BACKGROUND: In Pakistan’s case, President Pervez Musharraf has said, “We are short of energy. We want gas immediately. Our industry is suffering; investment coming to Pakistan is suffering, so Pakistan’s interest is to get gas fast.” Therefore Musharraf is pushing primarily for a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and then on to India. For his part Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said that “Energy security is second only in our scheme of things to food security.” Thus India’s dependence upon secure oil and gas supplies from the Gulf and from Central Asia, as manifested in its energy firms’ quest for equity holdings in Russian, Angolan, Sudanese, Venezuelan, Central Asian, and Iranian energy fields or for major deals with energy producing states like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran represents a vital national interest. Moreover, India wants to explore as many options as possible, not just Iran. Thus in June, 2005 it signaled its interest in participating in the so called TAP project (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Trans-Afghan Pipeline), a project sponsored by those governments and the Asian Development Bank. India’s interest in this project is only the latest manifestation of its rising interests in Central Asian energy. Accordingly India has signed or is negotiating major deals with Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as showing new interest in Turkmenistan. For, example, India has formally bid for immediate participation in the Tengiz and Kashagan oil fields and the Kurmangazy and Darkhan exploration blocs. India is also interested in nine other exploration blocs in and around the Caspian Sea. Indian Energy Minister Mari Shankar Aiyar also offered the services of India\'s Gail Ltd., a gas infrastructure firm, as a project consortium partner in Kazakhstan\'s three pipelines with China. Gail is also eager to invest in gas processing and petrochemical plants in association with other Indian public-sector companies in the Kazakh towns of Atyrau and Akhtau and to improve oil recovery in older fields in Kazakhstan. In order to promote this comprehensive plan of Indian participation in all aspects of Kazakhstan\'s oil and gas projects, both sides agreed to establish a joint working group to examine and develop various projects for cooperation. Nevertheless, the TAP project remains perhaps the most intriguing project in which India seeks to participate, precisely because it brings together Turkmenistan’s gas and a pipeline shipping it through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It will be remembered that there was considerable interest in such a project in the 1990s as it was believed that this could serve to moderate the threat then posed by the new Taliban rulers of Afghanistan and bring much needed royalties and energy access to that state. Such a pipeline would also constitute an outlet for Turkmen natural gas that was not at all dependent upon Russian pipelines and facilities. Thus the TAP pipeline would strengthen Ashkhabad’s independence from Moscow. Today all three states would benefit from this pipeline. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India have once again resurrected interest in it albeit under vastly changed geostrategic circumstances. Not only does Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government in Afghanistan need the royalties and the energy that would accrue to it through this pipeline; it appears that India and Pakistan have actually begun to approach each other in a cooperative spirit as regards energy. Previously such projects always foundered upon the rocks of Indo-Pakistani enmity as New Delhi was naturally most reluctant to have its access to reliable energy supplies depend on pipelines through its arch-rival and enemy, Pakistan. And without an Indian terminus this pipeline did not make sufficient economic sense to justify construction at a time of war, instability, terrorism, and much lower prices for natural gas. Neither was Pakistan interested in supporting India’s economic development and American policy towards this part of the world in the Clinton Administration was, as we now know, tragically disconcerted.

IMPLICATIONS: Today, however, Washington strongly supports this pipeline, and not only because it would enhance Turkmenistan’s independence and Afghanistan’s stability. India and Pakistan, both of whom need to obtain reliable energy access in and around the Caspian to meet their exploding demand for energy, are pondering their options. For Pakistan, as noted above the priority appears to be Iran. But it also clearly is interested in the TAP project and possibly in a third supply route originating in Qatar. India is ready to embrace all three options given the much larger population and demands that it must satisfy. But its professed interest in the TAP project reveals intriguing geostrategic considerations at work beyond considerations of merely obtaining reliable and quick access to natural gas. For example, Washington strongly supports the Turkmen option, not just to maintain tight economic pressure upon Iran, but also to bring India and Pakistan closer together. While India and Pakistan have never interfered with supply of water to both states as regulated by earlier treaties that give India the dominant hand over water from the Indus River, rivalry over energy has been a different case. If New Delhi and Islamabad can jointly agree on a pipeline from Turkmenistan or Iran, this will be a tangible sign of much greater mutual trust and willingness to accept mutual dependence. Indeed Aiyar talks openly of India’s and Pakistan’s common interest in securing access to low cost energy from their “extended neighborhood” (Central Asia and the Gulf) and espouses bilateral cooperation toward this end. Therefore it would be a sign of progress towards Washington’s main regional goal of being a midwife to a stable and progressively unfolding South Asian peace process that would cut the ground out from under much of the region’s terrorism and ethno-religious insurgency movements. The potential strategic payoffs from this pipeline option do not end with enhanced possibilities for bilateral Indo-Pakistani cooperation. Indo-Pakistani rivalry for influence continues to this day in Afghanistan and was in the past a major factor in aggravating Afghanistan’s own internal weaknesses that led to a generation of upheaval and war after the coup of 1973, even before the Soviet invasion of 1979. To the extent that both India and Pakistan learn to cooperate with each other and accept mutual dependence on energy and water as a stable, non-provocative, and undisturbed fact of life, their broader geopolitical rivalry throughout South and Central Asia should also cool down. That trend offers significant payoffs to Afghanistan as well for President Karzai recently again criticized Pakistan for not doing enough to suppress terrorists inside its borders or to refrain from providing assistance to Taliban forces in the Pakistani-Afghanistan border regions. Construction of the TAP line or of any pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India strengthens Afghanistan’s hand vis-à-vis Pakistan and raises the potential cost to Pakistan of continuing to flirt with elements who wish to spread terror throughout Central Asia. For these many reasons, stabilizing the nascent South Asian “peace process”, striking at the roots of terrorism in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and potentially Central Asia, and to demonstrate its friendship for India and Pakistan and solicitude for their energy needs, Washington has publicly supported the TAP line and pushed for it while pressuring both sides to refrain from the Iranian option.

CONCLUSIONS: This project is more than a potential of Indo-Pakistani rapprochement. It would also epitomize India’s growing reach and interest in the entire Caspian area. Aiyar has also proposed to Azerbaijan that it either build a pipeline through Iran to bring oil to India, or join its gas supplies to an extension of the TAP project to bring its natural gas to India. India is also pushing the idea of a consumers’ union in the energy market and is sponsoring major meetings to bring producers and consumers, including Caspian producers together in New Delhi later this year. India\'s aggressive oil and gas diplomacy hardly stops in Central Asia and is global in scope. All these signs of activity denote India\'s rising capabilities, demands, and ability to satisfy them. Henceforth India, no less than China, will be a major player in Central Asian and Russian energy issues. As it is equally interested in Central Asia for strategic reasons, India will be a factor to be reckoned with on those issues too.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the US Government.