By Emil Avdaliani

On October 9, the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan met in Dushanbe. Relations appear to be improving and despite the persisting distrust, Baku seeks to maintain a functional relationship with Moscow. At the same time, Baku has taken significant steps to strengthen ties with Washington, with U.S. companies pledging investments in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sector. Close relations with both Russia and the U.S. align with Baku’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy aimed at avoiding dependence on any single major power. Through this approach, Baku seeks to demonstrate that it enjoys increasing flexibility in its international maneuvering.



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BACKGROUND: Over the past two months, Azerbaijan’s relations with both Russia and the U.S. have undergone significant changes, reflecting Baku’s continued commitment to maintaining balance in its foreign policy.

On October 9, Vladimir Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. During the meeting, Putin addressed what he called the “most sensitive issue,” the December 2024 crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 jet, caused by a Russian air defense missile. He expressed his condolences and effectively issued an apology. Putin stated that the investigation into the crash had concluded and that the causes of the tragedy had been identified. He attributed the incident to three Ukrainian drones allegedly flying over Russian territory at the time and mentioned technical malfunctions in Russia’s air defense system, which launched two missiles that did not directly strike the plane but exploded about ten meters away.

Between the downing of the Azerbaijani airliner and the meeting in Dushanbe, relations grew even more strained following the arrest of members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg in June 2025. Russian security forces detained a group of Azerbaijani nationals in connection with murders committed in the early 2000s, resulting in the deaths of two suspects during the operation. In response, Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures, arresting eight Russian citizens on charges of drug trafficking and cybercrime. The Russian House in Baku was subsequently closed, all Russia-related cultural events were cancelled, and Azerbaijani authorities detained both the director and the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Azerbaijan.

Amid the tensions and eventual reconciliation with Russia, Baku has also improved its relations with the U.S., which had deteriorated during the Biden administration. That period coincided with the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and the mass displacement of Armenians, developments that created friction between Washington and Baku. However, with Trump’s return to the presidency, momentum began to build toward reversing this trend. The ongoing peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan drew renewed U.S. attention, with Washington showing a clear willingness to act as the main mediator in the process.

This development led to the peace summit in Washington, D.C., on August 8, where Yerevan and Baku reached a landmark agreement granting the U.S. a 99-year mandate to oversee the creation and operation of a transit corridor through Armenian territory. Named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), the corridor will connect Turkey with the Caspian Sea, bypassing the traditional route through Georgia. In addition, Azerbaijan secured U.S. President Donald Trump’s approval of an order lifting Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which had prohibited U.S. military assistance to Azerbaijan since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. During the summit, Azerbaijan’s SOCAR signed a memorandum of understanding with ExxonMobil, and following the event, Washington and Baku agreed to hold regular meetings on military and economic cooperation.

IMPLICATIONS: For Azerbaijan, Putin’s remarks were seen as an apology, and Baku now appears ready to normalize relations with Moscow. Yet beneath this adjustment lies a deeper motive: Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is shaped by calculations of power balance. Although weakened by the war in Ukraine, Russia remains strong enough to exert pressure on Azerbaijan, and Baku has been cautious not to provoke Moscow’s anger. Positioned geographically between Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan remains vulnerable to possible Russian military or economic pressure, as well as to instability from the Middle East driven by Israeli and U.S. actions against the Islamic Republic.

This explains why, after a relatively extended period of tension with Moscow, Baku ultimately chose reconciliation. Moreover, this approach aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader pattern of behavior toward other powers. Since 2020, when Azerbaijan achieved a decisive victory in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, its relations with Iran have worsened. Tehran grew concerned about the shifting balance of power in the South Caucasus, marked by Azerbaijan’s rising confidence and Turkey’s expanding influence. Until late 2024, ties between Baku and Tehran went through several cycles of tension, yet both sides were careful to prevent any major military escalation. This period concluded with a clear rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Iran, marked by bilateral visits and the reopening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran.

The reconciliation with Moscow also reflects Baku’s ongoing focus on maintaining balanced relations with its neighbors, particularly major powers. Ties with Russia remain important, as shown by the expansion of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russia’s interior through Iran to the Indian Ocean. A key branch of this corridor passes through Azerbaijan, making it a vital route for Russia’s access to the Middle East. In addition, strong bilateral trade between Azerbaijan and Russia provides another incentive for both countries to avoid any serious deterioration in their relationship.

