BACKGROUND: Uzbekistan shares some characteristics that contributed to the collapse of the incumbent regimes in Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently Kyrgyzstan. In particular, the current Uzbek government is similarly politically repressive, economically ineffective, and plagued by corruption. The lack of effective mechanisms for peaceful political change, or even accepted methods for leadership succession, has led some of the regime’s opponents to seek to depose it by force. But conditions in Uzbekistan today differ in two important respects from the pre-revolutionary situations in the other states. First, Uzbekistan lacks a credible opposition movement or leader. Whereas the other former Soviet republics allowed independent civil society, including foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some room to maneuver, Uzbek President Islam Karimov has suppressed all his important domestic opposition for years, including sweeping measures against so-called “independent Muslims” engaging in religious rituals outside of registered mosques. This repression has only intensified following the revolutionary upheavals elsewhere and the mass unrest in Andijan. No charismatic leader like Mikheil Saakashvili or Viktor Yushchenko nevertheless emerged to rally and direct popular hostility against the regime into a cohesive force for political change. Second, a major factor contributing to the development of revolutionary situations in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan was the inability or unwillingness of the local security forces to employ the high level of force needed to derail the burgeoning popular protests. In contrast, Uzbek security forces have shown a willingness to respond harshly against regime opponents. They also have been effective at countering the guerrilla attacks and urban bombings perpetrated by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and other Central Asian terrorist groups. Truly massive protests might eventually overwhelm them, but the Andijan violence has probably served only to reinforce their determination to remain in power and thereby thwart threats of retribution or retaliation. The challenges that the current Uzbek government’s collapse would present for Western policy should not be underestimated. For one thing, it is uncertain whether the successor regime would be any better. Although Muslim practices in Central Asia have traditionally been moderate, Islamic extremists, like the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution, could exploit the chaotic dynamics of a revolutionary situation to overwhelm their more popular but less well-organized democratic opponents. Another scenario for regime change would involve a “Ceaucescu-style” solution. As in Romania at the end of the Cold War, Karimov’s colleagues could sacrifice him and seize power themselves in a coup. In this case, the same ruling elite would remain, but with a different leader or dominant faction. It is unclear whether the putsch leaders would be inclined to initiate major political reforms given that the regime’s past atrocities would have compromised them as well. To begin to answer such questions, much better intelligence about Karimov’s possible successors is needed. The break-up of Karimov’s regime could easily see the break-up of his country. Neighboring Tajikistan offers a clear example of the problems such a development could present. There, the collapse of the Soviet system led to regional fragmentation and a five-year civil war from 1992-97 among coalitions organized by geography and ideology. Approximately 50,000-100,000 people died during the ensuing chaos. Even the advent of a genuinely democratic government in Uzbekistan would present serious problems if it proved too weak and ineffectual to ensure the domestic stability required for economic prosperity and internal security. The collapse of the old regime in Kyrgyzstan entailed an estimated $100 million damage from looting in Bishkek alone. As in Iraq, foreign investors typically shun countries that cannot provide clear signs of stability. In both Tajikistan and Afghanistan, moreover, Islamic terrorists associated with al-Qaeda, the IMU, and other extremist groups exploited unstable internal conditions to establish extensive network of training camps and related facilities. All the Central Asian governments as well as Afghanistan have proved unable to secure their borders sufficiently to counter the continuing surge in large-scale narcotics cultivation and trafficking.

IMPLICATIONS: The United States and other Western countries lack a strategy for promoting the right kinds of political change in Central Asia—one that transitions regimes from autocracy to democracy, not to theocracy. This problem is not new. During the Cold War, U.S. officials faced the dilemma of promoting reform but not communist revolutions in South Vietnam and Central America. The experience with Iran in 1978-79 is perhaps even more relevant, as detailed by Michael Fredholm’s article in the June 1 issue of the Analyst. These cases highlight the difficulty of seeking to transform a foreign country into a viable democracy when the underlying cultural and other prerequisites are weak. Unfortunately, it is not self-evident what tactics would best lead to a smooth transition. An interventionist approach would conform to the Bush administration’s statements about the need to promote democracy rather than continue to support authoritarian regimes. Although these remarks were aimed primarily at Middle Eastern governments, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, they clearly apply to U.S. ties with the Central Asian states as well. Indeed, Western pressure on Karimov and other Central Asian leaders has led them to commit on many occasions to reform. It is unclear, however, that the United States and its allies possess the leverage to compel the established regimes of Central Asia to transform. Their leaders believe that foreign governments have little choice except to support them given the risks of anti-American extremists coming to power in their wake. They also think they can turn to Moscow and Beijing if Western governments curtail financial aid or otherwise become too preachy. Recognizing these limitations, both the U.S. and the EU governments resist reducing their aid programs to Uzbekistan, because they at least indirectly support socioeconomic reforms. A strategy of disengagement, on the other hand, could repeat the mistake the United States made after the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when America’s subsequent lack of interest about the country fatally contributed to the establishment of terrorist sanctuaries there. Even Uzbek democrats critical of foreign ties with Karimov recognize that a complete Western withdrawal would not necessarily help their cause. Foreign governments will need to work closely together to best manage democratization. They could have much more influence if they acted in concert and thereby deprived Central Asian leaders of opportunities to play them off against each other. On the other hand, officials in China, Iran, and Russia could interpret a wave of democratization in Central Asia as aimed primarily at enhancing U.S. power. This perception would heighten concerns about U.S. encirclement, the repercussions of nearby chaos for their own territory, and fears of contagion.

CONCLUSIONS: Besides a long-term program aimed at advancing the right kind of regime change, international actors will need a hedging strategy in case of sudden regime collapse. The Central Asian political systems are so tightly controlled by personalities and informal networks that sweeping policy transformations could easily ensue from a turnover at the top. Any change in leadership would likely see a change in regime. Foreign governments will need to develop plans in advance of such a case to protect expatriates, manage refugees, discourage foreign intervention, conduct covert operations against Islamic extremists potentially trying to seize power, and prevent the emergence of another dictator—in particular, by pressuring new leaders from the start to introduce political and economic reforms before they have become so entrenched that they no longer feel vulnerable or the need for foreign endorsement.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Studies at the Hudson Institute. He has published several articles on U.S. policy toward Central Asia.