west to support the new regime in Bishkek. There is a golden opportunity for Bakiev and Kulov to focus on reforming the state apparatus and to start delivering along the lines of Bakiev’s first press conference. The regional situation, and in particular the situation in Uzbekistan, might turn out to be a unifying factor in this crucial stage of Kyrgyz state-building. The constitutional amendment process and the new power-sharing arrangements currently under discussion will define the near future. As for domestic opposition, the situation is still uncertain, and it might emerge from within the winning side of the tulip revolutionaries, i.e. from Kulov, or it might emerge from the remnants of Akaev’s power base. Kyrgyzstan was in the mid-1990s considered as becoming increasingly democratic and later turned less so. It is now making a comeback as the “island of democracy” in Central Asia. But for how long will this last this time around?

AUTHOR’S BIO: Fredrik M. Sjoberg is a junior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center at Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and Uppsala University, Sweden. He holds a BA in International Relations from Stockholm University and an MA in Development Studies from Uppsala University. He took part as an election observer for the OSCE to Kyrgyzstan during the presidential elections of July 2005.