However, this reconciliation is neither complete nor entirely sincere. Azerbaijan will continue to follow its multi-vector foreign policy, which increasingly limits its dependence on Russia. The broader geopolitical context favors Baku. Engaged in a prolonged conflict that demands vast economic and military resources, Russia has been unable to maintain the dominant position in the South Caucasus that it held before 2022. The regional states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, quickly moved to take advantage of this new flexibility. Azerbaijan regained territories long controlled by Armenia, while Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh largely stood by. Since the fall of the Armenian enclave in September 2023, Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia have steadily worsened. In Baku, the need to rely on Moscow’s goodwill has greatly diminished, giving the country greater confidence in its foreign policy. As a result, Azerbaijan has expanded ties with Israel and Pakistan, improved relations with Iran, strengthened strategic cooperation with Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and, most notably, established a strategic partnership agreement with China.

To balance Russia, Azerbaijan needs not only Turkey, its traditional ally, and stable relations with Iran, but also strong ties with the U.S. Although Washington has at times encouraged dialogue with Moscow over the war in Ukraine, it has also demonstrated its ability to pursue an independent agenda in the South Caucasus, often at odds with Russia’s core interests. The TRIPP agreement is one example of this approach. It angered Moscow because the deal reduced Russian influence and encouraged both Azerbaijan and Armenia to follow Washington’s lead. For Baku, therefore, greater U.S. involvement in the region translates into reduced dependence on Moscow.

CONCLUSIONS: The current level of tension with Russia has eased, following a familiar pattern in Azerbaijan’s dealings with Moscow and other neighboring states. It also shows that Russia cannot afford to abandon Azerbaijan or enter a cycle of escalation with Baku. Moscow is unable to handle another major crisis along its borders and remains dependent on Azerbaijan for transit within the INSTC project. Looking ahead, a continued period of stable but cautious bilateral relations is likely, without major escalation, yet unlikely to develop into deeper cooperation. The relationship will remain based on pragmatic, transactional engagement, while over time the geopolitical gap between the two countries can be expected to grow increasingly evident.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Vali Kaleji 

On August 27, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the unprecedented statement that he recognizes the mass killings of Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks in the early 20th century Ottoman Empire as genocide. Armenia dismissed the gesture as insincere and opportunistic, given Israel’s military cooperation with Azerbaijan and Yerevan’s ongoing normalization talks with Ankara. Netanyahu’s recognition and its aftermath signify the contradictions of the new regional order emerging between the South Caucasus and the Levant.

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BACKGROUND: To maintain ties with Türkiye, Israel had long avoided officially recognizing the mass killings of Christians in the early 20th century Ottoman empire as genocide. When asked by Patrick Bet-David on his podcast why Israel does not recognize the Armenian genocide, Netanyahu said, “I think we have. I think the Knesset passed a resolution to that effect.” However, Israel’s parliament has not passed any such legislation into law. When asked why no Israeli prime minister has recognized the genocide, Netanyahu responded, “I just did. Here you go.”

Türkiye condemned and rejected Netanyahu’s statements. On August 29, it announced the complete suspension of all commercial and economic relations with Israel and the closure of its airspace to Israeli aircraft. This decision may be interpreted as a reaction to Israel’s renewed ground operations in Gaza as well as Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide. Türkiye’s responses to previous recognitions have consisted of diplomatic tensions, temporary cooling of bilateral relations, the summoning or recall of ambassadors, and critical rhetoric. To date, Türkiye has not severed relations with any of the 33 states recognizing the Armenian genocide.

Internationally, positions taken on the early 20th-century mass killings of Christians can be broadly divided into three categories. The first includes Türkiye and its close ally Azerbaijan, which deny that the events constituted genocide, characterizing them instead as unsystematic outcomes of the turmoil marking the final years of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The second category comprises Asian, Middle Eastern, and African states that neither deny the events nor officially recognize them as genocide. Seeking to preserve relations with Türkiye, these countries employ terms such as “massacre,” “mass murder,” “catastrophe,” “human tragedy,” and “inhumane actions.” 

The third category comprises the governments and parliaments of 33 states that have formally recognized the Armenian genocide. Following Netanyahu’s recent statement, Israel may now be considered the 34th country to join this group. 

IMPLICATIONS: Although no state has ever officially revoked its recognition of the Armenian genocide, the durability of Netanyahu’s stance as an element of Israel’s official policy toward Türkiye remains uncertain. The Knesset has not enacted any legislation formalizing such recognition. It is conceivable that a conclusion of the Gaza war, Netanyahu’s departure from office, changes in the political composition of the Israeli government and Knesset, or a normalization of Israeli–Turkish relations could prompt a reassessment of this position. In that case, Israel’s recognition may remain confined to Netanyahu’s statement amid bilateral tensions with Türkiye, rather than evolving into a permanent state policy.

Syria provides a clear example of how political instability and relations with Türkiye have influenced decisions to recognize the Armenian genocide. For decades, Syria refrained from official recognition, despite its strong ties with the Armenian diaspora and Armenia itself, in order to preserve relations with Türkiye. However, at the height of the Syrian civil war, Syria became the second Arab state, after Lebanon, to recognize the massacres of Armenians as genocide on February 13, 2020. After the fall of the Assad regime, this stance appears to have shifted significantly. The de facto government led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani now maintains close relations with Türkiye. Although it has not yet officially rescinded the earlier recognition, revisions to Syrian school history books, specifically the removal of references to Ottoman-era massacres and Syrian resistance to Ottoman rule, suggest an emerging reorientation in Syria’s approach under the new leadership.

Conversely, the Armenian government’s response to Netanyahu’s statement diverged from its usual reaction to other states’ recognition of the Armenian genocide. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan rejected the Israeli leader’s remarks, emphasizing that Armenia must decide whether it wishes such recognition to become “a geopolitical bargaining chip in the hands of those who have no connection to our reality or the interests of our people.” 

There are four key aspects to the Armenian government’s position. First, Yerevan perceives Netanyahu’s statement as lacking sincerity and genuine historical or moral solidarity with the victims of the genocide, particularly at a time when Israel faces intense international criticism over human rights violations over its war in Gaza. Second, Yerevan attributes this declaration primarily to Israel’s escalating dispute with Türkiye, which has deepened following Israel’s decision to impose a total blockade and occupation of Gaza. Consequently, from Yerevan’s perspective, Netanyahu’s remarks function primarily as an instrument of political pressure on Türkiye. 

Third, Israel maintains a close partnership with Azerbaijan, and Israeli military assistance played a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s victory during the Second Karabakh War in October–November 2020. This conflict resulted in Azerbaijan’s full capture of Nagorno-Karabakh and the mass displacement of Armenians to Armenia. The legacy of Armenia’s political and military defeats, facilitated in part by Israeli support, renders it difficult for the Armenian government to accept or welcome Netanyahu’s recognition. 

Fourth, Pashinyan’s government has actively pursued the normalization of relations with Türkiye in recent years. Following the recent agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump, the likelihood of restoring diplomatic relations and reopening the borders between Armenia and Türkiye has significantly increased.

From the perspective of many Armenians, particularly those within the Armenian diaspora who regard themselves as descendants of the survivors of the genocide, Pashinyan’s government is transgressing the “red lines” of Armenian historical claims by seeking normalization with Türkiye without meeting four key preconditions. These include: official recognition of the genocide by the Turkish government; a formal apology from Türkiye, as the Ottoman Empire’s successor state; compensation for the approximately 1.5 million victims; and the restitution of Armenian homes, lands, and churches, especially in eastern Türkiye. Türkiye has consistently rejected these conditions for the past century. 

CONCLUSIONS: Ultimately, Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide represents the latest manifestation of the contradictions shaping the emerging regional order spanning the South Caucasus and the Levant. This new configuration has arisen in the aftermath of the events of October 7 and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, developments that have diminished the influence of Iran, Russia, and while positioning Arab and Western states, along with Türkiye and, as key actors in post-Assad Syria. Armenia lost an international partner in the al-Assad regime, whereas Azerbaijan has sought to build a productive relationship with its successor. 

Baku has sought to establish a new coalition with Türkiye, Israel, and Syria, attempting to mediate between Ankara and Tel Aviv, as well as between Damascus and Tel Aviv. However, issues such as the Golan Heights, Israel’s support for Syria’s Druze minority, and its military interventions have rendered rapprochement between Israel and Syria particularly difficult. Furthermore, Netanyahu’s recognition of the Armenian genocide and Türkiye’s subsequent decision to sever all trade and air connections with Israel have severely undermined mediation efforts between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, the divergent political aspirations of Syria’s Kurdish population, perceived as a shared challenge by both Türkiye and Syria’s new leadership, constitute another critical element in the intricate geopolitical landscape of the Levant in the post–October 7 and post-Assad era.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at    This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

The Caspian Sea is increasingly emerging as a focal point of geopolitical competition. The joint military exercises conducted by Russia and Iran in July, following similar drills by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the northern Caspian a month earlier, underscore the region’s rapid transformation into a nexus of strategic rivalries and evolving security alignments. Among the littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are assuming particularly prominent roles in shaping the strategic landscape. Their efforts are supported by Turkey, which is facilitating the naval expansion of these three Turkic nations. Russia’s ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine has significantly weakened Moscow’s capacity to assert dominance over the Caspian Sea and to effectively utilize it as part of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Russia to Iran and India.


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BACKGROUND: The Caspian Sea was widely regarded as a “Russian lake” during the Soviet era, as Iran, possessing only a short Caspian coastline, showed little interest in utilizing it for power projection. For decades, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla maintained dominance over the waters of the inland sea. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Moscow sought to preserve the existing balance of power in the Caspian. In 2018, Russia secured an agreement among the five Caspian littoral states on territorial delimitation, excluding the military presence of non-littoral actors in the sea.

The region experienced a significant geopolitical shift in 2020 after Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war against Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey provided military assistance to Azerbaijan during the conflict. Following the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, the Caspian littoral states expanded their navies. Turkey continues to support Azerbaijan’s requirements for modern weapons, equipment, and ammunition. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister, Zakir Hasanov, affirmed that Ankara was Baku’s principal partner in military cooperation.

Over the past five years, Turkey has facilitated the naval expansion of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. These countries, along with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are members of the Turkey-backed “Pan-Turkic Union.” Through this framework, Turkey has assumed a leading role in diminishing Russia’s influence over the military development of these states.

In 2023, Turkey’s Asfar and YDA Group, together with Kazakhstan’s Uralsk Plant “Zenit” JSC, concluded an agreement for the construction of offshore platforms in the Caspian Sea. The agreement included the production of various naval vessels, including main surface combat ships, to fulfill the operational requirements of the Kazakh Navy. Likewise, the deepening relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan signify a broader shift in energy geopolitics and highlight their shared strategic interests. The Bayraktar TB2, Turkey’s first domestically produced unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), is deployed within Turkmenistan’s armed forces. In February, the two countries signed a gas supply agreement that offers Turkmenistan a new export channel while consolidating Turkey’s position as a regional energy hub.

In 2024, the joint military exercises Birleistik (Unity) 2024 were conducted at Kazakhstan’s Oymasha training ground and Cape Tokmak along the Caspian coast, marking the first such drills held without Russian participation. The armed forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly participated in the exercise.

In April, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan announced plans to conduct the joint military exercises Caspian Breeze – 2025 in the northern part of the Caspian Sea near Russia’s coastline. The exercises commenced in June at Aktau, Kazakhstan, with the objective of strengthening the protection of maritime economic infrastructure, naval bases, and shipping routes. A month later, Russia and Iran initiated their own joint naval exercises, CASAREX 2025, under the banner “Together for a Safe and Secure Caspian Sea.” These drills were designed to enhance maritime security and promote deeper naval cooperation between the two states.

The two joint military exercises within the span of a single month demonstrate a changing regional balance of power. The Caspian littoral states have expanded their naval capabilities in recent years, thereby challenging Russia’s long-standing hegemony in the Caspian region.

IMPLICATIONS: The navies of the three Turkic littoral states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, have experienced substantial growth and deepened cooperation in recent years. Through a series of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and supported by Turkey, these states have enhanced their strategic position vis-à-vis Russia. These developments have not only strengthened the collective influence and military capacity of the Turkic states but have also posed a significant challenge to Russia’s longstanding naval dominance in the Caspian.

Security cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states in the absence of Russian participation signifies a major geopolitical realignment in the Caspian region. For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have agreed to employ their joint naval forces to protect pipelines on the seabed and vessels operating on the surface. The regional geopolitical competition is likely to intensify following Iran’s decision to resume drilling operations in the Caspian after a 30-year hiatus. This development could generate tensions with the three Turkic littoral states, which are already deeply engaged in offshore oil and gas extraction within the Caspian Sea.

Turkey plays a pivotal role in the ongoing militarization of the Caspian Sea. It initially strengthened Azerbaijan’s defense capabilities, subsequently supported Turkmenistan, and is now actively engaged in enhancing Kazakhstan’s naval power. According to Yuri Lyamin, an analyst at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), “Kazakhstan is following the ongoing, multi-year process of strengthening the navies of Caspian states. The reasons and necessity of this can be debated, but it is a long-standing trend driven by prestige and the desire to keep up with its neighbors. Over the past decade and a half, Turkmenistan has built a very strong navy in the Caspian, including with Turkey’s assistance. It was to a Turkish design that Turkmenistan’s largest ship, and one of the largest warships in the Caspian, the corvette Deniz Khan, was commissioned and constructed in 2021. A considerable number of missile, missile-artillery, and other boats for the Turkmen border guards were also built based on Turkish designs.” The growing number of actors in the region is complicating Moscow’s ability to utilize the area for strategic connectivity projects. One of these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a Russia-led project designed to connect Russian ports with Iran, the Gulf region, and the Indian Ocean. The INSTC agreement was initially signed in 2000 by Russia, Iran, and India, was later joined by Azerbaijan and several Central Asian states. Meanwhile, Iran is actively seeking alternative trade routes to the EU, including via Armenia.

Conversely, Azerbaijan’s Port of Baku serves as a critical hub within the east–west Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, which links China to the EU via Central Asia and the South Caucasus, thereby bypassing Russia. The Middle Corridor endows Baku’s with an important role for both Europe and Central Asia by providing a viable alternative to Russian transit routes, facilitating efficient east–west connectivity across the Caspian and through the South Caucasus.

Similarly, Turkey promotes the integration of Turkmenistan in the Middle Corridor, which would advance Turkey’s long-standing ambition to position itself as a strategic logistical bridge linking Asia and Europe.

The 2018 agreement grants the Caspian states the right to construct gas pipelines across the seabed. Ankara aims to channel Caspian gas to its territory via Azerbaijan, and onward to the EU, elevating Turkey’s role as a pivotal energy hub. However, this directly contradicts Russian interests and the potential exists for heightened tensions or even confrontation between the Turkey-backed Turkic states and the Russia-Iran alliance over control of the Caspian Sea’s energy resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The geopolitical competition between the three Turkey-backed Turkic littoral states and the Russia–Iran alliance could intensify as both sides continue to expand their economic and military presence in the Caspian region. The increase in military exercises conducted over the past two years underscores the emergence of new security alignments within the Caspian basin.

Turkey has taken on a leading role in advancing the naval capabilities of the three Turkic littoral states, a position that was traditionally held by Russia. As Turkey’s involvement in the region deepens, Moscow’s ability to shape the military development of these countries will likely be further marginalized. Russia, meanwhile, continues to bear significant geopolitical costs for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the onset of the conflict, Moscow’s influence across Central Asia and other regions, including the Caspian, has steadily declined and other powers such as China and Turkey have begun to fill the resulting vacuum.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a Karachi-based analyst at the Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books. He has contributed articles and analysis to a range of publications. He is a regular contributor to Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation  Email, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Svante E. Cornell

May 22, 2024

Turkey and Uzbekistan are the two largest countries in the Turkic world. As a result, the rela- tionship between them is a determining factor for the prospects of Turkic cooperation. For most of three decades, the difficulties in the bilateral relationship was a key impediment to Turkey’s influence in Central Asia. Since 2016, however, the arrival of a new leadership in Uzbekistan coincided with Turkey’s turn in a nationalist direction to provide a major boost toward a more fruitful and cooperative relationship. While Turkey’s relations with Uzbekistan have much ground to make up compared to its ties with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the two states have made it priority to do just that.

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Halil Karaveli

April 11, 2024

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) represents an institutionalized restoration of a pre-Soviet pattern of Turkic cooperation. A common linguistic, as well as the more dubitative no-tion of a cultural heritage that is supposed to unite the lands between Istanbul and Samar-kand contribute to furthering a sense of belonging among the member states of the OTS. Yet Turkic unity is valued and promoted only as far as it aligns with the economic-political state interests of the individual members of the OTS, and is discarded when it contravenes those in-terests. The deepening of Turkic cooperation answers to the material interests of the partici-pating states. The Turkic states’ reluctance to recognize and include the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus underlines the ultimately non-ethnic character of their cooperation, and is also indicative of Turkey’s limited ability to exercise an uncontested leadership role among the group of Turkic states.

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